

	JOURNAL OF ACADEMIC PERSPECTIVE ON SOCIAL STUDIES (JAPSS) *** SOSYAL ÇALIŞMALAR ÜZERİNE AKADEMİK PERSPEKTİF DERGİSİ	
E-ISSN: 2667-5889	https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/pub/japss	Paper Type: Review Makale Türü: Derleme
Sayı:1, Nisan 2023	Issue:1, April 2023	Received Date / Geliş Tarihi: 22/11/2022 Accepted Date / Kabul Tarihi: 28/12/2022
PRACTICE OF QUEUEING AS A CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE FOR A FAIR SOCIETY ◆◆◆ ADİL BİR TOPLUM İÇİN KATEGORİK BİR ZORUNLULUK OLARAK SIRADA DURMA UYGULAMASI		
Atıf/ to Cite (APA): Gökçekuyu, E. (2022). Practice of Queuing As A Categorical Imperative For A Fair Society, Journal of Academic Perspective on Social Studies (JAPSS), (1), 75-83.		Ertuğrul GÖKÇEKUYU ¹
DOI: https://doi.org/10.35344/japss .		

ÖZ

Alisdair MacIntyre, bir birey ilgilendiren ahlaki felsefik açıdan üç evresi olduğunu savunur. Bunlar, (1) doğum ve ölüm arasındaki bir *telos'a* yönelmiş ömür boyu süren bir arayış içinde olmak, (2) tarihsel ve toplumsal anlamda miras olarak devralınmış ve yalnızca kısmen oluşturulmuş bir kimlik ve (3) ilgili erdemlerin bireyin hayatında uygulanması. Bu üç ahlaki aşamayı işaret ettikten sonra bu makalede Alisdair MacIntyre'nin *After Virtue* isimli kitabında inşa ettiği argümanlar ışığında spesifik bir insan pratiği olan sırada durmanın önemi üzerinde duracağım. Bu makalede bahsi geçen uygulamanın toplumsal hakkaniyete işaret ettiğini ve MacIntyre'in de ifade ettiği gibi anlamlı ve ahlaki bir erdem olduğunu savunuyorum. MacIntyre, moderniteyi, bireyselliği ahlaki yoksunluğundan dolayı eleştirdiği bilinmektedir. Buna göre insan varlığı toplumların bünyesinde çıkmazlar ve umutsuzluklar içinde yoğunlaşmaktadır. MacIntyre'a göre erdemli yaşamak bir felsefi değerdir ve erdemli bir yaşamın çöküşünün, anlaşılabilir ve adaletsiz bir toplumun doğasında var olan bir türevi olduğunu öngörür. Bu makale, sırada durabilmenin erdemli bir duruş olduğunu ve sosyal düzen içinde adalet dağıtıcı bir işlevselliği olduğunu savunan insani eylem olduğunu anlatmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Ahlaki davranış, sırada durma, erdem, hayatın anlamı.

ABSTRACT

Alisdair MacIntyre argues that there are three stages of moral philosophical perspective for an individual. These are, the individual (1) being on a life-long quest towards a *telos* between birth and death, (2) who arrives in an inherited historical and social identity that is only partially constituted and (3) needs to exercise relevant virtues in one's life. Departing from these three moral stages I build on Alasdair MacIntyre's narrative in *After Virtue* with the purpose of focusing and highlighting one specific human practice. This practice is the practice of *queueing* and in this article, I argue that it functions as a signpost for whether *fair treatment* is a shared societal practice that also must hinge on what MacIntyre labels to be an intelligible action. On his turn MacIntyre is known to criticize modernity, individualism as lacking morality making human survival beyond despair. MacIntyre perceives virtues as philosophical values and foresees that the collapse of a virtuous life is an inherent derivative of an unintelligible and unfair society. This article aims to demonstrate that queueing is an intelligible human action that is to be labelled as virtuous social order and a form of distribution of justice.

Keywords: Moral behaviour, queueing, virtue, meaning of life.

1. INTRODUCTION

Pascal Blaise is remembered as to say 'What kind of a truth is this bounded by a chain of mountains and is falsehood to the people living on the other side?' (Hofstede, Hofstede, and Minkov 2005:507). There is another version that provides a better working for the purposes intended in this article which can be found in the book *Mastering Public Administration* narrated as 'There are truths in one country that are

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falsehoods in another' (Fry and Raadschelders 2013:100). This quote is especially interesting and denotes that nations and countries have different understandings and customs they employ in their daily practices. Countries around the world have varying histories that culminate in different degrees of development and understandings of norms and values. For example, for Max Weber Capitalism as he describes in his *Capitalism and Protestant Ethics* can only exist in Western European countries with a Protestant background (Weber 2005). Weber's rational society has developed the practice of bureaucratization that functions as an underlying activity to routinize administrative work (Fry and Raadschelders 2013:55). Weber's observation of the rational practice creates a sequential order of tasks with the reward of efficiency. Efficiency was a good outcome as it meant cost reduction, time management, neutrality that produced a fear treatment for consumers or citizens for whatever service the individual was waiting for. I am merely referring to Weber's ideal types as they serve the purpose of providing the basis for my next argument. While MacIntyre criticizes the replacement of shared common moral principles by individual personal moral preferences, he makes a valid point that some practices that we human beings have established were actually socially arranged agreements or contracts that benefitted us all as fairness (MacIntyre 2007:193). Weber's rational society that is purely ideal and theoretical serves the same purpose of bringing about a common interest which is a highly desired ethical conduct namely fairness. Countries such as the Netherlands, United Kingdom, Germany as well as Scandinavian countries are known to have a highly developed sense of fairness and a perception toward certain daily practices such as making appointments, time-management, agenda setting for meetings, taking minutes, distribution of labour, team-work, standardized routines, neutrality and of course methods to treat those who wait to be serviced in a just and predictable ways (Weber 2005:10).

MacIntyre's quest of the individual for further meaning in life is remedially existent in Weber's work as connection of the social and the social action of human conduct with the quest to have a purpose and a rational motivation to acquire meaning. Friedrich Nietzsche too -who lived just before Max Weber- is known to have appraised the merits of rational life beyond morality (Nietzsche n.d.). For Nietzsche it was all about rationality which was the awakening contrary to the disease of morality. Nietzsche foresaw a life that was in the light of rationality, an enlightened character as his famous character Zarathustra who after ten years decided to come down from his mountain to show people, they too can become *übermensch*. For Zarathustra man was the rope between the state of being an animal and the state of being an *übermensch*, a superman (Nietzsche n.d.). This where MacIntyre and Nietzsche separate their ways, for Nietzsche's *übermensch* was a dangerous path to take. However, Nietzsche could never know what kind of effect his ideas could have on a totalitarian psychopath (Nehamas 1999). Nietzsche pursued the path of rationality could change humanity to awaken to a better future which would be better than a life spent in a state of sleep. All too understandable up to the point where MacIntyre questions Nietzsche's hard break between rationality and morality.

Other than Nietzsche, Weber's positivistic and hermeneutic approach of rational societies has good outcome the freeing of oneself from emotivism (Fry and Raadschelders 2013:57). According to Weber there are two types of rationalities value rationality (*Wert Rationalität*) and purpose rationality (*Zweck Rationalität*) (Lucke 1990). Of which purpose rationality focuses on consequences or results and actions. In Weber's approach Capitalism for the modern individual is a consequence of moral principles that are highly recognizable in Protestantism. Capitalism for Weber was the highest attainable form of rationality (Fry and Raadschelders 2013:50). As it is well known Weber came up with a unique insight that Protestant ethics was responsible for the inspiration of capitalism. Capitalism not only was a rational and orderly way of employing economic life, but it also incorporated morality, just life, purpose and meaning in the worldly activities of men. It was this idea that constructed the pure or also ideal type that represented the best of both worlds.

For many critics today Weber's ideal types are obviously merely utopian and hardly empirical. However, for Weber such a rational society would be characteristic of hard work which would represent telos and therefore happiness. Weber's pure type of capitalism was built on the idea of the virtue of honest work and a good day's pay (Weber 2005:149). Weber's rational society could be constrained of negative side-effects by the use of self-control and ethical standards that have evolved throughout sequential historical successive steps. This rationality sets itself apart from the emotivism that was in the words of Alasdair MacIntyre problematic as men with certain emotions believed to be able to affect individuals' emotions and sentiments believing that this was the way to go. Weber was also quite aware of what a highly rationalized society would do to a society. Weber did not forget to warn rational societies of his infamous iron cage (Weber 2005:123) of bureaucratization that would cause goal displacement and deviation from character (consistency in human conduct) and good morals to a life of greed and total control and exploitation. From this perspective Weber completes the circle in Nietzsche's character Zarathustra. In other words, a rational society was also gravid of irrationality and could forsake routinization by emotional and charismatic forces that was a constant to the existence of humanity. Routinization was based on a successive sequence of rational steps that had the capacity to bring about social justice and equal distribution as bureaucratic administration had to be blind to the privileged people (Fagundes 2017). In Weber's ideal type there was no place for human passions such as hatred or irrationality such as feelings and emotions. However, the potential danger was always all too prevalent.

2. INTELLIGENCE AS A SIGN OF A RATIONAL SOCIETY

2.1. Critique of Loss of Morality and Its Connection To Intelligence

For MacIntyre criticizes modernity where the last two centuries are fallaciously endowed as the only human history in terms of achievements. This has caused humanity to be concealed from the complete human history and its achievements as the long human history must belong to the wider memory and awareness in order to prevent contextual and existential misinterpretation. For MacIntyre the last two centuries are characteristically categorical of the imperative of rationality and the loss of status of moral judgments and loss of meaning. For MacIntyre this concealment is a result of an emotivist narrative lacking contextual guidance causing moral philosophy to lose its communicative purpose in the world (MacIntyre 2007:60). In truth moral philosophy merely is there to show humans the consequences of their actions (MacIntyre 1998:3). Therefore moral philosophy may not be confused with direct intrusion or interference in human behaviour as for MacIntyre moral philosophy has always been neutral (MacIntyre 1998:3).

MacIntyre make this point because of critics such as Friedrich Nietzsche who criticized moral philosophy as directly meddling with human practice. For Nietzsche moral philosophy needed to be questioned as there was need for *critique* of moral values that grew out and became distortions, a disease, a drug. Nietzsche continued to criticize morality as a taken for granted indisputable fact. So Nietzsche questioned: What if morality was inherent to retrogression and held humanity back? 'So that really morality would be the danger of dangers?' (Nietzsche 2021:11). Again as with Nietzsche for David Hume a hard separation between science and philosophy was necessary. Philosophy for Hume was abstract, ambiguous and attempted to formulate general principles from particular instances. Such abstractions were based on philosophical concepts that were vaguely uttered. For Hume knowledge could only be an effect of a scientific enquiry by individual *experiences* in a world that is identical for every single person (Hume 2017:22–23). The effects in an experientially identical world could not deliver different knowledge, merely differences in interpretation.

For Immanuel Kant this debate comes down to the cultivation of the faculties of the mind. The cultivation of the faculties of the mind corresponds to what Kant calls the doctrine of duties. A duty is

based on the 'elective will' and derived from the inner strength of self-constraint. The doctrine of duty is considered to be systematic and not fragmented pieces of discrete human actions. The human agent can attain *perfection*, which comes down to the ultimate question of happiness. However, for Kant achieving perfection can only be possible through the cultivation of human faculties (Kant 2020:30). This cultivation is described as the gradual elevation of the human being from an animal state to a human state. In this respect for Kant this cultivation is a matter of morality as morality requires the human being to have the *freedom to will* and this elective will is what drives the human being to exercise the appropriate virtues, as virtues can change according to the social role we find ourselves in. MacIntyre does not deviate from this philosophy and he too argues that practice is key to ascertain certain virtues. One such virtue is justice and this virtue can only be achieved by the exercise of other virtues such as temperateness, courage and friendship (MacIntyre 1988:40). These for MacIntyre are justice-sustaining virtues and must be exercised if a community desires to establish social order that brings about an effective good that is inherently a common interest in. Temperateness for MacIntyre is disciplining and transformation of the desires, aversions, and dispositions of the self to enable oneself to achieve excellence in performance and judgement.

As with MacIntyre, Kant perceives rationality to be an outcome of practice of virtues. Therefore, a virtuous life cannot be an outcome of intuition or unsystematic and irrational actions but on the contrary can only be a result of *pure reason*. Kant's pure reason is categorically systematic founded on consistent and sequential order. Kant even goes as far as to argue that such a sequential moral order can be universal as human actions can be cultivated by the practice of virtues. In this respect Kant symbolizes the intellectual turning point in Western history as the one who pushed ontology onto epistemology. Kant's ideas on rationality and morality are still immensely attractive, as Kant does not perceive a hard separation between his *pure reason*, rationality and morality. Kant goes further and argues that a virtuous life is categorically (unconditionally) imperative (necessary) in order to be able to obey our duties (Kant 2020:47). Kant even argues that the human being can only help him/herself, making the individual sole responsible to exercise virtues as a moral duty. The exercise of these virtues taken as a duty cause the good, the social order as individuals learn to be conscientious toward others. Being conscientious does not imply to love others -which according to Kant it is unfortune that our species are not particularly worthy of love (Kant 2020:45)- as such an exercise though a worthy virtue benefits our own cultivation.

The question remains why a cultivated individual is essential. The answer is that a cultivated person has then attained true wisdom and can make one's own existence on earth an end. For Kant nobody should think of another person as a means, but must always place the self and others always as ends (Kant 2020:51). Virtues are from a rational point of view necessary as men have impulses and natural inclinations toward pleasure. If such inclinations are not cultivated and men become indifferent for their negative actions, they are no more than an object such as a table or descend toward the state of an animal. Men are to exercise virtues and combat the hindrances and by fortitude (Kant 2020:12) which is the inner power that is an essential part of moral character that battles against a powerful and unjust opponent. For Kant these natural inclinations that exist in men are unjust but also powerful opponents. The inner power of men is that men have power over pure reason, they are free to make choices and they possess the freedom to will, and the power of conscience an *inner judge* who speaks to the self. This power enables men to pursue the good, the right virtues appropriate to his/her circumstances and possess his/her own end on earth. It is this possession alone that makes men free, healthy, rich and a king (Kant 2020:51). For Kant a superhuman is a person who has all power in heaven and earth and is an ideal person that is all good and free of natural inhibitions, which is therefore just an ideal or a utopian person (Kant 2020:61).

MacIntyre criticizes Nietzsche's philosophy of emotivism, as such emotions in Nietzsche's philosophy may be argued as to refer to objectivity but in truth are merely the author's subjective will. Therefore, Nietzsche is preoccupied with generalizing moral judgment and the nature of morality as dead. MacIntyre criticizes Nietzsche's all enlightened *übermensch* as a dangerous fantasy. For Nietzsche morality is a mere inner moral sentiment that could not be based on human consciousness nor it could be universal as Kant argued. The Enlightenment project of the last two centuries was tasked to challenge moral philosophy and religion by figuring out scientific methods with the consequence of having a objective morality and an intelligent order that would bear good. For Nietzsche such an endeavour would only be possible by an act of destruction of morality. Whether such an endeavour may or may not be objective is a debate that still goes on. However, for MacIntyre Nietzsche was preoccupied with a subjective expression of the personal will. As is the case with *Zarathustra*, whose morality could only be what an individual wishes to create. Therefore, MacIntyre depicts liberal societies of consisting individuals who are complacent and are driven by their selfish passions and inclinations where Kant's legality and jurisprudence remain without the duty to exercise virtues.

For MacIntyre Nietzsche's superhuman is in a constant need to be liked, worshipped and incomparably narcissistic who creates his/her own discrete acts that are unsystematically obeying their own personal desires (MacIntyre 2007:266). Nietzsche depicts the rationally justified autonomous moral subject as a fiction, and settles for the will to replace Kantian reason and become autonomous moral subjects by a superhuman epic act inspired from the individual will. This for MacIntyre is problematic that arises from the Nietzschean philosophy. The implication is a society wherein every individual asserts his/her own morality by his/her own personal taste and preference (MacIntyre 2007:114). This inherently is problematic as the question is who must decide what fairness is.

As is the case with Kant (moral perfection) for Aristotle too excellence is derived from human character that can be attained through human intelligence. To achieve excellence in terms of virtuous life, intelligence or Kant's reason is prerequisite, which is at odds with our modern societal life. For MacIntyre it is against this prerequisite to view the world from purposeless and baseless catchphrases as 'to be good'. In Kant's view the good is a choice of the elective free will that categorically must be possessed by an individual in order to reach moral perfection. MacIntyre questions how one would know the applicability of general rules to particular cases when one commits the self on meaninglessness. Such a meaningless life in Kant's words could be observed with those who complain about meaninglessness and find solace in suicide. The lack of exercise of virtues obligates to enlarge one's faculty of understanding by the acquisition of knowledge, otherwise a contrary state may be described as stupidity. Therefore, stupidity may preclude goodness that is required for a good life for the self and others. However practical intelligence must be preceded by exercise of virtues which then accumulate to knowledge of man as end. Such a knowledge suggests the applicability of goodness being ascertained due to its possessor to be good (MacIntyre 2007:154).

2.2. Human Practice As A Systematic Complex

For MacIntyre human practice has a central position within human societies. Therefore MacIntyre describes practice to be 'any coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative human activity through which goods internal to that form of activity are realized in the course of trying to achieve those standards of excellence which are appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that form of activity, with the result that human powers to achieve excellence, and human conceptions of the ends and goods involved, are systematically extended' (MacIntyre 2007:187). Practices are not simple indiscrete daily activities of human conduct, but must be established in a social context with the higher attribute to add, enrich and complete human action in a systematic way.

Human practice of virtues holds and end in itself and is about the foundation as well as continuation of social order in social communities and institutions such families, urban life and the world (MacIntyre 2007:188). The Aristotelian account of the practices are enmeshed with the exercise of virtues and are essentially of a higher order and teleology. As states above Kant's reservation toward human species can also be found in Aristoteles. Even though practice is a high standard of human existence that could lead to the end of happiness, the flaws in individual character forms an essential part of their writings. Character is defined as the consistency of good practice and taking possession of complete control over moral existence. For Nietzsche men is the rope between ape and *übermensch*. For Kant human species are hardly loveable and must elevate themselves from animal state toward a human state. This socially teleological account for MacIntyre constructs a weakness in virtues and forms a grave danger (MacIntyre 2007:197). For MacIntyre human actions have always revolved around historical events that were achieved that were inherently complex and in a sequence of individual actions. For MacIntyre context is central as all action is supposed to be possible only in sequence and order. Such sequences form the elements for intelligible action and such intelligible action is per definition intelligible if it takes place in a sequence. It is considered by virtue to have an intelligible action and follow a sequence in the appropriate context (MacIntyre 2007:209).

2.3. The Rationale Of Waiting In Line

In this section I come to the question how and why waiting in line is a representation of a social order and is a sign for a just society. Waiting in line is a daily practice that is inherent to human existence. Societies around the world have some form of queueing which requires individuals to line up if one has a desire or wish to receive some type of service. When literature on queueing is studied, it can be observed that queueing is associated with annoyance (LARSON 1987:902). While the practice of queueing seems to be a natural practice for human societies, one can relate to waiting to be serviced whether it be a restaurant, a line to get the first iPhone or movie line, as it requires time and patience. Both time and patience are scarce in our modern 24/7 economies where one is in a constant hurry to be at some engagement. Yet, queueing as a form of practice for example at a bus stop as it happens in many societies is practiced to bring order where individuals need to line up as a respect for individuals who have taken extra effort and measures to get ahead. The order in a queue requires people to step in or step out in an orderly fashion. In highly rationalized communities people employ this sequencing of individuals of lining up to prevent blocking, pushing, cutting in line by distributing a fair treatment for all individuals regardless of what their social or economic status may be.

Therefore, the central question in this article is why some individuals in certain communities adhere to the practice of queueing that is sequential and orderly as described in MacIntyre's definition and why some communities lack the rationale of queueing. All the while it is common sense that irrational acts represent disorder and possess the potential to provoke disdain and retrogression to counteract as in pushing, scolding and even violence. What is then an unintelligible actions? For MacIntyre these are then quoted as 'failed candidates for the status of intelligible action; and to lump unintelligible actions and intelligible actions together in a single class of actions and then to characterize action in terms of what items of both sets have in common is to make the mistake of ignoring this. It is also to neglect the central importance of the concept of intelligibility' (MacIntyre 2007:209).

Waiting in line is not a practice that is without purpose or function. There are in scientific literature theoretical frames such as the 'Queueing Theory', which study the rationale of waiting in line from perspective of efficiency and effectivity (Tadj 1995). Unfortunately, most theories view queueing predominantly from an economic perspective as a necessary practice for people and companies to receive and deliver services and goods in efficient means. The central idea is that companies and people can be efficient in the usage of their time and resources, which are utilized to reduce a great deal of

costs. However, queueing should not only be viewed from an economic dimension, but also from a philosophical angle rooted in a more profound human need. This is the human need to fulfil the quest of fulfilling a good life. As argued in the above paragraphs it all starts with intelligence as a prerequisite for good life and social order. However, for intelligible actions to come into existence other virtues must be exercised. For MacIntyre the pursuance of justice is a virtue and or justice to come into existence individuals are required to exercise of temperateness. Temperateness is the disciplining of individual desires that enable excellent social performance and judgement. In the words of MacIntyre this disciplining also enables individuals to achieve goods more efficiently, making the circle to the economic argument complete. Departing from the above stated philosophical principles, I argue that waiting in line is an intelligible virtue that when exercised will bring about social justice among people. Therefore, the lack of exercise of this virtue will equally flaw social justice as the opposite condition will be irrational, chaotic approximating Hobbes's state of nature.

I started this article with MacIntyre's three stages of moral philosophy of which the first was the life-long quest toward a telos of an individual who inherited a partial historical social identity who is to exercise virtues to be able to complete social telos (Ertugrul Gokcekuyu 2022). Therefore, a quest must take place in order to achieve an intelligent, orderly and just social good life. For the ordinary citizen it is in his/her interest to wait in line as it prevents an unjust act, or provide privileged ones superiority. The historical human quests are filled with social struggles to achieve fairness and justice. Historical events demonstrate the sequencing of acts sometimes fragmented and irrational but for the purpose of fair treatment against privileged groups who cut in line. Societies that have either missed out on the opportunity to struggle for fairness have also missed out on the insight that waiting in line is a rational and just virtue that prevents stagnation making humanity an end instead of means.

For some nations around the world, especially in rational societies such the Netherlands it is an accepted practice to warn those who do not follow the practice of queueing as one is publicly expected to wait for his/her turn. If an individual at some point performs impatience and attempts to be privileged by cutting the line the person will be politely warned to obey his/her duty to exercise the shared practice of fairness. If at an airport a person again attempts to cut a line, the individual will perceive it as a his/her duty to warn to protect the integrity of the line. This warning is not only to protect the line but also the protection of the exercise of virtue. This practice is a categorical one and implies that waiting for one's turn is a functional and a virtues practice in the distribution of justice. The practice must therefore be an effect of a collectively common and shared custom to be imperative for institutionalization. Queueing is an agreement among like-minded people who share this value as a form of equal opportunity and a fair treatment of all individuals without the imposition of a privileged other (Palm 1953:2). The practice stops there where people stop sharing the practice as a common value. In many societies people behave in an irrational way refusing to stand in line or constantly try to impose oneself in front of others. The practice is characteristic of rational behaviour, based on a moral principle which in case of failure of such a practice will also fail human society. People will feel to be treated unequally and will push each other aside attempting to regain his/her right to have waited for its right in that line.

As human action must be part of a complex historical sequence that is comprised of particular intelligent actions, as must the unity of character guarantee human progress and sustainability. On the contrary the lack of character would imply stagnation and chaos. Both the presence of character as well as the lack of it can be traced in human social history. This makes the notion of history fundamental as much as the importance of intelligible action (MacIntyre 2007:204). The ability to queue must be a consequence of intelligible action that must be recognized by its place in a sequence. It is this sequence that provides context and represents a unity of character (MacIntyre 2007:217). It is this united character recognized by others that gives its meaning. Complaining is therefore vicing of a meaningless act, a life that has

become unintelligible, lacking *telos* representing lives to have lost rationality and therefore meaning (MacIntyre 2007:217). Even a seemingly simple act as queueing presupposes accountability and the unity of the character for the constitution of a just social order. Without accountability and exercise of virtues social life would lack meaning and continuity of fairness.

The concepts of intelligibility and accountability therefore precede applicability, without which intelligibility and accountability are bound to fail. MacIntyre recommends therefore for individuals to question what would be good for him/her that would amount for the unity and bring completion of a purposive quest. Since what is the good for one must also be good for the whole society. The systematic reflection of these questions bear answers and provide the moral life with a common unity, which is the sustainability of good life and social order. Virtues therefore are also dispositions that sustain and enable individuals to pursue their quest for the good. Within these quests individuals who exercise virtues must in most times combat inner and outer harms, dangers as well as their personal passions. To overcome these temptations as Kant argued would construct valuable knowledge and personal experience of which virtues to exercise.

3. CONCLUSION

In this section I come to the conclusion that queueing is an outcome of rational quest and the exercise of virtues fairness, and temperateness. Queueing as a social practice is a culmination of the understanding that fair treatment is a public interest and a sign that a society is intelligible. It is important to point out that the practice of virtues according to MacIntyre present variation across nations and circumstances due to their historical development. Nevertheless, queueing in any overcrowded society must be a virtue in order to sustain social order and fair treatment. Queueing therefore cannot be perceived as an ordinary purposeless practice but on the contrary an unconditionally necessary institution.

I have argued that the works of great minds feature terminology as order, sequence and the place of an event in a context have been characterized as parts of rationality and human thinking. Many thinkers and philosophers such as Weber, Nietzsche have occupied themselves with various quests to answer efficiency, purpose and/or happiness of human beings within work, morality and society. I have taken numerous ideas and vocabulary from these great minds to further build on two simple features, intelligible action based on ordered action and the exercise of appropriate virtues. We have seen that for Hume and Nietzsche morality and reason cannot exist side by side. However, MacIntyre who I followed his ideas and Kant perceive pure reason and morality as two sides of a coin and considered both to be imperative for intelligence and sustainable social order and future. I too have argued that the social practice of queueing without the appropriate human willingness to acquire and exercise deems social disorder, stagnation and obstruction of fairness and justice. Waiting in line is a signpost for a society in which individuals practice and exercise fairness as just behaviour and intelligible action.

Especially societies sharing the understanding collectively will practice a deeper understanding and be more sensitive toward fair judgement. Therefore, as MacIntyre pointed out, what is good for one under given circumstances must be fairly good for others. Such a principle might not be the believes or conviction of all individuals as some individuals may believe to be privileged. However, revolutions, and upheavals in the last centuries within the Western civilizations must stand guarantee that all must stand in line to be born, to die and to account for our actions. As argued earlier this perception is likely to come as alien in a society where virtues, morality are disregarded as obsolete, and new vogues are continuously invented as individuals go by personal taste and preference. Societies where individuals refuse to queue or cut in front of others behave irrationally and selfishly (MacIntyre 2007:220). Such a lack of exercise of relevant virtues must lack purpose and the fair distribution of justice. For MacIntyre societies are sustained by inherited traditions and practices (MacIntyre 1988). In this article I have

argued that queueing is an intelligible and essential virtue to be practiced in the light of all preceded arguments as an intelligent tradition must include queueing as a representation of a society that is fair for future (MacIntyre 2007:223).

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