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**The Role of Pakistan in the Military Operations Conducted by the United States in Afghanistan in the Fight Against Terrorism**

**Abstract**

The article “The role of Pakistan in the military operations conducted by the United States in Afghanistan in the fight against terrorism” explores U.S. assistance to Pakistan in the fight against terrorism. The article begins on the importance of Afghanistan for the Islamic Republic of Pakistan geographically and politically. It then provides a historical overview of the development of US-Pakistan relations from Pakistan's independence in 1948 until the events of September 11, 2001. The following describes the U.S. government's negotiations with the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and the U.S. diplomatic victory in gaining such an important regional ally during the war in Afghanistan. The article examines how this has affected US-Pakistan efforts to combat terrorism. Also significant were the U.S. airstrikes on Pakistani territory and the reactions to these events, particularly the importance of the elimination of “Al-Qaeda” leader Osama bin Laden in Pakistan on May 2, 2011. It concludes by summarising Pakistan's desire and awareness of the importance of alliance with the US in the developments in Afghanistan.

**Keywords:** USA, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Terrorism, Aid, Operation

**ABD'nin Terörle Mücadele Kapsamında Afganistan'da Yürüttüğü Askeri Operasyonlarda Pakistan'ın Rolü**

**Öz**

“ABD'nin terörizmle mücadelede Afganistan'da yürüttüğü askeri operasyonlarda Pakistan'ın rolü” başlıklı makale, ABD'nin terörizmle mücadelede Pakistan'a verdiği desteği inceliyor. Makale,



*Afganistan'ın Pakistan İslam Cumhuriyeti için jeostratejik ve siyasi açıdan önemi ile başlıyor. Daha sonra Pakistan'ın 1948'deki bağımsızlığından 11 Eylül 2001 olaylarına kadar ABD-Pakistan ilişkilerinin gelişimine tarihsel bir bakış sunuyor. Ardından ABD hükümetinin Pakistan İslam Cumhuriyeti ile müzakereleri ve ABD'nin Afganistan savaşı sırasında böylesine önemli bir bölgesel müttefik kazanarak elde ettiği diplomatik zafer anlatılmaktadır. Makale, bu durumun ABD-Pakistan'ın terörle mücadele çabalarını nasıl etkilediğini incelemektedir. ABD'nin Pakistan topraklarına düzenlediği hava saldırıları ve bu olaylara verilen tepkiler, özellikle de "El Kaide" lideri Usame bin Ladin'in 2 Mayıs 2011'de Pakistan'da ortadan kaldırılmasının önemi de önemlidir. Çalışma, Pakistan'ın Afganistan'daki gelişmelerde ABD ile ittifakın önemine ilişkin arzusu ve farkındalığının özetlenmesiyle sona ermektedir.*

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** ABD, Pakistan, Afganistan, Terörizm, Yardım, Operasyon

### **Introduction**

Undoubtedly, Pakistan has had the most tangible impact on the development of the situation in Afghanistan over the past 40 years. Islamabad's strategic goal was to ensure the rise to power of a friendly, preferably dependent and understanding regime in Afghanistan, which would provide Pakistan with some kind of "strategic depth" in its uneasy relationship with India. A controlled Afghanistan could also serve as a kind of "gateway" for Pakistan's political and trade-economic expansion into the Central Asian region, while simultaneously enhancing Islamabad's role as a mediator in commercial relations between Arab countries, Southeast Asian states, and Japan with this region. Moreover, Afghanistan has the shortest transit route for oil and gas resources from Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and other Central Asian states to the coast of the Gulf of Oman and beyond to many oil-consuming countries, which in itself can bring significant financial dividends. Afghanistan itself is a large market for the sale of Pakistani-made goods (Arunova, 2000).

### **1. Discussion**

Having emerged in 1948 as a politically and economically weak state, moreover burdened with conflicts with India and Afghanistan, Pakistan decided to rely on Western countries, primarily the United States. Agreements on economic and military-political cooperation were concluded with Washington. Pakistan soon joined the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO, 1954) and the Baghdad Pact (1955, later the Central Treaty Organization, CENTO) (Moskalenko & Topychkanov, 2013). The entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan had a huge impact on Pakistan. Pakistan's course and its position as a "frontline state" have provided it with great political and economic dividends. Since the early 1980s, the main supplies of arms, medicines and food for the Mujahideen have been carried out through Pakistan. Pakistan's

military-economic alliance with the US has been strengthened (Moskalenko & Topychkanov, 2013). With the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan in February 1989 and then with the collapse of the USSR in 1991, the Afghan conflict lost its global character and Pakistan lost its former importance to the West, with the consequence that material assistance was reduced (Moskalenko & Topychkanov, 2013). U.S. interest in Pakistan has faded. Pakistan's next goal was the rise to power of the Mujahideen in Afghanistan. The Mujahideen's takeover did not strengthen Pakistan's position in the country. A fierce armed struggle for power broke out in the victorious camp. The rivals divided Kabul and then the whole country into zones of control.

The need for a swift resolution to the crisis in Afghanistan and the impossibility of achieving this under the existing military and political balance led Pakistan to support the emergence of a new force in 1994—the “Taliban” movement, which was primarily made up of students (talibs) from religious schools established for Afghan refugees in Pakistan (Moskalenko & Topychkanov, 2013). Pakistan has defended the Taliban's interests in various international organisations. All important news from Afghanistan was transmitted through Pakistani media. Islamabad has been involved in organising numerous meetings between representatives of the warring parties, foreign politicians. Islamabad assisted the UN and its special representative in the negotiation process on Afghanistan. Naturally, by acting in this way, Islamabad sought, firstly, to safeguard its own interests in Afghanistan and, secondly, to raise its profile in the international arena in relation to Afghan affairs (Moskalenko & Topychkanov, 2013). Pakistani support and patronage did not make the Taliban obedient executors of Islamabad's directives; on the contrary, the Taliban increasingly became impervious to the desires of the Pakistanis. A wave of Taliban terror was growing against representatives of Afghan political and public figures in opposition to the Taliban regime in Pakistan, Afghan intellectuals and other circles that do not share the ideology and practice of the Taliban.

A heavy burden on the shoulders of the Pakistani authorities was the upkeep of around 1.5 million Afghan refugees, who could not return to their homeland due to the ongoing bloodshed there (Arunova, 2000). The difficulties of this situation created the possibility of a future divergence with the Taliban. Thanks to them, Pakistan was ready to abruptly change course after the terrorist attack in New York in September 2001.

Islamabad's change in Afghan policy was extremely difficult, not without pressure from the United States. It began with the cessation of supplies of fuel and lubricants to Afghanistan, the halting of transit trade, and the freezing of the bank accounts of Taliban leaders. Transport routes along the border with Afghanistan were then blocked (to the extent possible due to difficult

terrain). There was a curtailment of diplomatic relations between Islamabad and the Taliban government (Moskalenko & Topychkanov, 2013). For the United States, the first and most important problem that had to be solved quickly was the establishment of cooperation with Pakistan. Due to its favorable strategic position next to Afghanistan and participation in the war against the Soviet Union, Pakistan was a key player. However, the new US ambassador to Pakistan, Wendy Chamberlain, arrived in Islamabad “expecting to spend most of her time overcoming the consequences of the humanitarian crisis that has erupted in the region”. Severe drought and famine in Afghanistan have forced thousands of people to flee to Pakistan. That summer, it was the country's most important domestic issue. But the terrorist attacks of September 11 changed everything (Wadsworth & Jones, 2010). On September 12, Ambassador Chamberlain received instructions from the State Department to visit President Musharraf in Islamabad. They agreed to discuss all the details on September 15th. Chamberlain presented several issues for discussion, including the cessation of “Al-Qaeda” operations along the Pakistani border; granting U.S. aviation the right to conduct covert flights over Pakistani territory and to land secretly at Pakistani airfields; providing the United States access to Pakistani military bases; supplying the United States with intelligence and immigration information; and completely halting fuel supplies to the “Taliban”. And the final demand, which, as Secretary of State Colin Powell admitted in a conversation with Armitage, sounded very controversial: If there is confirmation of the presence of Osama bin Laden's network and “Al-Qaeda” in Afghanistan, and if Afghanistan and the “Taliban” continue to provide him refuge, then Pakistan will sever diplomatic relations with the Taliban government, cease support for the “Taliban”, and assist us in the aforementioned ways to eliminate Osama bin Laden and his “Al-Qaeda”. Musharraf put forward counter-demands. He also asked that American aircraft not use bases in India for their operations in Afghanistan, to which Chamberlain agreed.

Musharraf was clearly interested in using his favourable bargaining position to gain an advantage over India. In the end, the President of Pakistan accepted most of the demands of the United States, nevertheless refusing to give them the right to fly over Pakistani territory and secretly land at local airfields and provide access to most of the naval bases and ports. The United States also agreed to most of Musharraf's demands: American planes will not fly over Pakistani nuclear facilities, the United States will not attack Afghanistan from Pakistani territory, and the United States will continue to provide economic aid to Pakistan. Musharraf's support was a key factor in the US's initial success in Afghanistan. “Pakistan was determined to cooperate”, Ambassador Chamberlain noted, “his support was of great importance” (Wadsworth & Jones,

2010). The Pakistani mission in Kabul was closed shortly after the events of September 11, 2001. In the fall of 2001, the Taliban Embassy in Pakistan ceased its activities. Following the fall of Kabul in late November 2001, Islamabad announced the severance of diplomatic relations with the Taliban regime (Pakistan was the last of the three states to recognize the Taliban government to do so). A new diplomatic mission began work in Kabul in January 2002. Pakistani consulates were opened in Jalalabad, Kandahar, Mazar-e Sharif. Cooperation between American and Pakistani intelligence services has been established. In early 2002, their joint operation achieved a major success: the arrest in Pakistan of the second most important person in “al-Qaeda”, Abu Zubaydah. The co-operation of Pakistani and US intelligence agencies also led to the arrest of Khalid Sheikh Mohammad first in Karachi and then in Rawalpindi (2002 and 2003), Ramzi bin al-Shibha in Karachi (2002) and others. Pakistan has given the US freedom of action in its airspace. The Americans were given temporary use of four air bases on Pakistani territory, which was of great importance to the US and its allies. Washington was satisfied with Pakistan's actions in Afghanistan (Moskalenko & Topychkanov, 2013). Of course, the most important problem for Pakistan was its involvement in the military sphere of the anti-terrorist campaign in Afghanistan. As already noted, Pakistan has become widely involved in this area. All his military activities were connected with other members of the anti-terrorist coalition, but, of course, its core was cooperation with Afghanistan and the United States. To coordinate activities, primarily military, a trilateral American-Afghan-Pakistani commission was established, which discussed the common activities of the three countries, current issues, problems of logistics, joint operations, coordination of intelligence services, etc. In order to avoid border conflicts, work was carried out within the framework of the trilateral commission to develop better cooperation in combating terrorist movements in border areas.

In particular, representatives of the three countries visited a number of points in the disputed areas along the “Durand Line”. Specialists from the United States conducted reconnaissance on the ground using global positioning equipment to fix the exact location of border posts and prevent incidents related to the crossing of the Pakistani border by American troops or aircraft. The United States has provided \$73 million for a programme to strengthen Pakistan's border security and law enforcement agencies. During the implementation of the program, military transport equipment, short-range and long-range communications equipment were transferred to Pakistan, and specialists were sent to train employees of local special services in modern methods of combating terrorism (Moskalenko & Topychkanov, 2013). Since 2002, the U.S. strategy in Pakistan's border areas has consisted of two main components. First, the most

important goal remained to capture “al-Qaeda” leaders. In 2005 and 2006, U.S. representatives began to exert pressure on Pakistan, trying to compel it to take stronger action against Taliban leaders and other groups in the country's border areas. But “al-Qaeda” remained the primary target. Second, regardless of the consequences, the U.S. expected the Pakistani government to take over most of the operations. The United States provided it with aid and occasional pinpoint strikes, but mostly relied on Pakistan. The United States Government annually provided assistance in excess of a billion dollars to the main security agencies of Pakistan responsible for conducting counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency activities: Pakistan Army, Frontier Corps, Frontier Constabulary and ISI. The Frontier Corps, the largest civilian paramilitary force, has nearly 100,000 personnel and is responsible for securing Pakistan's western border, which is nearly 6,000 kilometres long. The Border Police is a federal force that polices the border between the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and the rest of Pakistan. In addition, separate Border Police units carry out internal security tasks in other areas of Pakistan – for example, in the cities of Quetta, Karachi and Islamabad. The money also went through the channels of the State Department, the CIA and other government agencies (Wadsworth & Jones, 2010). But despite such a promising start, peace and stability have not come to Afghanistan. The militants were leaving en masse for Pakistan, which was worrying. In December 2001, after the fall of Kabul and Kandahar, a significant number of Taliban leaders fled to Pakistan's Baluchistan province. Among them was Mullah Omar. For example, in November, the Americans carried out a bombing strike on the kariz system (underground canals) in Kandahar, where, according to intelligence, Mullah Omar was hiding. In Afghanistan, such channels are often used to supply water from springs and rivers. They connect to the surface through vertical wells. Marine aircraft first dropped several 2,000 lb (907 kg) GBU-10 laser-guided guided bombs on the target, but missed. Subsequently, U.S. Air Force aircraft attacked the kariz systems with GBU-28 Bunker Buster guided bombs weighing 5,000 pounds (2,268 kg), specifically designed to destroy underground command posts. The warhead of such a bomb weighs 2 tons. The tunnel was destroyed, but Mullah Omar survived. He eventually made it to Pakistan. “Al-Qaeda” militants, including Osama bin Laden, were fleeing en masse across the Pakistani border. In November 2001, in one of his last public appearances, bin Laden delivered a sermon to tribal leaders at the Islamic Research Center in Jalalabad. He promised that the militants would be able to teach the Americans a lesson “similar to what they taught the Russians”. He was wearing a gray 'shalwar kameez' (a long shirt and loose-fitting trousers) commonly worn by Afghans, along with a camouflage jacket. According to some reports, he distributed cash to the chiefs in order to gain

their support. US intelligence officials believe that as many as 1,000 “al-Qaeda” militants have fled through Tora Bora and other parts of the border over the past few weeks. In mid-December 2001, according to American intelligence estimates, bin Laden left Tora Bora for the last time, accompanied by several guards and close aides. CIA operatives operating there repeatedly appealed to the military command to allocate an additional battalion of rangers to block bin Laden's escape routes, but it decided to rely on Afghan troops. According to some reports, bin Laden paid the Afghans to let him leave. The Pakistani military believed that “militants had taken refuge in urban areas and mixed with the local population”. The leaders of “Al-Qaeda” left by various routes, and bin Laden moved on horseback in a southerly direction, passing through several mountain passes used by CIA caravans during the war against the USSR. The Pashtuns, who live in numerous villages and towns scattered along the route on both sides of the border, supported the Taliban and helped bin Laden and his companions negotiate the snow-covered passes to the old Pakistani outpost at Parachinar. The CIA later determined that “a group of two hundred Saudis and Yemeni nationals ... were led by members of the Pashtun Gilzai tribe, who were paid in cash and weapons”. Pakistan's Frontier Corps, a force operating in the country's border areas, has detained a number of militants in the border area. Al-Qaeda members and foreign fighters were handed over to Pakistan's ISI intelligence agency, which in turn handed many of them over to the United States government. They ended up in secret prisons in Kandahar, Bagram and elsewhere. Members of Al-Qaeda hoped for their connections with Pakistani paramilitary groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba (Army of the Righteous), which operated in major cities like Lahore and Faisalabad, to help them evade Pakistani and American intelligence services. However, they did not want to stay in Pakistan because its government was co-operating with the United States. Sporadic operations by the Pakistan Army in South Waziristan have forced militants to withdraw to North Waziristan (Wadsworth & Jones, 2010). In 2002, an anti-insurgency campaign called “Al-Mizan” began in Pakistan. At that time, many senior American politicians considered Pakistan a reliable partner. “Pakistanis were part of the solution to the problem, not the problem. Musharraf helped very well. He really stood up to the radicalization of Pakistan”, Pentagon Chief Controller Dov Zackheim said at the time.

During operation Al-Mizan, the Pakistanis deployed approximately 70,000 to 80,000 troops to the Tribal Area. Despite the lack of relevant experience, the army and intelligence agencies were able to capture or kill such important al-Qaeda members as Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, Abu Faraj al-Libbi, Abu Zubaydah and Abu Talha al-Pakistani. In December 2001, the government used army units and the Frontier Corps against foreign fighters in the Kurram

and Khyber tribal agencies. Counter-insurgency operations were also conducted between 2002 and 2005, mainly in Balochistan, south of the Tribal Area, and in North and South Waziristan. Hundreds, if not thousands, of Pakistani soldiers died in the fighting. For example, in early 2004, Pakistani intelligence began receiving reports of “al-Qaeda” activity in the Wana Valley in South Waziristan. The Frontier Corps launched an operation against the militants in March, but when its units arrived in the valley, they were ambushed. It was a typical “Al-Qaeda” operation. The militants acted in exactly the same way in 2002 against the Americans conducting operation “Anaconda”. They occupied the surrounding hills and heights, and the soldiers of the Frontier Corps found themselves in the open below (Wadsworth & Jones, 2010). The militants fired a hurricane of fire from shelters on the slopes of the mountains, causing heavy losses among the border guards. Units of the Pakistani army were alerted to help those who were ambushed. 6,000 troops were deployed to the battle area, 600 of them by helicopter. They cordoned off the area around the ambush site and began combing the area. When they found the militants, the army units attacked and cleared the hillsides. Sixty-three militants were killed, thirty-six of whom turned out to be foreigners. Soldiers found and destroyed an al-Qaeda command centre and a network of tunnels with sophisticated electronic equipment.

In June 2004, after receiving several disturbing intelligence reports that a militant group of more than 200 Chechens and Uzbeks, several Arabs and several hundred of their local supporters was concentrating in the Shakai Valley, the Pakistani army struck the area. The operation, which began on June 10, involved 10,000 military personnel, as well as parts of the special forces task force and the Border Corps. The Pakistani military, with the help of US special operations forces and CIA agents, destroyed the main propaganda base and the main stronghold of the militants, which also housed a workshop for the manufacture of improvised explosive devices. Two trucks of televisions, computers, laptops, CDs, tape recorders and cassettes were taken out of one of the camps. But it was a tactical short-term success because the militants soon established a better fortified camp in Waziristan (Wadsworth & Jones, 2010). In general, operation “Al-Mizan” included several stages. During the operation, the Pakistani army managed to destroy or capture many local and foreign fighters. But it has failed to clear the region of paramilitary groups, including “Al-Qaeda” (Wadsworth & Jones, 2010). The next intensification of terrorists started in Balochistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and FATA (Federally Administered Tribal Areas) under the direct influence of developments in Afghanistan. It then occurred in other parts of Pakistan as well. The 2007 Lal Masjid (“Red Mosque”) in Islamabad contributed to some extent to this. For months, the capital has been the scene of an epic negotiation between the

authorities and Taliban morality police-inspired radicals holed up in the mosque. All this ended with the imposition of a curfew and, finally, the bloody storming of the mosque on July 10-11.

After the events of the summer of 2007, the radical minority began to act more aggressively against the authorities, security forces and the civilian population. While before the storming of the rebel mosque, the main terrorist attacks were in Balochistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and FATA, after it the terrorists, using in some cases former madrassa students of the mosque, have developed activity in Islamabad, Panjab and Sindh. It was in the Punjabi “garrison city” of Rawalpindi that Benazir Bhutto was assassinated on December 27, 2007. In 2007, a form of terrorism such as suicide attacks, which had not been typical before, spread in Pakistan: There were 57 such attacks in 2007, compared to 6 in 2006 and 22 in 2002-2006. And in 2008-2013, the total number of suicide attacks reached 2,357.

These features were reflected in the territorial organisation of the Taliban. Quetta, the main city of Balochistan province, was generally considered the centre of Afghan Taliban and international terrorists in Pakistan. According to a report by Stanley McChrystal, former commander of US forces in Afghanistan, a 15-member council headed by Mullah Omar, a “Taliban” leader, was formed in Quetta – “the Quetta Shura”. This council, according to the general, managed the Taliban's military operations inside Afghanistan.

However, the geography of the arrests showed that most “Taliban” and “Al-Qaeda” leaders were detained in Karachi, the main city of Sindh province, which is simultaneously the financial capital, main port and Pashtun exclave of Pakistan. Obviously, it was here that the main leaders of the Afghan Taliban moved, as evidenced by the arrests in 2010-2011, not only Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, the deputy of Mullah Omar, but also Maulvi Abdul Kabir, the shadow governor of Afghanistan's Nangarhar province; Mullah Muhammad Hassan, the former foreign minister of the Taliban regime; Mullah Abdul Kayyum Zakir, responsible for the armed actions of the Taliban militia; Mullah Abdul Raouf, the former head of the northeastern operational command of the Taliban; Mullah Ahmad Jan Akhundzada, the former governor of Afghanistan's Zabul province; and Mullah Muhammad Yunis, the former commander of Kabul's police. These arrests suggest that the “Karachi Shura” already surpasses the “Quetta Shura” in importance, if not replaces it at all (Moskalenko & Topychkanov, 2013). The United States included extensive counterterrorism assistance to Pakistan first in the “Surge Pakistan” strategy and then in the AfPak strategy, which signified the interdependence of security issues in Afghanistan and Pakistan. In line with these strategies, the U.S. began conducting intensive unmanned aerial

vehicle (UAV) strikes inside Pakistan. After the departure of Pervez Musharraf in 2008, the United States began to use UAVs more actively against targets in Pakistan.

The Pakistan Armed Forces, with intelligence and air support from the US, launched a large-scale operation that resulted in forcing the Taliban out of Swat and Buner and shifting hostilities to the border with Afghanistan - the FATA (Federally Administered Tribal Areas). Thanks to this operation, by the fall of 2009 the Taliban base in Pakistan was significantly reduced, which had a positive impact on the situation in neighboring Afghanistan. Of course, a very significant event was the discovery and elimination of Osama bin Laden in the Pakistani city of Abbottabad on May 2, 2011 (Operation "Neptune Spear"). Overall, according to the Bureau of Investigative Journalism, there was 1 drone strike on Pakistani territory in 2004, 3 in 2005, 3 in 2006, 5 in 2007, 38 in 2008, 55 in 2009, 128 in 2010, 75 in 2011, 48 in 2012, and 1,364 in 2013. As a result of all 369 strikes, 2,500 to 3,500 people were killed, mostly militants. But there were civilians among the dead. On average, 1 in 4 of those killed in UAV strikes were civilians and 1 in 18 were children. Their deaths have every time led to mass protests, fuelled anti-American sentiments and forced some Pakistanis to join militancy. Overall, the war in Afghanistan has contributed to a growing number of supporters of radical, extremist and terrorist organisations in Pakistan, which has threatened the institutions of power (Moskalenko & Topychkanov, 2013). Meanwhile, relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan are far from cloudless. There are complex issues involved. The main one is Kabul's failure to recognise the "Durand Line". There are other irritants as well. Pakistan has watched India's growing influence in Afghanistan with great apprehension. In Islamabad, one could hear the view that India was taking advantage of its advantages to engage in anti-Pakistan activities in Afghanistan and its consulates in many Afghan cities were outposts of such activities. However, in private conversations, some members of Pakistan's military establishment denied that there was any real cause for concern about Indian activity in Afghanistan (Moskalenko & Topychkanov, 2013). Pakistan's relations with Kabul's leadership under President Ashraf Ghani (President of Afghanistan since 2014) have been extremely tense and at some times outright hostile (Kortunov, 2021). Despite all this, Afghanistan and Pakistan continued to intensify efforts aimed at expanding security cooperation. On December 17, the Chief of the General Staff of Pakistan visited Kabul to discuss the coordination of security activities. After that, on December 23, a trilateral meeting was held in Pakistan between the Commander of the Afghan Army, the Commander of the International Security Assistance Force and the Chief of the General Staff of Pakistan. On January 11, 2015, the head of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan met

with President Ghani in Kabul. As a result of this meeting, an agreement was reached to resume the operation of joint border coordination centers at the Torkham and Spin Boldak checkpoints to ensure coordination of actions in the framework of counterterrorism operations along the shared borders. Legislative meetings were also held, and an Afghan delegation participated in the Afghan-Pakistani Parliamentary Security Dialogue on 31 December 2014. Meanwhile, on January 9, 2015, a delegation consisting of officials from political parties in Pakistan discussed issues of cooperation in combating terrorism and ensuring border security with senior officials in Kabul (United Nations General Assembly Security Council Sixty-ninth session Item 37, 2015).

### **Conclusion**

Pakistan needs a stable and predictable Afghanistan. Since the relations with Afghanistan were special: a large and difficult to control border, cultural and ethnic closeness and instability forced Pakistan to act very carefully. With the beginning of the war in Afghanistan in 2001, Pakistan, using military-political and economic benefits from the United States, simultaneously tried to neutralize its efforts in Afghanistan, thereby asserting itself as a local power, and also exerted influence on Afghanistan, protecting it from itself.

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