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The Turkic World in Turkish Foreign Policy: Dynamics of Institutionalization and the Strategic Dimension of Bilateral Relations

**Türk Dış Politikasında Türk Dünyası: Kurumsallaşma
Dinamikleri ve İkili İlişkilerin Stratejik Boyutu**

ABSTRACT

This study thoroughly examines the institutionalization process in Türkiye's foreign policy towards Turkic States in the post-Cold War era. Following the end of the Cold War, Türkiye's relations with Turkic States in Central Asia and the Caucasus have undergone a significant transformation. Beyond historical and cultural ties, Türkiye has expanded these relations into various dimensions, including economic cooperation, security, and especially institutional integration. In order to ensure institutionalization in relations, Türkiye initially activated various organizations facilitating cultural cooperation and subsequently established institutional collaboration mechanisms such as the Organization of Turkic States (OTS). These institutionalization efforts have reinforced Türkiye's cultural and historical influence in the region while simultaneously deepening regional cooperation and integration. Cooperation in areas such as security, energy, transportation, and education has significantly contributed to regional stability and enhanced the effectiveness of institutional structures. Türkiye's effective use of institutional mechanisms has strengthened cooperation among Turkic States and bolstered regional solidarity. Consequently, this process of institutionalization demonstrates that Türkiye has adopted a comprehensive foreign policy strategy that is not only based on cultural ties but also aligned with regional security and economic interests. Türkiye's strategic approach has amplified its regional and international influence, highlighting the importance of institutional collaboration.

Keywords: Türkiye, Turkic Republics, Turkic World, Foreign Policy, Cooperation.

JEL Kodları: F50, F59

Öz

Bu çalışma, Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönemde Türkiye'nin Türk devletlerine yönelik dış politikasındaki kurumsallaşma sürecini detaylı bir şekilde incelemektedir. Soğuk Savaş'ın sona ermesiyle birlikte, Türkiye'nin Orta Asya ve Kafkasya'daki Türk devletleriyle olan ilişkileri belirgin bir dönüşüm yaşamıştır. Tarihsel ve kültürel bağların yanı sıra, Türkiye bu ilişkileri ekonomik iş birliği, güvenlik ve özellikle kurumsal entegrasyon gibi çeşitli boyutlarda genişletmiştir. İlişkilerde kurumsallaşmayı sağlamak amacıyla, Türkiye önce kültürel iş birliği sağlayan çeşitli örgütleri aktif hale getirmiş, ardından Türk Devletleri Teşkilatı (TDT) gibi kurumsal iş birliği mekanizmalarını devreye sokmuştur. Bu kurumsallaşma çabaları, Türkiye'nin bölgedeki kültürel ve tarihsel etkisini pekiştirirken, aynı zamanda bölgesel iş birliğini ve entegrasyonu derinleştirmiştir. Güvenlik, enerji, ulaşım ve eğitim alanlarındaki iş birlikleri, bölgesel istikrara önemli katkılarda bulunmuş ve kurumsal yapıların etkinliğini artırmıştır. Türkiye'nin bu süreçte kurumsal mekanizmaları etkin bir şekilde kullanması, Türk devletleri arasındaki iş birliğini güçlendirmiş ve bölgesel dayanışmayı pekiştirmiştir. Sonuç olarak, bu kurumsallaşma süreci Türkiye'nin sadece kültürel bağlarla değil, aynı zamanda bölgesel güvenlik ve ekonomik çıkarlar doğrultusunda kapsamlı bir dış politika stratejisi benimsediğini ortaya koymaktadır. Türkiye'nin bu stratejik yaklaşımı, bölgesel ve uluslararası etkisini artırmış ve kurumsal iş birliğinin önemini vurgulamıştır.

Keywords: Türkiye, Türk Cumhuriyetleri, Türk Dünyası, Dış Politika, İş Birliği

JEL Codes: F50, F59

Introduction

Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, newly independent Turkic Republics have been one of the subject matters of international relations studies in the Turkic academia. The importance of these states for Türkiye derives not only from cultural ties but also from the economic and strategic significance of the Central Asia as well as Caucasus. To that extent, the growing literature on Türkiye Foreign Policy towards Turkic Republics articulated on four dimensions. First and foremost, due to the cultural heritage, identity politics dominates both academic literature and political discourse in Türkiye (Yükselen, 2020). Secondly, owing to the natural resources, bilateral relations have become the subject matter of energy studies (Yesevi & Tiftikçigil, 2015). In relation to this, the third dimension has become realist literature, which emphasizes the energy security. The realist literature also highlights the security concerns about the geopolitical between the USA, Russia, China and Türkiye's position in this power struggle (Çınar, 2013). Finally, the hegemonic stability theory emphasizes the Russian dominance on Central Asia and Caucasians (Kubicek, 1997), which affects Türkiye's boundaries in the region.

This article will show that bilateral and multilateral relations are essentially motivated by identity politics. Yet, the identity was not taken for granted but

institutionalized, particularly after the Cold War. More specifically, the Turkic World perspective of Türkiye was based on bilateral relations throughout the 1990s and early 2000s. As a result, the relations between Türkiye and the newly independent states were underdeveloped in the early period. In this regard, this article suggests that the institutionalization of the Turkic World in Turkish foreign policy improved the relations between Türkiye and the Turkic Republics. As a result, bilateral relations were also affected by institutionalization.

This article is divided into two main parts. The first part includes three sections that will address the relations from a theoretical perspective. The first section will cover the historical background, the Turkic identity framework, and the institutionalization of Türkiye's foreign policy. The second section will elaborate on the opportunities and boundaries faced by Türkiye after the Cold War. Having outlined the structure and identity, the final section of the first part will demonstrate institutional changes after the Cold War. The second part of the study will provide a more detailed examination of events. In this section, bilateral relations will be analyzed due to the disharmony in relations. In addition to the claim that Türkiye's relations are based on identity politics, and considering that similar relations exist with Hungary, the article will clearly articulate how it supports this claim and how it differs from earlier works. Furthermore, the content of the second part will be expressed and detailed more clearly.

Identity Matter in Turkish Foreign Policy

Idea of Turkic World

Perception of the Turkic World or Pan-Turkism emerged in Türkiye in the late 19th century and was systemized in early 20th century (Akçura, 1978). The idea is mainly put forward by Turkic intellectuals, such as Yusuf Akçura, İsmail Gaspiralı who were born in Russia. After 1908, the idea is adopted to Turkish politicians and native intellectuals. On the other hand, Islamism and Ottomanism have become dysfunctional keeping the state together, making Turkic nationalism and Pan-Turkism the most suitable and enforceable policy objective (Akçura, 1976).

These policies were sought to be implemented only after the Committee of Union and Progress (İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti – CUP) took the rule in 1908. During this period, Pan-Turkist associations are established and pre-Ottoman Turkic cultural roots in Central Asia are revived. CUP leaders promoted the national identity and Pan-Turkism framework as ideological mobilization (Özdoğan, 2008). It was well-regarded by an important part of the state's political leadership; consequently, the movement was organized more meaningfully under favorable conditions (Landau,

1995).

Not surprisingly, these policies triggered tension between Türkiye and Russia. In fact, two countries had been competing each other since the 18th century. Starting from that period, Russia had been advancing territorially towards Crimea and the Central Asia. To that extent, rise of Pan-Turkism among Tatar intellectuals is not a coincidence. When the Ottoman Empire adopted Pan-Turkism, it unintentionally targeted Russia's security due to its high proportion of Turkic population. This idea peaked during the World War I, when two states staged in opposite camps. Even Pan-Islamist intellectuals promoted it by coloring an Islamic element (Landau, 1995). Furthermore, CUP supported independence of Azerbaijan in 1918 as well as unofficially aided to Basmachi movement in Turkestan with the initiation of Enver Pasha.

In contrast to CUP, after the WWI, Ankara government and newly formed republic have shifted towards a more pragmatic spectrum in terms of Pan-Turkism and politics to the Central Asia. This was motivated by change in two political situations. Firstly, unlike tsarist Russia, the newly formed USSR cooperated with Ankara government. This descended the Russian threat perception for Türkiye. This led the Turkish elite to take a more moderate attitude towards its new friend. Secondly, the War of Independence shifted Turkic nationalists towards more patriotists point and nation state perception rather than empire heritage, which encourages multiculturalism.

This led the new ruling elite to construct a more limited Turkic identity. Having dissolved the Ottoman Empire, the new republic concentrated more on domestic consolidation for two reasons. Firstly, its capacity was so limited that it sought to legitimize its authority as well as transformed the nation. Secondly, the ruling elite avoided to irritate its new and great friend Soviet Union (Heyd, 1950). As a result of this, Turkic World envision is excluded from political sphere. Instead, it is confined to the cultural sphere by the governing elite. However, nationalist groups kept promoting Pan-Turkist ideas and policies, especially after 1939.

Foreign Policy Institutionalization

As a result of this, the foreign affairs bureaucracy has institutionalized in a realist framework. The most important aim of the foreign policy has become to join with all civilized nations (West) in pursuit of peace and friendship (Bozdağlıoğlu, 2003). This leads us to elaborate on the institutionalism of Turkish Foreign Policy.

It is argued that Turkish Foreign Policy is based on Western-orientation and status

qua (Oran, 2004) which is shaped by so-called Kemalist identity. Nevertheless, as a declining empire and middle power, the posture of Turkish foreign policy is realist concerns by considering balance of power. Moreover, Western orientation has already been on the agenda since 1839. During 1920s and 30s, when Mustafa Kemal Atatürk was ruling the office, there had been two vital concerns: Consolidation of the new state and eliminating great power influences in the neighborhood, particularly British mandate in the region. As a result of this, early republican policy is based on protecting status quo and constructing a new national identity. Thus, the so-called Kemalist identity is in fact prosperous execution of realist policies under Atatürk's leadership. As a result of this, Türkiye's foreign policy revolved around two main axes: the maintenance of the nation's independence and the achievement of security in the face of Soviet ideological and territorial expansionism, and the preservation of the country's modernist, secularist, national regime (Özkeçeci & Taner, 2005).

This led Turkish foreign policy elite to shift its attention to Balkan Turks instead of Central Asia. Turkish identity is acknowledged as being a former Ottoman Empire citizen. Newly established republic officially recognized Balkan Turks as its diaspora minority. Thus, the minority issues in Balkan countries (particularly Greece and Bulgaria) as well as Cyprus have become dispute subject between Türkiye and these countries from time to time. Additionally, Iraqi Turkmens were also promoted on the basis of civil society, owing to immigrants from Iraq. Turks in the Central Asia and Caucasus, however, had never become subject matter in Turkish foreign policy elite.

The idea of the Turkic World and Central Asian roots revived only after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The emergence of a whole new Turkic world raised fresh identity questions for Türkiye itself (Fuller, 1994). Türkiye tried to capitalize on the strong cultural and linguistic bonds with the new republics, so the Caucasus and Central Asia became the focal point of Türkiye's diplomatic efforts, peaking in the early 1990s (Öniş, 2001). As a result, Turkic identity has expanded towards Central Asia. In this context, the institutionalization of the Turkish World has involved creating new diplomatic and cultural frameworks to solidify Türkiye's influence and connections within this broader Turkic sphere. Official discourse has become, "The 21st century will be the century of Turks from the Adriatic Sea to the Great Wall of China" (TÜDEV, 1993). Thus, the realist framework in the foreign policy elite has remained, but the Turkic identity is redefined by extending to Central Asia.

Institutionalization of the Turkic World

Türkiye is the first state to recognize the newly independent Turkic states as well as establish diplomatic offices in those countries. After years of cold-shouldering by the Western Europeans, and uneasy relations with their Middle Eastern neighbors, Turks suddenly realized that in Central Asia there were hitherto little-known nations with whom they could claim kinship, and who seemed to be looking for friendship with Türkiye (Hale, 2013). To that extent, as it is stated, Türkiye sought to become a model for these relatively weak and closed republics. Foreign policy discourse has become “From Adriatic Sea to the Great Wall” among presidential and governmental level. Such a discourse and enthusiastic approach were welcomed by local leaders in Turkic republics as well.

These developments encouraged Türkiye to institutionalize the Turkic World concept in foreign policy and other governmental levels slightly after the end of the Cold War. First and foremost, Turkic Cooperation and Development Agency (TİKA) is formed in 1992 as governmental institution in order to assist Turkic states with economic and infrastructural development. Besides, TİKA aimed the procreation of the own social structure of the Turkic Republics, their construction of an identity in a sustainable way (TİKA, 2024). Therefore, the transformation of Turkic Republics has been not only an economic issue for Türkiye but also an issue on nation-state building process. Additionally, Türkiye assisted the newly independent states via its ministries or other governmental institutions such as Ministry of Cultural Affairs, Ministry of National Education or Turkic Radio and Television Corporation (Erol, 2008). The reception of the thousands of university students should be considered the most important assistance of Türkiye to Turkic states.

More importantly, Türkiye sought to institutionalize its new identity at international level. First and foremost, the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) expanded to include newly independent Turkic states as well as Tajikistan and Afghanistan in 1992. Although over the following decade ECO has become an ineffective organization, Türkiye declared its intention to cooperate with them in international level by enlarging the organization. Secondly, Turkic President at that time, Turgut Özal intended to establish Turkic Common Market as well as Turkic Trade and Development Bank (Erol, 2008). Nevertheless, this planned could not be implemented for political and economic obstacles. Instead, cultural and political institutionalization realized. International Organization of Turkic Culture (TÜRKSOY) was established in 1993 to promote cultural relations. Cooperation Council of Turkic-Speaking States Summits held in the same year in presidential level, which turned into Turkic Council in 2009. At the Summit commemorating the 30th anniversary of the independence of the Turkic States, the organization’s name was

changed to “Organization of Turkic States” and Turkmenistan participated as an observer member in the Organization (Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2023a).

On the other hand, institutionalization of the Turkic world concept has obstacles and challenges. As it is stated in the previous section, Russia has always been the main obstacle for Türkiye in the region. In that sense, it is not only Türkiye who institutionalized its foreign policy towards region but also Russia. Immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia initiated Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Although it failed, Russia never left the region even during Yeltsin period. Instead, Russian hegemony over certain states, combined with political incentives for local political leaders, may give life to organizations such as the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) or Eurasian Economic Community (Kubicek, 2009). More importantly, Russia and China initiated Shanghai Cooperation Organization to promote the security of the region. Russian policy in Central Asia has been framed in a context of domestic political concern about Russian strategic displacement in the region after 9/11 (Allison, 2004).

Additionally, Türkiye’s membership in NATO obstacles to establish an alternative military alliance. This becomes more challenging with CSTO members. In the end, newly independent states securitize their authority instead of territorial integrity, thus they don’t seek for NATO umbrella.

This leads us to conclude that Central Asia is the primary security concern of Russia, so its militaristic initiations are more dominant than Türkiye as well as the US. This unavoidably affects economic relations of the region. Although Türkiye sought for creation of common market in the region, Russia realized it. Russia supported its existence by introducing Ruble as the trade currency in the region.

Thus, high politics fell from Türkiye’s agenda. Instead, the relations are institutionalized in low politics issues such as cultural, educational cooperation and regional development. As an illustration, loans given to the countries in the region through Eximbank have reached the level of around 1 billion USD (Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2022). Nevertheless, these agreements and relations never evolved into economic and politic integration. Western states, who support Türkiye’s initiation in the region, postponed their intention of transformation of the Russian sphere.

Relations between Türkiye and Turkic Republics

Bilateral Relations

The aforementioned developments led Türkiye to shift its policy into bilateral relations among Turkic states. While identity pioneered the motivation towards the region, relations are established in realist concerns. That is effective in Turkic states as well. After their independence, Turkic states constructed their own identity for the sake of building the nation state. As a result of this, on the one hand, they revived their Turkic identity; on the other hand, they sought to construct their national interests. This created conflict of interests at some point. While the newly independent states tried to construct their identity via leader cult, Türkiye and Western states saw democratic processes as a mean for that. This led Türkiye support opposition groups in some states, due to their emphasis on greater Turkic world discourse.

Additionally, the states in the region are bound to varying degrees by Russia due to their strategic and economic importance. This leads us to explore the bilateral relations of each state. Indeed, with the establishment of the Organization of Turkic States (formerly known as the Turkic Council) in 2009, momentum has been gained in relations among Turkic Republics. Particularly, relations that have been primarily cultural in nature have expanded into various fields such as political, military, and economic in recent years. This illustrates the dimensions of relations between the countries.

Türkiye – Azerbaijan

Azerbaijan is Türkiye's most important partner, unique in its significance. The relationship between Türkiye and Azerbaijan is primarily shaped by identity politics due to linguistic and historical motivations. The first Azerbaijan was founded in 1918 with Ottoman support via the Islamic Army of the Caucasus. After the Soviet annexation, notable Azerbaijani politicians migrated to Türkiye. Additionally, during Atatürk's period, Türkiye acquired the territory from Iran to become a neighbor with Nakhichevan (Republic of Türkiye Consulate of Nakhichevan, 2023b). As a result, Azerbaijan has always held a significant place in Türkiye's foreign policy agenda. Since Azerbaijan's second independence in 1991, it has become a tradition for leaders to visit each other's countries immediately after assuming office or in the wake of significant developments (Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2023c). The motto "One nation with two states" has encapsulated the relations, shaping them into three main pillars.

Firstly, the Armenian issue has been a major determinant in the relationship. Since its independence, Armenia has produced identity problems against both Türkiye and Azerbaijan, leading Türkiye to support Azerbaijan in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, contrasting with other Turkic states. In international forums, Türkiye has consistently promoted Azerbaijan's perspective on the conflict and played a key role in preventing a pro-Armenian approach from dominating these platforms (Cornell, 1998). Following the occupation of Azerbaijan's Kelbecer province by Armenia in 1993, Türkiye halted direct trade with Armenia and closed the border (Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2023d). Moreover, Türkiye trained the Azerbaijani army for three decades through NATO, contributing to Azerbaijan's victory in the 2020 conflict through enhanced military capabilities. The military cooperation includes training Azerbaijani officers, conducting joint military exercises, and collaborating in weapon technology, turning their cooperation into an alliance (Veliyev, 2023). The relationship with Armenia is thus closely linked to Armenia-Azerbaijan relations. For instance, Türkiye and Azerbaijan experienced a crisis in 2009 due to Türkiye's attempt to normalize relations with Armenia, which was later abandoned, highlighting the sensitivity of the Armenian issue for both countries.

Secondly, the South Caucasus conflict has affected the region's economic relations, particularly in energy issues. The transportation of Azerbaijani natural gas was problematic for a decade post-independence due to Armenian aggression. The construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline was a critical political and economic issue in the 1990s, despite Russian opposition and regional challenges. Completed in 2005, the project, along with the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum natural gas pipeline, facilitated the transportation of Caspian Sea resources to European markets. The proposed Nabucco and Trans-Anatolia Pipeline (TANAP) projects aim to further to enhance energy cooperation by transporting Azerbaijani resources through Türkiye. Intensive energy cooperation between Türkiye and Azerbaijan underscores the significance of identity in their bilateral relationship in two key respects. First, despite decades of efforts, similar cooperation has not been established between Türkiye and Iran. This suggests that the shared cultural and historical ties between Türkiye and Azerbaijan, rooted in a common Turkic heritage, play a crucial role in facilitating such collaboration. Second, despite counter-efforts from Russia to obstruct these energy projects, they have remained successful. This further highlights the resilience of the Türkiye-Azerbaijan relationship and the determination of both countries to pursue their energy cooperation goals, even in the face of external challenges.

Significant investments such as PETKIM and STAR Oil Refinery exemplify Azerbaijan's major investments in Türkiye. STAR refinery meets about 25% of

Türkiye's refined petroleum needs, and PETKİM meets about 12% of its petrochemical needs (Gurban, 2023). These projects not only highlight economic cooperation but also boost Türkiye's capacity and competitiveness in energy and petrochemical sectors.

As of 2023, Türkiye is Azerbaijan's second-largest import partner, accounting for 12% of Azerbaijan's total imports (Azərbaycan Respublikasının Dövlət Statistika Komitəsi, 2023). While Azerbaijan is not among Türkiye's top trade partners, trade volume has rapidly increased from \$500 million in 2005 to \$7.65 billion in 2021 (Azərbaycan Respublikasının Dövlət Statistika Komitəsi, 2023), making Türkiye one of Azerbaijan's main economic partners after 30 years. However, both sides find the current trade volume unsatisfactory.

In summary, since Azerbaijan's independence, Türkiye and Azerbaijan have emerged as pivotal political and economic allies, with identity politics shaping their relations amidst the persistent Armenian issue. Despite Russian influence and the uncertainty surrounding the Armenian conflict, both nations prioritize utility maximization. Azerbaijan views its partnership with Türkiye as a gateway to the Western world, facilitating access for other Turkic states to Europe. Türkiye's support during the Second Karabakh War, culminating in Azerbaijan's victory and significant territorial gains, underscores the deepening strategic partnership and mutual support between the two nations.

Türkiye – Kazakhstan

Since its independence, Kazakhstan has sought a balanced foreign policy between Russia and the USA. Despite its desire to reduce Russian influence, Kazakhstan recognizes Russia's importance for stability in the region. Still, Kazakhstan has shown the most enthusiasm for the Turkic World in Central Asia. President at that time, Nazarbayev frequently emphasized the significance of the Turkic World (Nazarbayev, 2012). Kazakhstan also supported Türkiye in institutionalizing the Turkic World concept (Kılıçbeyli, 2011). Thus, Kazakhstan aims to blend its realist concerns with identity politics. Unlike other Central Asian states, Kazakhstan has a relatively more open market economy and seeks to integrate into the Western system, which triggers its relations with Türkiye.

As a result, Kazakhstan has been more open to Turkic sponsorship than other Turkic states since independence. Kazakhstan views Türkiye as a powerful regional partner with strong institutions and capacity. The president declared his intention to follow the Turkic model, incorporating Muslim heritage into a secular, Europeanized state (Cummings, 2005). Türkiye also considers Kazakhstan as its most significant political

and economic partner in Central Asia (Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2024a).

Over the past 30 years, Kazakh-Turk relations have evolved in two main areas: cultural and economic. Cultural cooperation has been significant, with numerous Kazakh students in Türkiye and a Turkic state-owned university in Kazakhstan (Republic of Kazakhstan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2023). Economic cooperation is more developed, with both countries establishing trade agreements and making significant investments. In 2011, they agreed to create a Kazakh-Turkic industrial zone (Sieff, 2017). As a result, bilateral trade volume reached nearly 5.3 billion dollars in 2022 (Anadolu Agency, 2022). Turkish construction companies have completed projects worth 23.5 billion dollars in Kazakhstan by 2021. However, this figure was deemed insufficient, prompting efforts to increase trade volume. In 2022, the fourth meeting of the Türkiye-Kazakhstan High-Level Strategic Cooperation Council, which was established to strengthen bilateral relations and strategic partnerships, resulted in an agreement to raise the annual trade volume to 10 billion dollars during President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's visit to Astana. The council, which has been meeting since its establishment in 2012, plays a crucial role in facilitating cooperation and addressing mutual interests between the two countries. Mutual cooperation agreements were signed in various fields including trade, family and social services, business, culture, health, sports, and medicine (Tomar, 2022).

In summary, relations between Türkiye and Kazakhstan are more developed compared to other Central Asian states, as both countries combine realist concerns with identity politics, facilitating regional and international cooperation. Organizations like the Organization of Turkic States, Turkic Academy and TURKPA have been instrumental in promoting peace and stability in the region. Notably, despite Kazakhstan's active participation in organizations where Russia holds significant influence, such as the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and the Collective Security Treaty Organization, these ties have not caused friction in its relations with Türkiye. Kazakhstan's adoption of a balanced foreign policy, including its Eurasian orientation, does not provoke significant reactions from Russia, allowing Kazakhstan to maintain strong diplomatic and economic relations with both Türkiye and Russia.

Türkiye – Kyrgyzstan

Kyrgyzstan has been dealing with serious domestic challenges since its independence. In terms of politics, it is considered as the democratic island of Central Asia. Nevertheless, it is a country mired deep in poverty and political

instability (Kort, 2004). It is the only post-Soviet country faced with more than one colored revolution in 30 years. This weak state structure forced Kyrgyz governments to take steps towards an international system. As an illustration, Kyrgyzstan has become the first post-Soviet state accessed to World Trade Organization (WTO) membership and fastest in the world. Even so, it is a country that is close to be considered as a “failed state”. The characterization of Kyrgyzstan as a “failed state” is rooted in persistent political instability, deficiencies in governmental administrative capacity, widespread economic challenges, and shortcomings in the provision of basic public services. These factors indicate a significant weakening of the state’s ability to ensure security, justice, and welfare for its citizens.

This led Kyrgyzstan to set close relations with Türkiye. Türkiye also seeks to cooperate with Kyrgyzstan to that extent. Türkiye officially declared that “it attaches importance to the fact that Kyrgyzstan, which carries out its democratic transformation in Central Asia, maintains its stability and development. In this context, we support Kyrgyzstan at all levels from the beginning of the political and institutional transformation process” (Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2023e). As a result of this, Türkiye has become active in Kyrgyzstan not only in governmental level but also via societal level thanks to its relatively democratic structure compared to other Central Asian states. As an illustration, Kyrgyzstan hosts one of the two Turkic universities in Turkic states together with Kazakhstan. Last but not least, Türkiye erased the debts of Kyrgyzstan in 2011.

Apart from the economic cooperation, Kyrgyzstan attaches importance to Türkiye’s role in bilateral and multilateral relations. In fact, it can be asserted that Kyrgyzstan places Türkiye in its first circle together with Russia and Central Asian states. In the foreign policy objections, Kyrgyzstan declares that it seeks to create favorable conditions for the free movement of goods, services and labor between Kyrgyzstan and Russia, within Central Asia and with Türkiye (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kyrgyz Republic, 2023). Moreover, two countries formed the gendarme organization that is Organization of the Eurasian Law Enforcement Agencies with Military Status in 2013, together with Azerbaijan. Although it is an ineffective organization, it is the first militaristic organization among Turkic states.

Thus, Kyrgyzstan considers Türkiye as one of the main partners in its development agenda as well as integration to the international system. This leads two countries set close relations. However, economic and political inefficiency of Kyrgyzstan has been bounding the relations since its independence. Although two countries have some problems, it is considered as a temporary situation. Türkiye raised its disappointment to Kyrgyzstan after the coup attempt in Türkiye in 2016. Still, both

countries attach importance to bilateral relations with each other. In this context official visits and bilateral meetings have been made between two countries in recent years. President Jeenbekov's official visit to Türkiye in 9-11 April 2018 and his participation in the inauguration ceremony of President Erdoğan, Erdoğan's official visit to Kyrgyzstan to co-chair High Level Strategic Cooperation Council Meeting and participation Organization of Turkic States Summit in 2018, two leaders' meeting in Baku on the 15th of October 2019 on Organization of Turkic States Summit can be given as examples for that (Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2023e). In addition, Turkic Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan and his Kyrgyz counterpart Jeenbek Kuluabev joined a press conference in January 2024. Fidan expressed that two countries signed the 2024-2026 work program as a result of the efforts and decisions made during the sixth Joint Strategic Planning Group Meeting. Moreover, Fidan stated that efforts to share Türkiye's capabilities in the field of health with Kyrgyzstan are continuing (Calli, 2024). This move is also an evident that two countries' bilateral relations will continue to increase.

Türkiye – Turkmenistan

Turkmenistan is the most controlled transitional country not only among Turkic states but also among all post-Soviet states. After the independence, Turkmenistan declared its permanent neutral status on 12th December 1995. As a result of this, Turkmenistan neither engages with political alignments nor seeks for shock economic transition. Instead, it seeks to become a mediator country of the region as its role in Tajik Civil War. The purpose of this policy is seeking for domestic stability. Referring to Afghanistan and Tajikistan Civil Wars, Turkmenistan feels the danger of ethnic segregation. The conflicts in the region may also result in the Pashawarization of Turkmenistan.

It should also be highlighted that the state power is highly concentrated in presidential level in Turkmenistan for these security concerns. Thus, civil society becomes ineffective in pursuing relations. Instead, the relations are associated with governmental, even presidential relations.

To that extent, Türkiye should be considered one of the main partners of Turkmenistan. Although it seeks to create its own national identity, Turkmenistan also has a Turkic world conception, referring to Turkmen migration to Anatolia and Azerbaijan in the 12th century. Therefore, considering the limited international interactions of Turkmenistan, its relations with Türkiye have been at a relatively high level. In the earlier years following Turkmenistan's independence, Türkiye was among the first countries to recognize its sovereignty and establish diplomatic relations in 1991. This early engagement laid the foundation for ongoing political,

economic, and cultural cooperation. As an illustration, eight reciprocal presidential visits took place between 2014 and 2016 (Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2023f), which is a significant number in Turkmen foreign policy. Visits at the ministerial level continued in following years including Participation of a delegation, chaired by our Minister of Transport, Maritime Affairs and Communications, to the opening ceremony of Turkmenbashi Port on 2 May 2018 and to the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) Transport Ministers Meeting held on 3 May 2018. More importantly, the Turkmen President Berdimuhamedow declared Türkiye as a strategic partner several times.

This contradictory relation has prevailed in economic issues as well. Türkiye is the biggest import partner of Turkmenistan, which constitutes one quarter of total import (TIM-Türkiye İhracatçılar Meclisi, 2023). Additionally, more than 600 Turkic companies, which are mostly textile and construction, operate in Turkmenistan. The nominal amounts of trade and investment are low; however, they constitute the high proportion of small scaled Turkmenistan economy. In fact, more important relations are set in education. Accordingly, there are eighteen thousand Turkmen students in Turkic universities, which make more than 6% of all foreign students as of 2023 (Organization of Turkic States of Higher Education, 2023). The energy cooperation is however, lack of substantiating. Türkiye has been supporting Turkmenistan's goal of economic independence, particularly in the energy sector. Despite both countries expressing positive intentions regarding energy cooperation since Turkmenistan's independence, they have not been able to fully overcome Russian influence in energy policy. However, in recent years, various agreements have been signed and negotiations have been conducted, particularly concerning the Middle Corridor, which aims to enhance regional connectivity and trade routes. Currently, the Turkmen energy market is influenced by both Russia and China. Increasing cooperation and investments from China are leading to significant changes in the regional energy landscape. Additionally, Türkiye's recent initiatives regarding Turkmen gas are noteworthy. Specifically, an agreement for the transit of Turkmen natural gas through Azerbaijan and Georgia to Türkiye was signed following discussions with Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov at the Antalya Diplomacy Forum in March (Botaş, 2024). These developments have led to advancements in economic relations, reflecting a shift from cultural cooperation to more substantive economic collaboration.

Türkiye – Uzbekistan

Among the Central Asian states, Uzbekistan has the most essential cultural tradition and identity as well as state formation. Samarkand, Bokhara and Khiva had been the major spots of the historical Silk Road. This historical background encourages

Uzbekistan to locate itself in a more independent place. This ideology is not pertaining to the Turkic world, however. As a result of this, Uzbekistan has switched its primary foreign policy orientation several times since 1991, though always reserving its freedom of maneuver (Dina Spechler and Martin Spechler, 2010). This led Uzbekistan avoid from multilateralism. Instead, it seeks to develop bilateral relations, especially with its neighbors.

This attitude unavoidably affected its perception towards Türkiye. Since independence, Uzbekistan has pursued a multi-vectoral foreign policy to disengage itself from the growing interference of Russia in Central Asian affairs (Pikalov, 2014). As a result of this, Uzbekistan imposed pro-Western policies until 2005. For that reason, during this period it seeks to cooperate with Türkiye as well. The relations between Türkiye and Uzbekistan seemed friendly and progressing.

Uzbekistan's perception towards Western World as well as Türkiye has changed after Andijan events in 2005. Instability in former Soviet republics, which is raised as a result of the colored revolutions, irritated Kerimov. Referring to Kyrgyz experience, Kerimov considered these attitudes as a coup against governments. The Andijan protests, which were perceived an extension of them in Uzbekistan, were an alert for Kerimov regime. The illegal Akromiya organization attempted an unsuccessful coup against government. Kerimov publicly accused the West of being behind the plot to overthrow his government (Trenin, 2007). After the events, Türkiye voted against Uzbekistan in United Nations General Assembly. This made Uzbekistan more suspicious against Türkiye and the Turkic world conception.

Nevertheless, the two countries have been seeking to repair the relations. Turkish President Erdoğan has become the first head of the state visited Uzbekistan's acting President Shavkat Mirziyoyev. It can be safely claimed that the increasing activities of fundamentalism leads to cooperate both countries. The Daesh, which was born in the Syrian Civil War, split into Central Asia by forming alliance with Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. As a result of this, cooperation between two countries has become vital for the security of both countries (Erol, 2018). Moreover, as the two main power of the region, the strategic cooperation between the two countries will create more secure environment in the region.

It can be seen that there were mutual visits between the two states at the Presidential level by 2016. Turkish President Erdoğan visited Uzbekistan on 17-18 November 2016, and Uzbekistan President Mirziyoyev paid an official visit to Türkiye on 25 October 2017. Erdoğan paid a state visit to Uzbekistan between 29 April and 1 May 2018. Within the framework of this visit, 25 documents were signed in various fields, including a Joint Statement on the establishment of a High Level

Strategic Cooperation Council between Türkiye and Uzbekistan (Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2024b). In addition to political relations, economic relations have also progressed in recent years. Trade volume between two states reached 2,3 billion dollars. There are around 1300 Turkic companies in Uzbekistan which are especially in the textile, contracting, food, hotel management, construction materials and plastics, pharmaceutical and service sectors (Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2024b).

While Uzbekistan had previously shown little interest in membership in the TDC, this situation changed both under President Mirziyoyev's leadership and as a result of the increasing relations with Türkiye. With Mirziyoyev coming to power, Uzbekistan began to prioritize regional cooperation and relations with Turkic Republics. By participating in the Turkic States Organization meeting in 2018, Uzbekistan re-engaged with the TDC after a 17-year hiatus. Subsequently, in 2019, it was officially admitted as a member of the TDC. These developments indicate Uzbekistan's renewed interest in the TDC under the Mirziyoyev administration and its efforts to promote regional cooperation. Additionally, hosting the Turkic States Organization summit in 2022 demonstrates that the country has begun to play a more active role in regional and international platforms (Abdülkerimov, 2022).

In conclusion, Türkiye and Uzbekistan see each other as part of their common identity. Nevertheless, bilateral relations have been fluctuating over the last 30 years. The relations are mostly shaped by realist concerns of both countries. After the independence of Uzbekistan, the first decade was motivated by Uzbekistan's desire to integrate into the international system. Having disappointed by Türkiye's attitude in Uzbekistan's domestic events, two states sought for cooperation again due to the increasing fundamentalist threats in the region. The relation between the two countries is crucial, because as the most historical and powerful countries in Turkic world, two countries complement each other. While Türkiye possesses the experience of Western type of institutionalism, Uzbekistan is a mixture of the traditional and strong Soviet type statecraft experiences. To that extend, cooperation of two countries would lead to the development of not only bilateral relations but also Central Asia and Europe relations.

Overall Assessment of Bilateral Relations

Türkiye's bilateral relations among Turkic states indicate a range of variety between cooperation and strategic partnership. However, there are similarities as well. This leads us to summarize the similarities and differences between relations among Turkic states.

Firstly, the relationship is based on identity politics across all states. The discourse and approach towards the Turkic states include shared linguistic and historical backgrounds. All Turkic states are viewed as extensions of Türkiye's cultural heritage and part of its history. Turkic states also perceive Türkiye as part of their common culture. However, despite this shared cultural and historical connection, these countries have been unable to support Türkiye's institutionalization efforts in the region for many years. A significant factor behind this is the influence of Russia in the region. Russia's strategic and political interests have limited the willingness of Turkic states to actively support Türkiye's institutionalization initiatives. For instance, their absence from the Summit of the Heads of Turkic States reflects their reluctance to engage in institutional frameworks led by Türkiye, considering Russia's influence in the region and the complexities and divergent interests involved. This lack of support can be attributed to various political and strategic factors that affect their willingness to participate in Türkiye's institutional frameworks.

Secondly, all states seek to develop economic relations with each other. By economic relations, we mean international trade. Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, foreign trade of Türkiye with the newly independent states has been increasing gradually. Türkiye has become either the main or a big economic partner of Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Kyrgyzstan. Türkiye also become one of the main foreign investors in those countries. In recent years, its relations with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have gained momentum. Nevertheless, the economic relations are far from jumping into economic integration due to several reasons, including the economic differences between states and Russian influence.

Last but not least, although bilateral relations have been overshadowed by Russian influence on the newly established independent states in their first decades, Russia's influence is gradually diminishing compared to the past. Despite relatively developed states seeking to formulate a more independent policy, Russia has never completely relinquished its "backyard" to its own fate. Historically, there have been periods where Türkiye attempted to implement its policies in areas where Russian influence was intense. However, today Türkiye continues to pursue its own policies and strengthen its relations with Turkic states despite Russian influence. This situation has emerged as a result of the search for greater autonomy among the independent states in the region. These states aim to reduce Russia's influence in the region and strengthen their independence by establishing more external relations. In this context, Türkiye's efforts to increase its regional and international effectiveness contribute to balancing Russia's influence in the region.

On the other hand, there are occasional differences in the degrees of relations. For

example, while relations with Uzbekistan fluctuated in the early 2000s, Azerbaijan stands in stark contrast to Uzbekistan. Azerbaijan is static and deeply based on identity alliance. Pro-Western governments such as Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan seek to establish closer relations with Türkiye and balance the relations between East and West. In contrast, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan seem more willing to establish an independent foreign policy. However, fluctuating relations with Uzbekistan are often shaped by the security concerns of both countries. Indeed, both during this period of intense Russian influence and by the security concerns of these countries, Türkiye's constructive policies and initiatives for multilateral cooperation have gained momentum.

This shifted Türkiye's perspective towards the region's more realist paradigm. In contrast to the 1990s, today Türkiye considers all factors in the region. As an illustration, Türkiye does not seek to support opposition groups, whereas it cooperates with the existing regimes no matter they are pro-Russian or pro-Western. This is motivated by Türkiye's new identification of the region, which can be named as "further neighborhood". This makes the region a part of Türkiye's active security interest. Nevertheless, this has challenges such as competition between NATO and Shanghai Cooperation Organization. This leads us to conclude that the six countries seek to maximize their interest and create a shared culture but have systemic and domestic obstacles.

It could be concluded that the bilateral relations between Türkiye and Turkic states are positive. Nevertheless, there are some unintended problems that have the capacity to affect relations. The most prominent problem is that from time to time Türkiye becomes unable to balance its relations. Especially throughout the 1990s, there had been a disharmony between Türkiye's politics, strategy, and aims towards the region. During that period, Türkiye promised developmental assistance to the region beyond its economic capacity. This has resulted in disappointment among newly independent Turkic states.

Another inconsistency in Türkiye's foreign policy occurs within itself. That is to say, although the concept of the Turkic world has been institutionalized in foreign policy objectives, it did not always play a prioritized role until 2007. Turkish foreign policy orientation shifts from region to region occasionally. Therefore, while the depth of relations was unstable in the early years, relations have gained momentum over the past 20 years (Köstem, 2017).

Conclusion

Over the past 30 years, Türkiye's relationship with Turkic states has experienced

notable fluctuations. The literature offers various explanations for this turbulent relationship, predominantly through constructivism, which emphasizes identity politics, and hegemonic stability theory, which focuses on Russian influence in the post-Soviet space. While both theories are useful in explaining aspects of Türkiye's foreign policy, they are often treated as contrasting rather than complementary. Hegemonic stability theory delineates the boundaries, whereas constructivism elucidates the motivations behind Türkiye's regional attitudes.

To bridge the gap between systemic approaches and identity, this study adopts a neoclassical realist perspective. This approach not only connects systemic and identity dimensions but also highlights the impact of institutional factors on foreign policy. The institutionalization of Türkiye's foreign policy towards Turkic states is shaped by a realist framework and balance of power considerations. Within this framework, Turkic identity is infused with patriotic sentiments, referring to the Turkish and Ottoman heritage, while Central Asian roots, though acknowledged, are somewhat overshadowed by historical Soviet aggression post-1944. Consequently, the concept of the Turkic World gained prominence among civil society during the Cold War.

Despite the persistence of realist and balance of power dynamics after the Soviet Union's dissolution, the Turkic identity has been redefined by Turkic elites. Newly independent states are now viewed as part of Türkiye's cultural and linguistic sphere, leading to the institutionalization of the Turkic World concept both domestically and internationally. Türkiye has also played a proactive role in integrating these new states into the international system, with support from Western allies.

Conversely, Russia has consistently regarded Central Asia as its sphere of influence since the Soviet Union's fall. Russian foreign policy, even during the Yeltsin era, has aimed at promoting a multipolar world order with Russia leading Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. As a result, Moscow continues to view the newly independent states as natural allies within its political and economic system, creating a conflict of interests in Central Asia and the Caucasus.

This rivalry has led to a "New Great Game," where major powers see the region as a step towards hegemony. Türkiye, advocating for Western-style transformations, and Russia, supporting former Soviet elites, have both contributed to regional tensions. This divergence has resulted in a bifurcated relationship between Türkiye and the Turkic World: some interactions have become institutionalized, while others remain bilateral.

Cultural and educational relations are among the most institutionalized aspects. Institutions like TÜRKSOY and the OTS focus on cultural cooperation, and initiatives such as student exchange programs and scholarships are vital in strengthening ties. The “Ten Thousand Students Project” which supports Turkish education for students from Turkic states, stands out as a successful policy, fostering shared culture and values through education.

In contrast, economic relations among Turkic states initially developed through bilateral rather than institutionalized channels. Türkiye emerged as a leading trading partner for countries like Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Kyrgyzstan. Despite this, economic ties have remained limited due to the closed economies of most Turkic states. However, with the establishment of the OTS, economic relations are gradually forming under a multilateral framework. The OTS has facilitated various measures to enhance trade, investment, and cooperation among Turkic states.

Political relations, initially hindered by Russian hegemony, have also seen some institutionalization. While Türkiye’s strategic alliance with Azerbaijan was notable, the presence of NATO and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) reflected competing alliances. The OTS's development marks the beginning of a political alliance among Turkic states, reducing their reliance on Russian support in international politics.

The future trajectory of relations will be shaped by several key pillars. First, security concerns, particularly transnational terrorism, will be central. Counter-terrorism efforts will likely enhance state cooperation, given the significant threat posed by groups like Daesh.

Second, energy cooperation and security are crucial, given Central Asia and the Caspian Basin’s vast natural resources. Turkic states' cooperation in this sector is essential for regional stability and economic growth. Recent joint energy projects underscore the strategic importance of this collaboration.

Third, transportation, notably through China’s Silk Road initiative, will play a significant role in enhancing trade and cultural ties. Infrastructure projects such as pipelines and transport corridors, including the Zengezur corridor, are expected to improve relations among Turkic states and reduce security risks.

Fourth, economic relations, while showing potential, are not yet fully developed. Türkiye aims to assist in the industrialization of Turkic states, with the OTS playing a pivotal role in this process. Economic cooperation is anticipated to grow,

providing mutual benefits and increasing regional stability.

Lastly, education remains a vital component of Türkiye's engagement with the Turkic states. The "Ten Thousand Students Project" and the operation of Turkish universities in Central Asia are successful but still insufficient. Türkiye will continue to attract more students from the region, with Turkic universities expanding their capacities to accommodate this demand.

Overall, the relationship between Türkiye and the Turkic World reflects a blend of shared cultural identity and varying political interests, with future developments dependent on security, energy, transportation, economic cooperation, and educational initiatives.

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Geniřletilmiř zet

Bu alıřma, Trkiye’nin Sovyetler Birlięi’nin daęılmasından sonra Trk Cumhuriyetleri ile geliřtirdięi iliřkilerdeki kurumsallařma srecini ve bu iliřkilerin ikili boyutlarını ele almaktadır. Trkiye, bu srete tarihsel, kltrel ve dilsel baęları temel alarak Trk Dnyası ile iliřkilerini yeniden yapılandırmıř, aynı zamanda bu iliřkileri daha kurumsal bir ereveye oturtmayı hedeflemiřtir. Trk Cumhuriyetleri ile geliřtirilen bu baęlar, sadece gemiřten gelen bir mirasa dayanmayıp, siyasi, ekonomik ve stratejik iř birlięi aısından da nemli bir boyut kazanmıřtır.

Trkiye’nin Trk Cumhuriyetleri ile iliřkilerinde kurumsallařma sreci baęımsızlıklarından itibaren ivme kazanmıř olsa da, Trk Devletleri Teřkilatı’nın kurulması ile sistematik bir hal alarak hızlanmıřtır. Ancak bu abalar, yalnızca kurumsal yapılarla sınırlı kalmamıř, ikili iliřkilerdeki stratejik ortaklıklarla da pekiřtirilmiřtir. zellikle Azerbaycan, Kazakistan, zbekistan, Kırgızistan ve Trkmenistan ile yrtlen iliřkiler, Trkiye’nin blgesel liderlik hedeflerinin yanı sıra Trk Dnyası’nın uluslararası sistemde daha grnr hale gelmesini saęlamayı amalamıřtır. Bu baęlamda, Trk Cumhuriyetleri ile yrtlen ekonomik, siyasi ve kltrel iř birlięi, Trkiye’nin dıř politikasında giderek artan bir nem tařımaktadır. zellikle Azerbaycan ile kurulan stratejik ortaklık, enerji iř birlięinden savunma sanayine kadar geniř bir yelpazede iř birlięiyle somutlařmıř ve blgesel gvenlik iin de nemli bir boyut kazanmıřtır. Bu kapsamlı iř birlięi modeli, Trkiye’nin dięer Trk Cumhuriyetleri ve hatta daha geniř coęrafyadaki lkelerle iliřkilerini řekillendirirken bir referans noktası olarak grlmektedir.

Arařtırma, Trkiye ile Trk Cumhuriyetleri arasındaki iliřkilerin tarihsel baęlamından bařlayarak bu srecin nasıl kurumsallařtıęını analiz etmektedir. Tarihsel olarak, Trkiye’nin Trk Dnyası ile olan iliřkileri daha ok duygusal bir yaklařıma dayanmıř ve bu baęlar kimlik siyaseti ekseninde geliřmiřtir. Ancak 1990’lardan sonra, bu iliřkiler pragmatik bir dıř politika anlayıřıyla yeniden řekillenmiř ve daha somut hedeflere ynelmiřtir. Trkiye, zellikle enerji, ulařım ve ticaret gibi stratejik alanlarda iř birlięini glendirmiř, aynı zamanda eęitim ve kltrel projeler aracılıęıyla bu iliřkileri daha geniř bir ereveye oturtmayı bařarmıřtır.

Kurumsallařma srecinde, Trkiye ile Trk Cumhuriyetleri arasındaki iř birlięi sadece ekonomik ve siyasi dzlemde deęil, aynı zamanda diplomatik ve kltrel alanlarda da glenmiřtir. Trk Konseyi, bu baęlamda nemli bir rol stlenmiř, ye lkeler arasında iř birlięinin daha dzenli ve sistematik bir řekilde yrtlmesine olanak tanımıřtır. Ancak, kurumsallařma srecinin yanı sıra, Trkiye’nin Trk Cumhuriyetleri ile yrttę ikili iliřkiler de dikkat ekicidir. Azerbaycan ile “tek millet, iki devlet” anlayıřına dayalı iliřkiler, enerji projeleri ve Karabaę zaferi ile

derinleşmiştir. Kazakistan ile geliştirilen ilişkiler, Orta Asya’da liderlik rolü üstlenen bu ülkenin ekonomik ve stratejik önemi üzerinden ilerlemiştir. Özbekistan ve Kırgızistan ile ilişkiler, daha çok ekonomik iş birlikleri ve kültürel bağlar temelinde güçlenirken, Türkmenistan’ın tarafsızlık politikası çerçevesinde kurulan ilişkiler de stratejik bir denge unsuru olarak öne çıkmıştır.

Bu çalışma, Türkiye’nin Türk Cumhuriyetleri ile olan ilişkilerinde kurumsallaşmanın etkisini nitel bir yöntemle analiz etmektedir. Araştırmada kullanılan veriler, resmi belgeler, akademik kaynaklar ve basılı yayınlardan elde edilmiştir. Süreç izleme ve tarihsel analiz yöntemleriyle, bu ilişkilerin nasıl şekillendiği ve kurumsallaşma sürecinin Türk Dünyası üzerindeki etkileri incelenmiştir. Çalışma aynı zamanda, Türkiye’nin bu süreçte karşılaştığı zorlukları ve elde ettiği kazanımları da ele almıştır.

Araştırma bulguları, Türkiye’nin Türk Cumhuriyetleri ile ilişkilerinde kurumsallaşmanın üç temel boyutta etkili olduğunu ortaya koymaktadır. Birincisi, bu süreç, Türkiye’nin Türk Dünyası’ndaki kültürel dayanışmayı ve kimlik siyasetini güçlendirmiştir. İkincisi, ekonomik ve siyasi iş birlikleri, bölgesel entegrasyonun önünü açmış ve Türk Cumhuriyetleri arasında daha güçlü bir bağ kurulmasını sağlamıştır. Üçüncüsü, bu ilişkiler, Türkiye’nin uluslararası sistemdeki konumunu güçlendirerek, Türk Dünyası’nın küresel ölçekte daha görünür hale gelmesine katkıda bulunmuştur.

Sonuç olarak, bu çalışma, Türkiye ile Türk Cumhuriyetleri arasındaki ilişkilerin kurumsallaşma sürecini detaylı bir şekilde ele almakta ve bu süreçte Türkiye’nin rolünü ortaya koymaktadır. Türk Dünyası’nın entegrasyon hedefleri doğrultusunda, Türkiye’nin liderlik rolünün ve bu ilişkilerdeki kurumsallaşma çabalarının daha da geliştirilmesi gerektiği vurgulanmaktadır. Özellikle enerji, ticaret ve eğitim alanlarında iş birliğinin artırılması ve Türk Dünyası’nın uluslararası sistemle daha bütünleşmiş hale gelmesi, Türkiye’nin bu ilişkilerden uzun vadede daha fazla fayda sağlamasını mümkün kılacaktır. Kurumsal mekanizmaların güçlendirilmesi ve Türk Cumhuriyetleri ile ikili ilişkilerin daha da derinleştirilmesi, Türk Dünyası’nın bölgesel bir güç olarak uluslararası arenada daha etkili bir rol üstlenmesini sağlayacaktır.