

POPULISM IN FOREIGN POLICY DECISION-MAKING PROCESS¹

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ABSTRACT

This article examines populism as a factor influencing decision-making processes in foreign policy. The decision-making process in foreign policy is undoubtedly influenced by many factors. Among these, the structure of the leader is the most striking factor. Leader plays a role in foreign policy making according to the structure of the countries. While the leader is an ineffective actor in foreign policy making in some countries, s/he is in the process in some countries. The point where populism and foreign policy come together arises in countries where the leader acts as a decision-maker. Although populism remains like an element of domestic politics, it is obvious that today foreign policy is affected by domestic politics and vice versa. In countries where populist discourses are frequently on the agenda, leaders seem to be the most effective actors in all decision-making processes. The process is shaped according to how the policy maker wants to act in the decision-making process. Therefore, it is seen that populism is an important ideology in the decision-making process in foreign policy, as populist leaders also take populist steps in their foreign policies. This article examines by using literature review how foreign policy and domestic policy affect each other and get affected by each other, taking populism as an ideology as its basis.

Keywords: Populism, Foreign policy, Decision-Making Process, Policy Maker, Leader

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DIŞ POLİTİKA KARAR VERME SÜRECİNDE POPÜLİZM

ÖZET

Bu makale, popülizmi dış politikada karar alma süreçlerini etkileyen bir faktör olarak incelemektedir. Dış politikada karar alma süreci şüphesiz pek çok faktörden etkilenmektedir. Bunların arasında liderin yapısı en çarpıcı faktördür. Lider, ülkelerin yapısına göre dış politika yapımında rol oynar. Lider, bazı ülkelerde dış politika yapımında etkisiz bir aktör iken, bazı ülkelerde süreç içerisinde yer almaktadır. Liderin karar verici olarak hareket ettiği ülkelerde popülizm ile dış politikanın bir araya geldiği nokta ortaya çıkar. Popülizm iç siyasetin bir unsuru olmaya devam etse de, günümüzde dış politikanın iç siyasetten etkilendiği ve bunun tersinin de geçerli olduğu açıktır. Popülist söylemlerin sıklıkla gündemde olduğu ülkelerde, liderler tüm karar alma süreçlerinde en etkili aktörler olarak görünmektedir. Süreç, karar verme sürecinde politika yapıcının nasıl hareket etmek istediğine göre şekillenir. Dolayısıyla popülist liderlerin de dış politikalarında popülist adımlar atması nedeniyle popülizmin dış politikada karar alma sürecinde önemli bir ideoloji olduğu görülmektedir. Bu makale, popülizmi bir ideoloji olarak esas alarak, dış politika ve iç politikanın birbirini nasıl etkilediğini ve birbirlerinden nasıl etkilendiğini literatür taraması yaparak incelemektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Popülizm, Dış politika, Karar Verme Süreci, Politika Yapıcı, Lider

INTRODUCTION

This study is expected to contribute both Turkish literature and English written thesis literature. The importance of this work is it has correlated populism as an ideology in foreign policy processes. Before starting to write this topic, it was realized that in the above-mentioned literature the topic has not examined yet. Studying foreign policy alone cannot satisfy the lack in the literature anymore. Moving from this point, foreign policy is affected by domestic developments. Even though, at first, populism seemed like domestic ideology, we see that it is also international issues' ideology. Thus, by making foreign policy analysis using populism as an ideology is needed and in this study this necessity has fulfilled. When we look at the foreign policy analysis, the main actors are decision makers, meaning that if the decision maker defines him/herself as populist, they will make populist decisions and/or every foreign policy step of them will be named as populist. Besides, decision makers seek for followers' constant support, from this point, they will try to make politics in their foreign affairs to ensure this. There is a valid correlation between populism and decision-making processes. Decision making is affected by many factors, yet the most important factor is the decision maker. Decision makers are varied according to countries' dynamics.

To examine this topic literature review has been used for description of populism and then foreign policy analysis. Populism has mentioned quite concise to make a prelude then in order not to distract the point of the issue, only foreign policy analysis (FPA) has been examined under the title of foreign policy decision-making, since FPA is the most important issue in decision-making process. Lastly the populism's effect on foreign policy decision-making process has been studied quite widely.

1. WHAT IS POPULISM?

Populism is one of the main political fashion words of the 21st century. The term is used to define left-wing presidents in Latin America, right-wing parties in Europe, and both left-wing and right-wing presidential candidates in the USA (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2017, p. 1). Populism was a peasant movement in the 1890s (Müller, 2016, p. 105). It is based on the US farmers' movement that resisted capital sovereignty at the end of the century; it initiated the struggle against low credit policies, agricultural cooperatives and demands for participatory democracy and pioneered the establishment of the Populist Party of 1892. In political science, it describes the Russian Narodniki as a populist movement, advocating agricultural socialism that fought against tsarism and industrial capitalism in the second half of the 19th century. On the other hand, the idea of seeing populism as a "progressive" or "grassroots" movement is mostly based on America (north, central and south). Another provision on populism is valid in Europe based on historical conditions. There populism is associated with irresponsible political propositions and political evils by liberal commentators (demagogism and populism are mostly interchangeable terms) (Ibid, p. 26). While it is seen as populist movements close to fascism in Central and Eastern Europe; in the 1930s, representatives of the poor in Latin America were gaining strength (Ibid).

However, although this term has great tempting to many journalists and readers, its wide use also creates uncertainty and disappointment. While a significant theme is not beyond debate, the debate about populism is not only about what it is but also about its existence. It is controversial concept (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2017, p. 2). To be clearer, for instance, populism in different regions of the world inclines to equate and sometimes be limited by a quite different phenomenon. For example, in the European context, populism frequently points to anti-immigration and xenophobia, while in Latin America it often points to nepotism and economic maladministration (Ibid).

The long-standing discussion on the core of populism has led some scientists to discuss that populism cannot be a relevant concept in social sciences, while others see it as a normative term that should primarily be limited to media and politics. While disappointment is understandable, the term populism is too central to eliminate political arguments from Europe to America. Furthermore, it is possible to make a description that can truly seize the essence of all the important past and present manifestations of populism, but it is still sensitive enough to externalize obviously non-populist phenomena (Ibid).

More tangibly, Mudde and Kaltwasser also describe populism as a thin-centered ideology that thinks that society is ultimately divided into two homogeneous and hostile camps, "pure people" and "corrupt elites" and that politics should be a statement of *volonté Générale* (general will of the people) (Ibid). To be more descriptive about thin-centered, populism necessarily uses notions from other ideologies that are not only more complicated and steadier but also facilitate the creation of "subtypes" of populism. In other words, even though populism is appropriate at particular moments, a series of notions that are tightly aligned with the morphology of populist ideology are significant in the long run, at least for the resilience of populist actors. The thin-centered feature of populism makes it docile enough to seize different forms at separate times and places (Ibid).

2. FOREIGN POLICY DECISION-MAKING (FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS)

Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA), which emerges as an approach that examines the behavior and relations of different actors, primarily states in the international system, focuses on the decision-making process. Foreign policy analysis is conceptualized as a subfield rooted in the field of international relations; however, it is often regarded as distinct from the wider area, creating a gap between the two that is not specifically bridged with a common set of theoretical theories, techniques, or metrics. Foreign policy is the whole of the decisions, behaviors, and objectives that states produce regarding the external environment and is defined as "a strategy or method of planned actions developed by the decision-makers of a state towards other states or other international units" (Ak, 2009, p. 10).

International Relations (IR) has a base as well as a branch of study. All that appears among nations and through nations is based in human decisionmakers behaving singular or in groups. In a way, the base of IR is thence the same base of the whole social sciences. Comprehension how human sense and response to the world around them, and how humans form and are formed by the world around them, is inner to the examination of social scientists, even those in IR (Hudson, 2014, p. 3). To understand foreign policy on the one hand there is an importance to comprehend within the complexity of the issues, the processes that can be built upon comprehension the units that are included in these issues. Unlike the "macro" approaches that analyze international relations only through the international system, FPA is a "micro" approach to explaining international relations by focusing on the decision-making process of states and various aspects of the state's relationship with the international system.

FPA puts decision-makers at the center of the events taking place in international relations and stands out with its actor-oriented approach (Gürel, 2018, p. 1-17). According to Hudson, today FPA has six important features. Two of them are evaluating FPA's foreign policy decision making process as "multifactorial" and addressing variables into more than one analysis level at the same time which means as "multilevel".

As long as they affect decision making process, explanatory variables which can be achieved from all analysis levels, are among the materials of FPA researchers. states are not regarded as agents because they are abstract concepts. The only agents that change and change the source of international politics are people.

It is tough for political leaders in the twenty-first century to guide the state ship without both an internal compass to identify the direction of the state and a map to mark the positions of others and related environmental geopolitical characteristics. Foreign policy errors and fiascos can appear when states skirmish as leaders decide how to navigate world politics treacherous waters. The main argument of the Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) is that all relations between states are shaped according to the decisions of decision-makers acting alone or in groups.

The decision-maker [single or group], which is equipped with political decision-making authority within the borders of the country's sovereignty, is the main actor in determining the foreign policy decisions of the state it represents in the international system. In this respect, foreign policy is seen as an executive function depending on the legal-political legitimacy of the state. Properly selected political decision-makers or decision-makers make decisions that will produce results outside the borders of the country by means of policies and / or methods that are predetermined and / or to be determined on issues concerning the basic values, priorities and interests and security of the state. During the implementation of these decisions, they are vulnerable to the reactions of other similar actors outside the borders of the country. Therefore, decisions made by decision-makers contain their own high risks and possibilities and uncertainties (Aksu, 2017, p. 26).

Current approaches to the analysis of foreign policy differ mainly between focusing on state-as-actors, whose decision-making is driven by restrictions and incentives linked to their participation in the international system, and individual-as-actors who make decisions under the control of a wide range of external constraints and incentives within and between governments and even within individuals. The conclusion is that dyads are "where is action" in world politics, regardless of whether the solution to the field of international relations is from the level of "outside-in," state-systemic research, or from the level of analysis of "inside-out," individual-decision-maker (Walker et al., 2011).

3. POPULISM'S EFFECT ON FOREIGN POLICY DECISION-MAKING PROCESS

Foreign policy is popular but quite discussed notion. Generally, it addresses to the intents and moves of a player canalized the player's external world. In most situations, the player is accepted to be sovereign country (Neack, 2008), yet this outlook increases all sort of problems (Ibid). Foreign policy as an attribute of a spokesperson of a sovereign country since global diplomacy is still directed mainly by sovereign countries and since populist parties demonstrate themselves within sovereign countries (Ibid, p. 3).

The study of populism and foreign policy is an arising area. It will demand more empirical examination on the impact of international politics on the assets of populist as well as the foreign policies these parties maintain. Oxford handbook demonstrates to depict four diverse likely sorts of populist foreign policy. If populist's achievements and setback would like to be understood in maintaining particular foreign policies, internal political system's influence needed to be incorporated (Kaarbo, 2012), as well as the dynamics of coalition politics (Zaslave & Verbeek, 2012) and likely curricula arranging. Enforcing this study agenda may get comparative politics and international relations closer together (Ibid, 22).

The concept of foreign recommends that a difference can be made between the internal and international fields (Kaarbo et al., 2013); conventionally, foreign policy was regarded to the tangible safety of the country and its people, restricting the major foreign policy realm to defense and presuming that the state's other foreign attitude (e.g. trade, cultural affairs, etc.) were connected to conventional safety worries. Even though this instructing has all the time discussed, it has come under crucial assault because of the end of the Cold War, the arrival of globalization, and the growth of regional organizations. The end of Cold War has made conventional safety less evident and has made place for the thing is now named humanitarian intervention; globalization efficaciously has changed trade, finance, migration and the environment into on a large scale evident foreign policy topics that are matter to oppressions from diversified influenced internal actors; regionalization, specifically with the EU, has raised series of actors interfered in foreign policy and has compulsory member countries to harmonize (and modify) their foreign policy with other member countries (Ibid).

In the modern world, foreign policy, even though still primarily the move of a sovereign country, surrounds various separate policy fields and that it is the outcome of various actors (internal as well as external) that sense influenced by issues in the outside world. Therefore, populist parties can be hoped to improve an interest in various separate policy fields that recently could be counted as the object of a country's foreign policy. Additionally, in regional cooperation like the EU, populist parties might (in)directly influence the EU's foreign policy via their membership in the European Parliament or via their member country's governments (Ibid).

The relation between populism and foreign policy is active: the altering character of foreign policy, specifically after the Cold War, has made new chances for the growth of populist parties. Finally, populist parties have had to improve their own foreign policies. The differentiating character of populist parties is the moral people/elite difference. Assigning a coherent populist foreign policy through the whole populist parties is hard, yet, given that it is the adding ideology that frequently assign the particular foreign policy location of the parties. Oxford handbook separated between four such populist variations: populist radical right; populist market liberal; populist regionalist; and populist left-wing. Still, they all evaluate foreign policy in terms of its influences on the elite-people adjacency. Eventually, this is how they are populist party. In some situations, this is demonstrated in the isolationist policy of the populist radical right, which hosts a limited concept of the people; in other situations, it can bear the solidaristic internationalist cover of the populist left parties, which look for to project a more encircling concept of a people. Shortly, international politics is important for populism, yet the way it acts out varies among countries and ideologies.

Even though the whole states confronted the triple obstacle of the end of the Cold War, the appearance of globalization, and the arise of regional organizations, populist parties have replied in various ways. Oxford handbook pursues that this change is primarily entailed by the thin-centered ideology of populism: it requires to look for ideological companion, the decision of which leads their status about international obstacle and therefore their foreign policy statuses (Zaslove & Verbeek, 2017, p. 21).

Study on populism has the tendency to focalize on populists' influence on their country's internal politics, specifically because scholars incline to underline the anti-elitist motive of both populist politicians and their followers. This is surprising, like in recent globalized world, politics is less and less a solely internal field. Actually, difference between the internal and the external has become less obvious: internal issues spill over into the international context, while international issues influence internal relations (Ibid, 1).

As populists have shaped governments all around the world, it is obligatory to examine the results of the increase of populism for International Relations. However, methodological academic studies of the international influence of populist government constitution are still absent, and political interpreters incline to take consequences from few situations of right-wing populism in the Global North. Yet populism – conceived as a 'thin' ideology depend on anti-elitism and anti-pluralism – takes various kinds through world regions as populists associate it with diverse 'thick' ideologies. Populists in office are not, per se, more combatant of less eager to connect globally than their non-populist ancestors. Elements like position seeking or a state's accommodation in international institutions reduce the influence of populism. Its most prompt impact interests procedural sides: foreign policymaking turns out more centralized and personalized – but not completely unforeseeable, given the significance of 'thick' ideologies assimilated by populist parties and leaders. More than transforming course completely, populists in office solidify present trends, particularly an inclination toward differentiating international associations (Plagemann & Destradi, 2019, p. 1-20).

Because of constitutional situations and to the influence of separate 'thick' ideologies, populists in ruling do not spontaneously act like worse international citizens as contrast to their non-populist predecessors. Furthermore, populists in government incline to intensify present trends in global politics instead of changing course completely. While foreign policymaking turns out more centralized and personalized under populist leaders, strong 'thick' ideologies decrease their capriciousness and whimsy (Ibid, p. 2-3).

The up-to-date discussion on populism has been essentially formed by methods that take a notional outlook and contemplate populism a 'thin-centered ideology (Mudde, 2004, p. 544). Such methods focalize on what forms the outlook and ideological basic of populism. In other saying, they refer the very core of populism, anyhow of the economic policies concluded from it, the feature of its mobilization tactics, or the manner chosen by its leaders. Thus, a conceptional method has the benefit of pointing out the commonalities of distinct sorts of populist leaders and movements among through political spectrum. This is significant because populist 'thin' ideology typically coexists with 'thicker' ideological factors like nationalism, socialism, or religious fundamentalism (Ibid; Mudde, 2016).

The internal factors and inclusions of populism have been examined broadly, analyze on populism and foreign policy – and even more on populism and IR – is still in its beginning. Some works are that pay attention on populist parties in coalition governments. Furthermore, some works refer the relation between populism and foreign policy in a more methodical behavior, yet with an obvious Western prejudice; a limited focal point on populist radical right parties (exterior government) in Europe; or a point on the personalities of ‘mad’ populist leaders (as cited in Plagemann, Verbeek and Zaslove, 2017).

The evidence from these current works thus recommend that there is a necessity a detailed comprehension of populism and global politics that takes into account both innuendos of populism for foreign policy making internally (which is, procedural perspectives) and a state’s locating inside international relations more extensively. Preparedness of populists to heighten international skirmishes; eagerness of populists to conduce to global public goods verdict and to associate in international institutions; and centralization and personalization of populists of foreign policy making (Plagemann & Destradi, 2019).

A characteristic attribute of populists in office is the constant mobilization of their assist ground. Like they effectively turn the much-underestimated ‘elite’ themselves when in government, populists require to ‘sustain an anti-elitist position’ in a new path. They may do this by depicting themselves as preys (of the media, judiciary, or other internal institutions), or via accusing ‘elites behaving back of the scenes, if at home or abroad’ for any of their setbacks. Furthermore, the assertion to be the real spokesperson of the people is in steady necessity for performative confirmation. Thence, just as Jan Werner Müller states it, populists are on the struggle track for good and they ‘maintain to polarize’ (Müller, 2016). A politicization of chosen global matters for internal mobilization (rally around the flag) can whence be hoped to be specifically intensive under populist rules (Ibid).

One of the populism’s basic characteristic is the allegation by individual populist politicians to be the only genuine spokespersons of the ‘people’ and to concrete the ‘general will’. Foreign policy and diplomacy especially, is the area of an extremely elitist and special group, contained of appointed foreign affairs bureaucrats, (frequently second level) politicians and academic think tankers. For populists, the global outlook announced by such elites resumes the space between the people and their government. Not only most foreign policy topics are ahead the interest of casual citizens, but complicated diplomatic protocol and manners, with their origins in 15th century European customs, more annex to the influence of an impartiality of foreign relations from the ‘real’ people (Plagemann & Destradi, 2019).

The centralization and personalization of foreign policy belongs to the head of the states or governments is not matchless to populist governments but effectuates a wider stream (Cooper, 2013, p. 36). However, the sort of centralization improved by populist leaders in government varies from centralization somewhere else. Centralization under populist leaders is not only more prominent but also more individual. The anti-pluralist aspect of populism cause that just the populist leader can talk by the name of ‘real’ people. Consequently, the populist leader will be more individually involve in foreign policy making on the contrary to non-populist predecessors. Again, populist type governments, the bureaucracy might continue, but its marginalization is expected.

Populist leaders can be anticipated to work with narrow group of consultants, most probably not appointed from conventional foreign policy elites. Therewithal, populist leaders might be caused to believe more in their individual affairs with other world leaders, instead in other solemnized ways of mutual communication, from ambassadors to line ministries' links (Plagemann & Destradi, 2019).

Moreover, characteristic features of populist leaders do not look like in a coherent attitude. This is in spite a joint opinion in policy groups that leader-level structure has been exceptional for structural mutual relations. The most core alterations in populist foreign policies were more specular of thick ideologies also wider streams, and not much of characteristic features of leaders. The centrality of only populist leaders and their dissimilar characteristics should not be overrated while studying the influence of populism on global politics (Ibid, p.18).

In addition to these, Oxford handbook of populism handles populism as a thin-centered ideology; this method lets us to define obviously the center feature of populism as it also allows us to theorize the substantive policy locations that populist parties might get vis-à-vis foreign policy topics. The meaning of that, even though the whole populist parties are going to pick their statuses in terms of the pure people versus the corrupt elite, they might contradict about their foreign policy statuses, based on the thin-centered ideology to which they have added themselves (Zaslove and Verbeek, 2017).

In the progress of binding populism with foreign policy, it is appealing to compensate populist foreign policy with nationalist foreign policy. This needs us to debate the theme of nationalism as it concerns to populism. Two significant problems frequently overcast the relation between populism and nationalism: first, both notions are thin-centered ideologies (Freedon, 1998; Mudde, 2004). That is why, they cannot remain just, and they must each add themselves to another ideologies. Second, and in part tied to the first mark, populism, and nationalism frequently (but do not must) exist together. So, for instance, the describing features of the populist radical right (PRR) are both populism and unique type of nationalism, i.e., nativism, or what De Cleen addresses to as “an exclusionary ethnic-cultural nationalism”.

The achievement and the setback of a populist party may be adjusted by the capability of the populist party to tempt to the national culture of a nation. Essentially, hence, even if populism and nationalism frequently exist in an only movement, the core distinction between populism and nationalism is the difference between the people and the elite, which is natural to populism but necessary not be display in nationalism. It is likely to comprehend of an elitist nationalism, as an elitist populism is an oxymoron. To be certain, it could be discussed that populist leaders may arise from the political elite or the political founding or that they might fascinate voters with the elitist behaviors (Akeerman et al., 2014), yet for the party to be thought populist it must utilize a people-oriented anti-elite speech (Ibid).

Oxford handbook of populism dictionary suggests that while discussing the relation between populism and foreign policy, equating the two shall be avoided. Which elements of foreign policy are clear to populists should be especially argued. Identifying their foreign policy behaviors as nationalist would be too one-dimensional and overlook the significance of keeping the pure people as the point of take-off for any policy, with the inclusion of foreign policy (Zaslove & Verbeek, 2017).

It has been discussed that internal politics and international relations are frequently connected. In IR, this has directed to the subbranch of comparative foreign policy analysis, which looks for to consider for international results by analyzing internal level (“second image”) definitions (Hudson, 2014). Likewise, IR researchers have dealt with the query of how procedures at the level of the international system may influence internal politics (“second image reversed”) (Ibid, p. 6).

Focalizing on the connection between international and internal politics lets us to analyze initiatives by foreign players to impact the internal politics of states where populism evolves. Actually, there is number of proof that foreign players look for affecting internal improvements in states in which populism is powerful, particularly when these parties join in government coalitions. This might direct to a lack of faith or even embarrassing and ridiculing attitude, e.g., when the Orbán government in Hungary were sensed to menaced political constancy.

Populist parties face a more complicated defiance than conventional parties since these international improvements push them to describe more obviously who forms the pure people. In doing so, the added ideology turns significant in adjusting the foreign policy of the populist party in question. Based on their particular thin-centered ideology, populist parties might be anticipated to take a more obvious or protectionist perspective on trade and finance. Nevertheless, an akin topic rises when looking at the cultural dimension: some populist parties such as populist radical right parties, tighten the pure people to a cultural unity restrained within a nation state. Other populist parties have a concept of the people that is not enforcedly limited to a territorial unity, i.e., the nation state: left-wing populists adjust with the utilization. So, as Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser noted, left-wing populism inclines to be inclusive while right-wing populism inclines to be exclusive (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2012).

Oxford handbook expresses that populist parties’ taking same foreign policy positions are not expected. On the contrary, their differentiate in their foreign policy choices are expected because they are going to diverge in their evaluation of the influence that the international surrounding is going to have on their own comprehension of who the pure people are (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017).

The radical right takes a nativist understanding to the pure people – for instance, during a quite long time Jobbik in Hungary, even though they are counted as much closer to the center now. It may be attractive to discuss that all populists are anti-cosmopolitan. Yet, this is not the case. As a matter of fact, it would be wrong to basically equalize populism with nationalism, isolationism, and protectionism. Since the theme of the pure people might or might not address to a group inhabiting inside the borders of a sovereign country, populists might or might not be internationalist in orientation. Left-wing populists point to utilized generally, which can warn them not to neglect the internationalist unanimity dimension of foreign policy, e.g., in terms of encouraging improvement assistant and global policies that save workers (by, for instance, organizations like the International Labor Organization) (Ibid, 12).

More mainstream and governmental parties like FIDESZ continue a more tender line, yet obviously sway from the overall more pro-Atlantic behavior of the EU. Jobbik in Hungary clearly looks for reshape the map of Europe and to associate the old districts Hungary lost in the Treaty of Trianon in 1920 (Nagy & Róna , 2013).

To sum up, there is not an only populist foreign policy. In contrast, there seems a series of positions among populist kinds changing from isolationist policies to more clear statuses about cosmopolitanism or even a kind of social cosmopolitanism. The distinction among these locations based in part on the link between populism and the adding ideology. Thence, the populist radical right inclines to be more isolationist; the market liberals incline to be more open about cosmopolitanism and/or the market; and left-wing populists inclines to have a more social cosmopolitan tendency, while benefiting economic protection (Zaslove & Verbeek, 2017).

Yet, it is not expected populists to indiscriminately seize a more offensive foreign policy. Rather, their method of foreign policy usage for internal mobilization need to mirror a compound of their populist ‘thin’ ideology (anti-elitism and anti-pluralism) with their stressing ‘thick’ ideology. Based on their ‘thick’ ideology, populists might externalize particular parts of the population from their description of the ‘real’ people (for instance, migrants, or members of specific minorities). In this matter, it can be expected that populists in government to aim foreign states that are firmly incorporated with such externalized part of their population – mainly for internal mobilization aims. Populists may also be more eager to encourage ‘the people’ abroad against players unfriendly to them, and thus to mix with the domestic relations of the states that regale such diaspora (Plagemann & Destradi, 2017, p. 7-8).

Likewise, based on their ‘thick’ ideology, populists will have separate comprehension of what considers as ‘elite’. Once more, it can be expected this comprehension to form a more conflictual behavior toward single states that are assigned with such elite. All of them is specifically possible to direct to the induction or increasing of international controversies with particular global players, but not enforcedly to an ordinarily more polarizing, clashing approximation to global politics (Ibid, p. 8).

Populist governments can be anticipated to be less eager to handle the expenses of international public good supply when make comparison with non-populist governments. Actually, in theory, populists are expected to pay attention to a barely described ‘people’ to guide to a restricted preparedness to conduce to the well-being of those are not owned by it. The supply of international public goods not only advantages the ‘people’ yet lets others to free ride. Study on European populist radical right parties approves that they incline to reject global governance endeavors on matters such as climate change remission or improvement assistance. Yet, there may be examples where additions to global governance cause considerable advantages of a distinct sort for a populist government. For instance, increasing powers may use global public goods supply to display that they act as ‘liable’ members of the global society by completing the expectancy that ‘with strength comes liability’ (Kenkel & Destradi, 2019). Furthermore, populists’ particular thick ideology might either solidify or reduce their agnosticism of global governance in particular policy arenas. For instance, right-wing populists may more tend to make exceptions on trade liberalization as opposite to those seizing a leftist thick ideology (Destradi & Plagemann, 2019, p. 10).

Recently, when populism is considered – particularly, European populism – migration seems the primary topic that appears. There is no doubt that empirically immigration can be related with populism, but it is related with a certain sort of populism: the populist radical right. Studies display that migration is one of the topics that matters most to populist radical right parties and their followers (Van der Brug et al., 2015). Furthermore, if one case can be expressed to have given rise to policymaking through the past thirty years, it would be migration (Ibid).

In the beginning of 1990s, when it was more of a territorial populist than a populist radical right party, it was dubious of migration but was not absolute antiimmigrant. Lastly, left-wing populists frequently do not antagonistic to migration. Or, in cases where left-wing populist parties are argumentative of immigration, they incline to be softer than the populist radical right, frequently binding their assertions with labor market topics instead of cultural exclusion. This is also correct for right-wing populist parties in Central and Eastern Europe: FIDESZ in Hungary and PiS in Poland can be seen as parties which are dubious of the EU (Ágh, 1998; Zaslove & Verbeek, 2017).

At this point, it might be wondered if migration is a foreign policy subject. If foreign policy of a state is related to pursue sovereign control through its territory, its migration policies order the size and character of its population. Furthermore, countries have made different regulations to refer individuals' transborder movement: countries have accepted the rights of refugees by international treaties and are tied with them, and in economic unity layouts, countries order foreigners' approach to the labor market. Thence, migration policies belong to the center job of a country's foreign policy. In conclusion, populist parties which provoke against migration are undertaking to influence a state's foreign policy. For instance, populist radical right parties in Central and Eastern Europe have affected country response to the migration crisis, primarily some governments (e.g., Hungary and Slovakia) to reject to accept in Islamic refugees. States like Poland and Hungary have turned dubious of EU asylum policies, especially burden sharing. Repeatedly, there are many locations more than an only outlook about foreign policy most different is the populist radical right, which seizes antagonism to migration as its center location. For the other populist beliefs, this is less obvious. Both market liberal and territorial populists do not enforcedly object to migration, even though often they are also suspicious of it (Ágh, 1998).

Nevertheless, at the same time, it needs to be pointed that the PRR (populist radical right) has not constantly counter European integration. Through the end of 1980s and the beginning of 1990s, many PRR parties were in favor of European integration. For most PRR parties, the 1992 Maastricht Treaty was a milestone towards a more Eurosceptic status (Mudde, 2007). Still, this does not mean that the whole populist radical right parties object to all dimension of the EU. PRR parties frequently view the benefit of the EU.

Finally, another sensible statement displays itself, one that arises from fundamental separation of populism between the elite and the pure people: the valid international obstacles propose a chance for populists to reexplain or widen the concept of the corrupt elite; for instance, the populist radical right inclines to see the European elites in Brussels as their opponents, which impacts their dissent to EU integration, fiscal open borders, and migration (so far as these policy extents are frequently tied with EU integration). According to the populist liberals, the elite is something else: the bureaucratic politician. If the populist regionalists are mentioned again, the elite is less clear. It may be the hegemon political parties, or it may be the bureaucrats in Brussels. According to populist left parties, the elites can be politicians inside the country, but they can also be transnational economical elites or leaders of other states who support for globalization. To sum up, it comes out that international incidents, via the necessity to formulate a foreign policy, may warn populists to reconsider their concept of the elite, and therefore, the danger to the pure people (Ibid).

CONCLUSION

In today's world, populism is rising all around. While this ideology is increasing this fast, it cannot be thought separately examining external and internal policies. Since, what occurs inside the countries affects external policies as well. As Plagemann and Destradi (2019) states, populism certainly has an influence over global politics. Such influence is reduced by internal elements (particularly by populist governments' thick ideologies) as well as by constructional elements (particularly countries' embeddedness in global institutions, their location in the international system, and connected status interests).

Populism does not primarily and deeply influence the content or article of foreign policy. Proximity is important for the thin ideology of populism to influence the essence of foreign policy - in terms of geography, a common political history, or economic dependency. It is logical to make scapegoats in other countries, such as resettlement in international organizations, only if there are close links to the relevant local populist template. Populists centralize and personalize decision-making, they look for diversifying their international affairs far from special corporations, and they exalt a stream toward multipolarity and the centrality of particular thick ideologies. What has emerged is not a radical restructuring of world policy driven by the "anti-globalization" of populists, but a streamlined and less understandable international order.

As a conclusion, this study has shown that in the contemporary world internal and external policies are intertwined. Studying foreign policy alone cannot satisfy the lack in the literature anymore. Moving from this point, foreign policy is affected by domestic developments. Even though, at first, populism seemed like domestic ideology, we see that it is also international issues' ideology. Thus, by making foreign policy analysis using populism as an ideology is needed and in this study this necessity has fulfilled. When we look at the foreign policy analysis, the main actors are decision makers, meaning that if the decision maker defines him/herself as populist, they will make populist decisions and/or every foreign policy step of them will be named as populists. Besides, decision makers seek for followers' constant support, from this point, they will try to make politics in their foreign affairs to ensure this.

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