

Siyasal: Journal of Political Sciences

Research Article

Open Access

Analyzing the JDP Era through Class Struggles



M. Şafak Sağlam¹  

¹ Haliç University, Political Science and International Relations, Istanbul, Türkiye

Abstract

Several significant social changes have occurred during the 21-year tenure of the Justice and Development Party (JDP) government in Turkey. However, the scholarship on this period either utterly disregards the working class or depicts it as a passive demographic that is only affected by these changes. In other words, in the literature, the working class lacks agency. To fill this gap, this study examines the JDP government's role in relation to working class struggles. This analysis is based on labor protests between 2001 and 2019, obtained through newspaper reports of labor unrest. Based on this analysis, the JDP rule is divided into two periods: before and after 2010. In both periods, I illustrate that the working class was an agent of transformations, and it influenced transformations through bargaining processes and conflicts. In line with this analysis, this paper illustrates that the balance of power and class struggles between social classes constitutes an objective basis for understanding social and political transformations. Accordingly, based on new data, this study also contributes to the scholarly debate on authoritarianism, with an emphasis on the working-class agency.

Keywords


Justice and Development Party • Working class • Authoritarianism • Class struggles • Neoliberal transformation

Author Note

This article is based on Mertcan Şafak Sağlam's PhD dissertation entitled "Social classes against neoliberal transformation in Turkey: White collars and the traditional working class", supervised by Ahmet Bekmen.



“ Citation: Sağlam, M. Ş. (2025). Analyzing the JDP era through class struggles. *Siyasal: Journal of Political Sciences*, 34(1), 117-133. <https://doi.org/10.26650/siyasal.2025.34.1485156>

© This work is licensed under Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License. 

© 2025. Sağlam, M. Ş.

✉ Corresponding author: M. Şafak Sağlam safaksaglam@halic.edu.tr



Analyzing the JDP Era through Class Struggles

In the history of the Republic and since the introduction of multiparty elections, no party has held power in Turkey as long as the JDP has. During the JDP administration since 2002, Turkey witnessed essential socio-political transformations. During this period, many issues regarding social reconciliation, including ethnic, religious, and cultural, were reopened for discussion. The neoliberal transformation that began in the 1980s peaked during the JDP government and penetrated almost every aspect of society (Çelik, 2015, p. 618). Since the period was socially turbulent, the academic literature on the JDP government is extensive and diverse. However, two distinct periods can particularly be outlined in this literature.

The first period covers the period from 2002, when the JDP came to power, until the Gezi Park Protests (GPP) in 2013. Many studies during this period discussed the party's actions positively in terms of democratization, reformism, and economic policies (Erol, 2019, p. 664; Glombitza, 2021, p. 168). In particular, left-liberal intellectuals claim that there have been notable steps toward democratization and a divergence from the regime that followed the 1980 coup (Insel, 2003; Keyman & E. Öniş, 2007, pp. 224-225). Also influenced by this perspective, identity studies based on dichotomies such as secular-religious, Kurdish-Turkish, and Alevi-Sunni have come to the fore. Some studies also highlight the success of the economic policy, which supports the positive outlook during this period (Sezal & Sezal, 2018, p. 218). In the years following the 2001 economic crisis, the longest uninterrupted growth performance was achieved, and inflation was reduced to single digits (Kus, 2016, p. 43). Simultaneously, growth spread to the grassroots and increased incomes in almost all layers of society (Bahçe & Köse, 2017, p. 584). Boratav calls the economy of the 2000-2007 period the "Tulip Period" in reference to the brief period of social and intellectual revival in the 18th-century Ottoman Empire. Boratav emphasized the favorable economic conjuncture of the following years by stating that "during Turkey's multi-party years, it is difficult to find a more favorable date than 2002 for an opposition party to take over power." (Boratav, 2018, p. 241). During this period, the world economy experienced an uptick, and "capital flows to the economies on the periphery of the capitalist world system increased by 33 percent (according to the Institute of International Finance) or 48 percent (IMF data) on average each year" (Boratav, 2018, p. 242).

Although the left-liberal literature contains criticisms of JDP's pre-2013 policies, it emphasizes the progress made in democratization. Another approach, which emerged after the GPP in 2013, examines the government's actions more critically. These studies generally concur that the JDP administration has taken an even more authoritarian form. However, views vary on the causes and definitions of authoritarianism. The two main approaches that stand out are competitive authoritarianism, which represents a liberal-oriented analysis, and as the second one authoritarian statism, which represents a Marxist-oriented perspective, a form of governance that arose in response to the crises of the 1970s and politically enabled the rise of neoliberalism (Karahanoğulları & Duygu, 2018).

According to the competitive authoritarianism approach, the JDP's authoritarianism was driven by its patronage relationships with the business elite and the urban poor. Thanks to these relationships, the party did not feel the need to secure legitimacy through democratic means. The government's anti-democratic practices were also tolerated by the electorate, which benefited from these patronage relationships. The deterioration of the national economy during the JDP limited the allocation of resources and narrowed the party's coalition with the business community and the electorate, which in turn accelerated authoritar-

ianism (Esen & Gumuscu, 2021, p. 13). As a result, a competitive authoritarian regime was established. In such authoritarian regimes, the acquisition of political power appears to take place through democratic mechanisms, yet the ruling party resorts to authoritarian practices very often not to lose its position, so the regime often does not even meet the minimum standards of democracy (Levitsky & Way, 2002, p. 52). The ruling party's practices include a lack of electoral justice, restrictions on rights such as freedom of the press, freedom of expression, association, and assembly, and the unequal distance of state institutions from political parties (Levitsky & Way, 2002, p. 53). Research on Turkey using the competitive authoritarianism approach also underlines concrete facts such as the media bias in favor of the ruling party, the inequality of resources for organizing political campaigns, the politicization of state institutions, and problems with election security (Çalışkan, 2018, p. 7; Esen & Gumuscu, 2016, p. 1587). According to this approach, all political parties seem to have the possibility of becoming a government, but the competition between parties is manipulated in favor of the ruling party.

Another approach considers authoritarianism and neoliberalism in relation (Özkiziltan, 2019, p. 218). However, it differentiates between various authoritarian governance strategies. In one analysis using this framework, economic policy and labor relations were regulated by a neoliberal conservative governance approach until 2013, after which the accumulation regime and state crisis led to increasing authoritarianism (Akçay, 2021, p. 81). Another study emphasized that the rule-based/technocratic policy-making and formal/procedural democratic approach, which lasted until 2010, gave way to governance through fait accompli and overt coercion (Bozkurt-Güngen, 2018, pp. 220-223). Others have argued that financial neoliberalism underwent a crisis in peripheral countries in the early 2000s. From a Gramscian perspective, this crisis was overcome through an expansion of the historical bloc to include previously uncovered layers of capital and lower classes. In addition, a temporary period of prosperity has emerged in many peripheral countries due to the global proliferation of foreign capital flows. The form of governance based on this historical bloc has been referred to as neoliberal populism. This consensus became unsustainable after the 2008 global economic crisis, and authoritarianism rose (Özden, Bekmen, & Akça, 2018, p. 247). Although these narratives have continuity regarding the neoliberal approach, ruptures have occurred in the style of governance. However, it can also be stated that there was a continuous policy of authoritarian management of the labor force during the JDP period (Erol, 2019, p. 664; Özden, Akça, & Bekmen, 2017, p. 192).

Among the analyses discussed, those that examine JDP governments in relation to neoliberalism primarily adopt a class struggle perspective. Nevertheless, even these studies do not include the working class as an active agent of transformation (Birelma, Işıklı, & Sert, 2024, pp. 65,68; Pınar, 2021, p. 35). Generally, the working class is described as a passive victim of changes. Although they mention critical stages of neoliberal transformation, such as privatization, changes in labor laws, marketization, and even class reactions against them, this is usually done descriptively (Çelik, 2015; Erol, 2019).

Yet, as I argue based on new data, the working class often acted as the very subject of these processes. By doing so, it showed agency in class power relations. This agency is laid bare at every stage of the conflict process, from determining what needs to be transformed to the extent to which such transformation can be realized. To make this case, I will offer a reframing of the period of JDP rule, centering the agency of the working class.

Data Collection from Newspapers

Within the scope of this study, the analysis of the working class was carried out using newspaper-based protest event data. In the literature, there are national and international studies on collecting class actions data using a quantitative method. The most comprehensive one among these was conducted by the World Labor Research Group. This study collected data on the protests that occurred on a global scale between 1870 and 2000 through the Times and New York Times newspapers (Silver, 2015, p. 257). A study in Turkey using a similar data collection method is Erdem Yörük's, which collected data using the Turkish newspaper Cumhuriyet on odd days between 1970 and 2010 (Yörük, 2012). His study emphasizes the transition from the formal to the informal proletariat and the rising Kurdish and Islamic movements. Among similar studies, the Labor Studies Group, which has been publishing reports since 2015, collected the most detailed data. A larger group manages LSG data collection and publishes reports annually (Emek Çalışmaları Topluluğu, 2021).

The literature also contains critiques concerning the reliability of the use of newspaper data in the study of collective action (Earl, Martin, McCarthy, & Soule, 2004; Franzosi, 1987; Ortiz, Myers, Walls, & Diaz, 2006). Selection and description biases are the main forms of criticism. Selection bias is about the specific actions that are covered by newspapers. Description bias is how these actions are reported (Earl et al., 2004, pp. 68-73). The recommended approach to reduce the influence of these two biases is to increase the number of sources consulted (Earl et al., 2004, p. 74). However, this study was limited to a single source due to the length of the period covered. In this regard, Cumhuriyet was chosen because it is known for its sensitivity to labor news and has a relatively formal (the number of pages and the space allocated to labor news) and ideological consistency. This consistency allows for comparisons to be made between years regarding the number of protests. Index bias emphasizes actions that may be unnoticed because action data are collected through the newspaper's indexes (Earl et al., 2004, p. 68). Indexes were not utilized in this study. In addition to the quantitative data obtained from the newspaper, the news content was also subjected to analysis. The study was also conducted using secondary sources from the period.

The data presented in this study were obtained by the even-numbered days of the year covering the years 2001-2019. The data does not cover all social protests but are limited to those organized for work-related reasons by wage workers. The two main variables are protests and cases. Protest is defined as actions undertaken by wage earners in opposition to their employers or the government to secure or defend their labor rights. Case is defined as actions related to the same issue. In addition, the social class/groups of the employees who organized the protests and the reasons for the protests were used as variables.

Periodizing JDP Governments

Literature has shown that the JDP government can be divided into different periods regarding policies. In parallel, the quantitative changes in labor protests over the years prove the existence of various periods. [Figure 1](#), which indicates the number of protests, shows various patterns of increase and decrease in the number of protests over the years. The first pattern is the annual linear increase in protests from 2001 to 2005. The period between 2006 and 2010 also shows a similar trend. A continuous upward trend is also observed in [Figure 2](#), which indicates the number of cases. Based on the data in [Table 1](#), considering the reasons that triggered the protests and the workers' demands during these two periods, the interval between 2001 and 2010 can also be taken as a single period. These patterns align with JDP analyses that divide the period approximately as before and after 2010. However, while the pre-2010 JDP administration was perceived positively by left-liberal intellectuals, the agenda of these years in terms of workers' protests

was set by privatizations, marketization of public services, and demands for personal rights, particularly decreasing real wages. A bird's-eye view analysis proves that neoliberal transformation accelerated between 2001 and 2010, resulting in increased working-class reactions.

For the period after 2010, the number of protests and cases does not show such a clear pattern at first glance. Nevertheless, except for 2013 and 2017, worker activism has a general downward trend. The main reason for the high number in 2013 was the GPP, the most extensive mass democratic action in the republic's history. Various studies date the JDP's authoritarian turn to 2013 (Akçay, 2021, p. 81; Sezal & Sezal, 2018, pp. 221-226; Uysal, 2019, p. 16). As shown in [Figure 1](#), worker activism has remained high until this date.

Figure 1

Number of protests by year

Source: (Sağlam, 2023)





Figure 2

Number of cases by year

Source: (Sağlam, 2023)



The reason behind the high number of protests in 2017 was demonstrations against dismissal by decree law. These actions were generally carried out by politically engaged individuals with a political orientation. Therefore, they cannot be defined as mass protests. Furthermore, as a data source, Cumhuriyet newspaper's sensitivity towards these protests explains the high number of protests in the graph.

Table 1

Primary Causes of Protests by Period

Years / Causes of Protests	Privatization	Marketization	Employee Rights	Union Rights	Wage	Democracy	Occupational Safety	Unemployment
2001-2005	21%	10%	20%	12%	15%	11%	1%	4%
2006-2010	13%	7%	12%	11%	21%	19%	4%	5%
2001-2010	17%	8%	16%	11%	18%	16%	3%	5%
2011-2019	3%	0%	13%	14%	16%	34%	7%	7%

Source: (Sağlam, 2023)

Another factor distinguishing the period after 2010 is the change in the causes of protests. Before 2010, the opposition to the ascendancy of neoliberalism stood at the forefront. However, after 2010, the highest value came to be democratic freedoms. When we detail the reasons for protesting anti-democratic practices, the punishment of workers for their political views and attitudes is the primary one. Another leading reason is journalists' demands for the freedom of the press. In addition, the Kurdish issue, anti-secular practices, and corruption are other notable themes. Based on the workers' protests, the JDP government could be framed in two periods: before and after 2010.

Pre-2010 JDP Governments

Before delving into class actions, it is necessary to briefly discuss the state of the economy and social classes at the beginning of this period and the government policies that led to these actions. First, there is a case to be made that during the JDP era, the labor movement was relatively weak (Çelik, 2015, p. 618). Nevertheless, it should not be easily claimed that the working class was politically insignificant in Turkey at the onset of the 21st century. Curbed by the oppressive atmosphere following the coup d'état in September 12, 1980, working-class contention regained impetus via the Spring Actions in 1989 and 1990, the general work stoppage in 1991, and the Zonguldak miners' strike and march (Çelik, 1996, 2014). The mobilizations of the working class continued throughout the 90s (Akkaya, 1999; Koç, 2021; Üzümlü, 2011). Also during this period, public sector workers struggled first to have their unions recognized and then to win the right to collective bargaining, including the right to strike. All major trade unions demonstrated their eagerness to work collectively for a class-oriented mobilization by establishing the Labour Platform in 1999 (Üzümlü, 2011, p. 191).

The class struggle can be analyzed with its opposing sides. In contrast to the picture of the rising working class and the consolidation of their organizations, a fragmented landscape emerges for the power bloc. The working class confronted against a weak coalition government composed of the Democratic Left, Nationalist Movement, and Motherland Party. While none of these parties could surpass the national election threshold during the 2002 elections, the JDP managed to be the sole ruling party. However, it can be said that even the new party in power had a coalition within itself with different political views, including "moderate Islamists,

moderate nationalists, secular but socially conservative center-right voters, and a sizable number of liberal intellectuals" (Özbudun, 2006, p. 555). Furthermore, despite being the successor of the traditional lines of Turkish politics known as "Milli Görüş," or the main strand of Islamist politics led by Necmettin Erbakan, it was, after all, a new party and one that was not entirely accepted within the existing Status Quo.

From an economic perspective, the pre-JDP period was characterized by years of economic crisis, and the years encompassing the economic crisis (1998-2002) had an average growth rate of 1.0%, which is the lowest yearly rate in Turkey's history, save the years of the Second World War. The economy recovered after the JDP came to power, and the average growth rate for 2003-2007 rose to 7.3 percent. (Boratav, 2018, p. 254). Growth was also felt by lower-income groups. By 2007, the share of the working class in the total net financial wealth exceeded the 20% threshold. Indebtedness and social assistance programs also influenced the formation of this situation (Boratav, 2018, p. 254).

In this context, class struggles occur within the framework of neoliberal transformation. The period until 2010 can be interpreted as the construction of neoliberalism. The major aspects of this construction are the privatization of State Economic Enterprises, the marketization of public services, especially education and health, and the transformations in labor laws.

Privatizations

Privatization practices in Turkey were carried out at a slow pace until the 2001 crisis. After the crisis, privatization practices accelerated gradually (Erol, 2019, p. 665; Zaifer, 2018, p. 1). Based on numerical data, privatization revenues from 1986 to 2002 amounted to \$8.053 billion. In contrast, between 2003 and 2012, during the tenure of JDP governments, a total revenue of \$35.255 billion was generated from privatization (Toker & Angin, 2013, p. 76). As shown in Table 1, 17 percent of the working-class protests were against privatization.

The initial privatization efforts of the 2000s occurred within the banking sector, which suffered significant impacts from the economic crisis. In 2003, the number of existing banks decreased to 50 from 79 in 2001. The ratio of employees working in state-owned banks decreased by 42 percent from 1999 to 2004 and by 25 percent for the entire sector (Gençler, 2010). In this environment, Emlakbank and Türkbank were liquidated. Halkbank was put on the privatization agenda, but it was not realized in the end. Secondly, the abolition of the regional directorates of public institutions such as Rural Services and Highways, TCDD, 112, Retirement Fund, etc., came to the agenda. These changes represented more than just administrative modifications since they constituted implicit privatization. This paved the way for contractors and subcontractors to take over services previously operated by the public sector (TMMOB, 2005, p. 12). Thirdly, the privatization of state economic enterprises (SEEs), where protests reached the highest level, was carried out. While many SEEs were privatized during this period, the three cases in which protests were most intense were PETKİM, TÜPRAŞ, and TEKEL. The TEKEL protests represent the peak of reactions in all anti-privatization demonstrations.

If we consider privatization protests in a general sense, it becomes clear that they influence each other and exhibit shared repertoires of actions during the demonstrations. Typically, these protests commence within the confines of the enterprise ("Emlak Bankası çalışanları: Tasfiye istemiyoruz," 2001) and subsequently expand to encompass the vicinity of the enterprise, the local district/city where it is located ("Emlakbank çalışanları ayakta," 2001), and then, in a national context, move toward the capital city ("Bankayı hortumcular kapatamaz," ; "Emlakbank'ta tepkiler büyüyor," 2001). The repertoire of actions during these demonstrations includes elements such as press releases ("Emlakbank çalışanları ayakta," ; "Geleceğimiz

karartılıyor," 2001), placing advertisements in the media ("Köy Hizmetleri Genel Müdürlüğü Hakkında İftiralar ve Gerçekler," 2004), work slowdowns, marches within the vicinity of the enterprise ("İşçiler yürüdü," 2002), intercity marches from the city where the enterprise is situated to the capital ("KESK üyeleri Ankara'ya yürüyor," 2004), and large-scale rallies ("Söz bitti sıra eylemde," 2004).

During the privatization process of these three SEEs, this repertoire expanded. For example, strikes were practiced more frequently in PETKİM and TÜPRAŞ protests ("Tüpraş'ta eylemler sürüyor," ; "Tüpraş çalışanları yine eylemde," 2004). TEKEL protests represent the peak of the reactions among all anti-privatization demonstrations. A unique feature of the TEKEL protests was their creation of a permanent protest space ("Çadirkent'in muhtarı da oldu," 2010). Shortly after the start of their protests, the workers set up tents around the headquarters of the Confederation of Turkish Trade Unions (Türk-İş). They maintained their demonstrations at a fixed location for 78 days. Another unique feature of the TEKEL protests was the decision to call a general strike with the participation of almost all labor confederations (Bulut, 2010, pp. 344-345). Although the general strike did not achieve practical success, it showed the potential of establishing the unity of the whole working class through the TEKEL protests (Dönmez, 2020, pp. 524-525; Yalman & Topal, 2017, pp. 9,11).

In addition to these cases, privatization protests have also occurred in different enterprises. A general assessment of these protests is that they failed to halt the privatization process. In this regard, the failures in individual instances have impacted the objectives of subsequent protests. For example, in many protests, including the TEKEL protests, the goal of the workers was not to halt privatization but to secure public sector jobs for those working in the institutions to be privatized (Doğan, 2018, p. 267). Even though the working class obtained some concessions, it ultimately became weakened regarding labor organizations. The fact that unions in Turkey were organized mostly in the public sector also played a pivotal role in this context.

The Marketization of Education and Healthcare

Privatizations have restricted workers' opportunities for secure job contracts within the public sector. The marketization of public services, especially education and health, has similarly resulted for white-collar workers. Not all professions were equally affected by the process, but the overall process contributed to the precarization of white-collar workers. For instance, when considering educational services, the case in which teachers work in private schools for a minimum wage became possible solely due to marketization.

Educators opposed this neoliberal transformation process through their actions. The other main reasons for the protests in the education sector were secularism and ethnic issues. During this period, the largest numbers of protests reported in newspapers occurred in 2005, 2007, and 2012. In 2005, the reason for most of the protests was the closure case against the union Eğitim-Sen. The lawsuit was filed due to the statement on education in the mother tongue in the "Aims of the Union" section of the union's statute ("Kapatılmaya ikinci kez ret," 2005). In this respect, it appears to be related to the Kurdish issue. However, it is also interpreted as an illiberal attitude toward the freedom of union organization. Another notable action that year was the Great Educators' March, organized by the same union. Here, educators protested in different provinces, and then a representative group of teachers marched to the capital. The cross-country march ended with a large rally in Ankara. The union members emphasized their demand for free and high-quality education. Needless to say, demand was in stark contrast to the ongoing neoliberal transformation.

In 2007, educators organized again, including work stoppages. The prominent discourses in these protests were anti-neoliberalism, anti-reactionism ("Eğitimciler meydanlarda," 2007), and various demands such as

wage increases ("Eğitimcilerden sevk eylemi," 2007), and nepotism in the delegations ("Eğitimciler meydanlarda hak aradı," 2007). Additionally, several nationwide protests were organized against the terrorist acts that took place in the same year. The upper echelons of universities and academicians participated in these protests ("Türkiye tek yürek oldu," 2007). In 2012, protests took place against the regulation regarding educational content and duration at different levels, popularly known as the 4+4+4 law. The protests highlighted concerns about the quality of education and secularism ("Bütün çocuklar risk altında," 2012).

Neoliberal transformation also occurred in the health sector, affecting the recipients of health services and workers. Table 2 quantitatively evaluates this, indicating a rise in doctor and nurse employment within the private sector. The number of beds in public hospitals increased by 136% between 2002 and 2018, whereas in private hospitals, the increase was 405% (T.C. Sağlık Bakanlığı, *Sağlık İstatistikleri Yıllığı 2018*, 2018). The growth in auxiliary staff and hospital capacities demonstrates that the nature of the private sector's role in the health sector has changed. The role of private healthcare providers has evolved from a minor and specialized service to a more comprehensive service comparable to that of the public sector.

Table 2

Number of Physicians and Nurses Employed in Public And Private Institutions by Year

Years	Doctors		Nurses	
	Public	Private	Public	Private
1999*	64892	11329	60595	4020
2018	123699	29429	126891	34345
Change Rate	191%	260%	209%	854%

Note: *Total of SSK and university hospitals affiliated with the Ministry of Health.

Source: (T.C. Sağlık Bakanlığı 2000-2018 *Sağlık İstatistikleri Yıllığı 2018*)

Publicly known as The Full-Time Employment Law, Law No. 5947, enacted in 2010, notably impacted the private healthcare sector. Before implementation, physicians were permitted to operate their private practices and public institutional positions. However, the law stipulates that doctors must resign from their public positions or close their private clinics. In the education sector, the phenomenon of non-appointed teachers has accelerated marketization by creating a pool of cheap labor power. Similarly, in the healthcare sector, the Full-Time Employment Law restricted doctors' petty bourgeois-style working arrangements and contributed to the commodification of healthcare.

During this period, we counted the largest number of protests from the health sector in newspapers in 2004, 2010, and 2011. On March 11-12, 2004, health workers performed a work stoppage supported by various marches and protests. They carried out these actions under the slogan "'G(ö)revdeyiz' - We are on duty," emphasizing that it was healthcare workers duty to defend the people's right to health. Simultaneously, they demanded improvements in their working conditions ("İnsanca yaşam için g(ö)rev," 2004). Continuing similar actions throughout the year, doctors started marches from 6 provinces to Ankara in June and completed their march with a large rally in Ankara. This event, named the "White March for Hope," echoed similar themes in opposition to the commodification of healthcare. The Turkish Medical Association led the protests. ("Hekimler alanlara çıktı," 2004). Furthermore, in December of the same year, led by The Health and Social Services Workers Trade Union (SES), workers protested the transfer of Social Security Institution (SSK) hospitals to the public, expressing concerns about privatization and marketization. Across several provinces, they stopped working for a brief period and rallied ("Sağlık emekçileri: SSK halkındır satılamaz," 2004). Afterward, these protests grew much larger under the leadership of the Labor Platform.

In 2010, the protests were primarily focused on the Full-Time Employment Law. Doctors emphasized the aspect of the law that harnessed the labor of health workers and proletarianize. While the protests continued the following year, a work stoppage took place at the medical faculties of Istanbul University in November 2011. It is emphasized during the action that the Full-Time Law causes the loss of qualified staff; therefore, no expert personnel are left to perform the surgeries. Protesters also criticized Performance System ("Kölelik yasasına hayır," 2010).


Post-2010 JDP Governments

Post-2010 Turkish politics is commonly interpreted through the concept of authoritarianism. While the number of actions and cases increased annually in the previous period, the fact that they tended to decrease in this period seems compatible with the authoritarianism narrative. Beyond this, another critical factor is the change in the reasons for contentions. During this period, approximately one-third of the protests encompassed democratic demands. In summary, the nature of the protests after 2010 palpably differed from before.

One of the most significant reasons for the change in the content of the protests was the alterations in labor and public sector unionism. In the biggest union confederation, Türk-İş, the influence of the JDP started to increase from 2007 onwards (Erol & Şahin, 2023, p. 137). This influence became particularly evident during the protests against the Social Security and General Health Insurance law in 2008. Türk-İş participated in the joint movement at the beginning, just like in the previous Labor Platform protests ("Emekçilerden 2 saatlik uyarı," 2008). However, as the protests continued to grow, Türk-İş adopted a more passive stance ("Emekçilere Polis Jopu," 2008). The most concrete criticism of this stance came from the leader of the main opposition party, who stated, "Türk-İş" is said to be the backyard of the JDP. Well, it's not the backyard, it's the front yard" ("Türk-İş AKP'nin ön bahçesi," 2008). Members of the confederation also reacted to its transformation, prompting the formation of 'Sendikal Güç Birliği' by ten unions within the confederation ("Yeni sendikal güç birliğine doğru," 2011). This coalition aimed to take control of the confederation's leadership in the next congress but was unsuccessful. The transformation of Türk-İş also marked the de facto end of the Labor Platform.

Another significant transformation occurs in the struggle of civil servants. The trade unions covering civil servants represent three different lines. KESK, which is more militant, has experienced a decline in membership, while Memur-Sen, closely affiliated with the ruling party, has dramatically increased its membership. In 2009, Memur-Sen surpassed Kamu-Sen in terms of membership and became authorized to negotiate wage increases. Following this development, protests by public employees decreased gradually after 2010. The decline in organized labor movements resulted in a reduction in the massify of protests. Especially after 2016, with the declaration of emergency law, most protests were carried out by small groups or politically conscious pioneers.



Figure 3*Membership ratios of public service unions**Source: Derived from Trade Union Statistics of Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Labour and Social Security*

A further factor contributing to the reduction in the number of protests is the intensification of restrictions and the introduction of more punitive measures against protests. Not incidentally, while the number of prohibitions on protests was an average of 10 per year between 2007-2010, it began to increase following the GPP and reached its peak after the declaration of a state of emergency in 2016, with an average of 48 per year between 2011-2019 (Arslanalp & Erkmen, 2020, p. 110). A similar trend is evident in the findings of the V-DEM Institute report. In the report, the freedom of peaceful assembly is evaluated on a five-point scale, with an average of 2.5 for the years between 2001 and 2010 and a mean of 1.12 for the years between 2011 and 2019. For reference, a score of 1 corresponds to "State authorities rarely allow peaceful assemblies, but generally avoid using lethal force to prevent them." (Coppedge et al., 2024).

Finally, the 4857 Labour Law, implemented in 2003 to enable flexible employment conditions, has significantly affected labor relations and worker activism. With this law, subcontracted labor relations became widespread in the public sector. Although not yet prevalent, sub-contracting has been implemented across various professions, from theatre actors to imams and preachers ("AKP önünde imam eylemi," ; "İş güvencesi istiyoruz" 2011). The municipal and health sectors stand out as two fields where subcontracting is most widespread. While protests against subcontracted labor arrangements have emerged in many different sectors, the struggles of healthcare workers have been particularly prominent ("Sağlık çalışanından '15 acil talep,'" 2011).

In conclusion, the weakening of trade unions, the loss of trust among workers in unions, the increasing authoritarian practices of the government, and the growing costs of participating in protests in the precarious employment environment have all contributed to both a shift in the reasons for protests and a decrease in their frequency.

Gezi Park Protests

Gezi Park Protests are particularly prominent among the protests during this period. These protests, which occurred in 2013, were not only the defining moments of this decade but also the most extensive social movement in the history of Turkey. It is also possible to consider the protests as the culmination of

the class movements that gained momentum in the 2000s. Various studies have also considered 2013 as the milestone date of the authoritarian turn of the JDP government (Akçay, 2021, p. 88; Uysal, 2019, p. 16).

The GPP emerged in response to a proposal to regulate Taksim Square and its surroundings. The focus of the reactions was the plan for a shopping center in the park adjacent to the square. As this project became official in early 2012, various social groups began to react. In February 2012, the Taksim Solidarity platform was established under the leadership of TMMOB, DİSK, and KESK, along with various other trade unions, professional chambers, and NGOs ("AKP'nin Taksim Projesi'ne karşı Taksim Dayanışması kuruldu," 2012). This organization tried to raise awareness and prevented the plan through protests ("Taksim için insan zinciri," 2012). However, they had scant success initially. In late May 2013, with the beginning of construction activities in Gezi Park, the protests started again and quickly turned massive. By the end of the first month of the GPP, the protests had spread to 79 out of 81 cities, with around 2.5 million participants (İnsan Hakları Derneği 2013). It took several months for the protests to subside.

The GPP not only stands out as the largest protest during the period in question but also a catalyst for other protests. Almost every protest in 2013 and 2014 sought affiliation to Gezi Park, often adapting GPP's slogans and demands to their actions. Additionally, it causes an increase in environmentalist protests. In short, the GPP created hegemonic power over the protests in subsequent years. The high number of protests in 2013 and 2014 should be understood in the context of GPP and the dynamism it unleashed. However, this impact was not enduring and gradually fizzled out in the medium term.

Did the protests have a class dimension? There is no easy answer. According to the foreign press, participants in the protests were predominantly of the secular or young middle class (David & Toktamış, 2015, p. 34). Various academic studies have also described the participants as middle-class, triggered by democratic sensitivities. In contrast, some studies have critiqued middle-class thesis. One emphasizes the fault lines that could exacerbate class conflict triggered by the policies implemented by the JDP to facilitate capital accumulation (Ercan & Oğuz, 2015). The second focuses on the political and ideological dimensions of these politics. Both highlight the labor-capital contradiction in the protests through an analysis of participant profiles and demands of protests (Can Gürcan & Peker, 2015). Another quantitative study on the participant profile states that the protesters were predominantly from the working class. They are followed by white-collar and nonmanual workers who work in jobs that do not require high qualifications—followed by the petty bourgeoisie as third and professionals in fourth place. These data make it difficult to argue that Gezi was a middle-class movement (Yörük & Yüksel, 2015, pp. 137-138).

Nevertheless, compared to their representation within the overall population, it becomes evident that White Collar workers had a significantly higher participation rate in the Gezi protests than the working class. Moreover, this gap further widened in favor of white-collar workers if we consider only Gezi Park and its surroundings as the protest area. As a result of this data, it can be stated that white-collar workers are more attentive and support them intensively within their strata (Yörük & Yüksel, 2015, p. 156). Therefore, white-collar workers stand out in adopting and pioneering the Gezi Park protests compared to other social groups.

Protests Against Anti-Democratic Practices

The rise of authoritarianism has had consequences in many areas, including restrictions on freedom of thought, meetings and demonstrations, the rise of nationalism, and interference in lifestyles. As a result, the demands of the protests have changed accordingly (Dönmez, 2020, p. 526). One of the most prominent protests in this respect is against the dismissals by decree-law. Many individuals and groups, such as Acad-

emics for Peace, participated in these protests. However, these protests lacked widespread mobilizations and were limited to a few pioneering individuals. One of the notable instances was the protests led by Nuriye Gülmen and Semih Özakça, visibly associated with the protests. According to data compiled from the newspaper, 93 of the 168 democratic protests organized in 2017 were related to them. In addition to Gülmen and Özakça, many employees in similar situations also staged protests. The protests against the dismissals lasted quite a long. For example, Gülmen's protest lasted 433 days. These non-mass protests were often violently broken up by security forces.

Press freedom is another major cause of democratic protests. Numerous mass protests occurred between the prosecution of several well-known journalists and investigations against various media outlets. In 2012, known as the 4+4+4 Education System was a prominent issue that triggered democratic protests. The Kurdish issue and government corruption were the other two topics on which democratic protests were rising.

Other Protest Movements

During this period, significant protests occurred within the aviation and metal industries. A common characteristic was the high level of unionization compared to other sectors (T.C. Çalışma ve Sosyal Güvenlik Bakanlığı 2016). In the aviation sector, more than half of the employees were unionized. At this point, the JDP's bill of legislation, which aimed to weaken the collective power of unionized workers, sparked the conflict. According to a provision in the bill, companies would be permitted to carry out 40% of their activities in the event of a strike. Furthermore, the employer could determine the personnel needed to carry out the activities. The sector's largest union considered this provision as undermining the practice of strikes and eliminating the influence of unions ("Hava-İş Sendikası'ndan Kamuoyunu Bilgilendirme Duyurusu," 2012). When airline workers began to mobilize against this proposal, the employer responded with a lockout. The struggle lasted months and included legal proceedings, a 219-day strike, and 571 days of unemployment for the dismissed employees. Eventually, the bill was enacted, but the employees dismissed during the protests were reinstated.

In 2015, the metal sector experienced one of the biggest waves of strikes in its history. The cause of these protests was low wages. Workers started the actions spontaneously since their union was insensitive to their situation. During negotiations with the employers, their demands consisted of improvements in wages, the ability to elect their representatives, and job security for those participating in the protests (Taştan, 2015). Renault workers were the first to launch the strike, and each subsequent day, a new factory joined the strikes. By the fifth day of the strikes, production was halted in several factories employing a total of 12600 workers ("Metalde genel direniş: Reno, Tofaş, Coşkunöz, Mako'dan sonra Ototirim," Muzaffer Özkurt 2015). During these strikes, the focus of the protests was not directed only on the employers but also the union. Subsequently, mass resignations occurred in its membership (Özveri, 2016, p. 715). This strike wave, also called "Metal Storm," led to substantial improvements for the workers (Taştekin, 2019).

Finally, the number of occupational safety protests increased during this period. In particular, accidents resulting in fatalities in shipyards frequently led to protests ("Tersane işçileri tabutla yürüdü," 2015; "Tuzla'da iş cinayetlerine protesto," 2013). The relatives of victims of work accidents have established various organizations to draw attention to occupational safety. These organizations held regular demonstrations called "Conscience and Justice Watch" ("Devlet adaleti sağlasın," 2019).

Let me circle back to the steps taken toward marketization in the education sector in the pre-2010 period. The result of this marketization manifested itself as mass unemployment among teachers after 2010. The

"Non-Appointed Teachers Platform," established in 2009, effectively drew public attention to this issue through their subsequent activism (Kiraz & Kurul, 2018, p. 286).

Results

This study aims to demonstrate that during the JDP rule, the working class actively participated in determining the extent and nature of neoliberal transformation, contrary to its often repeated image as a passive collective victim. This is evident also through numerous class actions that hegemonized themselves, thus shaping public opinion and many actions not covered in this study. Dividing the JDP regime into two periods primarily based on authoritarianism and ignoring these actions would result in an incomplete analysis.

The causes of workers' protests demonstrate that the JDP government tried to establish neoliberal labor relations in its first period, which could be extended until 2010 or 2013. In this period, the working class has been putting a tough fight against neoliberal transformation from the beginning, and although its actions have not entirely halted it, they have limited it to a certain extent. In the post-2013 period, the decline of class organizations and the precarious working environment led to a decrease in the number of protests, and the protests became unorganized, more singular, and limited to politically-engaged militants. The government became authoritarian during this period, and the deterioration of the working class situation became more and more concrete due to neoliberal flexible employment policies. Even though it has become more challenging and perilous for workers to demand their rights under an authoritarian regime, their current situation, characterized by precarious working conditions resulting from neoliberal transformation, causes workers to be exposed to loss of rights much more frequently, which forces them to take action more than before. Therefore, it is necessary to wait for class reactions to emerge. It should be noted that the JDP consciously prefers authoritarianism as a management strategy to suppress possible contentions. Although the authoritarianization of power affects the pattern of workers' actions, the source of this authoritarianization lies in the increased potential for action caused by the workers' deteriorating conditions.



Peer Review	Externally peer-reviewed.
Conflict of Interest	The author has no conflict of interest to declare.
Grant Support	The author declared that this study has received no financial support.

Author Details

M. Şafak Sağlam (Dr.)

¹ Haliç University, Political Science and International Relations, İstanbul, Türkiye

 0000-0001-7660-9187  safaksaglam@halic.edu.tr

References

- Akçay, Ü. (2021). Authoritarian consolidation dynamics in Turkey. *Contemporary Politics*, 27(1), 79-104.
- Akkaya, Y. (1999). 1990'lı Yıllarda Türkiye'de Grevler. *Ankara Üniversitesi SBF Dergisi*, 54(2).
- AKP önünde imam eylemi. (8.2.2011). *Cumhuriyet*, p. 9.
- AKP'nin Taksim Projesi'ne karşı Taksim Dayanışması kuruldu. (02.03.2012). Retrieved from <https://haber.sol.org.tr/kent-gundemleri/akpnin-taksim-projesine-karsi-taksim-dayanismasi-kuruldu-haberi-52230>
- Bahçe, S., and Köse, A. H. (2017). Social Classes and the Neo-Liberal Poverty Regime in Turkey, 2002–2011. *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, 47(4), 575-595.



- Bankayı hortumcular kapatamaz. (2001, June 10, 2001). *Cumhuriyet*.
- Birelma, A., Işıklı, E. and Sert, H. D. (2024). The stubborn persistence of working-class protest in Turkey in an age of authoritarian neoliberalism. *Turkish Studies*, 25(1), 64-91.
- Boratav, K. (2018). *Türkiye İktisat Tarihi*. Ankara: İmge Kitabevi.
- Bozkurt-Güngen, S. (2018). Labour and Authoritarian Neoliberalism: Changes and Continuities Under the AKP Governments in Turkey. *South European Society and Politics*, 23(2), 219-238.
- Bulut, Ç. K. (2010). Ülke-Gündem-Direnış. In G. Bulut (Ed.), *TEKEL Direnişinin Işığında Gelenekselden Yeniye İşçi Sınıfı Hareketleri* (pp. 317-368). Ankara: Nota Bene Yayınları.
- Bütün çocuklar risk altında. (24.2.2012). *Cumhuriyet*, p. 4.
- Can Gürcan, E., and Peker, E. (2015). A class analytic approach to the Gezi Park events: Challenging the 'middle class' myth. *Capital & Class*, 39(2), 321-343.
- Çadırkent'in muhtarı da oldu. (20.2.2010). *Cumhuriyet*.
- Çakır, M. (4.4.2011). 'İş güvencesi istiyoruz'. *Cumhuriyet*, p. 8.
- Çalışkan, K. (2018). Toward a new political regime in Turkey: From competitive toward full authoritarianism. *New Perspectives on Turkey*, 58, 5-33.
- Çelik, A. (1996). Bahar Eylemleri, 1989. In *Türkiye Sendikacılık Ansiklopedisi* (pp. 103-104).
- Çelik, A. (2014). Mücadeleden Vesayete Türkiye'de Kamu Görevlileri Sendikacılığı. *Eleştirel Pedagoji*, 34, 22-27.
- Çelik, A. (2015). Turkey's New Labour Regime Under the Justice and Development Party in the First Decade of the Twenty-First Century: Authoritarian Flexibilization. *Middle Eastern Studies*, 51(4), 618-635.
- David, I., & Toktamış, K. F. (2015). Introduction
- Gezi in Retrospect. In I. David and K. F. Toktamış (Eds.), *Everywhere Taksim* (pp. 15-26): Amsterdam University Press.
- Derneği, İ. H. (2013). *Gezi Parkı Direnişi ve Sonrasında Yaşananlara İlişkin Değerlendirme Raporu*. Retrieved from Ankara:
- Devlet adaleti sağlasın. (8.7.2019). *Cumhuriyet*, p. 6.
- Doğan, M. G. (2018). Örgütlü İşçi Hareketinin Sindirilmesi. In İ. Akça, A. Bekmen, & B. A. Özden (Eds.), *"Yeni Türkiye'ye Varan Yol* (pp. 261,278). İstanbul: İletişim.
- Dönmez, P. E. (2020). Against austerity and repression: Historical and contemporary manifestations of progressive politicisation in Turkey. *Environment and Planning C: Politics and Space*, 39(3), 512-535.
- Earl, J., Martin, A., McCarthy, J. D., & Soule, S. A. (2004). The Use of Newspaper Data in the Study of Collective Action. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 30, 65-80.
- Eğitimciler meydanlarda hak aradı. (26.4.2007). *Cumhuriyet*, p. 9.
- Eğitimciler meydanlarda. (8.4.2007). *Cumhuriyet*, p. 6.
- Eğitimcilerden sevk eylemi. (22.4.2007). *Cumhuriyet*, p. 4.
- Emek Çalışmaları Topluluğu. (2021). *İşçi Sınıfı Eylemleri Raporu 2021*. Retrieved from emekcalisma.org.
- Emekçilerden 2 saatlik uyarı. (14.3.2008). *Cumhuriyet*, p. 6.
- Emekçilere Polis Jopu. (2.4.2008). *Cumhuriyet*, p. 1.
- Emlak Bankası çalışanları: Tasfiye istemiyoruz. (May 18, 2001). *Cumhuriyet*.
- Emlakbank çalışanları ayakta. (2001, May 19, 2001). *Cumhuriyet*.
- Emlakbank'ta tepkiler büyüyor. (2001, June 17, 2001). *Cumhuriyet*.
- Ercan, F., & Oğuz, Ş. (2015). From Gezi resistance to Soma massacre: Capital accumulation and class struggle in Turkey. *Socialist Register*, 51(1), 114-135.
- Erol, M. E. (2019). State and Labour under AKP Rule in Turkey: An Appraisal. *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies*, 21(6), 663-677.
- Esen, B. and Gumuscu, S. (2016). Rising competitive authoritarianism in Turkey. *Third World Quarterly*, 37(9), 1581-1606.
- Esen, B., & Gumuscu, S. (2021). Why did Turkish democracy collapse? A political economy account of AKP's authoritarianism. *Party Politics*, 27(6), 1075-1091.
- Franzosi, R. (1987). The Press as a Source of Socio-Historical Data: Issues in the Methodology of Data Collection from Newspapers. *Historical Methods: A Journal of Quantitative and Interdisciplinary History*, 20(1), 5-16.
- Geleceğimiz karartılıyor. (2001, May 28, 2001). *Cumhuriyet*.



- Gençler, A. (2010). 2001 Ekonomik Krizin Bankacılık Sektöründe İstihdama Etkisi. *Journal of Social Policy Conferences*, 50, 351-365
- Glombitza, O. (2021). From exceptionalism to normalization: the radical transformation of the Republic of Turkey. *Turkish Studies*, 22(2), 167-175.
- Hava-İş Sendikası'ndan Kamuoyunu Bilgilendirme Duyurusu. (2.3.2012). *Cumhuriyet*, p. 6.
- Hekimler alanlara çıktı. (11.6.2004). *Cumhuriyet*, p. 7.
- İnsanca yaşam için g(ö)rev. (11.3.2004). *Cumhuriyet*, p. 3.
- Insel, A. (2003). The AKP and normalizing democracy in Turkey. *The South Atlantic Quarterly*, 102(2), 293-308.
- İşçiler yürüdü. (2002, 30.4.2002). *Cumhuriyet*.
- Kapatılmaya ikinci kez ret. (22.3.2005). *Cumhuriyet*, p. 7.
- Karahanoğulları, Y., & Duygu, T. (2018). Otoriter devletçilik, neoliberalizm, Türkiye. *Mülkiye Dergisi*, 42(3), 403-448.
- KESK üyeleri Ankara'ya yürüyor. (2004, 19.11.2004). *Cumhuriyet*, p. 4.
- Keyman, F., & E. Öniş, Z. (2007). Globalization and Social Democracy in the European Periphery: Paradoxes of the Turkish Experience. *Globalizations*, 4(2), 211-228.
- Kiraz, Z., & Kurul, N. (2018). Türkiye'de öğretmen işsizliği ve ataması yapılmayan öğretmenler hareketi. *Mersin Üniversitesi Eğitim Fakültesi Dergisi*, 14(1), 270-302.
- Koç, Y. (2021). *Türkiye İşçi Sınıfı Tarihi*. İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları.
- 'Kölelik yasasına hayır'. (16.1.2010). *Cumhuriyet*, p. 6.
- Köy Hizmetleri Genel Müdürlüğü Hakkında İftiralar ve Gerçekler. (2004, 28.2.2004). *Cumhuriyet*, p. 7.
- Kus, B. (2016). Financial Citizenship and the Hidden Crisis of the Working Class in the "New Turkey". *Middle East Report*(278), 40-48.
- Levitsky, S., & Way, L. A. (2002). Elections without democracy: The rise of competitive authoritarianism. *Journal of democracy*, 13(2), 51-65.
- Metalde genel direniş: Reno, Tofaş, Coşkunöz, Mako'dan sonra Ototirir. (Muzaffer Özkurt, 20.5.2015). Retrieved from <https://www.evrensel.net/haber/113206/metalde-genel-direnis-reno-tofas-coskunoz-makodan-sonra-ototirir>
- Müdürlüğü, T. C. Ç. v. S. G. B. Ç. G. (2016). *2015 Çalışma Hayatı İstatistikleri*.
- Ortiz, D., Myers, D., Walls, E., & Diaz, M. E. (2006). Where Do We Stand with Newspaper Data? *Mobilization: An International Quarterly*, 10(3), 397-419.
- Özbudun, E. (2006). From political Islam to conservative democracy: the case of the Justice and Development Party in Turkey. *South european society & politics*, 11(3-4), 543-557.
- Özden, B. A., Akça, İ., & Bekmen, A. (2017). Antinomies of authoritarian neoliberalism in Turkey. *States of discipline: Authoritarian neoliberalism and the contested reproduction of capitalist order*, 189.
- Özden, B. A., Bekmen, A., & Akça, İ. (2018). Passive revolution: Beyond a politicist approach. *Development and Change*, 49(1), 238-253.
- Özkiziltan, D. (2019). Authoritarian neoliberalism in AKP's Turkey: an industrial relations perspective. *Industrial Relations Journal*, 50(3), 218-239.
- Özveri, M. (2016). Yasaklarla Şekillenmiş Endüstri İlişkileri Sistemi ve 2015 Metal İşçileri Direnişi. *Çalışma ve Toplum*, 49(2), 701-725.
- Pınar, E. (2021). A labour-oriented perspective on regime discussions in Turkey. In *Regime Change in Turkey* (pp. 32-48): Routledge.
- Sağlam, M. Ş. (2023). *Report on Working Class Protests between 2001-2019 in Turkey*.
- Sağlık çalışanından '15 acil talep'. (14.4.2011). *Cumhuriyet*, p. 7.
- Sağlık emekçileri: SSK halkındır satılamaz. (8.12.2004). *Cumhuriyet*, p. 6.
- Sağlık İstatistikleri Yıllığı 2018*. (2018).
- Sezal, M. A., & Sezal, İ. (2018). Dark taints on the looking glass: Whither 'New Turkey'? *Turkish Studies*, 19(2), 217-239.
- Silver, B. (2015). *Emeğin Gücü: 1870'ten Günümüze İşçi Hareketleri ve Küreselleşme* (A. Önal, Trans.). İstanbul: Yordam Kitap.
- Söz bitti sıra eylemde. (2004, 21.11.2004). *Cumhuriyet*, p. 9.
- Taksim için insan zinciri. (4.3.2012). *Cumhuriyet*, p. 3.
- Taştan, O. (2015). Türk-Metal Üyesi İşçilerin 2015 Eylemleri: Metal Sektöründe Fabrika Rejimi Üzerine Mücadelelerin Tarihi Açısından Bir Değerlendirme. *Mülkiye Dergisi*, 39(3), 305-342.
- Taştekin, U. (2019). *The metal storm: 2015 wave of strikes in The Turkish automotive sector*. (Yüksek Lisans Tezi). Orta Doğu Teknik Üniversitesi,
- Tersane işçileri tabutla yürüdü. (12.4.2015). *Cumhuriyet*.



- TMMOB. (2005). 5286 Sayılı Köy Hizmetleri Genel Müdürlüğünün Kaldırılması Ve Bazı Kanunlarda Değişiklik Yapılması Hakkındaki Kanun Hukukun Genel İlkelerine Anayasal Kurallara Kamu Yararına Sosyal Devlete Aykırıdır. Retrieved from https://www.zmo.org.tr/resimler/ekler/7cfdde9db36af8e_ek.pdf?tipi=38&turu=D&sube=0
- Toker, P. B., & Angın, M. (2013). AKP Döneminde Türkiye'de Büyük Ölçekli Özelleştirmeler ve Devletin Dönüşümü. *Praksis*, 31, 77-98.
- Tuzla'da iş cinayetlerine protesto. (16.1.2013). *Cumhuriyet*, p. 6.
- Tüpraş çalışanları yine eylemde. (2004, January 27, 2004). *Cumhuriyet*, p. 5.
- Tüpraş'ta eylemler sürüyor. (2004, February 7, 2004). *Cumhuriyet*.
- Türk-İş AKP'nin ön bahçesi. (30.3.2008). *Cumhuriyet*, p. 5.
- Türkiye tek yürek oldu. (12.10.2007). *Cumhuriyet*, p. 6.
- Uysal, G. (2019). Charity state: neoliberalism, political Islam, and class relations in Turkey. *New Proposals: Journal of Marxism and Interdisciplinary Inquiry*, 10(1), 16-28.
- Üzüm, T. (2011). *KESK TARİHİ: Kamu Çalışanlarının Sendikal Mücadele Süreci*. İstanbul: Kalkedon Yayınları.
- Yalman, G. L., & Topal, A. (2017). Labour Containment Strategies and Working Class Struggles in the Neoliberal Era: The Case of TEKEL Workers in Turkey. *Critical Sociology*, 45(3), 447-461.
- Yeni sendikal güç birliğine doğru. (2.7.2011). *Cumhuriyet*, p. 13.
- Yörük, E. (2012). *The Politics of the Turkish Welfare System Transformation in the Neoliberal Era: Welfare as Containment and Mobilization of Grassroots Politics*. Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore.
- Yörük, E., and Yüksel, M. (2015). Gezi eylemlerinin toplumsal dinamikleri. *Toplum ve Bilim*, 133, 132-165.
- Zaifer, A. (2018). The Acceleration of Privatization: Understanding State, Power Bloc, and Capital Accumulation in Turkey. *Review of Radical Political Economics*, 50(4), 810-829.

