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FROM THE EDITOR

ULUM Journal of Religious Inquiries 1/2 (December 2018)

Dear Readers, we present the second issue of *ULUM* to you.

As *ULUM* team, we are rightly proud of taking another step in reaching our target in the international platforms where scientific knowledge is shared. In order to contribute more to the world of science, we develop our infrastructure with strong investments and expand our staff with new academicians.

The civilization has only developed by adhering to its principles of intercultural interaction, quality standard and reliability. In this context, as *ULUM* journal, we have been trying to present the knowledge produced in the field of social sciences, especially in Muslim culture, to the common gains of humanity.

Since *ULUM* journal has already begun to be scanned by leading international indexes, it attracts attention of researchers from different countries. We try to be worthy of the expectations of the scientific world by selecting the scientific articles with the necessary conditions from among the submitted articles. With this understanding, we present to you our new issue including valuable articles, which are carefully selected and completed peer review process successfully.

In general, the articles are related to studies that focus on different aspects of social and religious issues. Before leaving you alone with these valuable articles, I would like to thank the valuable writers, reviewers and editorial board members who contributed to the preparation of this issue and to present our love and respect to our readers.

 I wish you all an enjoyable reading with our new issue with the hope that will be useful for the common future of humanity.

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EDİTÖRDEN

ULUM Dini Tetkikler Dergisi 1/2 (Aralık 2018)

Saygıdeğer okurlar, *ULUM*'un ikinci sayısı ile huzurlarınızdayız.

ULUM ekibi olarak bilimsel bilginin paylaşıldığı uluslararası platformlarda hedeflediğimiz yere ulaşmada bir adım daha atmanın haklı gururunu yaşıyoruz. Bilim dünyasına daha fazla katkıda bulunabilmek için her geçen gün altyapımızı güçlü yatırımlarla geliştiriyor, kadromuzu ise yeni katılımlarla genişletiyoruz.

Medeniyet; ancak kültürler arası etkileşim, kalite standardı ve güvenilirlik ilkelerine bağlı kalarak gelişebilmiştir. Bu bağlamda *ULUM* dergisi olarak, başta Müslüman kültürü olmak üzere, sosyal bilimler alanında üretilen bilgiyi, sağlıklı bir şekilde insanlığın ortak kazanımlarına sunma gayreti içerisindeyiz.

ULUM dergisi, şimdiden önemli dizinler tarafından taranmaya başlandığı için farklı ülkelerden araştırmacıların ilgisini çekmektedir. Gönderilen makaleler arasından gerekli şartları taşıyan nitelikteki makaleleri seçmeye gayret göstererek bilim dünyasının beklentilerine layık olmaya çalışıyoruz. Bu anlayışla, özenle seçilip hakem sürecini başarıyla tamamlamış birbirinden kıymetli makalelerden oluşan yeni sayımızı istifadenize sunuyoruz.

Genel olarak makaleler; sosyal ve dini konuların farklı boyutlarını konu edinen çalışmalarla ilgilidir. Birbirinden değerli bu makalelerle sizleri yalnız bırakmadan önce, bu sayımızın hazırlanmasında emeği geçen değerli yazar, hakem ve editör kurulu üyelerine teşekkür ediyor, okurlarımıza sevgi ve saygılarımızı sunuyorum.

Yeni sayımızın insanlığın ortak geleceği için faydalı olması dileğiyle hepinize iyi okumalar diliyorum.

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Did Physics [Cosmology] Render God Unnecessary?
A Critical Assessment of *The Grand Design* *

Mehmet Bulğen **

ABSTRACT

In this study, we will consider the claim, defended by world-renowned cosmologist Stephen Hawking and science writer Leonard Mlodinow in their book *The Grand Design*, that science is able to explain the universe as a whole and that therefore there is no need to appeal to a supernatural being in order to account for the coming into existence of the universe out of nothing and its fine-tuned order. In this regard, we will first analyze the extent to which M-theory is scientific. For M-theory is mainly mentioned by Hawking and Mlodinow as the theory that explains scientifically the generation of the universe out of nothing and why the universe is the way it is. In the second part, the conception of science that Hawking and Mlodinow adopt on the basis of the model dependent realism will be analyzed. Moreover, we will call attention to some problems that are rooted in the increased gap between theory and experiment in contemporary physics. In the last part of the article, we will analyze the subject matter from Islamic viewpoint in a theological

manner, and hereby we will attempt to answer the question 'what is an ideal relationship between science and religion in Islamic thought'? The general aim of the article is to demonstrate that M-theory, which is believed to be able to explain the generation of the universe, does not possess the scientific criteria for testability and that the claim that "physics renders God unnecessary" has no value other than being a speculative statement.

KEYWORDS

Kalām, God, Science, Physics, Cosmology, Theology, M-Theory

Fizik Tanrı'yı Gereksiz mi Kıldı? *Büyük Tasarım* Kitabı Üzerinden Bir Değerlendirme

ÖZ

Bu çalışmada ünlü kozmolog Stephen Hawking ile bilim yazarı Leonard Mlodinow'un *Büyük Tasarım* (*The Grand Design*) kitabında dile getirdikleri bilimin evreni tüm unsurları ile açıklayabildiği bu nedenle evrenin var oluşunu ve hassas düzenini açıklamak için doğa üstü bir varlığa ihtiyaç duymadığı iddiası değerlendirilecektir. Bu bağlamda ilk olarak evrenin yoktan var oluşunu ve hali hazırdaki durumunu bilimsel açıklamasında temel aldıkları M-Kuramı'nın ne derece bilimsel olduğu incelenecektir. İkinci kısımda Hawking ve Mlodinow'un bilim anlayışının esas aldığı Modele Dayalı Gerçeklik anlayışı değerlendirilecektir. Ayrıca bu bölümde günümüz fiziğinde teori ve deney arasında oluşan açığın meydana getirdiği problemler üzerinde durulacaktır. Makalenin son kısmında ise konunun İslâm dini ekseninde teolojik bir değerlendirmesi yapılacak ve İslâm dini açısından ideal bir din bilim ilişkisinin nasıl olması gerektiği sorusu cevaplandırılmaya çalışılacaktır. Makalenin genel amacı ise evrenin yoktan var oluşunu açıklayabildiği iddia edilen M-Kuram'ının başta test edilebilirlik olmak üzere bilimsellik kriterlerini karşılamadığı, bu nedenle "Fizik Tanrı'yı Gereksiz Kıldı" iddiasının spekülatif bir iddia olmaktan öte bir değeri olmadığını ortaya koymaktır.

ANAHTAR KELİMELER

Kelâm, Tanrı, Bilim, Fizik, Kozmoloji, M-Kuramı

INTRODUCTION

Traditionally, it has been argued that asking the question "how?" is of interest to science, and asking "why?" is of interest to philosophy.[1] The renowned cosmologist Stephen Hawking, who retired from Isaac Newton's (1643-1727) chair at Cambridge University, last year (2011) and theoretical physicist Leonard Mlodinow of the California Institute of Technology (Caltech), oppose the classical conception of science at the very first lines of their book, *The Grand Design*, co-authored, they argue:

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[1]   For a detailed comparison between science and philosophy see Alex Rosenberg, *Philosophy of Science; A Contemporary Introduction,* Second Edition (London: Routledge, 2005), 4; Fernand Renoirte, *Cosmology: Elements of A Critique of the Science and of Cosmology,* trans. James F. Coffey (New York: Joseph F. Wagner Inc, 1950), v-xi.

"To understand the universe at the deepest level, we need to know not only *how* the universe behaves, but *why*.

Why is there something rather than nothing?

Why do we exist?

Why this particular set of laws and not some other?"[2]

The language composed by Hawking and Mlodinow is not a new usage, nor does it mean a paradigm shift because this language was already formed as a result of a paradigm change that happened before: when cosmology became a science!

Cosmology is a controversial area. Many still do not accept that there can be such a "science"[3] because, as we said at the beginning, science is a classically descriptive activity, which asks the question "how?" and tries to portray the existing reality; however, cosmology asks not only the question "how?", but also "why?", which makes it necessary to grasp the universe from its very basic to most general aspects.[4] Again, classically, science is reductionist and nature is examined by dividing it into as many branches and parts as possible whereas cosmology is holistic; physical reality is conceptualized as a "whole", not as fragments.[5] Classically, science is based on observations and experiments; however, it is not possible to observe the entire universe, the subject matter of cosmology, or to experiment under laboratory conditions.[6]

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[2]   Stephen Hawking-Leonard Mlodinow, *The Grand Design* (Germany: Bantam Press, 2010), 9-10.

[3]   Helge Kragh, "The Controversial Universe: A Historical Perspective on the Scientific Status of Cosmology", *Physics and Philosophy* 8 (2007): 1 ff.

[4]   Gordon Kane, *Supersymmetry: Unveiling the Ultimate Laws of Nature* (New York: Basic Books, 2000), xvi. also see Ernan McMullin, "Is Philosophy Relevant to Cosmology", *Modern Cosmology & Philosophy,* ed. John Leslie (New York: Prometheus Books, 1998), 35-6.

[5]   John Charlton Polkinghorne, "Reductionism", *Interdisciplinary Encyclopedia of Religion and Science,* accessed: 25 October 2010 http://www.disf.org/en/Voci/104.asp. Also see. Leo Albert Foley, *Cosmology: Philosophical and Scientific* (Milwaukee: The Bruce Publishing Company, 1962), 10.

[6]   On the scientific value of today's cosmology see. Michael J. Disney, "Modern Cosmology: Science or Folktale?", *American Scientist* 95/1 (2007): 383; Hannes Alfvén, "Cosmology: Myth or Science?", *Journal of Astrophysics and Astronomy* 5 (1984): 79-98. Also see Marc Lachièze-Rey, *Cosmology: A First Course* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press 1995), 2; Milton K. Munitz, *Space, Time and Creation: Philosophical Aspects of Scientific Cosmology* (Illinois: The Free Press, 1957), 3.

Until the middle of the past century, "cosmology" is usually accepted as a field of metaphysics;[7] the philosophy itself was even described as "grasping the universe as a whole".[8] However, experimental investigations starting with the development of atomic physics since the late 19th century enabled scholars to study the core of a substance, not just its atoms, even into its core constituents, and to encounter extraordinary small distances and vast amounts of energy. On the other hand, observations in the field of astronomy enabled us to see beyond the Solar System and the Milky Way Galaxy; even to examine the early times of the ages and the first moments of the universe in an ever-growing scale by breaking all kinds of active optical systems. Theories and models such as Relativity, Quantum and Big Bang, which were simultaneously developed with large quantities of experimental and observational data obtained from research in the field of nuclear physics and astrophysics, not only built a scientific framework, but also made it possible to achieve the standard models for substance and the universe itself, too.[9] Thus, a "scientific cosmology" that examines the universe as if it were a single object, as a whole from the smallest particle to the widest scale, was born.[10]

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[7]   Herman Bondi, "Astronomy and Cosmology", *What is Science,* ed. James R. Newman (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1955), 84; R. CLI, "Cosmology" *The Oxford Companion to Philosophy,* New Edition Ted Honderich (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2005), 180; Foley, *Cosmology: Philosophical and Scientific*, 10; Even 1966, when the famous astronomer Edward R. Harrison (1919-2007) was admitted to the University of Massachusetts, he was given a booklet of what the university is or is not. It is written in this booklet that two lessons can not be found in the curriculum: witchcraft and cosmology. See Dick Teresi, *Lost Discoveries: The Ancient Roots of Modern Science from the Babylonians to the Maya* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002), 158.

[8]   Ernsts Von Aster, *İlk Çağ ve Orta Çağ Felsefe Tarihi = The History of Ancient and Mediavel Philosophy* (Istanbul: Im Publications, 2000), 3; also see. James Jeans, *Physics and Philosophy* (Whitefish: Kessinger Publishing, 2003), 81. [For instance, David Hume (1711-1776) claimed that an attempt to explain the creation of the entire universe could not be a matter of empirical knowledge. Since we can not go out of the universe and observe it or create an experience of its creation, we can not say anything about the whole universe itself with the events we perceive in our own limited world. In the same vein, Immanuel Kant (1724 -1804) argued that the questions such as "is the universe finite or infinite in terms of space and time?" or "is it composed of all indivisible atoms or not?" are antinomies and cannot be resolved by rationally. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. Werner S. Pluhar (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1996), 454-496; The most stanch advocates of the idea that investigating the ultimate nature of matter or the boundaries of physical reality was not the work of science, were the positivists. Auguste Comte (1798-1857) in his famous book, *Positive Philosophy* (1844), maintained that the structure of celestial bodies is an example of the knowledge that will remain hidden forever. As we never go to stars, there is no knowledge of their chemical and mineralogical composition. Accepting cosmology as a branch of philosophy led to the exclusion of it from the curriculum of the "positive sciences". The phrase "Don't let me hear anyone use the word 'Universe' in my Department!" which is attributed to the famous physicist Ernest Rutherford (1871-1937), gives an idea of the extent to which cosmology was negatively perceived at that time. also see Paul Davies, *Cosmic Jackpot: Why Our Universe Is Just Right for Life* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2007), 18.]

[9]   Maurizio Gasperini, *The Universe Before the Big Bang: Cosmology and String Theory* (Berlin: Springer 2008), 1.

[10] With regard to the process of cosmology becoming a science, see Stephen G. Brush, "How Cosmology Became a Science", *Scientific American* (August, 1992): 62; John F. Hawley - Katherine A. Holcomb, *Foundations of Modern Cosmology* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 4-6, 25; Matts Roos, *Introduction to Cosmology* (England: John Wiley &Sons, 2003), 1; William R. Stoeger, "What is 'the Universe' which Cosmology Studies?" *Fifty Years in Science and Religion: Ian G. Barbour and His Legacy,* ed. Robert J. Russell (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 2004), 127.

However, cosmology did not only become science, but it also changed the meaning of science because the common understanding of science was based on conceptual frameworks such as determinism, reductionism, realism and methodological positivism defined in the Newtonian sense. However, the scientific cosmology coming up with theories such as Relativity and Quantum challenged the firm, reductionist, determinist and positivist essentials of modern science.[11] Instead, many entirely new conceptual frameworks such as *relativity, uncertainty, probability, chaos, complexity, emergence, irreducibility, irreversibility, entanglement, non-locality, superposition* and *action at a distance* emerged.[12] The understanding of deterministic science that claims the whole future can be calculated when the starting conditions are known, left its place to a new relatively speculative understanding of science in which the role of the observer increases, particles can be found in several places and shapes at the same time, communicating faster than the speed of light with each other. An understanding, in which uncertainty is regarded as the ontological and epistemological features of nature, discontinuity substitutes for continuity, and space and time become not absolute, but relative, and defined by probabilities rather than certainty.

How can it be both a "science" and "speculative"? If the evidence found in the field is indirect, if the developed models and theories have never been able to be falsified or verified, and if they are contradictory with each other on the other hand, if a team regards metaphysical axioms before setting the work, and if scientists are approaching problems with the models prescribed by the conceptual system and culture they live in, welcome to "speculative cosmology"!

Before starting to discuss the topic through *The Grand Design*, we need to clarify that famous controversial claim of the book even before the book appears: "Now science can explain the universe by itself; philosophy is dead, theology is unnecessary!"

We need to remember that the science mentioned here is not science in the classical sense, it is "speculative cosmology" as mentioned above. Therefore, as soon as the book takes its place on the shelves, many critics called the claim that "philosophy is dead, theology is unnecessary" as Hawking's joke[13] in that claiming "Philosophy is dead" while associating physics to metaphysics; and "Theology is no longer necessary." while constantly mentioning God could only mean that Hawking is joking.

However, this joke does not discredit Hawking. At least, he will not be accused of being small-minded at any time of his life. Despite his incurable illness (ALS), since the age of 21, he always dealt with big questions; he could walk around the horizons of the universe with his mind although his body was attached to a wheelchair. Today, Hawking had one of the world's most prestigious academic titles (Lucasian Mathematics Professor) until his retirement due to reaching the age-limit last year, as well as being a natural

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[11] Because now there was no way to explain natural phenomena such as radioactivity, photoelectric, black body radiation, intrinsic heat, atomic structure, and high velocities at large distances with classical physics approaches. Salvator Cannavo, *Quantum Theory: A Philosopher's Overview* (New York: SUNY Press, 2010), 2; also see Ian G. Barbour, *Religion and Science* (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1997), 166.

[12] Harold Curtis, *Following the Cloud: A Vision of the Convergence of Science and the Church* (s.l.: BookSurge Pub. 2006), 135.

[13] For instance, see Michael Moorcock's review in *Los Angeles Times* http://articles.latimes.com /2010/sep/05/entertainment/la-ca-stephen-hawking-20100905; also see Christopher Norris, "Hawking Contra Philosophy", accessed: 10 September 2011, http://www.philosophynow.org/issue82/Hawking_contra_Philosophy.

member of the British Royal Society of Science and the American National Academy of Sciences. In the past, reputation of people those who had this title such as Isaac Newton (1642-1727), Paul Dirac (1902-1984) necessitates Hawking to be respected, too.

What makes Hawking a worldwide phenomenon is no doubt the books he wrote, not his title. *A Brief History of Time* (1988), now a classic, is the world's most popular cosmology book. The book, which leads many people to know science, has been translated into nearly 40 languages other than English and sold more than 20 million. After a while he came out with, *The Grand Design* (2010) and also managed to hit the bestseller lists both in the UK and the United States.[14]

Although the reason why Hawking sells so much is regarded as the ability to describe complex scientific issues in a clear way that everyone can understand, we think that the main factor behind his success is that he can transform cosmology into answering the questions related to man's search for meaning. Essentially, cosmology is a science that has the potential to respond to the existential questions of man. The answers to questions such as where the universe comes from, where it goes, whether it needs a creator or not, which principles and laws govern its operation and how the material is formed, to some extent, are the answers to ultimate human questions and the future of humanity as well; because human beings live in this universe and share the same destiny with the universe, which they are a part of.[15] In this respect, it is not a coincidence that the Big Bang Theory, particle experiments conducted in laboratories like CERN or a new book of Hawking arouse curiosity not only in physicists and astronomers, but in theologians, philosophers and ordinary people alike.[16]

While searching for answers to such questions in his books, Hawking is not satisfied with the narrow boundaries of science. So, he gives examples from mythology, makes references to the words of the clergy, conveys opinions of philosophers, and does not hesitate to use metaphysical implications when needed. However, such a style sometimes makes it difficult to discern between physics and philosophy in his books. Therefore, one who is not an expert may mistake some speculative expressions in his books as scientific facts. For example, there was the word "God" in nearly 50 times in *The Brief History of Time* (1988), so Henry F. Schaefer from the Nobel prize committee claimed that it was not a cosmology book, but a theological

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[14] Nate Freeman, "Hawking's Book Shoots to Top of Amazon Sales After He Denies God's Existence", accessed: 06 September 2011, http://www.observer.com/2010/culture/hawkings-book-shoots-top-amazon-sales-after-he-denies-gods-existence.

[15] For example, Marcus Aurelius Antoninus (121-180), the famous Roman Emperor and a Stoa philosopher, described this relation of meaning between the universe (Macro Cosmos) and man (Micro Cosmos) as follows: "He who does not know what the world is, does not know where he is. And he who does not know for what purpose the world exists, does not know who he is, nor what the world is. But he who has failed in any one of these things could not even say for what purpose he exists himself." See George Long, *Thoughts of Marcus Aurelius Antoninus,* accessed: 16 November 2010, http://www.gutenberg.org/ files/15877/15877-h/15877-h.htm#viii._52.

[16] This can be an answer to the question of how Hawking can discuss speculative and metaphysical questions like "Where do we come from? Where are we going? Why do we exist? Is there a God?" in his books. As another example also see Joseph Silk, *On the Shores of the Unknown: A Short History of the Universe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 2-4.

one.[17] Some science writers such as Timothy Ferris went even further and declared him a God-mongerer.[18] Hawking nonetheless increased the number: he used the word "God" more than 60 times in *the Grand Design.*

When he is asked why he has mentioned God so often in his books, Hawking says that it is difficult to explain the existence of the universe without talking about God. His works are at the boundary line between science and religion, but he himself tries to stay on the side of science.[19] Therefore, Hawking was known for using positive language when talking about God, contrary to what militant atheists like Richard Dawkins did. For example, in his book titled *The Brief History of Time*, Hawking said that, "If we discover a complete theory... it would be the ultimate triumph of human reason for then we should know the mind of God. "[20]

However, Hawking is forced to leave this intertwined style of religion-philosophy and science as the dominant claim of "Science alone can explain the universe!" clearly shows, that it will lead to a considerable decrease in the sales figures of his books.[21] Moreover, although he notes that they do not have the intention of rejecting God in writing *The Grand Design*,[22] it is very clear that the expression "the beginning and the end of the universe can be explained only staying within the boundaries of science without resorting to supernatural power or a God" has atheistic implications.[23] Although it has been scientifically criticized by senior scholars including Roger Penrose,[24] Joseph Silk,[25] Craig Callender,[26] Paul Davies,[27] Peter Woit,[28]

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[17] Henry Firitz Schaefer III, "The Big Bang, Stephen Hawking and God", *Science and Christianity: Conflict or Coherence?* ed. Henry Firitz Schaefer (USA: The Apollos Trust, 2008), 57.

[18] James E. White, "Unfortunate Godmongering", accessed: 14 September 2011, http://www.christianity.com/blogs/jwhite/11638165/print.

[19] Schaefer, *The Big Bang, Stephen Hawking and God*, 59.

[20] Stephen Hawking, *A Brief History of Time* (New York: Bantam Press, 1988), 191.

[21] Hawking, in an interview on his book *A Brief History of Time*, said that he had long thought put the "God's Mind" expression which is the very debated in the book. He also said that the book could not reach such successful sales figures if he did not put that expression.

[22] See Hawking's interview on Larry King Live CNN, accessed: 09 October 2010 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9AdKEHzmqxA.

[23] Dwight Garner, "Many Kinds of Universes, and None Require God", *The New York Times*, accessed: 14 September 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/08/books/08book.html.

[24] Roger Penrose, "*The Grand Design* (review)", *Financial Times* (04 September 2010), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/bdf3ae28-b6e9-11df-b3dd-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1CSIgPlwa.

[25] Joseph Silk, "One Theory to Rule Them All", *Science* 330 (6001): 179-180.

[26] Craig Callender, "Stephen Hawking Says There's No Theory of Everything", *New Scientist* 207 (2777) (September 2010): 50

[27] Paul Davies, "Stephen Hawking's Big Bang Gaps", *The Guardian,* accessed: 04 September 2010, http://www.guardian.co.uk /commentisfree/belief/2010/sep/04/stephen-hawking-big-bang-gap,

[28] Peter Woit, "Hawking Gives Up", accessed: 14 September 2011, http://www.math.columbia.edu/~woit/wordpress/?p=3141.

Marcelo Glesier,[29] John Horgan[30] and Baroness Greenfield[31], the fact that there are not many backing up the book except for the famous atheist, Richard Dawkins, confirms our evaluation. According to Dawkins, in the 19th century, Darwin excluded God from biology, but physics was undecided, but it was badly hit by this book of Hawking's.[32]

Unlike Dawkins's claim, however, we do not think that the general approach of the book, will satisfy the atheists just as the theists. Yet, Hawking accepts it is not so absurd to show God in reply to questions such as "Why is there something but nothing?", "Why are not the laws of nature different?", "How can our universe have such appropriate living conditions?", because there is not a definite answer to these kinds of questions in the scientific framework until now.[33] In fact, Hawking accepts the "premises" of cosmological evidences widely used today to prove the existence of God such as "intelligent design", "anthropic principle", "first cause" and "fine tuning", and explains them almost in a way that even makes the theists jealous. However, in the classical atheist approach, the premises of such kind of cosmological evidences are contradicted and rejected from the very beginning. For example, in this context, the Big Bang Theory, which is regarded as the beginning of the world, has not been accepted for many years by atheist circles, just as the rejection of the evolution theory in theistic circles. Some atheist cosmologists like Fred Hoyle have developed an alternative universe model (Steady State).[34]

At this point we must immediately remind that Hawking and Mlodinow accept the premises of cosmological arguments, and according to them, science can now respond to questions like "how can the universe create itself from nothing?", "why does it have such sensitive living conditions within its own scope?" So, it is no longer necessary to involve a supernatural being or God to explain such phenomena.

Undoubtedly, such a discourse will run some risks in itself. Revealing that the theory (M-theory), which is said to be capable of responding to these phenomena scientifically, is not scientific or highly

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[29] Marcelo Glesier, "Hawking and God: An Intimate Relationship", accessed: 10 September 2011, http://www.npr.org/blogs/13.7/2010/09/08/129736414/hawking-and-god-an-intimate-relationship.

[30] John Horgan, "Cosmic Clowning: Stephen Hawking's "new" theory of everything is the same old CRAP", *Scientific American*, accessed: 13 September 2010, https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/cross-check/cosmic-clowning-stephen-hawkings-new-theory-of-everything-is-the-same-old-crap/.

[31] Baroness Susan Greenfield, a prominent UK scientist, was asked to comment on Hawking's Hawking and Mlodinov's ideas about God. Was she worried by scientists making claims about other areas of life? "Yes, I am," she replied. "Of course, they can make whatever comments they like but when they assume, rather in a Taliban-like way, that they have all the answers then I do feel uncomfortable. I think that doesn't necessarily do science a service." see Alister McGrath, "Stephen Hawking, God and the Role of Science", *ABC Religion and Ethics* (14 Sep 2010), http://www.abc.net.au/religion/articles/2010/09/14/3011163.htm

[32] "Science and Religion: Another Ungodly Squabble" (5 September 2010). http://www.economist.com/blogs/babbage/2010/09/science_and_religion

[33] *The Grand Design*, 172.

[34] Hoyle's acceptance of the idea of infinite time led him to defense Steady State Theory a long period of time although most of his colleagues did abandon this theory. see John Polkinghorne, "Cosmology: Scientific Cosmologies" *Encyclopedia of Religion,* ed. Lindsay Jones (Detroit: Thomson Gale 2005): 3/2032; also see Ian G. Barbour, *When Science Meets Religion* (San Francisco: HarperOne, 2000), 42.

speculative will nullify the premises of the above cosmological arguments, and in this case "God" will likely continue to be a stronger argument.

Since we have already made a detailed review,[35] we will not negotiate the parts of the book again, but instead we will try to evaluate the book based on its main idea.

To sum up, according to Hawking and Mlodinow, humanity from Ptolemy (100-160) to Copernicus (1473-1543), from Newton to Einstein (1879-1955) and to the present quantum theories, has always tried to understand the physical reality via "models". Considering that they are constantly being replaced, will this series of models always continue to change like this, or will they reach an endpoint? It is such a point that will be the ultimate theory of the universe, and it will contain all the forces of nature and predict all the observations we can make. And again, according to Hawking, the models of the universe produced until now have always had to be associated with God in some way. Plato regarded that the universe was created by God, and Aristotle regarded God as the first mover. God was regarded as the founder of the order of the universe by Newton and as the creator of the continuity by Descartes. Today, the Big Bang Theory, which attributes a beginning to the universe is interpreted as indicating God. Can't a model or theory that can explain and answer all the questions about the universe without resorting to God at all and staying within the limits of science itself be developed?

"We do not yet have a definitive answer to this question, but we now have a candidate for the ultimate theory of everything, if indeed one exists, called M-theory (Membrane Theory)[36]. M-theory is the only model that has all the properties we think the final theory ought to have, and it is the theory upon which much of our later discussion is based... We will describe how M-theory may offer answers to the question of creation. According to M-theory, ours is not the only universe. Instead, M-theory predicts that a great many universes were created out of nothing. Their creation does not require the intervention of some supernatural being or god. Rather, these multiple universes arise naturally from physical law. They are a prediction of science."[37]

As seen, Hawking and Mlodinow attribute all their claims to the success of M-theory. For this reason, getting to know this theory a little better will allow us to question better the validity of the claims.

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[35] Mehmet Bulğen, "The Grand Design (Büyük Tasarım): a book review", *Marmara Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi* 39 (2010/2): 171-182.

[36] The meaning of "M" in M-theory is controversial. Edward Witten, a professor of theoretical physicist who first introduced the theory at the University of California, did not explain the meaning of M. He said, "As soon as we understand the theory better, we will understand what "M" is", he said. He even wanted to add a mystery to the theory, stating that it could mean "Magic", Mystery. But for many, the meaning of "M" in M-Theory is "membrane". Because, on the 10^{-35} meter scale, M-theory, bases on the entities that are membranes, not "strings" as opposed to String Theory. For a detailed discussion of string, super string and their current form, M-theory, see, Michael J. Duff, "The Theory Formerly Known as Strings", *Scientific American* (February 1998): 64.

[37] *The Grand Design*, 8.

1. M-THEORY: IS IT SCIENCE OR PHILOSOPHY?

Today's scientific cosmology is based on two basic components: Quantum Mechanics, the General Theory of Relativity.[38] The former explains the universe on a micro scale, and the latter on a macro scale. Although both the Relativity Theory and the Quantum Mechanics are successful in their own fields, these theories are not compatible with each other.[39] Removing the incompatibility arising from the discreteness of Quantum theory and the continuum of General Relativity is one of the most important research areas of today's cosmologists.[40]

On the other side, it is generally accepted that the universe began to exist with a huge explosion/expansion 13.7 billion years ago but the Big Bang Theory cannot explain what led to the expansion. This theory starts to explain the expansion moment from 10^{-43}th seconds, and when one tries to go beyond it, a situation called "singularity" arises, and after that the General Relativity lose its validity, or it cannot elucidate it further.[41]

"String Theory" was put forward towards the end of the 1960s in order to develop a non-conflicting physics theory by bringing together incompatible physics theories, and to overcome the obstacles in situations such as the Big Bang and the Black Hole, too. In this theory, instead of the particles of the Standard Model whose basic components are non-dimensional "points", one dimensional "strings" provide a basis for it. On the other hand, 6 additional space dimensions, which are folded as circle have been added on the known 3 space and 1-time dimension. Accordingly, vibrations at different frequencies of strings that resemble violent wires constitute protons and electrons, which form atoms, and an additional six space dimensions make an infinite number of multiverses possible.[42]

M-theory which Hawking shows as a candidate for the theory of everything is the product of the struggle to unite five different String Theories and Super Gravity Theory. It is different from the String Theory, as well as on the same scale as the basic unit (10^{-35} meters, i.e. Planck Distance), because M-theory is based on two-dimensional membranes instead of one-dimensional strings, and it adds a space dimension to the ten dimensions in String Theory. Although the theory seems to be mathematically successful, no experimental clue has been obtained about the existence of these additional strings/membranes or the additional spatial dimensions to the three dimensions we already know.[43]

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[38] Spencer Scoular, *First Philosophy: The Theory of Everything* (Florida: Universal Publishers, 2007), 349.

[39] Serge Brunier, *Majestic Universe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1999), 175.

[40] William R. Stoeger, "String Theory", *Encyclopedia of Science and Religion,* ed. Wentzel Van Huyssteen (New York: Macmillan Reference USA, 2003), 844.

[41] Christopher Ray, *Time, Space and Philosophy* (London: Routledge 1991), 199.

[42] Gordon Kane, *Supersymmetry*, 131; Laura Ruetsche, "String Theory", *Encyclopedia of Philosophy,* 2nd edition, ed. Donald M. Borchert (Detroit: Macmillan Reference USA, 2006), 9: 267; Larry Gilman, "String Theory", *The Gale Encyclopedia of Science,* Third Edition, ed. K. Lee Lerner (New York: Macmillan Reference USA, 2004), 6: 3868; Katrin Becker, *String Theory and M-Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 2; Barton Zwiebach, *A First Course in String Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2004), 3; Michael Green, "A Brief Description of String Theory", *The Future of Theoretical Physics and Cosmology,* ed. G.W. Gibbons (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 473.

[43] Larry Gilman, "String Theory", 3869.

To clarify the idea of not being tested experimentally, with the present experimental conditions, it has been found that an atom normally consists of a nucleus and the electrons whirling around it, and this nucleus is composed of protons and neutrons, which consist of smaller particles called 'quarks'. However, the question of whether these particles are composed of smaller particles as well and what their building blocks are cannot be answered with the present technological advancements.

For example, in the world's most advanced particle accelerators, 1 trillion electric volts of energy can be produced by colliding subatomic particles. This level is one quadrillion time lower than the energy level required for the membranes of M-Theory to be tested experimentally, while it is sufficient to examine subatomic physics like protons in quantum mechanics. This is because the size of the membranes of M-theory and the additional seven space dimensions are on the smallest possible scale, that is, the Planck Scale, which is such a small distance, 10^{-35} meters, that if we make a comparison over the size of the protons (10^{-15} meters) that are subject to collision at CERN today, the size of a proton compared to the size of the Sun is equivalent to that of a membrane of M-Theory compared to the large size of the proton. It is also stated that a particle accelerator in a galaxy size, namely 1000 light years (about 46.357.579.315.645.920.000 km) long will be needed to empirically demonstrate that such membranes or strings exist with the present technological possibilities. However, when we think that the Great Hadron Collider (LHC), the largest particle accelerator in the world, has a 27 km circumference, it will be understood how impossible it is. Therefore, many scholars who criticize the String Theory, as we will also discuss below, think that it is a "philosophy" that cannot be verified and falsified by experiment, rather than being a part of science.

One of the first scientists to come to mind about critics of the String / Super-String / M-Theory is undoubtedly Nobel Prize winner physicist, Sheldon Lee Glashow. According to Glashow, the String Theory may have achieved some mathematical success. However, physics is not "Mathematical Platonism"; it has to rely on observations and experiments. If physics is regarded as mathematics only, then all the achievements that have been made since the 17th Century Science Revolution will be ruined, and such a paradigm shift will take physics to the Middle Ages. Glashow, who defends that String Theory cannot be tested in the future as it cannot be tested today, goes so far as to call it "the tumor of physics" and asserts that it must be removed from the curriculum before it is too late.[44]

Science writer Jim Holt says the following about String Theory, which has been nominated for "The Theory of Everything" in his article in *The New Yorker*:

"It is the worst of times in physics. For more than a generation, physicists have been chasing a will-o'-the-wisp called string theory. The beginning of this chase marked the end of what had been three-quarters of a century of progress. Dozens of string-theory conferences have been held, hundreds of new PhD.s have been minted, and thousands of papers have been written. Yet, for all this activity, not a single new testable prediction has been made, not a single theoretical puzzle has been solved. In fact, there is no theory so far—just a set of hunches and calculations suggesting that a theory might exist. And, even if it

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[44]   For an interview with Sheldon Lee Glashow on String Theory, see "Viewpoints on String Theory: Sheldon Glashow", accessed: 05 September 2011. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/elegant/view-glashow.html

does, this theory will come in such a bewildering number of versions that it will be of no practical use: **A Theory of Nothing**."[45]

John C. Baez from The Departments of Mathematics and Physics at the University of California also makes statements similar to Jim Holt:

"For the last few decades, astrophysicists have been making amazing discoveries in fundamental physics: dark matter, dark energy, neutrino oscillations, maybe even cosmic inflation in the very early universe! Soon the Large Hadron Collider will smash particles against each other hard enough to see the Higgs boson - or not. With luck, it may even see brand new particles. But about all this, string theory has had little to say."[46]

Peter Woit from Columbia University says that String Theory has a very good relationship with the public because ideas like infinite universes, eternal lives, dimensional dimensions are interesting to humans; however, this situation leads to the exaggeration of the true value of the theory and the exploitation of people's emotions by some physicists and popular media. According to Peter Woit, the public should no longer be deceived for the sake of being sold and watched, and it should be explained that a theory that cannot be verified and falsified cannot be science in popular science magazines. On the other hand, department heads and senior theoreticians in universities should be warned, theses about String Theory should not be given in postgraduate and doctoral studies, and the energy of young and curious minds should not be wasted. Research funds should not be used for these kinds of theories, but rather for their true purpose, and conferences for the sake of this theory should not be organized any longer. According to Peter Woit, physics would have been far more advanced than its present position if the cost, effort, time spent, and energy consumed on String Theory over the last 30 years were used for the Standard Model.[47]

The Trouble with Physics (2006), written by the theoretical physicist Lee Smolin, to criticize String Theory, is regarded as a breaking point. Smolin claims in his book that the physics which is the basis for of all the sciences is now deviated. According to him, the human understanding on the laws of nature has increased rapidly in the last two centuries, but today there is not much more known about the laws of nature than in the 1970s. Why has humanity suddenly been stuck for almost forty years? why is physics in "depression"? One of the most important sources of the problem, according to Smolin, is that "String Theory", which physicists created for gathering their ambitious enthusiasm and all the forces of nature as a single theory (Theory of Everything). This theory unfortunately succeeded in attracting the interest of society and captivating the hearts of physicists with its exotic new particles, and parallel universes. However, according to Smolin, there is a huge shortage in this theory: as any part of it cannot be tested until

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[45] Jim Holt, "Unstrung: In string theory, beauty is truth, truth beauty. Is that really all we need to know?, *The New Yorker*, accessed: 8 September 2011,
http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2006/10/02/061002crat_atlarge?currentPage=2

[46] John C. Baez, "This Week's Finds in Mathematical Physics", accessed: 05 September 2011,
http://math.ucr.edu/home/baez/week246.html.

[47] Peter Woit, "String Theory: An Evaluation", accessed: 10 September 2011,
http://arxiv.org/PS_cache/physics/pdf/0102/0102051v1.pdf; also see Peter Woit, *Not Even Wrong: The Failure of String Theory and the Continuing Challenge to Unify the Laws of Physics* (New York: Basic Books, 2006).

now, there is no hope that it will be testable in the future, so this theory, which comes with infinite number of versions, does not carry the scientific criteria. Nevertheless, since it takes the lion's share in funding, it is able to attract the best minds to itself. Therefore, young physicists who go to other areas are punished, so this theory decreases the value of physics as a whole. According to Smolin, if "verifiability" or "falsifiability" principles are to be regarded as the criteria, theories in String Theory certainly do not meet the criteria of being scientific, and thus it is in the scope of "metaphysics". Smolin also, parallel to scientists like Glashow and Peter Woit, wants the theory to be removed from the curriculum and cut the research grants.[48]

2. HAWKING'S UNDERSTANDING OF SCIENCE AND SOME METHODOLOGICAL PROBLEMS OF TODAY'S PHYSICS

The basic criticism over String Theory or M-Theory, as can be seen from the clear expressions of the physicists we have quoted above, is that it cannot meet the basic criterias for scientific knowledge.[49] Indeed, it can be considered as an indicator of the regard that M-Theorists such as Stephen Hawking and Edward Witten could not receive the Nobel Prize despite their popularity. The Swedish Royal Academy, which awards this prize, strictly requires that the discovery that is rewarded be verified empirically and the evidences should be testable.

We nevertheless do not think that while they claim "science can explain the universe alone", Hawking and Mlodinow are not aware of the speculative character of M-theory, which their thesis is based on. In many parts of the book, they see no harm in citing that most of their ideas are rejected by scientists.[50] So, we need to consider why Hawking and Mlodinow have ignored the criteria, such as being testable or verifiable and falsifiable, which are required for scientific knowledge, or rather, what they understand by science.

First of all, we need to point out that the testability condition of today's physics theories is a difference in approach. According to Hawking, a physical theory is simply a mathematical model, and it is pointless to question whether it matches external reality or not.[51] In fact, as he stated with the understanding of "model-depended realism," the best theory according to him is the theory that "constructs its own reality".[52] Therefore, Hawking is close to the idealist wing, which attributes everything to mind and derives everything from it, and does not accept the existence of an objective reality outside the mind.

However, it would also be erroneous to reduce the distinction between the experiment and the theory of today's physics to the historical controversy between idealism and realism. We must also be aware of the discussions on the nature of science by the thinkers and schools of though like the Vienna School, Karl

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[48] Lee Smolin, *The Trouble with Physics: The Rise of String Theory, The Fall of a Science, and What Comes Next* (New York: Mariner Books, 2007), xv-xxii.

[49] Peter Woit, "Is String Theory Testable?" accessed: 10 September 2011, http://www.math.columbia.edu/~woit/testable.pdf. Also see. John Horgan, "Cosmic Clowning: Stephen Hawking's "new" theory of everything is the same old CRAP", 13 September 2010, https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/cross-check/cosmic-clowning-stephen-hawkings-new-theory-of-everything-is-the-same-old-crap/

[50] Hawking – Mlodinow, *The Grand Design*, 7.

[51] Stephen Hawking - Roger Penrose, *The Nature of Space and Time* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), 4.

[52] Hawking – Mlodinow, *The Grand Design*, 173.

Popper, Jürgen Habermas, Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend. For example, Thomas Kuhn thinks that science is neither a cumulative validation of accumulation as logical positivists suggest, nor is it a human activity that approaches the truth by sorting out mistakes as Karl Popper defends. According to Kuhn, no scientific theory is absolute, but contains a number of limitations that will cause it to lose favor one day. The underlying reason for this is that scientific theories regarding physical reality are determined based on broader conceptual paradigms. The formation of these paradigms that guide scientific activity is holistic, that is, with many factors coming together. In addition to the historical and socio-cultural environment in which the scientific study is conducted, many factors that cannot be controlled like the researchers' personal attitudes and beliefs influence the formation of conceptual paradigm.[53]

As seen, Kuhn makes science a socio-cultural phenomenon. It is also revealed by the fact that we often encounter the paradigm concept, he actually developed for natural sciences, in the field of social sciences.

In addition to these speculations about the nature of science, we must also remark that the today's physics faces very important methodological problems in practice. Whereas physics has been traditionally accepted as a science based on the combination of "theory and experiment",[54] when the level of the research on the most fundamental and outmost limits of the universe is considered, it can be defended that such research threatens the sustainability of the theory-experiment cooperation.[55] One of the primary reasons for this is that it requires extremely expensive and sophisticated conditions to test particle physics and astrophysical theories. For example, the Large Hadron Collider (LHC), which is considered to be today's most advanced particle accelerator, is reported to have a machine cost of 10 billion USD, which is such a huge budget that it is impossible for a university but even for an ordinary state to meet. Although it is possible for many countries to build joint research laboratories, such as the European Nuclear Research Center (CERN) or the International Space Station (ISS). That is not all; experiment facilities can be created as a result of very large technological infrastructure, knowledge accumulation, institutional organization, and complicated processes that do not accept any fault and cannot be compensated. For example, the so-called "God Particle" (Higgs Boson) of the Standard Model, which is often the subject of today's media, has been theorized by Peter Higgs at Edinburgh University in the 60's. At least half a century has passed since it was tested by Atlas and CMS tests in CERN last year, and it is stated that the results of the experiment can be taken as a result of data analysis that will last for about 10 years, or even a definite result cannot be obtained.[56] In this case, even common-sense scientists lose control and now claim that physics should be

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[53] Alexander Bird, "Thomas Kuhn", *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* Fall 2011 ed. Edward N. Zalta, URL = http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2011/entries/thomas-kuhn/; also see. Thomas Kuhn, *Structure of Scientific Revolutions,* 3rd edition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996).

[54] Barry Loewer, "Philosophy of Physics", *Encyclopedia of Philosophy* 2nd ed. Donald M. Borchert (Detroit: Macmillan Reference, 2006), 7: 473-478.

[55] We can explain the relation between experiment and theory in physics with the example of "the scissor". Just as a scissor must be opened and closed in order to be able to continue its functioning, it is necessary to occasionally open and close between experiment and theory in order to be able to achieve progress in physics. As in quantum physics, sometimes theories do not exactly match observations and a new theory is developed that explains new observations. But nowadays the gap between theory and experiment is so open that nobody knows how these two faces can intersect again.

[56] Geoff Brumfiel, "Higgs Hunt Enters Endgame", *Nature* 479 (24 November 2011): 456-57.

avoided from restricting obstacles, and these works should be done with greater emphasis on mathematics.[57] However, the principle of "relying on experiments and observations", which is regarded as the most basic condition of scientific knowledge, is damaged then, and as a result, the line separating science and philosophy from each other disappears to some extent.

Undoubtedly, it would be useful to give details about why just mathematics cannot be accepted as a single criterion for understanding nature. Although mathematical modeling of nature is very important for the development of scientific knowledge, mathematics or unaided reason without experiment and observation is not considered essential to describe physical reality.[58] Indeed, it is because most of the great physical theories create their own mathematical axioms themselves. For example, from Ancient Greece to the 19th century, the linear space vision of Euclidean geometry, based on continuity in the mathematical modeling of nature, was considered as the basis for nearly two thousand years. However, mathematicians such as Riemann (1826-1866) and Gauss (1777-1855), especially Lobachevsky (1793-1850) and Bolyai (1802-1860), have shown that Euclidean geometry is not absolute and that other types of geometries could be developed, with different axioms.[59] In fact, Einstein's relativity theory is based on Riemann geometry, which is curved space geometry instead of Euclidean geometry based on lineer spaces. Today, geometric axioms (such as discontinuity and discreteness) on which the String Theory and therefore M-Theory are based differ from both Euclidean geometry and Riemannian geometry.[60] Therefore, mathematical splendor is not sufficient for the theory to fully describe physical reality.[61]

Another methodological problem faced by modern physics is on the measurement issue and seems to be a more insuperable obstacle because Werner Heisenberg's "Uncertainty Principle" predicts that the position and momentum of a particle cannot be measured with the same certainty, even when appropriate testing conditions are met and experiments are carried out.[62] Accordingly, the smaller uncertainty in the

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[57] J. D. Bernal, *A History of Classical Physics: From Antiquity to the Quantum* (New York: Barnes & Noble Books, 1972), 302; also see J. D. Bernal, *Modern Çağ Öncesi Fizik,* Turkish trans. Deniz Yurtören (Ankara: TÜBİTAK Publications, 1995), 334.

[58] Barry Gower, *Scientific Method: A Historical and Philosophical Introduction* (London: Routledge, 2012), 67; Peter Kosso, *A Summary of Scientific Method* (New York: Springer Science & Business Media, 2011), 7.

[59] For example, Lobachevsky accepts that, contrary to Euclidean's fifth axiom, he can draw more than one parallel from a given point to a given straight line, or that the sum of the angles of a triangle is less than 180 degrees. The Riemannian geometry differs from both the parabolic geometry of Euclid and the hyperbolic geometry of Lobachevsky, its elliptical geometry has no parallel lines, and the sum of the angles of a triangle is greater than the sum of two perpendicular angles. George Sarton, "Euclid and His Time", *Ancient Science and Modern Civilization* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1959), 27-28; Alexander Hellemans – Bryan Bunch, *The Timetables of Science: A Chronology of the Most Important People and Events in the History of Science* (USA: Simon & Schuster,1988), 272-73.

[60] Brian Greene, *The Elegant Universe: Superstrings, Hidden Dimensions and The Quest for The Ultimate Theory* (New York: Vintage Books, 2000), 231; George Johnson, "How Is the Universe Built? Grain by Grain", accessed: 07 September 2011, https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/library/national/science/120799sci-planck-length.html

[61] For an overall assessment of the relationship between experiment / observation and mathematics / logic in cosmology bk. Hannes Alfvén, "Cosmology: Myth or Science?", *Journal of Astrophysics and Astronomy* 5 (1984): 79-98,

[62] George Greenstein - Arthur G. Zajonc, *The Quantum Challenge: Modern Research on the Foundations of Quantum Mechanics* (Jones & Bartlett Learning, 2005), 45

position of the particle (the more precise its position measured) is, the greater uncertainty of its momentum is; on the contrary, the uncertainty of its position increases as the uncertainty of its momentum decreases. This implies that statistical or probabilistic values are valid in natural sciences, as in social sciences, instead of "certainty". However, perhaps more important than all these is the acceptance of quantum mechanics as a postulate that "measuring or observing an object will change its state". According to this, there is no possibility of measuring the position and momentum of a particle in its natural state without affecting it. If the activity of measurement and observation makes the object different from what it actually is, in this case the question arises, "Is the thing that which is demonstrated by the measurements and observations really nature itself or is it just the form that which is influenced by the observer?". Thus, the principle of "describing physical reality as it really is", which is perhaps one of the most important existential purposes of physics, becomes controversial.

The role of the observer in quantum physics is not only this, but it gives ground for making many interpretations contrary to common sense and daily life. Hawking and Mlodinow take advantage of quantum physics' anti-realist interpretations, while founding the claim in *The Grand Design* that "science alone can now explain the universe". For example, "Sum Over History" theory developed by Richard Feynman, the American Nobel Prize winner physicist who theorized "Double Slit" experiment, are among them. If we remember briefly the experiment and the theory, according to the classical physics, while the objects are in motion, they follow only one orbit, one track between the initial and final target positions. However, the "interference pattern" in the Double Slit Experiment implies that a particle at the atomic scale can pass through two or more slits at the same time. This theory was formulated by Richard Feynman as the particle progressing from one point to another in space-time as possible. Accordingly, the probability of a particle going from A to B is found by gathering the waves for each possible way from A and B. So, there is a possibility that an A particle going to point B will come to Jupiter, which is not on its road, and even pass the entire universe. So according to Feynman's theory, the particle has "sum over histories" before reaching the goal. On the other hand, observation of the observer in the Double Slit Experiment brings the particle into a single position from the "superposition". Thus, the observer has determined that the route of particle followed, that is, its past.

Hawking and Mlodinow have arrived at the following conclusions from this experiment and theory: If quantum physics is dominant at the very basis of matter, the universe as a whole must have multiple pasts or alternative histories, just as in Feynman's theory of sum over histories. In other words, just like a particle, the universe should have lived through all alternative pasts until it comes to its present position, which means that there is an infinite number of universes. Some of these universes may resemble our universe, some may not; some have appropriate living conditions, some do not. And in some of them, Elvis Presley dies at a young age, but he does not die in some. In some, Napoleon loses the Battle of Waterloo, in some, he wins. In each universe, there are different laws and situations in which all possibilities are experienced. So, the answer to the question, "How does our universe have such delicate life conditions?" is not God, but the "Sum Over History Theory", because there is a possibility that in the infinite number of universes there is a universe with suitable living conditions similar to ours. Again, the result is that just as our observation of particles affects the past of the particle in the Double Slit Experiment, our observation of the universe at this moment determines the past of the universe.

"The usual assumption in cosmology is that the universe has a single definite history. One can use the laws of physics to calculate how this history develops with time. We call this the "bottom-up" approach to cosmology... Instead, one should trace the histories from the top down, backward from the present time. Some histories will be more probable than others, and the sum will normally be dominated by a single history that starts with the creation of the universe and culminates in the state under consideration. But there will be different histories for different possible states of the universe at the present time. This leads to a radically different view of cosmology, and the relation between cause and effect. The histories that contribute to the Feynman sum don't have an independent existence, but depend on what is being measured. We create history by our observation, rather than history creating us." [63]

Hawking and Mlodinow want us to believe that we have been to Mars at the same time during our trip from Istanbul to Ankara. If so, Hawking and Mlodinow did not write *The Grand Design* book, but we created the book with our observations during the introduction of the book by having an impact on the past (top-down approach)! However, we must admit that we find it much more surprising that Hawking and Mlodinow continually try to benefit from Feynman's Sum Over History Theory while trying to support M-Theory, and they claim that the unified theory that Einstein was seeking is this theory. It is known that Feynman himself, as long as he lived, strongly opposed the String Theory and labeled it as madness, deviation, and the wrong path.[64] It is known that Einstein opposed the interpretation of Quantum Physics with an objective indeterminist or anti-realist point of view, and struggled with these ideas throughout his life. He argued that the problem arises from our lack of knowledge, not because nature is in fact like this, and that a theory corresponding with common sense will absolutely be revealed in the future.

In our opinion, however, the main criticism to M-Theory is its claim to be the "ultimate theory" that contradicts the overall progress of science. In fact, a claim such as "The Theory of Everything" means that there is no longer something to investigate, physics comes to an end and science is over. Essentially, this fact brings to mind a familiar claim. Towards the end of the 19th century, the leading scientists of the time, the mathematical physicist Lord Kelvin (1824-1907), claimed that physics came to the last decimal place of its life. According to him, all the basic problems have been solved, except for some insignificant details on heat and light theory, and that in the following decade, these would probably be resolved as well.[65] However, a decade later the discovery of radioactivity, the theory of relativity, and quantum mechanics transformed physics totally, and caused scientists to change their perception of the universe.

3. AN EVALUATION WITH REGARD TO ISLAMIC VIEWPOINT

Undoubtedly, the basic principle of the Islamic religion is "monotheism" (*tawḥīd*). This principle, which emphasizes that nothing but *Allah* can be deity, divides existent beings into God and everything other than God (*mā siwa Allāh*). On this ontological distinction, God represents the eternal, perpetual, immutable, necessary, sacred and incomprehensible side of reality; however, the universe stands for the side which is finite, limited, contingent, discontinuous, profane, comprehensible, mutable and diverse. Therefore, the

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[63]   Hawking – Mlodinow, *The Grand Design*, 139-140.

[64]   Jim Holt, "Unstrung: In String Theory, Beauty Is Truth, Truth Beauty", accessed: 8 September 2011, http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2006/10/02/061002crat_atlarge

[65]   Peter E. Hodgson, *Theology and Modern Physics* (Burlington: Ashgate Rub., 2005), 1.

principle of *tawḥīd* or monotheism stipulates the condition that the universe can be comprehended as a whole, and subject to research and examination by cleaning the universe from divine attributes such as sacredness, transcendence, eternity, and infinity.

So, according to Islam, does "human being" have the competence to do this, and to comprehend the universe from the very basic to the most general, that is to say, to make a "scientific cosmology"?

Even if the *Qurʾān* emphasizes that man cannot grasp *Allah* in many verses,[66] it approaches the universe differently. *The Qur'an* states that Allah taught all the names of things to prophet *Adam*,[67] and as a "steward of *Allah* on earth", the human being is required to establish sovereignty over nature and other beings,[68] and to examine heaven and earth using the senses and the mind, using this knowledge as evidence for the existence of *Allah*.[69] Indeed, the fact that all beings except for *Allah* are expressed in terms of "The Universe" (*ʿĀlam*) in the sense of "pointing to the creator's existence" (with which man is explicitly directed to cosmological arguments about knowing *Allah*), implies that man can comprehend the universe because human beings must be able to grasp the universe as a "whole", so that they can develop reasoning and reflection. Hence, according to Islam, mankind has no right to direct his incapability of not being able to see or comprehend Allah to the nature and the phenomena in the world: in other words, to render the universe metaphysical.

After presenting this perspective, if we evaluate the expression "Now, science can explain the existence of the universe alone, God is unnecessary!", it is true that it holds the claim of abstracting nature from signs and symbols so much that one cannot make religious associations. However, while we state that M-Theory, which is used to support this claim is a highly speculative theory, that is, it does not have the basic criteria required for being scientific, as the "*tawḥīd*" principle notes above, we need to avoid approaches which imply that human beings cannot comprehend the universe, know the very nature the of things, scientific research on the substance and the limits of reality will fail, and that therefore, cosmology is in the field of metaphysics, not science. Although it seems to be useful for religion in the short run to make the universe incomprehensible by man, it will cause cosmological proofs to fall into contradiction in themselves as it will open the way to deification of the universe over the long term. An unknown (God) cannot be explained with another unknown (the universe); the human cannot grasp the universe, so s/he cannot develop reasoning and reflection of God through it.

Therefore, instead of declaring the universe incomprehensible and trying to reach God through the points that science cannot explain (god of the gaps), as theologinas we must encourage science to further research on the universe, and we must consider these progresses as a service to the "*tawḥīd*" principle and distancing from "pantheism" and "polytheism or henontheism" (*shirk*). When we approach the matter in this way, even cosmology becomes a "science", and will be regarded as a service to *tawḥīd* and departure from *shirk*, because the fact that the universe can be explored and understood as a whole is the greatest proof that it is not God.

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[66] al-Anʿām 6/103, al-Aʿrāf 7/143, al-Baqara 2/55, al-Nisāʾ 4/1.

[67] al-Baqara 2/31.

[68] al-Baqara 2/30; al-Anʿām 6/165; Fāṭir 35/39.

[69] al-Dhāriyāt 51/20-21.

From such a religio-scientific perspective, since religion does not try to reach God through the points that science cannot explain, the possibility of conflict with science will also be minimized. However, reaching God through the unknowns in the universe -the unsolved points by science- will cause conflict between science and religion each time science makes progress in explaining little known issues. Even if science uses methodological naturalism and reveals that the whole universe is the result of a law of nature, it will not be able to harm religion because today science can reveal how the rain falls, and from which stages babies pass through the mother's womb and are born. However, this does not prevent a believer from regarding rainfall as the mercy and the birth of the baby as the work of a unique miracle of God. So, why is the birth of the universe based on natural laws -for example, The Law of Gravity- contrary to religion?

CONCLUSION

Today, cosmology is a science, but it is true that this science faces many deficiencies and crises in comprehending the universe as a whole. However, this does not mean that they cannot be overcome and no progress can be recorded in this field. If we know much more about the universe today than a decade ago, there is no reason not to feel optimistic about the future. If science fails to understand the universe, it will never be due to the inadequacy of the human capacity or incomprehensibility of the universe; perhaps failure, as J.D. Bernal states, will be due to the fact that the social organization necessary for science is not established.[70] Therefore, instead of the way of reaching God through the points where science is helpless to explain, theologians have to put forward a conception of God from the knowledge of the universe.

On the other hand, the religion - science relation can be evaluated restrainedly, first of all, by having knowledge about both of them. When examined closely it is seen that although science seems to follow a certain methodology based on the rational evaluation of experiments and observations, it also includes speculative aspects. On the other hand, although religion is supposed to be totally speculative, it has certain methodologies when based on a just and wise belief of God. Accordingly, it should be well questioned why modern science emerged in the west, where monotheistic religions were dominant, not in a geographical region where Indian religions such as Hinduism and Buddhism were dominant. In response to the Eastern religions which make God and nature identical, and so have supreme, holy, mysterious, frightening, incomprehensible natural conceptions, the fact that the monotheistic religions separate the universe and God with clear lines, and the whole world is given to the control of a just and wise God with an "unchanging custom" enabled the development of a conception of nature free from independent semi-god spirits and supernatural powers, thus an infrastructure was established in which natural sciences could have the opportunity to improve. The liberation of nature from mythical narratives, spiritual elements and divinization by monotheistic religions constituted one of the most important stages in the development of science.[71] Therefore, although they are portrayed as if they were clashing, "science" and "monotheistic religions" are actually children of the same family and the same worldview. For this reason, just as science has contributed to religion in its purification from superstitions, religion can also help to purify science from superstitions, contrary to common sense, and anti-realist approaches. In this scope, it can be seen that Einstein's quantum physics responds to the objective indeterminist interpretation with that statement,

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[70]   J. D. Bernal, *Tarihte Bilim=Science in History,* trans. Tonguç Ok (Istanbul: Evrensel, 2008), 484.

[71]   Ismail R. Faruqi, "Islam and The Theory of Nature", *Islamic Quarterly* 26/1 (1984): 16-24.

"God does not play dice", as a call to religion as a relief for the deviation from the traditional understanding of science.

Religion does not only encourage science to use common sense, with its red lines it may also enable scientists to ask the right questions and turn to the right channels in terms of the ultimate goal. It should not be forgotten that the astronomer George Lemaitre (1894-1966), one of the great theoreticians of the Big Bang Theory, which is considered one of the greatest discoveries of the past century and regarded as a starting point for the physical world in accordance with religion, is also a priest at the same time. In fact, String Theory, which is argued to foreshadow infinite universes contrary to religion for about 40 years, led physics to a stalemate, and caused a loss of time, and should be looked at from this point of view.

On the other hand, regarding science only as a technique means to underestimate it. On the contrary, with its worldview, science provides important clues about not only the functioning of the universe but also the place of the human being in the universe, the purpose of life, and moral duties and responsibilities. In addition, it provides scientists who deal with it with features such as neutrality, honesty, diligence, inquisitive spirit, passion of truth and humility. For example, according to Epicurus, physics reveals that nature is not governed by capricious gods, but by its systematic rules, so it frees man from unnecessary fears and obligations caused by these gods, and opens the way for a happy and free life. According to the classical period Islamic theologians (the practitioners of the science of *kalām*, *mutakallimūn*), physics does not only purify nature from the divine elements, but reveals that nature in constant change and transformation is in need of a God out of itself, so it makes the human being ready to duties that God will guide through His prophets.

In fact, the debate is the same today, as well. Today, in the West, Hawking and Mlodinow claim in *The Grand Design* that physics makes God unnecessary by revealing that the universe is a self-sufficient whole without needing the intervention of a supernatural being from the beginning to the end; which means that the human being must follow the path of his own mind, not a religion based on God. On the contrary, according to Antony Flew, who left atheism in the light of the picture of the universe set forth by modern science, science reveals that there exists an omnipotent, omniscience and omnipresent being, which is transcendent.[72]

As a result, for us, God and the universe represent both sides of reality. Science examines the side of the universe in the form of change, transformation and multiplicity, while theology focuses on the side of God, who is eternal, unique and immutable. However, this does not mean that the fields are completely separate and independent from each other. The history of thought has shown that both sides cannot be put forward with great consistency unless they are associated and reconciled. Many philosophers and scientists from Plato to Aristotle, Newton to Einstein felt the need to somehow associate their systems with God in order to construct a coherent model of the universe. Theologians, on the other hand, were able to proof a concept of God only after the association with the universe, as can be understood from the cosmological evidences commonly used in defense of God's faith. It is therefore difficult for a person to speak about God

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[72] Antony Flew, *There is God: How The World's Most Notorious Atheist Changed His Mind* (New York: Harpercollins 2007), 90-91, 155

without revealing an opinion about the universe. In that case, we as theologians must also be busy with the universe as much as we are engaged with God.

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The New Approach to The Source Of Kalām Atomism *

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ABSTRACT

'Kalām atomism' is one of the central subjects in the Mutakallimūn's doctrine of universe. The origin of this subject still remains to be explored. Moses b. Maymonides claims that kalām atomism was affected by Greek atomism. This claim also has been taken into account by various orientalists. In the XIX. Century, Schmölders and Mabilleu claimed that Kalām atomism was effected by Indian atomism. Shlomo Pines in his *Beitrage zur Islamischen Atomenlehre* has acknowledged a resemblance between the certain aspects of Greek and Kalām atomism. Pines thought that the difference between Greek atomism and Kalâm atomism were too great and therefore believed that the search for a source of Kalām atomism was inconclusive. Pines established some congruities between the doctrines and Kalām atomism. According to Alnoor Dhanani in *The Physical Theory of Kalām* (Brill 1994) Pines failed to find possible routes transmission from the former of the latter. Before Pines (ten years ago), Şemseddin (Günaltay), in his article called "Mütekellimûn ve Atom Nazariyesi" (*Daru'l-*

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Funun İlahiyat Fakültesi Mecmuası, 1925) acknowledged congruities between the doctrines of Indian atomism and Kalām atomism. This article claims that Kalām atomism was put forward by *mutekellimûn* in and the influence of Greek and Indian atomism on Kalām atomism was indirect. Therefore Kalām atomism can be treated as an original theory.

Kelâm Atomculuğunun Kaynağı Sorunu

ÖZ

Kelâmcıların âlem telakkisi ile adeta özdeşleşmiş bulunan Kelâm atomculuğunun kaynağı konusu tam açıklığa kavuşamamıştır. Musa b. Meymûn tarafından Yunan orijinli olduğu iddiası uzun süre oryantalistleri etkilemiştir. 19. yüzyılda Kelâm atomculuğunun menşeinin Hint atomculuğu olabileceği iddiası ortaya atılmıştır. Bu iddiayı ilk defa Schmölders 1840'larda dillendirmiş, bundan elli yıl sonra Mabilleu bu iddiayı Kelâm atomculuğunun tamamının Hint düşüncesinden geldiği noktasına götürmüştür. Bu fikrin günümüzde en önemli savunucusu Shlomo Pines'tır (ö. 1990). Pines, 1936 yılında Berlin'de basılan *Beitrage zur Islamischen Atomenlehre* adlı kitabında bu düşünceyi savunur ve Kelâm atomculuğunun Yunan atomculuğundan çok Hint atomculuğuna yakın olduğuna ve aralarında esaslı benzerlikler bulunduğuna dikkat çeker. Alnoor Dhanani ise *The Physical Theory of Kalam* (Brill 1994) adlı çalışmasında Pines'in çabasını başarısız bulur. Türkiye de ise Pines'ten on yıl önce *Daru'l-Funun İlahiyat Fakültesi Mecmuası*'nda "Mütekellimûn ve Atom Nazariyesi" adlı makalesinde (1925) M. Şemseddin (Günaltay), Kelâm atom düşüncesinin menşeinin Yunan filozofu Demokritos'a götürülmesini, İbn Meymûn'un yanlış adres göstermesine ve müsteşriklerin bundan etkilenmesine bağlar. Ona göre Kelâmcıların atom nazariyesi Hint âlimi Kanada'nın atomculuğuna daha yakındır. Ancak bu iddiaların somut ve kesin delillerden çok benzerlikler yoluyla ortaya konulduğu görülmektedir. Bu durumda Kelâmcıların bu bilgileri doğrudan Yunan ve Hint düşüncesinden değil Ortadoğu bölge kültüründe bulunduğu şekliyle dolaylı yoldan elde etmiş olmaları daha bir ihtimal dahilinde görülmektedir. Bu da Kelâm atomculuğunun özgünlüğü anlamına gelir.

INTRODUCTION

The inclusion of the "Atom" concept in Islamic theology (Kalām) results from the tendency of Islamic theologians (Mutakallimūn) in developing a conception of universe. Encountering with new cultures and thoughts in parallel with the enlargement of the Islamic society forced Islamic thinkers to adopt new attitudes and new approaches towards these cultures and thoughts. To be able to put new attitudes and approaches, firstly it is crucial to be equipped with the necessary information and qualifications essential in

introducing yourself and also in having knowledge about others. In other words, firstly one should develop a thesis and then propose an anti-thesis against the thesis developed by the other. The way in which other defines itself or others can also serve as a sample model. To that end, theologians who can also be named as the "first Muslim thinkers" attempted to define and introduce their religion to other cultures by basing their references primarily on Islamic revelation; in other words, they tried to formulate rational explanation and expression of their religion. Considering the revelation as the basis formed these attempts into a religious thought and as a natural result placed "*God of the said religion*" into the centre of these beliefs and so, other issues were defined and explained around this. Since a definition requires firstly the development of a conception, thinkers started referring to the Qurʾān as the main source in the scope of the attempts to develop a conception which begins with Allah, the God of the religion.

The two attributes of Allah -*eternal (qadīm) and creator (hāliq)*- are quite frequently emphasized in the Qurʾān. Since according to the verse "There is no god but He: that is the witness of God. His angels and those endued with knowledge, standing firm on justice, witnessed that there is no god but He, the Exalted in Power, the Wise."[1]; bearing witness that there is no god but Allah means accepting that He is the only creator of all beings, and is the first cause of any incident and the only everlasting being. Briefly, He is *eternal* with no beginning (*qadīm*) and no end (*abadī*). As a matter of fact, "Allah created both you and all the works you do"[2], "Allah is the creator of everything"[3] and "Is the Creator the same as non-creator?"[4], these verses particularly emphasizes that Allah's main attribute is being the "creator". In the light of these and such verses, the following judgments have been made: Allah has the attribute of being "*eternal*" which means that He has no beginning and He can not be placed at any point in "time" concept. Any being other than Him can not have such features and they exist only by the creation of Allah. Beings other than Allah constitute the "world". This way, the "conception of the world" in Kalām is shaped on the basis of the conception of God. Unlike Allah's feature of "having no beginning (*qadīm*)", the features of the world such as "being originated (*hādith*)" and "being created (*mahlūq*)" are emphasized. The most important indicator showing that the world does not have the feature of "having no beginning (*qadīm*)" is that there is a beginning and ending point for the world and the beings within it. In addition, since the beings in the world are divided and separated into smaller components, this process must end at a specific point; otherwise, the thought of the "eternalness of material", which is indeed invalid, can rise in the minds. At this point, where such division processes end, we encounter the "atom" which is the smallest indivisible component of any material. Theologians sometimes use the phrase "*al-juz alladhī lā yatacazzāʾ*" which means "the smallest indivisible component" or the word "*jawhar*" which means "essence or core".

The dictionary definition of the word "*jawhar*" used as the rendering of "atom" is referred to "any kind of stone from which valuable elements can be extracted". Moreover, it is suggested that the statement "*jawhar* of x" means "the essence or core of x". It is widely believed that the Arabic word "*jawhar*" etymologically is the transliteration of the word "gawhar/gohar" in Persian; however, some Arabic dictionary

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[1]   Āl Imrān 3/18.

[2]   al-Ṣaffāt 37/96.

[3]   al-Zumar 39/62.

[4]   al-Nakhl 16/17.

authors suggest that this word comes from the Arabic root (j-h-r) which means "to come out/appear"[5]. In the light of the above meanings, the concept "*jawhar*" used as a term in philosophy and theology disciplines has a meaning which reflects the disagreement between these two disciplines. Philosophy prefers the meaning of "self-existing, self-being and entity that is not in a subject" while Kalām accepts the explanation of "a being which takes up space in itself and is the opposite of the accident (ʿAraḍ)". In the beginning and within the scope of Islamic theology, the concept of "*jawhar*" was used for both the body (*jism*) and a part of it and then for both the material and the essence, and finally it was termed "the smallest indivisible component"[6]

After this introduction, we can focus on "the source of the atom thought in Kalām", which is the main subject of this article. Being one of the basic questions asked in the scope of Kalām, there is no clear-cut information on this issue. However, three arguments have been developed on the basis of the similarities between various thoughts and some evidences, each of which will be elaborated in this article. The three basic arguments suggested to date are as follows:

The thought of atomism comes from

- the main sources of Islam,

- the Greek philosophy,

- the Indian philosophy.

We believe that Kalām atomism comes from the culture of the region where this discipline initially emerged. This argument will be dealt with in this article as the fourth argument which suggests that "the thought of atomism comes from the culture of the region where Kalām atomism has emerged".

1. BASIC SOURCES OF ISLAM

The argument that Kalām atomism comes from the basic sources of Islam has not been widely accepted; since, the basic sources, the Qurʾān and Hadith, do not include any clear expression which can serve as a basis for this argument. On the other hand, Traditionists (Ahl al-Hadith) who are famous for their strict dependence on the Qurʾān and Hadith prefer to be distant from the terms used by Kalām atomists and even react to the use of these terms, which shows that the first argument has no strong grounds[7]. For instance, as Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī (d. 505/1111) related, Traditionists condemned theologians for using terms such as "substance (*jawhar*)" and "accident (ʿAraḍ)" that had not existed in the time of Companions (Sahaba). Similarly, Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ (d. 643/1245), famous Hadith expert, strongly criticized the use of philosophical and logic

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[5]   Jamāl al-Dīn Abū l-Faḍl Muḥammad b. Mukarram Ibn Manẓūr, *Lisān al-ʿArab* (Beirut: Dār Sadr, nd.), 4/152-153; Abū al-Tāhir al-Fīrūzābādī, *al-Qāmūs al-muḥīt* (Beirut 1407/1987,472; Murtaḍā al-Zabīdī, *Tāj al-ʿarūs* (Beirut: Dār al-Sadr, nd.), 3/115; Mutercim Aḥmad ʿAṣim, *Kamus Tercumesi* (Istanbul 1305), 2/233.

[6]   Abū l-Ḥasan ʿAlī b. Ismāʿīl al-Ashʿarī, *Maqālāt al-islāmiyīn wa ikhtilāf al-muṣallīn*, ed. Helmut Ritter (Wiesbaden 1980, 301-306; Muṭahhar ibn Ṭāhir al-Maqdisī, *Kitāb al-badʾ wa-l-taʾrīkh*, ed. and trans. Clément Huart (Paris 1899–1919),1/43; Abū l-Maʿālī al-Juwaynī, *Lumʿa al-adilla, ed.* Fawkiyya Husein Mahmud (Beirut 1987),77; Shlomo Pines *Madhhab al-zarra inda al-Muslimin*, Trans. Muhammed Abd al-Hadi Abu Rida (Cairo 1365/1946),4; Muna Ahmad Abu Zayd, *al-Tasawwur al-zarri* (Beirut 1414/1994), 26.

[7]   Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī, *Iḥyāʾ ʿulūm al-dīn* (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-Arabi, nd.), 1/165.

terms in Islamic sciences[8]. One of the leading traditionists, Ibn Taymiyya (d. 728/1325) objected to the use of terms such as "body (*jism*) and substance (*jawhar*)" in the scope of studies on Allah and other religious areas. According to him, there is no difference in terms of violation of religious rules (*bid'a*) between saying "Allah is a body" and "Allah is not a body". Besides being never mentioned in Hadith and the Qur'an, these words are not uttered by previous scholars (*salaf*) as well. Therefore, he finds it unnecessary and groundless for theologians to make substance (*jawhar*) and body-oriented discussions[9].

2. GREEK PHILOSOPHY AS THE SOURCE OF KALĀM ATOMISM

The argument that theological atomism comes from the Greek philosophy was suggested by Ibn Maimūn (Maimonades) (d. 601/1204), Andalusian Jewish scholar[10], and supported by modern researchers Brockelmann, De Boer and Zuhdī Hasan Jārullah[11]. The similarity between Kalām atomism and the atom theory suggested by Leukippos and developed by his student Democritus is proposed as the strongest evidence of this argument. It is easy to make an analogy between the statement "beings are composed of indivisible components" belonging to these two philosophers and the statement "the smallest indivisible component" (*al-juz alladhī lā yatacazzā*) belonging to Muslim theologians[12]. Taking into account the fact that Greek classics were translated into Arabic in the quite early times, it is natural for Muʿtazila, since they had a rational approach and gave priority to the reason rather than traditional scholars, to be affected by this thought. Moreover, it is quite normal for the Islamic theologians to benefit from the existing Greek culture and philosophy which they found it present to develop new methods and terms and a conception of God and Universe by using such methods and terms. However, it is not so easy to consider the atomism of Democritus in a materialist manner compatible with the Islamic belief which is based on an "eternal creator" God. Indeed, no concrete evidence has been revealed reflecting a direct relation between the first era of Islamic theologians and Greek philosophy[13].

Beyond the mentality difference between Kalām atomism and Greek atomism, there are both qualitative and quantitative differences between both of them as well. According to Leukippos and Democritus, there are three characteristics of atoms: hardness, form and size. Hardness is the unique characteristic that prevents division of atoms. Rather than theoretical division, Democritus finds actual division impossible due to the hardness characteristic. On the other hand, Islamic theologians associate indivisibility with "being

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[8]   Ibn al-Ṣalāh, *al-Fatawa* (Diyarbakir nd.), 35.

[9]   Ibn Taymiyya, *Minhaj al-sunna* (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-Ilmiyya, nd.), 1/180-181.

[10] Abū ʿImrān Mūsā b. Maimūn b. ʿAbd Allāh al-Ḳurṭubī Ibn Maimūn, *Dalālat al-ḥāʾirīn,* ed. Hüseyin Atay (Ankara 1974), 189.

[11] Irfan Abdulhamid, Dirasat fi al-firaq wa al-aqaid al-Islamiyya (Beirut 1404/1984), 153-154; Abu Zayd, al-Tasawwur al-zarri, 24.

[12] See; Eduard Zeller, *A History of Greek Philosophy*, trans. S.F. Alleyne (London 1881), 2/27-253; Kamıran Birand, *İlkçağ Felsefesi Tarihi [History of First Era Philosophy]* (Ankara 1956); Cağfer Karadaş, "Atomculuk" [*Atomism*], *Felsefe Ansiklopedisi*, ed. Ahmet Cevizci (Istanbul 2003), 1/700-704.

[13] See Otto Pretzl, "Madhhab jawhar al-fard inda al-mutakallimun fi al-Islam", *Madhhab al-zarra inda al-Muslimin,* ed. Shlomo Pines [al-Qahirah: Maktabat al-Nahḍah al-Miṣriyah, 1946), 131, 147.

the smallest component" and find both physical and theoretical division impossible.[14] There are also differences in terms of the second characteristic; namely, form. Democritus suggests that atoms can be in round, ribbed, hollowed and etc. forms in line with the differences in the world while theologians suggest that there is only one single form for any atom. According to theologians, form differences observed in atoms result from accidents[15]. Thirdly, the theory that atoms have different sizes contradicts the thesis of theologians that atoms are of the same size. According to them, there is no difference between the sizes of the atoms forming a mountain and the atoms forming a seed.[16] In addition, theologians regard the characteristics like "hardness, weight, heat and coldness" as the accidents occurring and existing for a period in substances (*jawhar*) and bodies while Democritus regard them as basic and endless characteristics of atoms[17].

Although there are important similarities between Greek and Kalām atomism such as "indivisibility of atoms" and "that they exist in a vacuum (*hala*)", there is a fundamental difference: Greek philosophy suggests that material has no beginning and no end and that there is a compulsory cause-effect relation between movement and existence as a consequence of the determinist thought. Theology suggests that material is created from "nothing" and that movement and existence come out only with the intervention of Allah, which invalidates mechanism and determinism since the orderliness of the object comes from the Creator not the object itself.[18] In addition, some Islamic sources mention about the atom philosophy of Democritus but do not mention any relation between this philosophy and Kalām atomism, which strengthens the doubts against the thesis that Kalām atomism is affected by the Greek philosophy. For instance, Sa'id b. Ahmad, al-Andalusī suggested that Abū al-Hudhayl al-Allāf (d. 235/850) –who have been considered as the founder of Kalām atomism- had some arguments in line with the characters thought of Empedocles on attributes; however, he did not mention any relation between Democritus' atomism and Kalām atomism[19]. al-Shahristānī allocating the biggest place for Democritus and his atomism, did not make any connection or find any similarity between Kalām atomism and Greek atomism as well[20].

[14]   al-Ashʿarī, *Maqālāt al-islāmiyīn,* 314; Abū Bakr Muḥammad Ibn Fūrak, *Mujarrad maqālāt al-shaykh Abī l-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī,* ed. Daniel Gimaret (Beirut 1987), 203-211; Irfan Abdulhamid, *Dirasat,* 154.

[15]   Abū Rashid al-Nīsābūrī, *al-Masāil fī al-khilāf* (Beirut 1979), 29; Ibn Fūrak, *Mujarrad maqālāt,* 203-211 ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Baghdādī, *Usūl al-dīn* (Istanbul 1346/1946), 35; A. Weber, History of Philosophy, trans. Frank Thilly [New York 1905), 56; Hilmi Ziya Ülken, *Varlık ve Oluş [Being and Existence]* (Ankara 1968) 191; Kamıran Birand, *İlkçağ Felsefesi Tarihi [History of First Era Philosophy],* 28-29.

[16]   al-Bāqillānī, *Kitāb al-Tamhīd*, ed. Imaduddin Ahmed Haydar (Beyrut 1407/1987), 37; al-Baghdādī, *Usūl al-dīn*, 36; Pines, *Madhhab al-zarra*, 13-14

[17]   al-Bāqillānī, *Kitāb al-Tamhīd*, 38, 56-60; Pines, *Madhhab al-zarra*, 8.

[18]   See Ḥusām Muḥyī al-Dīn Ālūsī, *The Problem of Creation in Islamic Thought* (Cambridge 1965), 272; A. Weber, *History of Philosophy*, 56; M. Şemseddin, "Mütekellimin ve Atom Nazariyesi [Theologians and Atom Theory]", 101.

[19]   Sa'id b. Ahmad, al-Andalusī, *Tabaqat al-umam* (Beirut 1985),73, 82.

[20]   Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Karīm al-Shahristānī, *al-Milal wa-l-niḥal* (Beirut 1410/1990), 399, 422, 435.

3. INDIAN THOUGHT AS THE SOURCE OF KALĀM ATOMISM

This idea has been developed on the basis of the suggestion that Kalām atomism is similar to Indian atomism rather than Democritus atomism. In the Vaisheshika System developed by the famous Indian philosopher Kanada in III century BC in the scope of Indian thought, it is believed that God created the world from eternal atoms[21], a statement close to and with more similarity to Kalām atomism when compared to Greek atomism. This theory was for the first time suggested by Schmölders in 1840's. Fifty years later, Mabilleu developed this hypothesis to the point that Kalām atomism completely evolved from the Indian thought[22]. The biggest defender of this philosophy today was Shlomo Pines (d. 1990)[23]. In his article published in 1936 in Berlin under the title "*Beitrage zur Islamischen Atomenlehre",* Shlomo Pines defended this hypothesis and emphasized the basic similarities between Indian atomism and Kalām atomism. According to Pines, the differences between Democritus atomism and Kalām atomism are not only limited with details; there are many fundamental differences as well. For instance, according to Democritus, atoms constituting the materials have some determined essential characteristics. On the other hand, according to theologians from Abū al-Hudhayl to Ash'arites, accidents are a kind of being and different from *jawhar*s.[24] In his article titled "Mütekellimîn ve Atom Nazariyesi" *(Islamic Theologians and Atom Thought)* published in the *The Journal of Istanbul Dar al-Funun Faculty of Divinity* (1925) ten years before Pines' study, M. Şemseddin suggested that basing Kalām atomism on Greek philosopher Democritus results from the misleading of Ibn Maimūn and the effects of this misleading on Orientalists. According to him, the atom theory of theologians is closer to the atomism of Kanada, Indian philosopher[25]. In the Vaisheshika system developed by Kanada, natural philosophy and metaphysics are given importance in explaining the world. "Vaisheshika" which literally means "difference" is a system that enables finding the truth by using differences and similarities between beings. This natural philosophy is based on a kind of atom discipline. According to this system, cosmos is composed of indivisible particles. These particles are endless separately but finite when combined. Change in the cosmos takes place when these particles combine with and separate from each other[26]. God builds the world by using these endless atoms. Cosmos starts with the combination of these atoms and ends with the separation of them. These atoms do not move by themselves. God creates the world in compliance with "Karma Laws" and by using the atoms under His order[27]. Although acceptance of the atoms as "eternal" components through this system contradicts Kalām atomism, the hypothesis that atoms move not due to mechanical reasons but God's intervention is an important similarity. The school of Jainism located in the Indian region disagrees with the idea of "a first cause" and also gives place to the thought of atomism. According to this thought system, in the final analysis, material is an atomic structure. The smallest part of the material is an

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[21] Kemal Çağdaş, Eski Hint Çağ Kültür Tarihine Giriş [Introduction to History of Ancient Indian Era] (Ankara 1974), 38, 42.

[22] Syed Nomanul Haq, "The Indian and Persian Background", *History of Islamic Philosophy*, ed. Seyyed Hossein Nasr and Oliver Leaman (London and New York 1996), 1/54.

[23] Irfan Abdulhamid, *Dirasat*, 154; Abu Zayd, *al-Tasawwur al-zarri,* 21-22.

[24] Pines, Madhhab al-zarra inda al-Muslimin, 8, 91-121.

[25] M. Şemseddin, "Mütekellimîn ve Atom Nazariyesi [Theologians and Atom Theory]", 91.

[26] Qadir, "Pre-Islamic Indian Thought", M.M. Sharif, *A History of Muslim Philosophy* (Wiesbaden 1963) 1/42-43.

[27] Çağdaş, *Eski Hint Çağ Kültür Tarihine Giriş [Introduction to Cultural History of Ancient Indian Era]*, 42.

atom-like particle and this particle has some characteristics such as color, taste, smell and sense of touch. They believe that the whole cosmos is alive and all atomic particles have souls. Time means eternity and the world has neither a beginning nor an end[28]. This system is much closer to Democritus atomism rather than Kalām atomism since it does not accept a first cause and suggests that material and cosmos are eternal.

Considering the fact that the transfer of Persian and Indian sciences into the Islamic world took place before the Greek philosophy can also be seen as an important reason behind the Indian effect[29]. While no contact was established with Syrian translators in the era of Harun al-Rashid (170-193/786-809), Indians were quite well-known in the Islamic world. For instance, in 249/863 Ibn al-Nadim made the following statements about a book being prepared on Indian religions: "Yahya b. Khālid al-Barmakī the Wazīr (d. 190/805) sent someone to bring some medicines from India and collect data about the religions of Indians so as to write a book."[30].

Important evidence suggesting that Kalām atomism comes from Indian thought is that Abū Bakr Zakariya al-Rāzī (d. 313/925), a philosopher strongly defending atomism, was a close friend of Iranshahrī who had enormous knowledge about Indian beliefs and culture and that it was quite a high possibility for al-Rāzī to transfer atomism from India via Iranshahrī[31]. On the other hand, Abū Rayḥān Muḥammad b. Aḥmad al-Bīrūnī (d. 453/1061) -a specialist on Indian beliefs and thoughts- stated that he benefited from the works of Iranshahrī on Indian beliefs and culture[32].

In the light of these facts, we can conclude that Kalām atomism is similar to Indian atomism rather than Greek atomism in terms of God-Universe relations due to the fact that Greek philosophy is solely a philosophy while Indian thought is a religious belief. Democritus is a materialist philosopher and makes a conception of the world in line with this thought. Subsequently it can not be expected from him to develop a conception of God and the cosmos as a theologian who has religious concerns do. Therefore, it is natural for the Kalām atomism theory to be closer to and have more similar features with the Indian atomism theory which has a God and cosmos conception. However, in addition to the acceptance of material as being eternal[33], the absence of the idea of "vacuum" in the Indian thought, which is an important component of Kalām as Şemseddin Günaltay[34] underlines, it is also an important difference between these two thoughts. Another important problem is the question of "How did the atomism thought -which remained quite marginal in the Indian philosophy- succeed to influence the area where Kalām developed?". As a matter of fact, there is no clear information in Islamic sources about Indian atomism.

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[28]   Haq, "The Indian and Persian Background", 1/54; Qadir, "Pre-Islamic Indian Thought", 1/29-30.

[29]   Ibn al-Nadīm, *al-Fihrist*, 305, 360; Hilmi Ziya Ülken, Uyanış Devrinde Tercümenin Rolü [The Role of Trasnlation in Reneaissane Era], Istanbul 1997.

[30]   Ibn al-Nadīm, *al-Fihrist*, 409.

[31]   Pines, *Madhab al-zarra*, 36, 72.

[32]   Abū Rayḥān Muḥammad al-Bīrūnī, *al-Āthār al-bāqiya ʿan al-qurūn al-khāliya,* ed. Parviz Azka'i (Tahran 2001), 16.

[33]   al-Bīrūnī, *al-Āthār al-bāqiya,* 244; al-Andalusī, *Tabaqat al-umam*, 52-54.

[34]   M. Şemseddin, "Mütekellimîn ve Atom Nazariyesi [Theologians and Atom Theory]", 103.

4. THE CULTURE OF THE REGION WHERE KALĀM ATOMISM EMERGED

Theologians are neither physicians nor just philosophers; their main aim is to prove that Allah is the Creator. In other words, they do not aim at developing a theory or making additions to or eliminations from an existing theory, rather, they aim at strengthening and explaining further their religious thoughts with the help of the data they collect. As a matter of fact, according to Saʿd al-Dīn al-Taftāzānī the reason why theologians prefer the atomism thought is because philosophers who accept matter (*hayula*) and form (*surah*) as world components suggest that these two components are eternal[35]. Because, accepting "eternal" materials and forms means accepting an "eternal" world. Thus, theologians have stayed away from such ideas as they can damage the thought that it is only Allah who is "eternal" and turned towards the atomism thought. Taking the *concern* mentioned by al-Taftāzānī, as a basis it does not seem logical for theologians to adopt the atomism thought of materialist Democritus. Even if we foresee that theologians have re-arranged this thought in line with the Islamic thought, it won't be logical for theologians to prefer a more materialist atomism rather than a "material and form" thought which foresees the idea of an *first cause*. On the contrary, while evading from the eternity of material, it would be contradictory for theologians to adopt a materialist thought that does not foresee an "first cause"[36]. So in this situation either theologians benefited from Indian atomism which includes the thought of God or that Greek and Indian atomism had mixed into each other in this region and turned into a structure acceptable for theologians. In a sense, it means that theologians have developed an eclectical theory by synthesizing Greek and Indian atomism. In that case, the following questions will have to be answered: Were these two theories on atomism already present in the Iraq region where theology initially developed? Do the religions and cultures in the region include the atomism thought? In more general terms, were Indian and Greek philosophies known in the Iraq region? If yes, to which extent? It is a priority to know the ethnical, religious and cultural structure of the region to be able to answer these questions.

4.1. The Ethnic and Cultural Structure of the Region

When the Muslims started to rule over the Mesopotamia region where Kalām atomism developed, there were many religions, sects and ethnic groups in the region. Jews and Syrians; the Christian population composed of Nestorians, Melkites and Armenians; Persians to have adopted Mazdaism, Manihaism and Zoroastrianism; Assyrians; Kildanians; Nabtians; Zots immigrated from Sind Basin; Kharranians mentioned as Sabians in Islamic sources and; Arabians a part of whom were Christians and the other parts being Pagans. Although Greeks are mentioned in Islamic sources, it is quite clear that these are indeed Christian groups under the control of Byzantium. As a matter of fact, Anatolia is mentioned as Greek region (Ard-Rum) in Arabic sources and Saʿid al-Andalusī talks about Latin and Byzantium people under the title of "Greeks"[37].

Kharran located in the north of Mesopotamia and the surrounding area where the Kalām developed was conquered by Alexander the Great in 4th century BC and then the region was colonized by Greece and

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[35] Saʿd al-Dīn al-Taftāzānī, *Sharh al-Aqāid*, ed. Mahmud Adnan Darwish (Dimashq, nd.), 78.

[36] See Ḥusām Muḥyī al-Dīn Ālūsī, *The Problem of Creation in Islamic Thought*, 273-277

[37] al-Andalusī, *Tabaqat al-umam*, 96, 101, 200. Cağfer Karadaş, *Bakıllanî'ye Göre Allah ve Alem Tasavvuru [Allah and World Conception According to Baqillani]* (Bursa 2003), 65-75.

Rome. First Qādī of Abbasians, Abu Yusuf (d. 182/798) stated that the people living in this region were composed of Nabtians and Greeks[38]. In the light of this data, it can be concluded that the population there was in contact with the Greek and Byzantium culture. With the beginning of Islamic sovereignty, academic activities in the region were not intervened in and remained intact for a long period of time. As a matter of fact, that Abu Yusuf stated that taxes was collected parallel to the income levels of the population in accordance with Muadh b. Jabal (d. 18/639)'s view and that he didn't mentioned any social or other type of implementation towards them verify the above-given statement[39]. Succeeding Muslim caliphs and sultans attached great importance to the region, even, the Kharran city served as the capital of the Umayyad state for some time[40]. Thābit ibn Qurrah al-Kharranī (d. 288/901) coming from Kharran settled in Baghdad in the time of Caliph Muqtadir and wrote many books on logic, mathematics, geometry and astronomy sciences[41]. In the light of valid data, it is considered that the people living in this region had an important role on the transfer of Greek philosophy and culture to Islamic world. Kharranians[42] accepted by Islamic heresiographers as Sabians used philosophic concepts such as "atom", "vacuum" and "material". Kharranīans believed in five eternal beings; two active, one passive and the remaining two where considered neither active nor passive. Among these five eternal beings, God and the soul are active, material is passive and time and vacuum are neither active nor passive[43]. According to the data given by Ibn al-Nadīm, they used the concepts "material, element, form, nonexistence, time and place" to refer to the meanings attributed by Aristotle as well. As a matter of fact, ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Baghdādī (d. 429/1037) suggested that there is a similarity between the "materialist" thought of Kharranīans and the "materialist" thought of materialist philosophers[44]. Their "five eternal beings" thought is also close to the "five eternal beings" thought of the atomism philosopher Zakariya al-Rāzī[45].

The era of Nushirawan, one of the Persian sultans, was the golden era of the Persian culture in traditional sense. In this era, Hellenistic culture revived in the Jundishapur city located in the southeast of Mesopotamia. Closure of Athens schools by Byzantium emperor Justinianus (529) resulted in the migration of Greek philosophers to this area. Greek science and philosophy was highly respected by Mazdak bishops, however, Indian thought had a more dominant role. Indians made considerable improvement in mathematics and particularly developed architecture more than the Babels and Greeks did. The case was similar as

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[38]   Abū Yūsuf, *Kitab al-Kharaj* (Cairo 1396), 42.

[39]   Abū Yūsuf, *Kitab al-Kharaj*, 42-45.

[40]   Şinasi Gündüz, *Mitoloji ile İnanç Arasında [Between Mythology and Belief], Samsun 1998,* 169-170.

[41]   Ibn Juljul, *Ṭabaqāt al-aṭibbāʾwa-l ḥukamāʾ*, ed. Fuʾād Sayyid, (Cairo 1955), 75.

[42]   See for Kharranians, Ibn al-Nadīm, *al-Fihrist*, 383-386; al-Bīrūnī, *al-Āthār al-bāqiya*, 243-245; Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Karīm al-Shahrastānī, *al-Milal wa-l-niḥal* (Beirut 1410/1990), 2/365-368; Abū l-Faraj Ibn al-ʿIbrī, *Tārikh al-Zamān,* trans. from Syrian to Arabic Ishaq Armala (Beirut 1986), 23, 48.

[43]   Ibn al-Nadīm, *al-Fihrist*, 384; Pines, *Madhab al-zarra*, 60-66.

[44]   Ibn al-Nadīm, *al-Fihrist*, 384; ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Baghdādī, *al-Farq bayn al-firaq, e*d. Muhammad Muhyiddin Abdulhamid (Beirut 1411/1990), 355.

[45]   T.J. de Boer, *The History of Philosophy in Islam*, trans. Edward R. Jones (New York 1903), 77-80.

well in the area of the science of medicine[46]. Persians that where interested in Indian science and philosophy collected information from the Indian scientists they invited to Jundishapur school concerning astronomy, mathematics and mythology[47]. As a result of this interaction, many works of Indian's were translated into Middle Persian (Pahlawī), the language of Persians at that time. Among these works *Kalila ve Dimna* [48], the work of the Indian scholar Beydeba, which was translated into Arabic in the following years by Ibn al-Muqaffa is an example of the translation efforts. After the conquest of Persia by Arabs, Muslims learned the science of astronomy by translating Siddhanta's middle Persian translated work into Arabic, when they were not aware of the *Almagest* of Ptolemy. This book was translated by Abū Isḥaq al-Fazarī, the first Muslim to work on astrolabe and was known as *Kitab al-Sind-hind* or shortly *Sindhind* amongst the Muslims[49]. The aim behind the establishment of Urfa (Edessa/Ruha) School, another philosophy school established by Persians, was firstly to increase the religious knowledge of Persians who adopted the Jacobite sect of Christianity and secondly to teach Greek science and philosophy to Persians[50]. Thus, Persians had brought both the Greek and Indian cultures and sciences into the region on account of the philosophy schools they had established before the arrival of Muslims.

According to Greek approach Hippodamos (checker board), Alexandria was established with the order of Alexander the Great, and is one of the important entrances of the Greek culture. Although it lost its glory due to the immense damage caused during the Byzantium-Sasani battles in the first years of Muslim sovereignty, it still retained the traces of those days with its general view and long history[51]. It is known that translation activities playing an important role in cultural interaction and communication were carried out in Alexandria, particularly by Jewish scholars. For instance, the Jewish philosopher Philon established a unique philosophical school in Alexandria by compromising Old Testament texts with philosophical texts. Old Testament interpretations he made by benefiting from philosophical texts had esoteric characteristics[52]. Another important feature of Alexandria was highly developed *alchemy*. Muslims benefited from alchemists such as Bolos Democritus, Zosimos, Apollonius of Tyana, Teukros and Stephanos from Alexandria in this sense and made references to them in their works. Particularly *The Secret of Creation (Sirr al-haqiqa)* work of Apollonios was widely known by Muslims[53]. Alchemy which suggests two dimensions for material (one visible and one concealed) subjects beings to a down-to-top classification. At the bottom of the classification atom or *materia prima* lays and no change is observed in the *essence* in any level of the classification. For

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[46]   W. Barthold, *İslam Medeniyeti Tarihi [History of Islamic Civilization],* trans. Fuat Köprülü (Ankara 1977), 11-12.

[47]   Syed Nomanul Haq, "The Indian and Persian Background", 1/53; Mehmet Bayraktar, *İslam Felsefesine Giriş [Introduction to Islamic Philosophy]* (Ankara 1988), 78-79.

[48]   Ibn al-Nadīm, *al-Fihrist*, 364-365; al-Andalusī, *Tabaqat al-umam,* 57.

[49]   Ibn al-Nadīm, *al-Fihrist*, 332; Bayraktar, *İslam Felsefesi [Islamic Philosophy]*, 78-79.

[50]   Barthold, *İslam Medeniyeti [Islamic Civilization]*, 10; Bayraktar, *İslam Felsefesi [Islamic Philosophy]*, 78.

[51]   Fuād al-Sayyid Ayman, "İskenderiye (Alexandria)", *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi [TDV Encyclopedia of Islam]* (Istanbul: *Turkish Religious Foundation*), 22/574.

[52]   Hugh Goddard, *A History of Christian-Muslim Relations* (Chicago 2000), 14; Ralph Marcus, "Hellenistic Jewish Literature", *The Jews Their History, Culture and Religion*, edit. Louis Finkelstein (New York 1960), 2/1080.

[53]   Ibn al-Nadīm, *al-Fihrist*, 417-420; ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Badawī, *al-Ilhād fi'l-Islām* (Cairo 1945), 196.

instance, according to Alchemist Jabir ibn Hayyan, there are universal laws in the nature and each combination and composition takes place in the scope of these laws. Beings are divided into two: simple beings and compound beings. Compound beings appear when the single beings combine in line with these universal rules [54]. In the light of this suggestion, it is possible to make an analogy between Kalām atomism and the thought of Alchemist Jabir. Zakariya al-Rāzī, accepted as one of the most important names of both alchemy and chemistry, also dealt with nature and atomism, which makes it possible to mention a high level of interaction between alchemy and atomism.

One of the groups that used to live in the region before Islamic era was Christians. According to the data obtained from Islamic sources, Christians used the concept "substance" (*jawhar*) with a meaning close to the one in Kalām. al-Ashʿarī (d. 324/925) referred to the definition of Christians: "substance (*jawhar*) is what stands alone and what stands alone is substance"[55]. On the basis of this definition, Christians came to the conclusion that God is *substance*[56] and accepted *jawhar* as the never changing substance of God. According to Christians, *substance* is unique and there are three *elements*. Elements do not exist alone and they are different states of this unique essence[57].

It is worth mentioning that the most amongst these Christian groups in the region was Syrians with their philosophical experience and translation activities. Besides being a trade channel between East and West like the Jews, they also played a role in the transfer of culture and civilization. According to De Boer, it was the Syrians who brought the Greek Culture they adopted from Alexandria and Antioch (Antakya) to Urfa, Nusaybin, Jundishapur and Kharran schools. Due to this outcome, the Syrian language was used as the common language in the churches of the East and West for some time. The works of Greek philosophy started to be translated into the Syrian language in IV century BC. Doctor and bishop Probus, born in Antakya and died in Istanbul in 536 AC, translated not only Aristotle's works related with logic but also many works in the area of theology, ethics, mysticism, physics, medicine and philosophy into the Syrian language. Such translation activities of Syrians continued after Islamic sovereignty[58]. These data show that there was a huge philosophical experience in the Iraq region. However, it has to be explained whether this experience preserves its originality.

4.2. Originality of Philosophic Experience in the Region

As seen in the previous part, Greek and Indian culture and experience in the region was directed either by Christians such as Syrians and Nestorians or Kharranī Sabians and alchemist Gnostiks or Persians. These groups re-shaped and attributed new meanings to the cultural and scientific experiences which they

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[54] Badawī, *al-Ilhād fi'l-Islām*, 194-195; Ülken, *İslam Düşüncesi İslam Felsefesi Tarihi [Islamic Thought: The History of Islamic Philosophy]*, 2/69.

[55] al-Ashʿarī, *Maqālāt al-islāmiyīn,* 306.

[56] al-Bāqillānī, *Kitāb al-Tamhīd*, 93-94; Alnoor Dhanani, *The Physical Theory of Kalām* (Leiden 1994), 56-57.

[57] Nāshiʾ al-Akbar, Masāʾil al-imāma *and Muktatafat min al-Kitāb al-Awsaṭ fī al-maqalāt.* Frühe muʿtazilitische Häresiographie, ed. Josef van Ess (Beirut 1971),76; Juwaynī, *al-Irshad*, 47-48; al-Baghdādī, *al-Farq bayn al-firaq,* 216.

[58] T.J. de Boer, *The History of Philosophy in Islam,* trans. Edward R. Jones (New York 1903), 14-15.

exposed to a kind of selection, in line with their beliefs and attitudes. In other words, cultural elements lost their originality and were re-shaped. This is proved with the following statement of Ibn Maimūn:

"All of the theories suggested by Muʿtazila and Ash'arites about these meanings are based on some preliminaries. These preliminaries are taken from the works of Greeks and Syrians who objected to the thoughts of philosophers and invalidated their suggestions. The reason behind this situation is that Christianity was extending by incorporating other religions which included philosophic approaches. Believers of this religion developed a philosophy and among them there was kings who preserved their religion. Greek and Syrian scholars of that period saw that there were huge conflicts between their own religious ideas and philosophy. Then, they developed the science of theology and re-arranged philosophic preliminaries in a possible-to-benefit way. They rejected any philosophical thought that could damage the basic principles of their religion."[59]

A modern researcher, Barthold confirms such statement and explains the reason why Christians interacted with philosophy:

"In the fight against gnosticism and paganism philosophy, Christian clerics had to use philosophic evidences as well. Various religious and philosophic sects developed with the biggest ones in Alexandria and Antakya. The biggest sect was based on Plato while the second biggest one on Aristotle."[60]

It is possible to observe a similar approach in Jews as well. Non-created "ideas" of Plato's philosophy turn into the creatures of God "who created everything from nothing" in the philosophy of the Jewish philosopher Philon, in other words in the interpretations of Old Testament. Thus, the idea of "a creator God" is compromised with the theory of "ideas". This method and approach to have been adopted by Philon had huge impacts on successive Christian philosophers.[61]

On the other hand, Greek philosophers were attributed alchemist characteristic by the alchemists of Alexandria. According to Ibn al-Nadim, Naturalist philosopher Zakariya al-Rāzī included Pythagoras, Democritus, Plato, Aristotle and Galen in the category of the philosophers dealing with alchemy.[62] Shahristānī placed Democritus into the group of Pythagoras' successors.[63]

The Arabic translation of Plato's work named *Timaios*- was widely known among Muslims and written in the form of statements made by Galenus- that begins as "Galenus says…" and is virtually a work of conversion. In this translation, *God The Maker* in Plato changes into *God The Creator*; second degree Greek gods turn into *angels*; and *transmigration of soul* into *good and evil states of human being*.[64] These conversions were

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[59]   Ibn Maimūn, *Dalālat al-ḥāʾirīn,* 184-185.

[60]   Barthold, *İslam Medeniyeti [Islamic Civilization]*, 11.

[61]   Ralph Marcus, "Hellenistic Jewish Literature", *The Jews Their History, Culture and Religion*, ed. Louis Finkelstein (New York 1960), 2/1079, 1107-1114.

[62]   Ibn al-Nadīm, *al-Fihrist*, 417.

[63]   al-Shahrastānī, *al-Milal wa-l-niḥal,* 2/399.

[64]   Fahrettin Olguner, *Batı ve İslam Dünyasında Eflatun'un Timaios'u [Timaios of Eflatun in the Western and Islamic World]* (Konya 1990), 9,10, 11, 12 (See; 5a-5b for the text in Arabic).

quite possibly made by Christian translators and then this conversed text was directly translated into Arabic. As a matter of fact the monotheist trend of Galen was effective on Christians before Islam and a group of religious men in Anatolia tried to compromise Christian theology and philosophy under such effect.[65]

Indian thought was also subject to some changes and could not preserve its originality. It reached the Muslims through the Pagan Kharran school, Mazdak's and Maniheist Persians. This situation was strengthened with the proof that the Kharran school was effective on the rejection of prophecy by Zakariya al-Rāzī and his trend towards the thought of "five beings with no beginning". Indeed, al-Rāzī established his system by adding "soul" and "material" that he took from the Greek philosophy to the principle of four beings with no beginning "vacuum, light, time and darkness" in Zoroastrianism. We should also take into consideration the Persian identity of Ibn Muqaffa who was known as the translator of Manihaism and was one of the most important names translating Indian and Persian sources into Arabic.[66]

4.3. Interest of Muslims in Regional Culture and Atomism

The Mesopotamia region where Kalām atomism developed was included in the Islamic borders in the era of the Caliph Omar ibn Khattab. Not only the military but also the cultural and constructional activities were heavily performed in the region. Particularly, Basra and Kufa established with the order of Omar and Wasit established by Hajjāj, the governor of Umayyads, turned into cultural centers in a short time although they were designed as military basis in the beginning.[67] In addition to religious sciences such as Islamic Law and Theology, important works on the Arabic language were studied in these cities and the Basra and Kufa language schools were established. The Islamic Law-Theological schools established by Hasan al-Basrī (d. 110/728) in Basra and by Abū Ḥanīfa (d. 150/767) in Kufa gradually became famous and resulted in the development of the two major and important sects: Muʿtazila and Ḥanafism. Scholars educated in these schools traveled to different parts of the country to play significant roles in spreading Islam and in interacting with other cultures.

Wasil b. Ata (d. 131/748), the student of Hasan al-Basrī and the leader of Muʿtazila, sent his students to Ma'rib (West of Northern Africa), Khorasan, Yemen, Armenia and Jazira (the area between Euphrates and Tigris) so as to defend and strengthen Islam. After staying in these destinations for some time, they turned back to Basra with new ideas. At that time this enabled the development of a huge culture, with an environment of interaction and communication. As a matter of fact, Jahm b. Safwān (d. 128/745) met the believers of Buddhism (Sumaniyya), an Indian sect, and asked help from Wasil b. Ata for the points he had difficulty in explaining.[68]

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[65] Kutluer, "Calinus", 33.

[66] Ülken, *İslam Düşüncesi İslam Felsefesi Tarihi [Islamic Thought: The History of Islamic Philosophy]*, 11-12, 35; Fakhri, *İslam Felsefesi Tarihi [History of Islamic Philosophy]*, 32.

[67] See al-Balādhurī, *Kitāb Futūḥ al-buldān* (Beirut 1407/1987), 236, 387, 407.

[68] Ibn al-Murtaḍa, *Ṭabaqāt al-Muʿtazila* (Beirut 1380/1961), 32-34.

When we consider the objections such as *Kitab ala al-Sufistaiyya, Kitab ala al-Mejus, Kitāb ala al-Yahūd*[69] written by Abu'l-Hudhayl al-Allaf, the founder of Kalām atomism, and his discussions with the Jews, Christians and Parsees, we can easily see that he had the required qualifications and knowledge to examine and evaluate the philosophic groups and the religions other than Islam. Due to this fact, Abū l-Muẓaffar al-Isfarāyīnī and al-Baghdādī criticizes Abū al-Hudhayl with the statement: "His thoughts are in line with the thoughts of materialists".[70]

Musa b. Shākir and his sons Muhammad, Ahmad and Husain[71] (Benu Musa) are defined by Said al-Andalusi as scholars widely known in philosophy and science. Ibn al-Nadim says that Muhammad (d. 259) wrote *Risālā fī al-Juzz* (Booklet on Atom) and *Risālā fī al-awwaliyyat al-alam* (Booklet on the Beginning of World). In addition, we learn from Ibn al-Nadim that Mu'tezilite al-Nazzam who rejects atomism wrote *Kitāb al-Juzz* (The Book of Atom) and that Muammar al-Sulamī (d. 215), who is known to have had discussions with Nazzam due to differences in their thoughts, wrote *Kitāb al-Juzz alladhī la yatacazza* (The Book of Atom: The Smallest Indivisible Component).[72] This data is of great importance as it shows that not only the theologians but also other scholars in the region were interested in the issue of atom.

Galen, who became famous particularly for his school in Alexandria became well-known in the Middle East on account of the Christian theologians and was widely-known by also Muslims in the early times. His work on philosophy and medicine were not translated into Arabic in the early times, however, it was quite possible for Muslims to learn about these works through the translations into other languages and via non-Muslim scholars. That Zakariya al-Rāzī refered to Galenus in his works and wrote an objection to his medicial study proves it.[73] Moreover, the Arabic translation of *Timaios,* a work of Plato widely-known among Muslims, starts with "Galen says…"[74], which shows that this work was written by Galen's supporters in the region and that then translated into Arabic. The "Indivisible substance" (al-jawhar alladhī la yanqasim)[75] statement in this work is important as it shows that the idea of "indivisible component" is wide spread in the region.

5. EVALUATION AND CONCLUSION

When the history of Kalām is considered, we see that the "science of Kalām" started to develop in the second half of the first century (Moslem calendar) and completed its development to a large extent in the first quarter of the second century. As a matter of fact, many schools were established in the said period in Basra and Kufa on Theology, Islamic Law and Philology and many intellectual formations took place around

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[69] Ibn al-Nadīm, *al-Fihrist*, 204; Metin Yurdagür, "Ebu'l-Huzeyl Allaf", *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi [TDV Encyclopedia of Islam]* (Istanbul: *Turkish Religious Foundation,* 1994), 10/332.

[70] Abū l-Muẓaffar al-Isfarāyīnī, *al-Ṭabṣīr fī l-dīn* (Beirut 1403/1983); al-Baghdādī, *al-Farq bayn al-firaq,* 122.

[71] al-Andalusī, *Tabaqat al-umam*, 141-142.

[72] Ibn al-Nadīm, *al-Fihrist*, 206-207, 331.

[73] Ibn al-Nadīm, *al-Fihrist*, 417; Kutluer, "Calinus", 33.

[74] Olguner, *Batı ve İslam Dünyasında Eflatun [Eflatun in Western and Islamic World],* 1b (Arabic Text), 1 (Turkish Translation).

[75] Olguner, *Batı ve İslam Dünyasında Eflatun [Eflatun in Western and Islamic World],* 3b (Arabic Text), 7 (Translation from Arabic to Turkish), 8 (Translation from French to Turkish).

eminent names such as Hasan al-Basrī and Abū Ḥanīfa in the fields of Islamic Law and Theology. Wasil b. Ata and Amr b. Ubayd al-Basrî (d. 144/761) who directed the thought of Hasan al-Basrî to more logic-oriented points laid the foundation of Mu'tazilite school. Regarding this period, there is no information showing any direct relation with Greek or Indian philosophy; any heavy translation effort; or any study made by first theologians on Greek or Indian philosophical books translated into any language other than Arabic. Otta Pretzl also thinks that we can not mention any direct relation between first theologians and Greek philosophy.[76] Since the Greek and Indian cultures in the region were subjected to change before Islamic sovereignty, it is possible only to mention an indirect interaction. In general, three elements should be considered in the development of theology, particularly Kalām atomism.

5.1. Historical Continuity

Historical continuity is a reality accepted by most of the historians today. As well as the fact that the events taking place throughout history do not start at one point and end immediately at another point, no event is independent from the former and comes out from zero point without any background or plan. Time naturally brings together continuity and requires continuous change. Continuity of time enables a natural interaction between cultures and civilizations while change creates differences in this continuity. Each culture and civilization that has developed throughout time is a successor of a previous one. The difference results from exposing the heritage to a "selection" process and providing previous cultural elements with "new forms" and "meanings".

Ethnical groups that have been included in boundaries of Islam gradually, such as the Persians, Syrians, Greeks and Indians brought with them their previous cultural and civilization heritages as well. They exposed their material and spiritual elements to a *selection* process; either *changed* them or interpreted the belief's they adopted to legitimate their cultural elements. For instance, theologians changed the atomism thought they encountered according to their own beliefs and interpreted their beliefs in line with the atomism thought so as to create a new synthesis. The Hadith "Go and find wisdom even if it is in China, Because, learning wisdom is a religious duty for all Muslims"[77] was widely implemented in the early periods by the Islamic society. Even if there are some allegations that this Hadith is *weak* or *fake*, it is considerably meaningful as it reflects the attitude of first era Islamic society towards science and foreign cultures. This statement reflects the profile of a society which gives priority to benefiting from previous and other cultures and civilizations.

5.2. Regional Conditions

Taking into consideration the density and variety of the cultural experience and knowledge in the region, it is not surprising for Kalām atomism to emerge and develop in such a short time. As a matter of fact, this region can be included in the borders of both the Greek and Indian culture basins from both land and sea. This region served as a threshold for the Mesopotamian civilization and is a neighbor of Egypt culture which had impacts on Greek philosophy. Moreover, the Persian philosophy in the region carried Indian culture to the west. The establishment of the philosophy schools in Kharran, Urfa and Jundishapur

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[76]   Otto Pretzl, "Madhab jawhar al-fard inde al-mutakallimin fi'l-Islam", 131.

[77]   See. Ismāīl b. Muḥammad Aclūnī, *Kashf al-khafā* (Beyrut 1351), 1: 138.

is of great importance for the region as well. These all show that in the establishment phase of Kalām, the region had a strong civilization and cultural background created by important civilizations. However, such knowledge and background reached the area after being subjected to some changes and selection as mentioned by Ibn Maimūn. When we consider that the Greek and Indian cultural experience and knowledge reached Muslims through the Christians, Persians and Gnostics, we can easily reveal the fact that the knowledge we encounter had already been subjected to change and selection before reaching us. This is, in fact, a natural development taking place when a civilization or a culture is handed over by another society. A society can neither completely leave behind its original cultural knowledge and civilization perspective to adopt a completely new culture and civilization nor can a nation act as an antiquarian to preserve its knowledge and experience completely so as to transfer it to another society.

5. 3. Religious Concerns

Theologians have two objectives: First is to express their own religion to people from different cultures and second is to present evidences against the rejections made against their own religion. These two activities were carried out simultaneously; in other words, theologians suggested a thesis on one hand and proposed an anti-thesis on the other. The basic thesis of Islam is that *God is one and others are created by Him.* While defending this thesis of Islam, theologian tried to invalidate the counter-evidences that try to invalidate the thesis they suggested. For instance, in addition to suggesting "*Uniqueness of Allah and creation of the World*" while developing the atom thought, an anti-thesis is developed against *eternity of materials* on the basis of the *finite structure of atoms.*

It is natural for theologians to benefit from experiences and knowledge present while developing *a concept of universe.* As a matter of fact, the Qur'an is neither a physics book nor is the Prophet Mohammad a physician. Allah has created people with qualifications required to produce information on this issue. First era theologians naturally benefited from the experience and knowledge created and conveyed in some way, on the basis of this fact. However, on the basis of the basic and decisive principles of Islam such as *eternity of Allah* and *creation of the world*, this act of theologians brought the conclusion that "*the world which means anything other than Allah is created later and has a beginning*". For a beginning point, an ending point for the world and all the things constituting the world must be defined. In logical terms, this point is the *final point* reached when the material is divided. This "final point" is the smallest building block of materials; namely atom (al-jawhar al-fard / al-juzz allazi la yatacazza).

As a conclusion, that Democritus atomism has a materialist character, Indian atomism accepts material as an "eternal" being and no idea similar to Kalām atomism is encountered in Mesopotamia or its surroundings where Kalām developed makes us think that Kalām atomism is an original thought developed by theologians that benefited from the regional culture so as to strengthen the Islamic belief and to create a conception of Allah and universe.

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ULUM

علوم

The Influence of the 73 Sects Ḥadīth on the Classification of Theological Sects in Islamic Heresiographical Literature *

Kadir Gömbeyaz **

ABSTRACT

This article deals with the influence of the "73 sects ḥadīth," which states that Muslims will be separated into 73 sects, when Jews had 71 and Christians had 72 sects, and that only one of them will be saved whereas the others will go to Hell, on, particularly, Islamic heresiographical works written to examine and classify theological sects and their beliefs in the Islamic community from the beginning. This ḥadīth has had a crucial and decisive role in those works' form and way to study the sects as well as their authors' perception of their own sect and the other sects. Studying the influence, not the authenticity, of the 73 sects ḥadīth, the article first mentions the famous narration of the ḥadīth, noting other different narrative versions; then

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points out some questions that would be arisen in one's mind about the implication of the ḥadīth. The article mainly discusses the attitudes of Muslim heresiographers towards 73 sects ḥadīth and describes by placing them in main three categories: 'Those who consider the 73 sects ḥadīth authentic,' 'Those who do not consider the 73 sects ḥadīth authentic,' and 'Those who do not take notice of the 73 sects ḥadīth.' Considering the ḥadīth authentic, most of heresiographers have different views about the meaning of the number 73 mentioned in the ḥadīth. Some thinks that the number is for a fact and, accordingly, divides the sects to reach up 73 with different formulas and some are of the opinion that the number is a metaphor and a mere allusion on abundance as a common usage in the Arabic language and, accordingly, do not limit the number of the sects to 73. The article ends up with a discussion of the problems of the consideration of the 73 sects ḥadīth a measure for studying and classifying theological groups.

KEYWORDS

Islamic Theological Sects, Islamic Heresiography, Sect (*Firqa*), 73 Sects Ḥadīth, Saved Sect (*al-firqa al-nājiya*)

73 Fırka Hadisinin Mezhepler Tarihi Kaynaklarında Fırkaların Tasnifine Etkisi

ÖZ

Bu makale, Yahudîler'in 71, Hıristiyanlar'ın 72, Müslümanlar'ın 73 fırkaya ayrılacağını ve bu fırkalardan yalnızca birinin kurtulup, diğerlerinin Cehennem'e gideceğini haber veren "73 fırka hadisi"nin özellikle İslam tarihi boyunca ortaya çıkan siyasî-itikadî fırkaları ve görüşlerini tasnif etmek üzere kaleme alınan fırak eserleri üzerindeki etkisini incelemektedir. Bu hadis, fırak eserlerinin gerek biçim gerekse de mezhepleri ele alış tarzında belirleyici olmuş; fırak yazarlarının kendi mensup olduğu fırkaya ve diğer fırkalara bakışına etkide bulunmuştur. 73 fırka hadisinin sıhhat durumuna dair bir soruşturmaya girmeyerek etkisini araştıran bu makale, öncelikle hadisin meşhur rivayet formunu nakletmekte; hadisin metni üzerinde düşünüldüğünde akla gelebilen birtakım problemli meselelere dikkat çekmektedir. Daha sonra 73 fırka hadisi karşısında fırak yazarlarının takındığı belli başlı üç tavra işaret etmekte ve bunları '73 fırka hadisini sahih kabul edenler', '73 fırka hadisini sahih görmeyenler' ve '73 fırka hadisini dikkate almayanlar' şeklinde gruplandırıp örnekler üzerinden incelemektedir. Fırak yazarlarının çoğu hadisi sahih kabul etmekte, fakat hadiste geçen 73 rakamının ne anlam ifade ettiği noktasında farklılaşmaktadır. Bir kısım müellif rakamı *hakiki* bir sayı olarak alıp fırkaların sayısını 73'e tamamlamaya gayret ederken bir kısmı rakamın Arap dilinde *kesretten kinaye* anlamında kullanıldığına işaret ederek fırkaların sayısını 73 ile sınırlandırmamıştır. Makale, fırkaların tasnifinde 73 fırka hadisinin bir ölçüt olarak alınmasının doğurduğu sıkıntılara işaret edip birtakım öneriler sunarak son bulmaktadır.

ANAHTAR KELİMELER

İtikadî İslam Mezhepleri, Fırak Geleneği, Fırka, 73 Fırka hadisi, Fırka-i Nâciye.

INTRODUCTION

The ḥadīth, which states that the Islamic community would be divided into 73 sects and only one of them would be saved from Hell, and commonly known as *73 sects ḥadīth*, has had great influence on Islamic

thought as it has determined how the followers of a sect should see the followers of other sects and how the relationship between them should be.

Although it has different narrative versions,[11] the most common version of this ḥadīth is as follows:

"Jews were divided into 71 sects. One of them is in Heaven, seventy of them are in Hell. Christians are split into 72 sects. Seventy-one of them are in Hell, the one is in Heaven. I swear to Allah whose mighty hands hold the Muhammad's will, beyond any doubt, my umma will be divided into 73 sects. One will be in Heaven, seventy-two will be in flames.

Said: 'Oh the Messenger of Allah! Who are they?'

Thus he spoke: 'They are *al-jamā'a* (the community)'."[2]

In another narration, the saved sect is expressed as "*The one on which path I and my companions are.*"[3]

When the ḥadīth is reflected on, a set of questions come to mind. For instance, what is meant with the number 73 in this ḥadīth? Does it indicate a number adding up to reality or is it used as a figurative count implying plenitude? Besides, is this the count of major sects? If so, no writer has managed to specify the number of major sects as more than 10-12. If the ḥadīth implies major sects together with their sub-branches, then the number 73 can be easily exceeded. Furthermore, what would be the criterion for being defined as sect and who would determine the identity of these 73 sects and how would it be done? However, if the number 73 is used figuratively, what does the division of the Jews, Christians, and Muslims into 71, 72, and 73 sects refer to, respectively?

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[1] Mevlüt Özler divides the different narrative versions of the 73 sects ḥadīth into four groups: 1. Narratives declaring only the number of sects into which the Muslim community will divide (al-Tirmidhī, Abū Dāwūd, Ibn Māja, al-Nīsābūrī, al-Bayḥakī, Ibn Ḥibbān), 2. Narratives saying that only one sect will be saved while the other will be in Hell (al-Dārimī, Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal), 3. Narratives explaining the exact identity of the saved sect (Abū Dāwūd, Ibn Māja, al-Tirmidhī, Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal, al-Nīsābūrī), 4. Narratives stating that all sects will be in Heaven except for only one (al-'Ajlūnī, al-Suyūṭī, 'Alī al-Qārī, Ibn 'Arrāq). For these narratives, see Mevlüt Özler, *İslâm Düşüncesinde 73 Fırka Kavramı* (Istanbul: Nûn, 1996), 21-28. Another researcher, Ahmet Keleş, evaluates the narratives of the 73 sects ḥadīth under five groups: 1. Narratives stating that the Islamic community will divide into various sects, 2. Narratives determining identities of sects that will go to Heaven and Hell, 3. Narratives describing the saved sect that will go to Heaven, 4. Narratives describing the sects that will go to Hell, 5. Narratives suggesting to follow the community (*al-jamā'a*). For details, see Ahmet Keleş, "73 Fırka Hadisi Üzerine Bir İnceleme", *Marife* 5/3 (2005), 25-45.

None of the narratives of the 73 sects ḥadīth is mentioned in al-Bukhārī, Muslim, and al-Nasā'ī.

For further details of the different narrative versions of the 73 sects ḥadīth and the investigation of narrators, see Ismā'īl b. Muḥammad al-'Ajlūnī, *Kash al-khafā'* (Beirut: Dar iḥyā al-turāth al-'arabī, 1932), I: 149-151; Abdullah Eren, *İftirak Hadislerinin Tahric, Tahkik ve Yorumu* (M.A. Thesis, Uludağ University, 1998); Sayın Dalkıran, "Yetmişüç Fırka Hadisi ve Düşündürdükleri", *EKEV Akademi Dergisi* 1/1 (1997), 97-116.

[2] Ibn Māja, "Fitan", 17

[3] Al-Tirmidhī, "Īmān", 18.

The explanation for the reason why Muslims split into 73 sects while Jews and Christians were divided into 71 and 72[4] is that the Prophet wanted to express that Islam has more qualities compared to Judaism and Christianity[5] and make a comparison between three religions.[6] It has been also marked that this supremacy should be sought within the freedom of thought, which Islam features and which is entitled to Muslims.[7] However, explaining the fact that there is only one sect to be saved and all others would be in hell with the freedom of speech in Islam does not seem to be so consistent. If this is a consequence of the freedom of thought, why does only one of these thought-holders deserve to go to Heaven and others are sent to the Hell?[8] Accordingly, Watt draws attention to this issue as: "One can understand a Muslim being proud of the virtues of his religious community, but the multiplicity of sects is hardly a matter for pride. How did the tradition about seventy-three sects come to find acceptance among Muslims? Perhaps a group of extreme rigorists was happy to maintain that they belonged to the one 'saved sect' (*firqa nājiya*) while the other seventy two sects would go to Hell."[9] As a matter of fact, this ḥadīth has been used by the followers of the sect which considered itself the saved sect in the ḥadīth as a means to justify their claims and to marginalize other sects by stigmatizing them as deserving of hell, as well as Ahl al-bid'a.[10]

Narrations suggesting that the Islamic community would be divided into 73 sects, 72 of them would go to Hell while only one of them would ascend to Heaven, along with the sayings accredited to the Prophet such as *"al-Qadariyyah are the majūs of the umma,"*[11]*"al-Khawārij have abandoned the religion just as an arrow loosing from the string"*[12] brought the problem of "takfīr (declaring a Muslim as apostate)".[13] So will the followers

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[4] Watt notes that the first European scholar to appreciate the importance and problematic character of the 73 sects ḥadīth is Ignaz Goldziher. See, W. Montgomery Watt, *The Formative Period of Islamic Thought* (London: Oneworld, 2002), 2.

[5] Goldziher states that a ḥadīth telling that Islam has 73 virtues while Judaism does 71 and Christianity does 72 has been misunderstood, so the 73 virtues were turned into 73 sects and 'this error provided the ground for enumeration of 73 sects.' See, Ignaz Goldziher, *Introduction to Islamic Theology and Law*, translated by Andras and Ruth Hamori (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1981), 167. Watt affirmatively says that Goldziher plausibly argued that the 73 sects ḥadīth had been derived from another ḥadīth in which the Prophet said that "*īmān* has 70 odd branches", see *The Formative Period,* 2.

[6] Bekir Topaloğlu, *Kelam İlmine Giriş* (Istanbul: Damla, 1996), 164.

[7] Ethem Ruhi Fığlalı, "Çevirenin Önsözü [Preface of the Translator]", in his *Mezhepler Arasındaki Farklar (el-Fark beyne'l-fırak)* (Ankara: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, 1991), xxv.

[8] Keleş, "73 Fırka Hadisi Üzerine Bir İnceleme", 43.

[9] Watt, *The Formative Period,* 2.

[10] Ejder, Okumuş, "Ehl-i Sünnet ve'l-Cemaat'in Bir Meşruiyet Aracı Olarak İcat ve İstihdamı", *Marife* 5/3 (2005): 56-58.

[11] Abū Dāwūd, "Sunna", 17; Ibn Māja, "Muqaddima", 10.

[12] Al-Bukhārī, "Faḍā'il al-Qur'ān", 36, "Manāqib", 25, "Adab", 25, "Istitāba", 5, "Tawḥīd", 23; Muslim, "Zakāt", 47; al-Tirmidhī, "Fitan", 22; Abū Dāwūd, "Sunna", 31; al-Nasā'ī, "Taḥrīm", 26, "Zakāt", 79; Ibn Māja, "Muqaddima", 12.

[13] *Takfīr* is a very delicate issue due to the consequences it brings about. Although its limits differ from a scholar to another, everyone shares the idea that there are definite situations in which *takfīr* is necessary. For the necessity of justifiable *takfīr* and the danger and damages of unjustifiable *takfīr*, see Ahmet Saim Kılavuz, *İman Küfür Sınırı* (Istanbul: Marifet, 1996), 235-239, 245-252.

of these sects which the Prophet vilified to such extent be considered as believers or non-believers? At this point, as al-Shahrastānī (d. 548/1153) states, there is disunity among juristic methodologists on the problem of *takfīr* of *ahl al-ahwāʾ*; while more radical and fanatic ones in terms of sectarianism lay the blame on their opponents for blasphemy and heresy, whereas tolerant ones seek to reconcile, standing clear from *takfīr*.[14] Al-Ashʿarī, for example, instead of ostracizing antagonistic sects emerging after the Prophet's demise, opted to include them into the circle of Islam by saying *"Islam unites them and draws them together!"*[15]

al-Ghazālī, who raises concerns over that *takfīr* brings forth the serious consequences both for the world and hereafter,[16] points out that *takfīr* mechanism can only be executed by denying what the Prophet brought,[17] as long as they stick to "Lā ilāh illallāh" principle and does not perform anything contradictory to it, it must be avoided to malign Ahl al-Islam and to declare the sects unbeliever no matter how diverged their paths are.[18] In his *Fayṣal al-tafriqa,* he prefers to use the narration *"My umma will split up into seventy-odd sects. They all will go to Heaven, except unbelievers (zindīqs)"* for 73 sects ḥadīth. Nevertheless, being aware of the other famed narration, he attempts to combine both forms. According to him, two ḥadīths can be reconciled as following: There is one sect among them that is certainly infernal and they have no chance to be saved. These are *zindīq*s. Yet there is another sect, whose followers will be directly sent to Heaven without passing through the Hell, and thus will be totally saved. The ones that will remain between these two will either be brought to account or will be interceded for after giving account or will stay in the Hell as much as their sentence. That is, in any case, they will not be able to escape totally and their situation will be on a shaky ground.[19] Two ḥadīths are thus reconciled.

Regarded less tolerant than Al-Ashʿarī and al-Ghazālī, al-Baghdadī argues that the followers of 72 sects -which he discusses under the title of *deviant sects*- can be considered within the Islamic community in some aspects, yet excluded in other aspects. From his view, members of these sects could be considered to belong to Islamic community in that they are allowed to be buried in Muslim grave, have a share for spoils providing they fight beside Muslims and they must not to be prevented from praying in mosque; while they are not regarded in Islamic community regarding the following aspects: they cannot be the *imām* in prayers, Sunnīs should not pray at their funeral, marry them and the animals they slaughter are not *ḥalāl*.[20]

The most convenient example touching on the fact that the narration suggesting that only one of the 73 sects would be saved has shaped the approach towards religious matters as is cited in al-Maqdisī's *Aḥsan*

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[14] Abū l-Fatḥ Muḥammad b. ʿAbd al-Karīm al-Shahrastānī, *al-Milal wa-l-niḥal*, ed. Amīr ʿAlī Mahnā & ʿAlī Ḥasan Fāʿūr (Beirut: Dār al-Maʿrifa, 1996), I: 240.

[15] Abū l-Ḥasan ʿAlī b. İsmāʿīl al-Ashʿarī, *Maqālāt al-islāmiyyīn wa ikhtilāf al-muṣallīn*, ed. Hellmut Ritter (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1980), 2.

[16] Abū Ḥāmid Muḥammad b. Muḥammad al-Ghazālī, *al-Iqtiṣād fī l-iʿtiqād* (Beirut: Dār al-kutub al-ʿilmiyya, 1983), 155.

[17] Al-Ghazālī, *Fayṣal al-tafriqa* (Beirut: Dār al-kutub al-ʿilmiyya, 1986), 120.

[18] Al-Ghazālī, *Fayṣal al-tafriqa*, 134; id., *al-Iqtiṣād*, 157.

[19] Al-Ghazālī, *Fayṣal al-tafriqa*, 145.

[20] ʿAbd al-Qāhir b. Ṭāhir b. Muḥammad al-Baghdādī, *al-Farq bayn al-firaq*, ed. Muḥammad Muḥyī al-Dīn ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd (Cairo: Maktabat dār al-turāth, nd.) 14.

al-taqāsīm. In the chapter where he mentions the views of some sects about whether 'every *mujtahid* is accurate in his ruling, or not', he notes a party from Qarrāmiyya and another group from Murji'a are in the opinion that every *mujtahid*, whether in theology (*uṣūl*) or law (*fiqh*), is accurate in his judgment except *zanādiqa* and for this argument, they adduce the Prophet's ḥadīth saying "My umma will separate into 73 sects. 72 of them will be in Heaven, only one will burn in fire." On the other hand, he states that in the opinion of the other sects only the one who consents the right can be accurate in his ruling and only one sect fits in with this, and the evidence they adduce for this is another narration suggesting '72 are in Hell and only one is in the Heaven'.[21]

1. APPROACH OF THE MUSLIM HERESIOGRAPHERS TOWARDS 73 SECTS ḤADĪTH

73 sects ḥadīth has been taken as a basis by the writers especially in the genre of heresiography which were written in an effort to classify, give information about and mostly falsify the sects that had emerged within the Islamic community. The ḥadīth has shaped Muslim heresiographers' writing purpose, tone, approach towards sects and even their mentality. Many heresiographers produced works claiming the number 73 in the ḥadīth is true and adopted different methods in an effort to designate their own sect as the saved sect that would go to the Heaven and resorted to different methods to round up the number of the other sects which would perish to 72. This effort, however, left heresiographers in a considerably difficult situation. As many of them tried hard to fix the number of the sects to 72, they could not escape from a set of contradictions.[22] Moreover, these writers sought 73 sects within the period until their time, reckoning without the possibility that the new sects could emerge after their lifetime.

73 sects ḥadīth, considered as authentic, has shaped the heresiographers' mentality and their view on other sects.[23] As stated by Keith Lewinstein, who has carried out important research on the Islamic heresiography, this ḥadīth paved the way for a schematic approach towards the tradition and history of religion, as well as supported heresiographers to perceive the Islamic doctrine in a static and stable manner, without any historical change.[24] According to al-Jābirī, heresiographers evaluated earlier sects over the debates he entered with other sects at the time; thus adopted '*an ideological and epistemological imperialism*' by imposing

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[21] Muḥammad b. Aḥmad al-Bashshārī al-Maqdisī, *Aḥsan al-taqāsīm fī maʿrifat al-aqālim*, ed. M. J. Goeje (Leiden: Brill, 1906), 39. Al-Maqdisī says that the second narration is more famous, however the first one is more strong in its *isnād*, although he never provide any *sanad*.

[22] For the problems resulted by the understanding of 73 sects ḥadīth, see Watt, *The Formative Period*, 3-5; Fığlalı, "Çevirenin Önsözü", xxiii-xxv; id., *Çağımızda İtikâdî İslâm Mezhepleri* (İzmir: İzmir İlahiyat Vakfı, 2004), 12; Sönmez Kutlu, "İslâm Mezhepleri Tarihinde Usûl Mes'elesi", in *İslâmî İlimlerde Metodoloji (Usûl) Mes'elesi Tartışmalı İlmî İhtisas Toplantıları* (Istanbul: Ensar, 2005), 1: 408-411; Mehmet Ali Büyükkara, "Bir Bilim Dalı Olarak İslâm Mezhepleri Tarihi ile İlgili Metodolojik Problemler", *İslâmî İlimlerde Metodoloji (Usûl) Mes'elesi*, 1: 451-453.

[23] In this point, it is discussable whether this ḥadīth gave form to the mentality or the present mentality produced this ḥadīth.

[24] Keith Lewinstein, *Studies in Islamic Heresiography: The Khawārij in Two Firaq Tradition* (PhD Dissertation, Princeton University, 1989), 4.

his time's criteria upon the past. Besides, in these works, reader is epistemologically pushed out of the history since the time and developments are left out because the sects are considered as sect from their very beginning and hence the political motives behind their views are overlooked.[25]

The heresiographers can be said to adopt broadly three different attitudes towards 73 sects ḥadīth: those who regard the ḥadīth as authentic, those who don't consider it authentic, and those who do not include the ḥadīth in their works.

1.1.   Those Who Consider the 73 Sects Ḥadīth Authentic

The greater part of Muslim heresiographers agree that the ḥadīth is authentic. Based on the ḥadīth, writers claimed their own sect to be the saved one, thus the identification of the sect that would be salvaged varies as to the writer. For instance, according to Sunnī writers such as Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Malaṭī, ‘Abd al-Qāhir al-Baghdādī, Abū l-Muzaffar al-Isfarā'inī, al-Shahrastānī, Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, al-Saksakī, and ‘Aḍud al-Dīn al-Ījī, the saved sect is *Ahl al-sunna wa-l-Jamā‘a*.[26] From the perspective of Ismā‘īlī scholar, Abū Ḥātim al-Rāzī, the saved sect is Ahl al-sunna wa-l-Jamā‘a, yet this term refers to "*those who have embraced the Sunna of the Prophet of God, who have abandoned the innovators and their innovations who had come after him, and who are with a conglomeration gathered around an imām who is a connector and a guide through the righteous path.*"[27] According to another Ismā‘īlī writer, Abū Tammām al-Khawārizmī (IV/X cent.), the saved sect is Ahl al-bāṭin, that is the Ismā‘īliyya;[28] according to Ibn al-Murtaḍā, it is Zaydiyya;[29] and according to Abū ‘Abd Allāh al-Qalhātī, it is Ibāḍiyya.[30]

The Qāḍī ‘Abd al-Jabbār, one of the important figures of Mu‘tazila, attempts to interpret the saved sect as Mu‘tazila and to infuse this idea. For him, "*al-Jamā‘a*" which was mentioned in 73 sects ḥadīth to be the sect that will attain salvation is not those in the majority, but those who are on the right path. In fact, Allah praises the minority in many verses, yet discredits the majority. According to ‘Abd al-Jabbār, those

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25   Muḥammad ‘Ābid al-Jābirī, *İslâm'da Siyasal Akıl* [orig. *al-‘Aql al-siyāsī al-‘Arabī*], translated into Turkish by Vecdi Akyüz (Istanbul: Kitabevi, 1997), 588.

26   Among these writers, the content of *Ahl al-sunna wa-l-Jamā‘a* is not the same. Al-Baghdādī classifies Ahl al-sunna under the eight groups (al-Baghdādī, *al-Farq bayn al-firaq*, 313-318); al-Ījī identifies it as al-Ash‘ariyya and Salaf scholars of ḥadīth (‘Aḍud al-Dīn ‘Abd al-Raḥmān b. Aḥmad al-Ījī, *al-Mawāqif fī ‘ilm al-kalām* [Cairo: Maktabat al-Mutanabbi, nd.], 429); al-Saksakī regards Aṣḥāb al-ḥadīth and Ḥanbalites as Ahl al-sunna (‘Abbās b. Manṣūr al-Saksakī, *al-Burhān fī ma‘rifat ‘aqā'id ahl al-adyān*, ed. Khalīl Aḥmad Ibrāhīm [Cairo: Dār al-turāth al-‘arabī, 1980], 20.

27   Abū Ḥātim Aḥmad b. Ḥamdān al-Rāzī, *Kitāb al-Zīna*, in *al-Ghuluw wa-l-firaq al-ghāliya fī l-ḥaḍārat al-Islāmiyya*, ed. ‘Abd Allāh Sellūm al-Sāmarrā'ī (Cairo: Dār al-wāsiṭ, 1982), 252.

28   Abū Tammām, *Bāb al-Shayṭān*, in *An Ismā‘īlī Heresiography: The ‘Bāb al-Shayṭān' from Abū Tammām's* Kitâb al-Shajara, ed. Wilfred Madelung & Paul E. Walker (Leiden: Brill, 1998), 8.

29   Aḥmad b. Yaḥyā Ibn al-Murtaḍā, *Kitāb al-Milal wa-l-niḥal*, ed. Muḥammad Jawād Mashkūr (Beirut: Dār al-fikr, 1979), 29, 36.

30   Abū ‘Abd Allāh Muḥammad b. Sa‘īd al-Azdī al-Qalhātī, *al-Kashf wa-l-bayān*, ed. Sayyida Ismā‘īl Kāshif (Masqat: Salṭanat ‘Umān Wizārat al-turāth al-qawmī wa-l-thaqāfa, 1980), 2: 471.

who genuinely embrace the *Sunna* and *Jamāʻa* are Muʻtazila.[31] He also interprets the 73 sects ḥadīth as another narrative which supports his own sect. According to this narrative,

> It is reported as follows by Sufyān al-Thawrī who related from Ibn al-Zubayr, who then related from Jābir ibn ʻAbd Allāh, who related from the Prophet Muḥammad (pbuh): *"My umma will divide into more than seventy sects. The highest (abarruhā) and most devoted (atqāhā) of them is the one that stands away (al-Fiʾat al-Muʻtazila)."* After relating this ḥadīth, Sufyān al-Thawrī told his companions: "Take this name, since you have stood away from misguidance (ḍalāla);" when his companions told him that "ʻAmr ibn ʻUbayd and his companions took this name," he then never spoke of this narration, rather said *"only one sect of them is saved".*[32]

Those who agree that the 73 sect ḥadīth is authentic are divided on the matter whether the number 73 in the ḥadīth is a fact or a metaphor:

1.1.1.   Those who think that the number 73 in the ḥadīth is for a fact

According to the writers in this group, the number 73 in the ḥadīth refers to a fact. As the Prophet stated, the Islamic community is divided into 73 sects. Accordingly, after the writer has found that his sect is the one that will attain salvation, it is necessary to determine 72 sects to perish. However, there is one obstacle to overcome for the writer, that is, the number of major sects is not even close to 72. To overcome this obstacle, the number of the sects was rounded up to 72 with their subsections. Of course, this led to the artificial sects and newly created sects.

Every heresiographer divided the sects to reach up 73 until his own era, and the following heresiographer needed to remove or reorganize the sects in the lists of former heresiographes in order to include new sects arisen in between the time passed.[33] For example, al-Baghdādī said that al-Najjāriyya had more than 10 sects in his era, yet they can be reduced to 3.[34] If otherwise, the number 73 will be exceeded.

The heresiographers that agree the number 73 in the ḥadīth is a fact developed various classification methods to complete the sect number up to 73. Writers such as al-Barbahārī (d. 329/941), al-Ājurrī (d. 360/970), Ibn Baṭṭa (d. 387/997), and al-Saksakī (d. 683/1284) told that the main sects apart from the saved one divide into 4 subsections, and these subsections divide into 18, thus reaching the number 72 by 4x18 formula.[35] Beside these, scholars such as Abū Mutīʻ al-Nasafī (d. 318/930), Ibn al-Jawzī (d. 597/1200) and some

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[31]   Al-Qāḍī ʻAbd al-Jabbār b. Aḥmad, *Faḍl al-iʻtizāl wa-ṭabaqāt al-Muʻtazila wa-mubāyanatuhum li-sāʾiriʾl-mukhālifīn*, in *Faḍl al-iʻtizāl wa-ṭabaqāt al-Muʻtazila*, ed. Fuʾād Sayyid (Tunis: ed-Dāruʾt-Tūnisiyya, 1974), 186.

[32]   Al-Qāḍī ʻAbd al-Jabbār, *Faḍl al-iʻtizāl*, 166.

[33]   Al-Jābirī, *İslâm'da Siyasal Akıl*, 587-588.

[34]   Al-Baghdādī, *al-Farq bayn al-firaq*, 25.

[35]   According to this classification mostly preferred by Ḥanbalite scholars, the main sects apart from the saved one that is Aṣḥāb al-ḥadīth are Rawāfiḍ, Khawārij, Qadariyya and Murjiʾa each of which are divided into 18 subsects whose exact names were not generally mentioned by those scholars. This classification was traced to Yūsuf b. al-Asbat (d. 192/807) by al-Ājurrī (Abū Bakr Muḥammad b. al-Ḥusayn b. ʻAbd Allāh al-Ājurrī al-Baghdādī, *al-Shariʻa*, ed. Muḥammad Ḥāmid al-Faqiyy [Beirut: Dār al-kütüb al-ʻilmiyya, 1983], 15). While Watt states that the classification was attributed to ʻAbd Allāh b. al-Mubārak (d. 181/797) (Watt, *The Formative Period*, 58), Lewinstein indicates to

writers who had become prominent with their Ḥanafi identities, such as [Abū Shakūr al-Sālimī] al-Kashshī (ca. V/XI. cent), al-Iraqī (ca. VII/XIII cent.), Ibn Kamāl Pāshā-zāda (d. 940/1534), al-Birgivī (d. 981/1573), reach the number 72 by dividing the main sects to 6 and their subsections to 12, thus the formula of 6x12.[36] Ismāʿīlī heresiographer Abū Tammām classifies the 11 main sects, apart from the saved sect Ahl al-Bāṭin, as 24 dividends of 3 major disputed subjects, and reaches the number 73 by the formula of 3x24. There are some other heresiographers that did not use similar patterns, yet reached the number 73 by various methods. For instance, al-Malaṭī (d. 377/987) divides the sects as Zanādiqa (5), Jahmiyya (8), Qadariyya (7), Murji'a (12), Rāfiḍa (15) and Ḥarūriyya (25), thus reaching up to 72. In a statement on the 73 sects ḥadīth, al-Munāwī (d. 1031/1622) said that there is a classification dividing the sects as Rawāfiḍ (20), Khawārij (20), Qadariyya (20), Murji'a (7), Najjāriyya (1), Ḍirariyya (1), Jahmiyya (1), and Qarrāmiyya (3), along with a 6x12 formula.[37]

The first writer to state that the number of sects will reach up to number 73 in the ḥadīth by citing the 73 sects ḥadīth is -as far as we could ascertain- al-Nāshi' al-Akbar (d. 293/906).[38]

1.1.2. Those who agree that the number 73 in the ḥadīth is a metaphor

Some heresiographers say that the number 73 in the ḥadīth does not state a fact, yet is a mere allusion on abundance as it is highly prevalent with the numbers 7, 70, 700 in Arabic language. In his work, Ibn al-Jawzī states that, although he prefers the 6x12 formula in classification of sects which he had attributed to some (uncertain) scholars, the number of sects and their viewpoints are so many that it is not possible to comprehend them all.[39]

Another heresiographer whose opinions to be cited is Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606/1210). al-Rāzī, in his work *I'tiqādāt firaq al-Muslimīn wa-l-mushrikīn* states his opinion about the seventy 73 ḥadīth by organizing an imaginary question-answer format, after classifying the sects:

Question: If one says the sects you have counted are more than seventy-three. Yet the Prophet did not voice that there would be that many, then how should one understand this ḥadīth? The answer would be: "Here, the Prophet could have meant major sects. However, the sects we have counted are not major sects.

Yūsuf b. al-Asbat, ʿAbd Allāh b. al-Mubārak, and Abū Ḥātim al-Rāzī (d. 277/890) (Keith Lewinstein, "Notes on Eastern Ḥanafite Heresiography", *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 114/4 (1994), 584, fn. 9.

[36] Al-Birgivī bases the 6x12 formula on Abū Ḥanīfa, see Meḥmed b. Pīr ʿAlī al-Birgivī, *Tuḥfat al-mustarshidīn fī bayān madhāhib firaq al-Muslimīn*, ed. Avni Ilhan, *Dokuz Eylül Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi* 6 (1989), 200.

[37] Muḥammad b. ʿAbd al-Raʾūf al-Munāwī, *Fayd al-qadīr Sharḥ al-Jāmiʿ al-saghīr* (Beirut: Dār al-maʿrifa, 1972), 2: 20.

[38] Pseudo-al-Nāshi' al-Akbar, *Masāʾil al-imāma wa-muktatafāt min al-Kitāb al-awsaṭ fī l-maqālāt*, ed. Josef van Ess (Beirut: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1971), 20. Wilferd Madelung argues that this book, *Uṣūl al-niḥal* known as *Masāʾil al-imāma*, was actually Jaʿfar b. Ḥarb's (d. 236/850) *Kitāb al-uṣūl*, and gave evidences from the text itself to ground his argument (Wilferd Madelung, "Frühe muʿtazilitische Häresiographie: das Kitāb al-uṣūl des Ǧaʿfar b. Ḥarb?", *Der Islam* 57 [1980]: 220-236). No matter who the author of this book is, we are not be able to determine what formula the author use to reach the number 73, since the complete version of the book has not been available for us, yet.

[39] Abū l-Faraj Jamāl al-Dīn ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. ʿAlī Ibn al-Jawzī, *Talbīs al-Iblīs* (Beirut: Muʾassasat al-kutub al-thaqāfiyya, 1992), 19.

Besides, he declared that there would be no fewer than seventy-three sects. If there are more sects, it does not falsify what is meant by this ḥadīth. Given that the number 73 is exceeded even though this short work does not cite many of the famed sects, what else could be meant? If we were to mention them elaborately, there could be many more than we have assumed. In fact, as there are seventy-three sects of Imāmiyya itself, there can be as many sects in any of Rāfiḍī sects.[40]

As seen, al-Rāzī proposes two approaches on this matter: one of which is that the ones mentioned in the ḥadīth can be major sects. However, al-Rāzī himself assumes the major sects as nine, if we count Ahl al-sunna as one of them, which is not mentioned in the treatise. It is seen in other heresiographical books that the number of major sects does not exceed ten. Thus, this case indicates that the number 73 cannot refer to major sects. His second approach is that the number seventy-three can be the lowest limit, meaning that the Prophet declared that the number of sects can be 73 at least, and that it cannot be fewer but more than that. Yet, whether a coherent meaning can be deduced from the ḥadīth is up for discussion.

According to al-Dawwānī (d. 908/1502), who has a different approach with regard to the number 73, it is not necessary and groundless to think that the number is lower when attributed to major sects and higher when attributed to sub sects. The number 73 can be attributed to disputed matters between the sects or it can be thought that the sects might have reached up this number at any time.[41]

1.2. Those who do not consider the 73 sects ḥadīth as authentic

After Ibn Ḥazm (d. 456/1064) stated that some people argued that those who suggest contradictory opinions on faith can be called heretics based on the ḥadīth: "*al-Qadariyya and al-Murji'a are the Zoroastrians of the umma*" and "*This umma will divide into more than 70 sects, all of them will go to Hell, except one, which will go to Heaven*", he remarked that these two ḥadīths are not authentic in terms of narrators' chain, thus it cannot be evidence even for those who consider *al-khabar al-wāḥid* as evidence.[42] Hence, in his work entitled *al-Faṣl* which includes critical knowledge and assessments on the history of Islamic sects, Ibn Ḥazm did not appeal to a method in order to classify the sects accordingly with the number 73.

Ibn al-Wazīr al-Yamānī (d. 840/1436), the famous ḥadīth critic, states that the narrative as *My umma will divide into more than 70 sects. Except one, all of them will be in Hell* is not authentic as it has a *nāṣibī*[43] in its

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40   Fakhr al-Dīn Muḥammad b. 'Umar al-Rāzī, *I'tiqādāt firaq al-Muslimīn wa-l-mushrikīn*, ed. Muḥammad Mu'taṣim Billāh (Beirut: Dār al-kitāb al-'arabī, 1986), 101-102.

41   Abū 'Abd Allāh Jalāl al-Dīn Muḥammad b. As'ad al-Dawwānī, *Sharḥ al-'Aqā'id 'Aḍuḍiyya (Jalāl)* (Istanbul: Sa'īd Effendi, 1291 AH), 8-9.

42   Abū Muḥammad 'Alī b. Aḥmad Ibn Ḥazm, *al-Faṣl fī l-milal wa-l-ahwā' wa-l-niḥal* (Beirut: Dār al-ma'rifa, 1975), 3: 247-248.

43   The concept of *nāṣibī* mostly used by Shī'a for those who do not accept 'Alī as appointed *imām* by Allāh and His Messenger, instead get (*naṣb*) a leader according to their desire (Abū Ḥātim al-Rāzī, *Kitāb al-Zīna*, 256-257) or display enmity toward 'Alī (Abū l-Faḍl Muḥammad b. Mukarram Ibn Manẓūr al-Anṣārī, *Lisān al-'Arab* [Beirut: Dār ṣādir, 1994], 1: 762; Muḥammad Jawād Mashkūr, *Mawsū'āt al-firaq al-Islāmiyya*, translated into Arabic by 'Alī Hāshim [Beirut: Majma' al-buḥūth al-Islāmiyya, 1995], 513; Sharīf Yaḥyā al-Amīn, *Mu'jam al-firaq al-Islāmiyya* [Beirut: Dāru'l-Aḍvā', 1986], 243). The meaning of the word is sometimes expanded to include all theological groups except for

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chain and as no conditions of validity is met in the narrative by Ibn Māja; therefore, al-Bukhārī and Muslim did not write down the ḥadīth. He also emphasizes that, in the narrative form accepted as authentic by al-Tirmidhī, there is no part stating that *except one, all of them will be in hell.*[44] Besides, he says that this is a vicious addition and has no authentic basis, that it is not certain if it is a deceit of the *mulḥid*s, and that Ibn Ḥazm also does regard this addition in the ḥadīth as fabricated.[45]

1.3. Those who do not take notice of the 73 sects ḥadīth

Some heresiographers neither mention the 73 sects ḥadīth, nor try to reach up to 73 in their classifications. Al-Ashʿarī (d. 324/936) is an outstanding figure in this group. He does not make a comment on the narrations about 73 sects in his *Maqālāt al-Islāmiyyīn*, and does not mention this ḥadīth. He divides the major sects into 10; the number of all sects he mentions well exceeds 73 with their subsects.[46] In line with this, it can be assumed that al-Ashʿarī was not informed about the 73 sects ḥadīth. On the other hand, with regards to the facts that this ḥadīth is mentioned in *Musnad*[47] of Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal, to whom al-Ashʿarī esteemed and subjected to,[48] and that al-Ashʿarī lived in Baghdād in a period when Ḥanbalis were highly active, it can be thought that al-Ashʿarī knew of this ḥadīth, yet he did not deem it authentic or binding or that he did not accept it as a determinative source of information in classifying sects.

Nashwān al-Ḥimyarī (d. 573/1178), famous Zaidi scholar, does not mention 73 sects ḥadīth and pay regard to the number 73 in his heresiological classification in its work entitled *al-Ḥūr al-ʿīn*, which contains important knowledge on religions and sects and in which he had utilized from Abū l-Qāsim al-Kaʿbī particularly on Islamic sects.

Shīʿa; after all, is generally referred to those who are hostile to ʿAlī and Ahl al-bayt which is meant here. Because it is told that Adhhar b. ʿAbd Allāh in the narrators' chain in the mentioned narration in Abū Dāwūd (Sunna, 1) is a *nāṣibī* maligning ʿAlī (Abū ʿAbd Allāh Muḥammad b. ʿUthmān al-Dhahabī, *Mīzān al-iʿtidāl fī naqḍ al-rijāl*, ed. ʿAlī Muḥammad al-Bijāwī [Beirut: Dār al-maʿrifa, 1963], 1: 173).

44   Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm Ibn al-Wazīr al-Yamānī, *el-ʿAwāṣim wa-l-qawāṣim fī l-dhabb ʿan sunnat Abī l-Qāsim*, ed. Shuʿayb al-Arnaʾūt (Beirut: Muʾassasat al-risāla, 1992), 3: 170.

45   Ibn al-Wazīr, *el-ʿAwāṣim wa-l-qawāṣim*, 1: 186, 3: 172. Ibn al-Wazīr is of the opinion that Ibn Ḥazm argues that the narrations of the 73 sects ḥadīth including the addition "*except one, all of them will be in hell*" are not authentic. However, it is not clear in Ibn Ḥazm's statements to determine what he does not consider strong enough in terms of *isnād* and then suggests that they can not be used as evidence are all narrations of the 73 sects ḥadīth or only the narrations with the additional statement as indicated by Ibn al-Wazīr. Because Ibn Ḥazm mentions the ḥadīth without giving any narrators' chain, moreover provides the text of the ḥadīth only conceptionally. Cf. Ibn Ḥazm, *al-Faṣl*, 3: 247-248. Mevlüt Özler thinks that it is understood that Ibn Ḥazm meant all narrations in the subject when the preceding and succeeding parts (*siyāq-sibāq*) of the text and statements are evaluated in its entirety (Özler, *İslâm Düşüncesinde 73 Fırka Kavramı*, 32).

46   Cf. the whole text of al-Ashʿarī's *Maqālāt al-islāmiyyīn.*

47   Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal, *al-Musnad* (Beirut: al-Maktaba al-Islāmī, nd.), 2: 332; 3: 120, 145; 4: 202.

48   Al-Ashʿarī, *al-Ibāna ʿan ʿuṣūl al-diyāna* (Medina: al-Jāmiʿa al-Islāmiyya, 1975), 8.

CONCLUSION AND EVALUATION

The 73 sects ḥadīth had a structuring effect on both the form and content of the Islamic heresiographical works and the mentalities of the writers of these works. Especially during and after the 4th/10th century, the writers who undertook the classification of the sects, except very few, could not remain indifferent to this ḥadīth, in fact, many of them accepted this ḥadīth as the benchmark forming the classification. Thus, heresiographical works, instead of identifying the theological beliefs and groups actually existing in the Muslim society, became the works that was written in order to classify these 73 sects one by one and to show how far the other sects from the righteous path, except one, of which the writer is a follower.

The effort to identify the 73 sects surpassed the research to find whether these sects actually exist, and led writers to forced activities such as creating imaginary sects and regarding the diversity in opinions on various matters as sects to reach the desired number. Also, the perception developed out of this ḥadīth which states that only one sect will reach salvation and others will go to Hell caused the writer to see his own sect at the center of truth, to canonize it above all, to belittle, and alienate other sects. According to this perspective, other sects are not regarded as the riches of the Islamic thought and the manifestation of the importance that is given to free speech by Islam, yet as some deviant sides outside of true Islamic thought. Besides, although deserving Heaven or Hell is ought to be measured by the fulfillment of responsibilities assigned to each individual by the religion, this measure is degraded to sects formed as a result of some speculative discussions and came to be measured by whether being a member of a certain sect or not. While the followers of the sect determined by the writer to be the saved one reach salvation, followers of the other 72 sects of *bid'a*, even if they fulfill their religious obligations, deserve hell for their initiation. Therefore, one cannot imagine that followers of a sect other than his can be religious and good believer. The individual is evaluated, not by his inner situation and conduct, but by the viewpoints he bears. Besides all these, the individual justifies awarding himself with the authority to adjudge who deserves Heaven or Hell with some solutions he came up as this ḥadīth allows.

In conclusion, the 73 sects ḥadīth is not a suitable benchmark in identification and classification of religious sects that emerged within the Islamic community. Instead, a researcher, whose intent is to identify and classify the religious sects, is to process the data he obtains through observation, experiment, and studies, and to suggest explicable, internally consistent and fact-related findings.

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Different Interpretations of Abū Ḥanīfa:
the Ḥanafī Jurists and the Ḥanafī Theologians *

Abdullah Demir **

ABSTRACT

Since the spread of Islam in Transoxiana *(Mā-warāʾ al-Nahr)*, religious understandings based on the opinions of Abū Ḥanīfa (d. 150/767) have always been dominant in the region. Therefore, it was not possible for other understandings, which may seem to be opposite to Abū Ḥanīfa's opinions, to be influential in the region. That Najjāriyya and Karrāmiyya could not be perennial in the region may be an example of this case.

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Similarly, Māturīdiyya, which benefited from Abū Ḥanīfa's treatises of creed and his rational method, could not adequately get the support of people at the time of Abū Manṣūr al-Māturīdī (d. 333/944) and Abū l-Muʿīn al-Nasafī (d. 508/1114) because the school was seen as an opposite approach to the prevailing imaginations about Abū Ḥanīfa. Moreover, the Ḥanafī jurists *(Ḥanafī fuqahāʾ)*, who were influential in not only people but also bureaucracy, and the Ḥanafī theologians *(Ḥanafī mutakallimūn)*, who followed al-Māturīdī's theological method, did not come to terms on their interpretations of Abū Ḥanīfa. The Ḥanafī jurists who benefited mostly from juridical sources and *manāqib* works were thinking different from the Ḥanafī theologians who relied on the treatises of Abū Ḥanīfa on such issues as the legitimacy of Kalām as a scholarly discipline, the responsibility of people of *fatra* (ahl al-fatra: people having no access to the message of Islam), and the creation of faith *(īmān)*. The Ḥanafī jurists took different stance on various issues and argued that faith is not created; the informative *(khabarī)* attributes of God *(ṣifāt Allāh)* mentioned in the Qurʾān cannot be interpreted *(taʾwīl)*; no one can be held accountable for faith only based on the intellect unless the message of the Prophet reaches to her or him; the people of *fatra* cannot be responsible for faith. They also stated that Abū Ḥanīfa broke his relationship with the theological *(kalāmī)* issues in the last years of his life. Although these jurists accepted Abū Ḥanīfa's distinction between faith and deeds and his view of the stability of one's faith without increasing or decreasing they condemned theological discussions on these issues by going beyond the limits of the treatise of creed. While the Ḥanafī theologians known as *the Ḥanafī scholars of Samarqand* who adopted the religious views of Imām al-Māturīdī of Samarqand acknowledged the intellect and considered it as an independent source in religion, the Ḥanafī jurists known as *the Ḥanafī scholars of Bukhārā* authorized the intellect only in understanding the transmission *(naql)* and its interpretation. The different opinions of the two groups can be seen clearly on the question of the religious responsibility of the people of *fatra*. When we look at the debates regarding Kalām and the Islamic law, we can see that the difference between these two cities (Samarqand and Bukhārā) stems from their methodological views on the epistemological values of the reason *(ʿaql)* and the transmission *(tradition).* Māturīdiyya is a school of theology established by the Ḥanafī theologians who upheld the necessity and significance of Kalām. It is possible to say that the Ḥanafī jurists did not contribute to the establishment and systematisation of this school; rather, they tried to prevent it. Our findings show that the Ḥanafī jurists who lived in Transoxiana differ from each other because of their different understandings of Abū Ḥanīfa. In the historical process extending today it is evident that the religious views of the Ḥanafī jurists and their interpretation of Abū Ḥanīfa have been prominent and effective, not that of Māturīdiyya, which is the understanding of the Ḥanafī theologians.

KEYWORDS

Kalām, Abū Ḥanīfa, Understandings about Abū Ḥanīfa, Māturīdiyya, Hanafī Theologians, Hanafī Jurists.

Farklı Ebû Hanîfe Tasavvurları: Fakih ve Mütekellim Hanefîler Örneği

ÖZ

Mâverânnehir'de İslâm'ın yayılmasından itibaren her dönemde Ebû Hanîfe'nin (ö. 150/767) fıkhî ve itikādî görüşlerine dayanan din anlayışları güçlü oldu. Onun görüşlerine aykırılık taşıdığı düşünülen dinî telakkilerin ise halk nazarında güçlenmesi ve bölgede uzun süreli etkili olması mümkün olamadı. Neccârîlik ile Kerrâmîlik'in bölgede kalıcı olamaması buna örnek verilebilir.

Benzer şekilde Ebû Hanîfe'nin akāid risâlelerinden ve akılcı yönteminden beslenen Mâtürîdîlik'in gerek İmam Ebû Mansûr el-Mâtürîdî (ö. 333/944) ve gerekse Ebü'l-Muîn en-Nesefî'nin (ö. 508/1114) hayatta olduğu yıllarda yaygın olan "Ebû Hanîfe tasavvuruna" aykırı görülmesi nedeni ile geniş bir halk desteğine ve baskın bir konuma ulaşamadı. Zira bölgede halk üzerinde açık bir otoriteye sahip olan hatta şehir idarelerine yön veren *Hanefî fakihler* ile Mâtürîdî'nin öncülüğünü yaptığı kelâm yöntemini kullanan *mütekellim Hanefîler*'in Ebû Hanîfe anlayışları tam olarak uyuşmamaktaydı. Daha çok fıkhî kaynaklar ile menâkıb eserlerinden beslenen fakih Hanefîler, kelâm ilminin dinî meşruiyeti, fetret ehlinin yükümlülüğü ve imanın yaratılmışlığı gibi konularda Ebû Hanîfe'nin risâlelerine dayanan mütekellim Hanefîler'den farklı düşünmekteydi. Fakih Hanefîler; imanın mahlûk olmadığını, haberî sıfatların te'vîl edilmemesinin daha doğru olduğunu, peygamberin daveti olmadan sadece akla dayanılarak yüce bir yaratıcıya inanma yükümlülüğünün başlamayacağını, fetret ehlinin sorumlu tutulmayacağını ve Ebû Hanîfe'nin âhir ömründe kelâmla meşguliyeti terk ettiğini savunmaktaydı. Bu kişiler, iman tanımına amelin dâhil olmadığı ve imanın artıp eksilmeyeceği gibi konularda Ebû Hanîfe'nin itikādî görüşlerini benimsemekle birlikte, akāid risâlesi muhteviyatını aşacak şekilde bu konularda konuşulmasını yani kelâmî faaliyetleri mekruh kabul etmekteydi. Semerkantlı İmâm Mâtürîdî'nin din anlayışını benimseyen mütekellim Hanefîler ise akla kendi alanında bilgiye ulaşmada bağımsız bir rol tanırken; Buhara Hanefîler'i olarak atıf yapılan fakih Hanefîler, akla sadece nakil bağlamında anlama ve yorumlama yetkisi tanımaktadır. Bu husus, fetret ehlinin dini yükümlülüğü konusunda tarafların ortaya koydukları görüşlerde açıkça görülebilmektedir. Kelâm ve fıkha dair bu tartışmaların geneline bakıldığında, her iki şehir özelinde ortaya çıkan bu farklılığın, aklın ve naklin bilgi değeri konusundaki metodolojik farklılığa dayandığı anlaşılır. Mâtürîdîlik, kelâm ilminin önemli ve gerekli olduğunu düşünen mütekellim Hanefîler'in gayretleri sonucunda teşekkül etmiş itikādî bir mezheptir. Bu ekolün ortaya çıkmasına ve sistemleşmesine fakih Hanefîler'in yeterince katkı sunmadığı hatta engel bile oldukları söylenebilir. Zira ulaşılan sonuçlar, Mâverâünnehir bölgesindeki Hanefî fakihlerin farklı Ebû Hanîfe tasavvurlarına sahip olmaları nedeni ile ayrıştıklarını göstermektedir. Günümüze uzanan tarihsel süreçte, mütekellim Hanefîler'in din anlayışı olan Mâtürîdîliğin değil fakih Hanefîler'in din anlayışının ve Ebû Hanîfe tasavvurunun etkin olduğu açıktır.

ANAHTAR KELİMELER

Kelâm, Ebû Hanîfe, Ebû Hanîfe Tasavvurları, Mâtürîdîlik, Mütekellim Hanefîler, Fakih Hanefîler.

INTRODUCTION

A great deal of authors and scholars has written for and against Abū Ḥanīfa (d. 150/767) since his death. Richness of anecdotes and stories about his life and opinions reflects different readings of Abū Ḥanīfa. Some of those readings go further and glorify him as some harshly criticize him. To give an example, those who extolled him attempted to solidify his authority by a clearly fabricated *ḥadīth* saying that "the person named Abū Ḥanīfa or Nuʿmān will arrive and be the light for the Umma (community), and will revive the religion and the Sunnah," while those who showed a hostile attitude towards him even regarded him as *Dajjāl* (a malevolent creature). In this study, I will discuss the Transoxianian Ḥanafīs' different interpretations of Abū Ḥanīfa, who accepted him as their leader in religious issues regarding the Islamic law *(fiqh)* and theology *(kalām)*.

As mentioned, the religious approaches based upon the legal and theological ideas of Abū Ḥanīfa have always been prominent in Transoxiana *(Mā-warā᾽ al-Nahr)* since the Muslim conquest. Thus it has not been possible for other Islamic schools of law and theology, which stood against his opinions, to gain strength and have influence in the region. Najjāriyya and Karrāmiyya seem to be good examples for this situation, because they ceased to exist against the Ḥanafī schools in the region.

It is understood that there is a distinction between the Ḥanafī jurists' understanding of Abū Ḥanīfa, who had an apparent authority over the public, because they had official administrative positions *(ra᾽īs/ṣadr)*, and that of the Ḥanafī theologians who used the theological method of Abū Manṣūr al-Māturīdī (d. 333/944). The Ḥanafī jurists, who relied on legal sources and *manāqib* works (biographical genres about miraculous deeds of a charismatic leader), had different opinions on various matters such as the religious legitimacy of the Islamic theology *(ᶜilm al-kalām)*, the responsibility of the people of *fatra (ahl al-fatra)*, the creation of faith *(īmān)*, and the necessity of consent for faith. They differed from the Ḥanafī theologians, who grounded their opinion on the epistles of Abū Ḥanīfa. Th jurists argued that faith is not a creation *(makhlūq)*; it would be better not to interpret informative attributes of God; one cannot be held accountable to believe in God without receiving God's message; the people of *fatra* cannot be held responsible; Abū Ḥanīfa abandoned *ᶜilm al-Kalām* and theological debates towards the end of his life. They also adopted Abū Ḥanīfa's definition of faith, in which he separates faith from deeds and argues that there is no increase or decrease in one's faith. They, however, determined that it is blameworthy *(makrūh)* to talk about theological matters if it exceeds the scope of the epistle of doctrines. In classical works, one can encounter discussions with regards to the Ḥanafī scholars of Bukhārā and Samarqand having distinct opinions on some legal issues. When examining these discussions in a broader sense on Kalām and law, it can seen that the distinction between these scholars of the two cities is based on their different methods concerning the knowledge value of reason *(ᶜaql)* and of transmitted sources *(naql)*, despite exceptions.

DISCUSSIONS AND DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE ḤANAFĪ THEOLOGIANS AND ḤANAFĪ JURISTS
1. Opinion on the discipline of Kalām: Did Abū Ḥanīfa avoid *ᶜilm al-kalām* towards the end of his life?

The Ḥanafīs of Transoxiana had different opinion on *ᶜilm al-kalām*. Ḥanafī scholars can be divided into two groups: Theologian Ḥanafīs who were interested in *ᶜilm al-kalām* and adopted the method of Kalām, and jurist Ḥanafīs who remained distant to Kalām. This difference becomes apparent as the various transmissions *(riwāyāt)* indicated in the *manāqib* works on Abū Ḥanīfa that he is not interested in *ᶜilm al-kalām* and even banned his son, Ḥammād, from any debates about the matters of faith.

The theologian Ḥanafīs or Ḥanafī scholars of Samarqand think that Abū Ḥanīfa did not approve discussions by incompetent people, from which there can be no result deduced, but not the discipline and the method of Kalām. This group consists of the Ḥanafī scholars, who were mentioned as "those of us who are truth-seekers" and who had adopted the theological method. The importance and necessity of *ᶜilm al-kalām* and its religious legitimacy were advocated by the first period scholars in their works, e.g. al-Māturīdī in

Taʾwīlāt al-Qurʾān[1], Abū l-Yusr Muḥammad al-Bazdawī (d. 493/1100)[2], Abū Shakūr Muḥammad b. ʿAbd-al-Sayyid b. Shuʿayb al-Sālimī (second half of the 5th century Hijrī /11th century AD) in *Kitāb al-Tamhīd fī bayān al-tawḥīd*[3], Abū l-Muʿīn al-Nasafī (d. 508/1114) in *Baḥr al-kalām*[4], Abū Isḥāq Ibrāhīm b. Ismāʿīl al-Zāhid al-Ṣaffār al-Bukhārī (d. 534/1139) in *Talkhīṣ al-adilla li-qawāʿid al-tawḥīd*[5], ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn al- Usmandī (d. 552/1157 [?]) in *Lubāb al-kalām*[6] and Nūr al-Dīn al-Ṣābūnī (d. 580/1184) in *al-Kifāya fī ʾl-hidāya*[7].

For instance, as told by al-Ṣaffār al-Bukharī, Abū Ḥanīfa was willing and ambitious to teach this discipline in his first periods of his life and he encouraged his son, Ḥammād (d. 176/792), to learn this discipline. Following his father's advice, Ḥammād learned this discipline. Later, Abū Ḥanīfa forbade his son to discuss the matters of this discipline. Al-Ṣaffār al-Bukharī admits that the stories about Abū Ḥanīfa forbidding his son from Kalāmī discussions might be true. However, he implements the theologians' (critical) method to the reports as in the transmission of a *ḥadīth* and reinterprets those stories without understanding them ostensibly and superficially. In this context, another story why Abū Ḥanīfa changed his attitude [towards Kalām] is very interesting: "We used to discuss those matters carefully as if there were birds sitting on our heads and we were behaving with care and caution in order not to scare them. In later periods, the intention was perceived as superseding the person with whom one discusses. The one who aims to cause the opposite to fall into blasphemy (*kufr*) becomes blasphemous himself".[8] Al-Ṣaffār al-Bukhārī suggests that Abū Ḥanīfa forbade his son because he did not approve any discussions that do not go beyond obstinacy of parties. Otherwise, it is not possible for Abū Ḥanīfa to completely forbid to learn ʿilm al-kalām and to discuss theological issues. In order to ground his opinion, he mentions Abū Ḥanīfa's *fatwā* (legal opinion) about two people discussing whether the Qurʾān was created or not *(the createdness of the Qurʾān, khalq al-Qurʾān)*: "While we were sitting with Abū Ḥanīfa, a group brought two people before him and said, 'one of these two claims

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[1] See Abū Manṣūr Muḥammad b. Muḥammad al-Māturīdī, *Taʾwīlāt al-Qurʾān*, critical ed. Bekir Topaloğlu - Ahmet Vanlıoğlu et al. (Istanbul: Mizan Publications, 2005-2010), 2: 165; 8: 217-218.

[2] Abū l-Yusr Muḥammad b. Muḥammad al-Bazdawī, *Uṣūl al-dīn*, critical ed. Hans Peter Linss (Qāhira: Dār Iḥyā al-kutub al-ʿArabiya, 1383/1963), 3-4, 258.

[3] Abū Shakūr Muḥammad b. ʿAbd al-Sayyid b. Shuʿayb al-Sālimī, *Kitāb al-Tamhīd fī bayān al-tawḥīd,* Süleymaniye MS Library, Şehit Ali Paşa, 001153, 192a-192b.

[4] Abū l-Muʿīn Maymūn b. Muḥammad al-Nasafī, *Baḥr al-kalām*, critical ed. Walī al-dīn M. Ṣāliḥ al-Farfūr (Dimashq: Maktabat al-Farfūr, 1421/2000), 61.

[5] Abū Isḥāq Ibrāhīm b. Ismāʿīl al-Zāhid al-Ṣaffār al-Bukharī, *Kitāb Talkhīṣ al-adilla li-qawāʿid al-tawḥīd*, critical ed. Angelika Brodersen (Beirut: al-Maʾhad al-Almani liʾl-abhas al-sharqiyya, 1432/2011), 1: 32–33. See Abdullah Demir, "Mâtürîdî Âlimi Ebû İshâk Zâhid es-Saffâr'ın Kelâm Müdâfaası [Māturīdī Theologian Abū Ishāq al-Zāhid al-Saffār's Vindication of the Kalām]", *Cumhuriyet Ilahiyat Dergisi – Cumhuriyet Theology Journal* 20/1 (June 2016): 445-502. http://dx.doi.org/10.18505/cuifd.12582

[6] ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Abd al-Ḥamīd al-Usmandī, *Lubāb al-Kalām*, critical ed. M. Sait Özervarlı (Istanbul: TDV ISAM Publications, 2005), 37–38.

[7] Nūr al-Dīn Aḥmad b. Maḥmūd al-Ṣābūnī, *al-Kifāya fī ʾl-hidāya*, critical ed. Muhammed Aruçi (Beirut: Dār Ibn Ḥazm - TDV ISAM Publications, 1434/2013), 39-41.

[8] al-Ṣaffār al-Bukharī, *Talkhīṣ al-adilla*, 1: 56; al-Muwaffaq b. Aḥmad al-Makkī, *Manāqib al-Imām al-Aʿẓam Abī Ḥanīfa* (Beirut: Dār al-kitāb al-ʿArabī, 1401/1981), 1: 183 -184.

that the Qurʾān was created (makhlūq) by God, and the other the Qurʾān was uncreated (ghayr makhlūq).' Abū Ḥanīfa said, 'Do not perform ṣalāt (prayer) behind both of them!' I said, 'Yes for the first one, as he does not accept the eternity of the Qurʾān,' and asked, 'But what is wrong with the second one, so that we cannot perform ṣalāt behind him?' Then he said, 'Both of them had disagreements over al-dīn (unchanging principles of faith). Disputing over the religion is an innovation (Bidaʿ)." For al-Ṣaffār al-Bukhārī, Abū Ḥanīfa issued this fatwā because the disputants were incompetent on the matter, the disagreement would continue as long as they would not back down from their obstinacy, and that it was not possible for the discussion to come to a conclusion.[9] Al-Ṣaffār al-Bukhārī states that Muḥammad b. al-Ḥasan al-Shaybānī (d. 189/805) has the same opinion on the discussions that ground upon obstinacy and do not have the purpose to reveal the truth.[10] Abū l-Muʿīn al-Nasafī, Abū Shakūr al-Sālimī, and Ḥuṣām al-Dīn al-Sighnāqī (d. 714/1314) mention that if discussions on religious matter are done over ordinary interests, such as gaining position or authority, they become blameworthy.[11] We can suggest based on the stories that, in case they are between competent people and its aim is to reveal the truth, theological discussions were supported by Abū Ḥanīfa and the theologian Ḥanafīs that follow his path.

A report attributed to Abū Yūsuf Yaʿqūb b. Ibrāhīm al-Anṣārī al-Kūfī (d. 182/798), in which he held that ʿilm al-kalām leads people to disbelief, is a reason for the jurist Ḥanafīs' opposition to Kalām. When al-Māturīdī interprets the verse in the Qurʾān as "[Prophet], they ask you about the spirit (rūḥ). Say: 'The spirit is part of my Lord's domain (amr rabbī). You have only been given a little knowledge' (al-Isra' 17/85)", he uses this verse against Abū Yūsuf, and he states that the verse refers to the discussions that are impossible to give any results and lead to deviance, rather than to Kalām itself actually. Besides, al-Māturīdī argues that it is allowed to talk about the matters of faith and to engage with Kalām, by pointing out to the verse "Debate them in the most dignified manner" (al-Naḥl 16/125).[12]

Al-Ṣaffār al-Bukhārī accepts and conveys the statement of Abū Yūsuf: "He who acquires faith in a hostile manner will become a disbeliever; he who earns assets with chemistry goes bankruptcy; and he who demands gharīb al-ḥadīth (the rare words in ḥadīth) becomes a liar." In addition, he states that in some stories, the statement is conveyed as "He who acquires faith with Kalām will become an disbeliever (zindīq)". For him, Kalām as causing a disbelief is no different from the situation of the philosophers, who discuss in a hostile manner with incompetent people. Otherwise, the statements from both Abū Ḥanīfa and Abū Yūsuf regarding debating about religious matters cannot be targeting directly ʿilm al-kalām. He grounds his view on the verse "Debate them in the most dignified manner," as al-Māturīdī does. Al-Ṣaffār al-Bukhārī thinks that, by this verse, discussion to reveal the truth is not forbidden, on the contrary, it is ordained. Therefore, the criticism here is the discussions based on obstinacy and fanaticism, which would not yield any results, and the shallow rivalries between incompetent people.[13]

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[9]   al-Ṣaffār al-Bukharī, Talkhīṣ al-adilla, 1: 56–57.

[10] al-Ṣaffār al-Bukharī, Talkhīṣ al-adilla, 1: 57.

[11] Nasafī, Baḥr al-kalām, 61; Ḥuṣām al-Dīn Ḥusayin b. ʿAlī Al-Sighnāqī, al-Tasdīd sharḥ al-Tamhīd fī qawāʿid al-tawḥīd, Süleymaniye MS Library, Esad Efendi, 3893, 7b-8a.

[12]   al-Māturīdī, Taʾwīlāt al-Qurʾān, 8: 349- 350.

[13] al-Ṣaffār al-Bukharī, Talkhīṣ al-adilla, 1: 57.

Al-Māturīdī, al-Ṣaffār al-Bukhārī, and other Ḥanafī theologians prefer to interpret single reports (āḥād) in the sources by taking their soundness and context into consideration. They apply the same method to the various transmissions *(riwāyāt)* against Kalām conveyed by Abū Ḥanīfa and Abū Yūsuf, and they evaluate these revelations regarding the intent of the owner of the word and other stories and evidences. On the other hand, the jurist Ḥanafīs, who read the same narrations superficially, adopt an understanding of "Abū Ḥanīfa as someone who repented from Kalām and who stood distant from Kalām" in spite of his theological doctrines. In the years that followed, even though the authority of Imām al-Māturīdī gained strength, it is hard to assume that Ḥanafīs, who had remained distant to Kalām, internalized the theological method and approach of al-Māturīdī.

The pioneers of the Ḥanafī theologians are Imām al-Māturīdī primarily, and Abū l-Ḥasan al-Rustufaghnī (d. 345/956), Abū l-Ḥusayn Muḥammad b. Yaḥyā al-Bashāgharī (d. 4ᵗʰ/10ᵗʰ century), Abū Bakr al-ʿIyāḍī (d. second half of the 4ᵗʰ/10ᵗʰ century), Abū Salama al-Samarqandī (d. second half of the 4ᵗʰ/10ᵗʰ century), the Commentator of *Jumal uṣūl al-dīn* Ibn Yaḥyā (d. second half of the 4ᵗʰ/10ᵗʰ century), Abū Naṣr Isḥāq b. Aḥmād al-Ṣaffār (d. 405/1014), Imām al-Shahīd Ismāʿīl b. Abū Naṣr Isḥāq al-Ṣaffār (d. 461/1069), Abū Shakūr Muḥammad al-Sālimī (second half of the 5ᵗʰ/11ᵗʰ century), Abū Bakr Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm al-Ḥaṣīrī (d. 500/1107), Abū l-Muʿīn al-Nasafī (d. 508/1115), Aḥmād b. Mūsā al-Kashshī (d. 550/1155), Maḥmūd b. Zayd al-Lāmishī (d. 522/1128), Abū Isḥāq Ibrāhīm b. Ismāʿīl al-Zāhid al-Ṣaffār al-Bukhārī (d. 534/1139), Abū Ḥafṣ Najm al-Dīn ʿUmar al-Nasafī (d. 537/1141), ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn al-Samarqandī (d. 539/1144), Ṭāhir b. Aḥmād al-Bukhārī (d. 542/1147), ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn al-Usmandī (d. 552/1157), ʿAlī b. ʿUthmān Sirāj al-Dīn al-Farghānī al-Ḥanafī al-Ūshī (d. 575/1179) and Nūr al-Dīn al-Ṣābūnī (d. 580/1164). Examining the period when these scholars lived, we can say that this understanding was prominent during the years in which Imām al-Māturīdī was alive and in the period of the Western Qarakhānids (433-608/1041-1212). In any case, this determination is confirmed by Abū l-Muʿīn al-Nasafī, who stated that al-Māturīdī fortified the religion of Islam in the region of Samarqand and saw the result of this while he was alive.

The Ḥanafī jurists, who were the majority in the region in every period, adopted literally the transmissions on Abū Ḥanīfa forbidding his son, Ḥammād to engage in ʿilm al-kalām and to discuss on the issue, and they allied on the issue that engagement with ʿilm al-kalām is not advisable and they also mentioned their opinions in their books of the Islamic law. The Ḥanafī jurists did not write any theological book by adopting this attitude in their private lives, and avoided involving in theological debates. For example, the famous Ḥanafī jurist Qāḍīkhān (d. 592/1196) conveys al-Māturīdī's opinion that the person who claim that he saw God in his dream is worse than a worshipper of idols. He also mentions the view of the Ḥanafī scholars of Samarqand on the matter: "the claim that one can see God in his dream is invalid *(bāṭil)*." He also states his personal opinion that "it is better not to talk about this issue." This shows that he does not prefer to talk about theological matters "more than necessary". He also states openly that redundant engagement with Kalām is blameworthy. In this regard, he is of the opinion that "respecting the Qurʾān and fiqh is obligatory; redundancy in learning and discussing ʿilm al-kalām is blameworthy". Likewise, in the same context, he also tells the story of Abū Ḥanīfa forbidding his son, Ḥammād, to engage with Kalām. His attitude is the evidence of that he did not approve the engagement with ʿilm al-kalām.[14] It is understood that some Ḥanafī scholars

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[14]   Qāḍīkhān Fakhr al-Dīn al-Ḥasan b. Manṣūr b. Maḥmūd al-Awzajandī, *al-Fatāwā Qāḍīkhān*, critical ed. Sālim Musṭafa al-Badrī (Beirut: Dār al-kutūb al-ʿIlmiyya, 1865), 3: 329, 331.

that focused on the discipline of Islamic law *(fiqh)* remained distant from Kalām because they thought that Abū Ḥanīfa and Abū Yūsuf had forbidden Kalāmī discussions. Abū l-Yusr Muḥammad al-Bazdawī mentions this issue in his work, *Uṣūl al-dīn*. Endeavoring to explain the religious legitimacy of Kalām, al-Bazdawī says "the scholars have failed to agree on learning, teaching and writing about Kalām," and states that "the majority of the scholars in Transoxiana" does not permit this discipline and forbids it. He also conveys that in the region people did not favorably consider people engaged with *ʿilm al-kalām*, the theologians were disdained, and that fiqh was held more important than Kalām.[15] Considering that Ḥanafī scholars were always dominant in every period in Transoxiana, it is obvious that he refers to the Ḥanafī jurists with the expression of "the majority of the scholars in Transoxiana". As a result of this widespread consciousness among Ḥanafīs, *fatwās* against *ʿilm al-kalām* and the theologians were included even in the Ḥanafī books of law. Some of the examples for these *fatwās* include: "the testimony of a theologians cannot be accepted", "one cannot perform *ṣalā* behind a theologian", "theologians are not considered as scholars", "the names of those who have engaged with Kalām are omitted from the scholars' class", "theological books are not considered as works of *ʿilm* (knowledge)", "the term of 'scholar' only includes jurists *(fuqahāʾ)* and traditionalists *(muḥaddithūn)*, not theologians *(mutakallimūn)*", "any redundant engagement with Kalām is blameworthy".[16]

It can be said that Abū l-Layth ʿUbayd Allāh al-Bukhārī (d. 258/872) and Abū l-Qāsim al-Ṣaffār (d. 336/947), who were contemporaries of Imām al-Māturīdī, are the leaders of the Ḥanafī jurists, who stood distant from Kalām. In the work named *al-Multaqaṭ fī l-Fatāwā al-Ḥanafiyya* by Muḥammad b. Yūsuf al-Samarqandī (d. 556/1161), a Western Qarakhānid jurist, the statement by Abū l-Layth ʿUbayd Allāh al-Bukhārī that "The names of those who have engaged with Kalām are written off from the scholars class" and the *fatwā* by Abū l-Qāsim al-Ṣaffār that "theological books are not considered as scholarly works" are cited.[17] Abū l-Qāsim al-Ṣaffār, one of the contemporaries of Imām al-Māturīdī, is a Ḥanafī jurist, whose opinions are frequently conferred in the Ḥanafī legal literature of the Western Qarakhānid period, such as *Fatāwā Qāḍīkhān.* It is visible that his attitude against Kalām affected the jurists of the region and reflected on his works. Upon this influence, it can be determined that the pioneer of the religious understanding of Ḥanafī jurists is Abū l-Qāsim al-Ṣaffār. The fact that the abovementioned books followed the understanding of Abū l-Qāsim, rather than that of Abū Ḥanīfa or of Imām al-Māturīdī, on the religious legitimacy of Kalām is important as it reveals the case of the Ḥanafī understanding of religion at the time. A similar account can be seen in the famous *fatwā* corpus named *al-Fatāwā l-Hindiyya* (also known as *al-Fatāwā l-ʿĀlamgīriyya*) compiled from various acknowledge sources on Ḥanafī sect between 1664 and 1672 by the joint work of a board of more than forty Ḥanafī scholars under the supervision of Shaykh Niẓām of Burhānpūr (d. 1089/1678): "If one bequeaths his property to be given to scholars, this can include the scholars of *fiqh* and of *ḥadīth*; not *ahl al-ḥikma* (philosophers). If one asks whether theologians included in the context, or not?', the answer is 'no'. Abū l-Qāsim al-Ṣaffār gives a *fatwā* on this issue as follows: It is undoubted that the books of Kalām are not considered

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scholarly works. It is based on the tradition. If one uses the word book, he does not mean any Kalāmī books. Likewise, theologians are not considered as scholars." [18]

It can be thought that scholars from Transoxiana, who stood distant from the discipline and the method of Kalām and who did not write any works in that field, adopted the religious understanding of Jurist Ḥanafīs. Abū l-Layth al-Samarqandī (d. 373/983), who did not mention al-Māturīdī even once in his works, can be mentioned in this context. This determination is substantiated by the fact that Abū l-Muʿīn al-Nasafī did not mention Abū l-Layth al-Samarqandī's name in the list of Ḥanafī theologians in his work, *Tabṣirat al-adilla.* The Ḥanafī Qāḍī Ṣāʿid b. Muḥammad al-Ustuwāʾī (d. 432/1041), who was considered as the leader *(raʾīs)* of Ḥanafīs in the region of Khurāsān in his period, can be included in this list, as he openly states his own opinion as follows in his work titled *Kitāb al-Iʿtiqād,* in which he explained the opinions of Abū Ḥanīfa on faith: "Our predecessors have kept their distance from Kalām. It is praised to satisfy oneself with the transmitted sources on the matters of faith. When someone is engaged in Kalām, he dives into disputed matters. The right way is to stay away from Kalām." [19] In addition, the bottom line of work is that "he who accepts these advices should follow the guidance of scholars whose words and choices are sound by Islam and who keep their distances from Kalām." [20] Considering that al-Ustuwāʾī was the ancestor of the Saʿīdī family which had the position of judge *(qāḍī)* in Nīshābūr and surroundings for at least a century in the Ghaznavids and Saljūks period [21] and their sons and grandsons, who had the power of the state, possibly held his advice as to stay away from Kalām. Another reason why al-Māturīdī's views could not gain authority against Ashʿarīyya is the Ḥanafī jurists' anti-Kalāmī attitude. In this connection, it must be deeply examined how the Ḥanafī jurists acknowledged a religious understanding against Kalām and how they came to this point, although it is contrary to what is stated in the epistles of Abū Ḥanīfa.

The Ḥanafī jurists of the first period, who did not write any the theological or creedal work, are Abd al-ʿAzīz al-Ḥalwānī (d. 448/1056), ʿAbdullāh b. Ḥusayn al-Nīshābūrī al-Nāṣiḥī (d. 447/1055), Abū l-Ḥasan ʿAli b. Ḥusayn Sughdī (d. 461/1069), Abū l-ʿUsr al-Bazdawī (d. 482/1089), Shams al-Aʾimma Muḥammad al-Sarakhsī (d. 483/1090), Khāharzāda Muḥammad b. Ḥusayn al-Bukhārī (483/1090), Abū Naṣr Aḥmad b. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. Isḥāq al-Rīghadmūnī (d. 493/1100), Ṣadr ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz b. ʿUmar b. al-Māza (d. 518/1124), Ṣadr al-Shahīd ʿUmar b. ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz al-Māza (d. 536/1141), Sadr Aḥmad b. ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz al-Māza (d. 551/1156), Muḥammad b. Yūsuf al-Samarqandī (d. 556/1161), Ṣadr Muḥammad b. ʿUmar al-Māza (d. 559/1164), Ṣadr Maḥmūd b. Aḥmad al-Māza (d. 570/1174), Imāmzāda Muḥammad b. Abū al-Sharghī (d. 573/1177), Abū Ḥafs ʿUmar b. Muḥammad al-ʿAqīlî (d. 576/1180), Aḥmad b. Muḥammad al-ʿAttābī (d. 586/1190), Qāḍīkhān (d. 592/1196), Burhān al-Din al-Marghīnānī (d. 593/1197), Ṣadr ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz b. Muḥammad al-Māza (d. 593/1197), ʿUmar b. ʿAlī al-Marghīnānī (d. 600/1203) and Ṣadr ʿUmar b. Mesʿūd b. Aḥmad al-Māza (d. 603/1207).

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[18]   Shaykh Niẓām of Burhānpūr et al, *al-Fatāwā l-Hindiyya: Al-Fatāwā l-ʿĀlamgīriyya* (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1421/2000), 6: 146.

[19]   Ṣāʿid b. Muḥammad al-Ustuwāʾī, *Kitāb al-Iʿtiqād*, critical ed. Seyit Bahçivan (Beirut: Dār al-kutūb al-ʿIlmiyya, 1426/2005), 212.

[20]   al-Ustuwāʾī, *Kitāb al-Iʿtiqād*, 233.

[21]   Abū Saʿd ʿAbd al-Karīm b. Abī Bakr Muḥammad al-Samʿānī, *al-Ansāb*, Critical ed. Abdullah ʿUmar al-Bārūdi (Beirut: Dār al-Jinān, 1408/1988), 1: 135.

It is understood that the Ḥanafī theologians, who adopted the al-Māturīdī's kalāmī method, lost power in the region after the Western Qarakhānid period. One of the reasons for this is anti-Kalāmī stance of the Banū Māza family *(Āl al-Burhān)*, who were assigned to the presidency of the Ḥanafī scholars of Bukhārā after the exile of Abū Isḥāq Ibrāhīm b. Ismāʿīl al-Zāhid al-Ṣaffār al-Bukhārī (d. 534/1139), who used to be the president of Bukhārā Ḥanafīs (the chiefs/raʾīs of the Ḥanafīs in the town) and adopted the religious understanding of Imām al-Māturīdī, in 495/1102 by the Saljūq Sultan Sanjar b. Malikshāh (r. in Khurāsān 490–552/1097–1157 and as Saljūq overlord 511–52/1118–57). No one among the administrative jurists of this family, which gained a regional leader position under the authority of the Qara Khiṭāy in the environment created after the Battle of Qatwan, is considered as theologian or approved a theological work. No knowledge supporting the development of ʿilm al-kalām or al-Māturīdī's religious understanding by the Banū Māza, who governed the religious educational institutes in region, was found.[22] On the contrary, the religious understanding of the Ḥanafī jurists in this period gained strength and the negative attitude towards the discipline and method of kalām.

The results of the discussions on religious legitimacy and necessity of Kalām among Ḥanafī scholars of Samarqand and Bukhārā can be listed as follows:

a) Ḥanafīs advocating for Kalām and its method argue for this understanding by relating it to Imām al-Māturīdī. Therefore, he is the pioneer of the Ḥanafī theologians. The Ḥanafīs against Kalām base their views on Abū l-Qāsim al-Ṣaffār (d. 336/947). It can be said that Abū l-Qāsim was the pioneer of the view that "Abū Ḥanīfa repented from Kalām."

b) In this discussion, it is stated that the Ḥanafī theologians' interpretation of Abū Ḥanīfa is based on the written sources, the *aqāʿid* (creeds) epistles attributed to Abū Ḥanīfa, whereas it is noteworthy that these Ḥanafīs had relied on the verbal stories and the *manāqib*. Being aware of this situation, Abū l-Yusr Muḥammad al-Bazdawī cites the opinion of Abū Ḥanīfa to argue for the religious legitimacy of Kalām basing his argument on a passage in *al-ʿĀlim waʾl-Mutaʿallim*: "We argue against those who say that 'the Companions of the Prophet did not dive into such matters and we say that the situation of the Companions of the Prophet is like the community which had no enemy before them, thus, they did not need weapons.; On ther other hand,, we are under attack and we need weapons (Kalām).[23]

c) The scholars, who are called as Ḥanafī jurists in this study, are called Ahl al-Ẓawāhir by Abū Shakūr Muḥammad b. ʿAbd al-Sayyid b. Shuʿayb al-Sālimī, who died in the second half of the 5th(11th) century.[24] The term "Ahl al-Zawāhir" or "Aṣḥāb al-Zawāhir" refers to those who understand the verses and ḥadīths according to the literal meanings understood at first glance without

22 Abdullah Demir, *Ebû İshâk Zâhid es-Saffâr'ın Kelâm Yöntemi [The Kalām Method of Abū Isḥāq al-Zāhid al-Ṣaffār]* (PhD Thesis, Sivas Cumhuriyet University, Sivas, 2014), 87-93; Id, *Ebû İshak es-Saffar'ın Kelâm Yöntemi [The Kalām Method of Abū Isḥāq al-Ṣaffār]* (Istanbul: TDV ISAM Publications, 2018).

23   Abū Ḥanīfa, *al-ʿĀlim waʾl-Mutaʿallim*, In *İmam-ı Âzam'ın Beş Eseri [The Five Works of Imām al-Aʿẓam Abū Ḥanīfa]* (Istanbul: IFAV Publications, 1992), 14.

24 Abū Shakūr al-Sālimī, *al-Tamhīd*, 192a-192b.

considering the facts of meanings and the reasons for judgements and the purpose of statements.[25] By using the term "Ahl al-Zawāhir", Abū Shakūr al-Sālimī suggests that the Kalām opposition is the product of a perspective that does not take the meaning and the purposes of the the naṣṣ (pl. nuṣūṣ: text; the Qurʾān and Sunnah) into account. This is an expression of the methodological difference that has emerged between jurist and theologian Ḥanafīs.

d) The results showed that the people who used the theological method had a minority status in the region and the use of this method decreased after al-Māturīdī. As known, al-Māturīdī lived in the city of Samarqand and died in 333/944 during the reign of the Sāmānids (204-395/819-1005), which ruled the regions of Khurāsān and Transoxiana for nearly two centuries. The date of his death coincides with the time in which Sāmānids' power was falling into a sixty-year decline and collapse right after the amīr Nūḥ (I) b. Naṣr (r. 331–43/943–54) came to power in 331/943. In this process, it can be said that the interest in intellectual disciplines, including ʿilm al-kalām, decreased in the region, whereas the popularity of the disciplines of fiqh and ḥadīth increased, because the discipline of fiqh gained prominence against ʿilm al-kalām after al-Māturīdī. In this context, it is also thought that the Madrasa called Dār al- Jūzjāniya[26] where al-Māturīdī taught turned its focus from the teaching of Kalām to teaching fiqh and ḥadīth after al-Māturīdī's death. This conclusion was drawn by examining the biographies of the people who taught in Dār al-Jūzjāniya.[27] ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn al-Samarqandī's statements also confirm this situation. Al-Samarqandī states that Imām al-Māturīdī had been neglected in his home town for nearly two centuries and the Ḥanafī jurists had not been interested in the theological discussions of in his works and studied fiqh only.[28] Similarly, Abū l-Yusr Muḥammad al-Bazdawī states that in Transoxiana they abstained from ʿilm al-kalām and this discipline was not considered favorably, and instead fiqh was regarded more important.[29] After al-Māturīdī, the consolidation of the anti-Kalām stance in Transoxiana led the Ḥanafī scholars to deal with fiqh rather than Kalām and to compile sources for this discipline.[30] The Ḥanafī jurists, who refused ʿilm al-kalām, even thought that the engagement with kalām was blameworthy, did not promote this discipline nor write a book on Kalām or faith. The fact that Abū l-Muʿīn al-Nasafī did not mention the name of any theologians in the list which he included Imām al-Māturīdī until the IV.th (X.th) century and the fact that not a single noteworthy theologian scholar emerged from the region among Ḥanafīs within a century after the fall of the Sāmānids until the time of Nasafī confirm that no theological work had been written

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[25] H. Yunus Apaydın, "Zâhiriyye", *TDV Encyclopedia of Islam* (Ankara: TDV Publications, 2013), 44/93-100.

[26] Ibn Yaḥyā, *Sharḥ Jumal uṣūl al-dīn,* Süleymaniye MS Library, Şehit Ali Paşa, 1648/2, 161b.

[27] Demir, *Ebû İshâk Zâhid es-Saffâr'ın Kelâm Yöntemi,* 41.

[28] ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn Abū Bakr Muḥammad b. Aḥmad al-Samarqandī, *Mīzān al-uṣūl fī natāʾij al-uṣūl*, critical ed. M. Zaki Abd al-Barr (Qāhira: Maktaba Dār al-turāth, 1418/1997), 3.

[29] al-Bazdawī, *Uṣūl al-dīn*, 258.

[30] Maḥmūd b. Sulaymān al-Kafawī, *Katāʾib aʿlām al-akhyār min fuqahāʾ madhhab al-Nuʿmān al-mukhtār*, Tehran Kitabkhāna-yi Majlis-i Shūrā-yi Millī, 1385, 109b; Şükrü Özen, "V. (X.) Yüzyılda Mâverâünnehir'de Ehl-i Sünnet–Muʿtezile Mücadelesi ve Bir Ehl-i Sünnet Beyannamesi [The 4th/10th Century Conflict between Ahl al-Sunnah and Muʿtazila in Transoxania and a Declaration of Ahl al-Sunnah], *İslâm Araştırmaları Dergisi* 9 (2003): 62-63.

on the Ḥanafī theology in Transoxania.[31] In addition, the result is fortified by the fact that, as ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn al-Samarqandī put it, there is no information that a comprehensive work, in which the theological method was used, was written in the two-century period from al-Māturīdī to al-Nasafī.

e)   In the two different periods of Transoxiana, where the Ḥanafī jurists' understanding of religion was dominant, there are works that were written by the theological method and exceeded the size of an epistle. The first period is the time of al-Māturīdī. These developments were based on the obligation to propose an answer to the Ḥanafī-Muʿtazilī theologian, Abū l-Qāsim al-Kaʿbī (d. 319/931) and Bāṭinī- Ismāʿīlīs, who tried to spread their views over the region and to put forward the misconceptions of Ḥanafīs. In *Kitāb al-Tawḥīd* of al-Māturīdī, it is clear that the views of al-Kaʿbī are tried to be refuted. A similar development based on the argument is seen in the Western Qarakhānids period, as Abū l-Muʿīn al-Nasafī had to respond to Ashʿarīs, who were in an effort to spread in the region in the second half of the 5th (11th) century, and their serious allegations against Ḥanafīs on the divine attribute of *takwīn* (creation). As a result of his efforts and his putting forward al-Māturīdī, the religious understanding of al-Māturīdī, in which the basic opinions of the Ḥanafīs on faith were based on the transmitted sources and intellectual evidences or the understanding of Abū Ḥanīfa were re-enacted and strengthened in the region. Until this time, *ʿilm al-kalām* and the religious understanding of al-Māturīdī, the pioneer of the Ḥanafīs, remained in the background. It is seen that the need for argument is in the foreground in the works written with the theological method in Transoxiana and in the consolidation of the theological understanding in the relevant periods. This situation can be interpreted as the Ḥanafī jurists had the authority and their understanding of Abū Ḥanīfa became widespread when the persistence to struggle and the ability of discussion of a theologian was not needed for the Ḥanafīs. Until the need for the power of debating and arguing of a theologian in the Ottoman society, the fact that ʿilm al-kalām, Abū Ḥanīfa's views, and Māturīdīyya was at the background seem to be linked to the fact that the Ottoman Empire was a society guided by jurists. For example, what Muḥammad b. Farāmarz Mollā Khusraw (d. 885/1480), the most powerful figure of his time, says about Kalām is this: "One can leave his home country without his parents's permission to study disciplines, except Kalām because Imām al-Shāfiʿī says that 'It is better for the servant to appear before God with a great sin, rather than the sin of Kalām. When this is the verdict for the discipline of Kalām in his time, imagine the verdict for Kalām that is full of garbled, innovative, and silvered words of philosophers'.[32] In modern Turkey, the fact that religious formations or media preachers trying to steer the society through legal *fatwās* are more effective than the religious understanding represented by the departments of theology, which are nurtured by the religious understandings of the scholars, who value reason and thought, such as Abū Ḥanīfa and Imām al-Māturīdī, can be

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31   M. Sait Özervalı, "Alâeddin el-Üsmendî'nin Kelâmcılığı ve Bilgi Teorisi: Mâverâünnehir Kelâm Düşüncesine Bir Katkı [ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn al-Usmandī's Theology and Epistemology: A Contribution to Kalām Thought in Māwarā al-Nahr]," *İslâm Araştırmaları Dergisi* 10 (2003): 41.

32   Mollā Khusraw Muḥammad b. Farāmarz, *Durar al-ḥukkām* (Āsitāne: Shirkat Ṣaḥafiya al-Uthmāniya, 1317), 1: 323. See Ibn ʿAbd al-Barr al-Namarī, Abū ʿUmar Yūsuf b. ʿAbdillah, *Jāmiʿ bayān al-ʿilm wa-faḍlihi wā mā yanbaghī fī riwāyatihi wa-ḥamlihi* (Cairo: Maktabah Ibn Taymiyya, nd.), 365-366.

interpreted as the religious understanding of the Ḥanafī jurists or Ḥanafī-like Salafīs are widespread. Although scientific research has been made on Imām al-Māturīdī and Māturīdīyya in the Faculty of Theology in the Republican period, it can be said that the religious understanding of al-Māturīdī could not spread due to influence of communities and religious sects in the social life, which are nurtured from the works of the Ḥanafī jurists.

The view that the Ḥanafī jurists began to consider Kalām as blameworthy in the period of the Western Qarakhānids created a basis for the exclusion of other disciplines, especially philosophical disciplines, as there would be no justification for philosophical disciplines if Kalām were to be blameworthy and forbidden. Therefore, the effect of this change in the Ḥanafīs' religious understanding under the decline in the scientific fields after the Sāmānids period (third–fourth/ninth–tenth centuries) is also worth exploring because some Ḥanafīs were driven away from the understanding of Abū Ḥanīfa valuing reason to the understanding of Abū Ḥanīfa forbidding Kalām. In the historical process to the present, it is clear that the religious understanding of the Ḥanafīs and their view of Abū Ḥanīfa have been effective, rather than Māturīdīyya, which is the religious understanding of the Ḥanafī theologians.

f) From the last quarter of the 5ᵗʰ (11ᵗʰ) century (Hijrī 475-550), the religious understanding of Imām al-Māturīdī was revisited by the endeavors and leadership of Abū l-Muʿīn al-Nasafī against the threat of the Ashʿarīs who attempted to gain power in the region. Al-Nasafī's efforts to bring al-Māturīdī to the forefront were supported by the theologians who continued to have this understanding and in the second half of the 6ᵗʰ (12ᵗʰ) century (Hijrī 550-600) after the death of al-Nasafī, Māturīdīyya was accepted as a theological school of the Ahl al-Sunnah. In these years, even by the Ḥanafī jurists, who were distant from Kalām, al-Māturīdī was called the head of the Ahl al-Sunnah. This reminds us of the Ottoman scholars, who had a higher respect for the Ashʿarī Kalāmas they said that they were of Māturīdīyya.

2. The Power and Authority of the Reason (ʿaql): The Discussion on the Necessity of Faith Based on Reason Only

The Ḥanafī theologians or truth-seekers, in other words the theologians of Samarqand who adopted the religious understanding of Imām al-Māturīdī al-Samarqandī, gave an independent role for reason (ʿaql) as a source of knowledge in their field, Kalām, whereas the Ḥanafī jurists, who are also known as the imāms of Bukhārā, reduced the authority of reason only in understanding the revelations. This can be clearly seen in the opinions of the parties concerning the religious responsibilities of the people of *fatra*. According to what is told by Abū Abdallāh Muḥammad b. Samāʿa (d. 233/847) from Abū Yūsuf, Abū Ḥanīfa thinks as follows on the matter: "No one can make an excuse because of his ignorance in acknowledging his creator because the heavens, the earth, His self and the creation of other beings is obvious. In the case of worships (ʿibādāt) and other religious rules (sharāʾiʿ), the people are excused unless these are proved with evidence." The second part of this word is told with open statements as follows in the work named *al-Muntaqā of* Ḥākim al-Shahīd (d. 334/945), which is not available today: "Those who have no knowledge [of Islam], do not receive the Prophet's message, or have never met any Muslim cannot be held responsible".[33]

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[33] al-Ṣaffār al-Bukharī, *Talkhīṣ al-adilla*, 1: 132; al-Samarqandī, *Mīzān al-uṣūl*, 191-192; al-Bazdawī, *Uṣūl al-dīn*, 207; al-Usmandī, *Lubāb al-Kalām*, 47; Nūr al-Dīn Aḥmad b. Maḥmūd al-Ṣābūnī, *al-Bidāya fī uṣūl al-dīn*, critical ed. Bekir Topaloğlu (Ankara: Presidency of the Republic of Turkey Presidency of Religious Affairs, 1998), 85-86; Id, *al-Kifāya*, 347-348; Ḥasan b. Abī Bakr al-Ḥanafī al-Maqdisī, *Ghāyat al-marām fī sharh Baḥr al-kalām*, critical ed. Abdullah Muḥammad

Imām al-Māturīdī adopts the opinion of Abū Ḥanīfa on this matter and provides proof for his opinion with the theological method. According to him, if God had not sent any messengers, the people would still have to know God's existence and His unity through reason.[34] This opinion by Abū Ḥanīfa was adopted by the Ḥanafīs who inclined towards the ideas of the Iraqī Muʿtazilīs, as well as the Ḥanafī theologians of Transoxiana such as Abū l-Muʿīn al-Nasafī (d. 508/1115), Abū Isḥāq Ibrāhīm b. Ismāʿīl al-Zāhid al-Ṣaffār al-Bukharī (d. 534/1139), ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn al-Samarqandī (d. 539/1144), Maḥmūd al-Lāmishī (d. 552/1157), ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn al-Usmandī (d. 552/1157) and Nūr al-Dīn al-Ṣābūnī (d. 580/1184) who cited al-Māturīdī.[35] Nonetheless, the Ḥanafīs of Transoxiana like Abū l-Yusr Muḥammad al-Bazdawī (d. 493/1099),[36] Shams al-Aʾimma Muḥammad al-Sarakhsī (d. 483/1090) and Qāḍīkhān (d. 592/1196) think that the religious responsibility begins only when God sends a messanger. Abū l-ʿUsr al-Bazdawī (d. 482/1089) thinks that these two opposite views are presumptuous.[37] His brother, Abū l-Yusr Muḥammad al-Bazdawī, attributes the view that no one can be held responsible without any notice of God to the scholars of Bukhārā, whom he stated that he met with Imām al-Ashʿarī. He, however, adopts the opinion of Imām al-Ashʿarī.[38] Nevertheless, he knows that Abū Ḥanīfa, Imām al-Māturīdī, and other Ḥanafīs of Samarqand argue that people would be responsible regardless of any divine message. With this preference, Abū l-Yusr Muḥammad al-Bazdawī differentiates himself from the al-Māturīdī understanding. According to the system of Kalām, which is represented by Imām al-Māturīdī, reason is also a proof and it has primacy in the issues to which it can offer indubitable knowledge. Therefore, people who can realize the existence of God by their intellects are obliged to believe. This view is connected to the power and competence of reason. The Ḥanafī theologians such as Imām al-

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Abdullah Ismāil – Muḥammed Sayyid Aḥmad Shahhāta (Qāhira: al-Maktabat al-Azhariyya li al-turāth, 1432/2012), 267.

34 Māturīdī, *Taʾwīlāt al-Qurʾān*, 5: 108; 109: 417.

35 Ibn Yaḥyā, *Sharḥ Jumal uṣūl al-dīn*, vr. 19b; Maḥmūd b. Zayd al-Lāmishī, *al-Tamhīd li-qawāʿid al-tawḥīd* (Beirut: Dār al-Gharb al-Islāmī, 1995), 86-90; al-Samarqandī, *Mīzān al-uṣūl*, 50-51, 191; al-Usmandī, *Lubāb al-Kalām*, 47-50; al-Ṣaffār al-Bukharī, *Talkhīṣ al-adilla*, 1: 132; al-Ṣābūnī, *al-Bidāya*, 85-87; Id, *al-Kifāya*, 347-349; al-Maqdisī, *Ghāyat al-marām*, 265-267.

36 al-Bazdawī, *Uṣūl al-dīn*, 207.

37 Abū l-ʿUsr ʿAlī b. Muḥammad Al-Bazdawī, *Uṣūl al-Bazdawī*, In *al-Kāfī fī sharḥ al-Bazdawī*, critical ed. Fakhr al-dīn S. Muḥammad (Riyāḍ: Maktaba al-Rushd, 1422/2001), 5: 2130-2132.

38 al-Bazdawī, *Uṣūl al-dīn*, 207.

Māturīdī,[39] Abū Salama al-Samarqandī,[40] Ibn Yaḥyā,[41] Abū l-Muʿīn al-Nasafī,[42] ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn al-Samarqandī[43] and Nūr al-Dīn al-Ṣābūnī[44] accept that intellectual judgements are split in three groups as necessary (*wājib*), impossible (*mumtaniʿ*) and possible (*jāʾiz [wāsıṭ/mumkin])*.

    a) Necessary (*Wājib [Intellectual Obligation]*): The issues that reason offers necessary knowledge and definitive judgements are these: to understand that the universe has a creator (*Ṣāniʿ*), to grasp the necessity of gratitude to the Master, to appreciate truth and justice, and all matters similar to these. In this field, reason is the leader (*matbūʿ*), and revelation follows and supports reason.

    b) Impossible (*Mumtaniʿ [Intellectual Impossibility]*): Issues such as the impossibility of uniting the opposites in a single object and the impossibility of attributing futility to God are grasped and

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[39] According to Māturīdī, theory (*uṣūl*) is divided into three: *Mumtaniʿ* (impossible), *wājib* (obligatory) and *mumkin* (possible). In terms of reason, *wājib* is on the position that there cannot be a report against it, as well as *mumtaniʿ*. However, there can be different positions for *mumkin*. In terms of reason, it is not possible to make any of *mumkin*'s alternatives *wājib* or *mumtaniʿ*. Prophets provide an explanation of the preferred alternative of *mumkin* in every position. See Abū Manṣūr al-Māturīdī, *Kitāb al-Tawḥīd*, 282. Furthermore, Māturīdī explains the fifth verse of the surah Isra by dividing into three, namely a) Those known apparently b) Those known with consideration and deliberation c) Those known with teaching and advice, he thereby mentions about the domains of reason and revelation. See *Taʾwīlāt al-Qurʾān*, 8: 243-244.

[40] According to Abū Salama al-Samarqandī, belief is divided into three: Intellectually *wājib, mumtaniʿ* and *mumkin*. *Wājib* is recognition of who gives blessing and being thankful to Him; *mumtaniʿ* is such matters as intellectually knowing that it is not true disavowal of who gives blessing and showing ingratitude to Him. As for *mumkin*, it is regarding the quantity of religious rules (*Sharāʾiʿ*), such as determining the *zakāt (the obligatory payment by Muslims for the benefit of the poor)* giving amount. When the reason remains incapable of directing *mumkin* to *wājib* and *mumtaniʿ*, the need of a prophet for explaining the matters of *mumkin*, directing *mumkin* to *wājib* and *mumtaniʿ*, and teaching the truths of things to people is necessary. Prophets are sent to confirm intellectually *wājib*, to reveal non-occurrence of intellectually impossible, and to explain intellectually *mumkin*. See Abū Salama al-Samarqandī, *Jumal uṣūl al-dīn*, 9.

[41] Ibn Yaḥyā, *Sharḥ Jumal uṣūl al-dīn*, 19a-20a, 123b.

[42] Abū l-Muʿīn al-Nasafī explains intellectual provisions as *wājib, mumtaniʿ* and *wāsıṭ (mumkin)*. See al-Nasafī, *Tabṣirat al-adilla*, 2: 21; Id, *al-Tamhīd li-Qawāʿid al-tawḥīd*, 232.

[43] While ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn al-Samarqandī indicates belief in Allah and necessity of worships as intellectual and legal (*sharʿī*) goodness, he accepts the matters such as forms, amounts and times of worships, merely legally (*sharʿī*) good (*husun bi al-sharʿ*) With this distinction, he specifies the domain of reason similar to other Māturīdīs. See al-Samarqandī, *Mīzān al-uṣūl*, 46, 178-183.

[44] According to Nūr al-Dīn al-Ṣābūnī the provisions of intellect (*qaḍiyya al-ʿuqūl*) are divided into three: *Wājib, mumtaniʿ* and *jāʾiz* (possible). Although reason easily rule on *wājib* and *mumtaniʿ*, it hesitates on *jāʾiz* and concludes neither positive nor negative. Reason cannot reach to obligatory (*farḍ*) and prohibited (*ḥaram*) provisions and it requires the explanation of prophets in matters of *jāʾiz*. See al-Ṣābūnī, *al-Bidāya*, 46; Id, *al-Kifāya*, 180, 371. Also see al-Ṣābūnī for examples of intellectual provisions. For him knowing Allah and his attributes, *wājib*; polytheism and attributing child to Him, *ẓulm* (wrong) *mumtaniʿ*; punishments and circumstances of the grave, the resurrection after death, the gathering, the accounting of deeds, the ṣirāṭ bridge, the intercession, heaven and hell are included in *jāʾiz* in terms of intellectual provision. Reason requires transmitted knowledge in such matters. See *al-Kifāya*, 371.

rejected by reason. Reason is also the leader in this field; and revelation follows and supports it.

c) Possible *(Jāʾiz [Intellectual Possibility]):* Issues, in which the existence and nonexistence of something are equally possible, forms the 'possible' field in which the reason cannot reach a definite result. Worshiping and other religious practices *(ʿumūr al-shariʿyya)* fall within the scope of the possib*le* in the categories of the intellectual judgements because, reason hesitates to choose between different possibilities on how to conduct worship and other religious practices *(ta-waqquf)*. Therefore, reason needs to comply with revelation on these matters. After revelation determines what to do in this field, reason supports and explains what is determined by revelation.[45]

As can be seen, the theologians who adopted the understanding of the al-Māturīdī have used the concepts of necessary, impossible, and possible to express the intellectual judgements accurately by determining the epistemological scopes of reason and revelation based on the judgements of reason. They acknowledge that reason can find the correct information in the fields of *wājib and mumtaniʿ*, which include knowing God *(maʿrifatullah)*, and that reason is the leader in these fields. On the other hand, rituals *(ʿibādāt)* and religious practices are in the field of possible outside the reach of reason, where it cannot reach definitive knowledge. There is a need for revelation in this field. Therefore, in the absence of revelation, one's responsibility for religious judgements does not begin. Al-Ṣaffār al-Bukharī conveys this understanding from Imām al-Māturīdī as follows: "rituals and other religious practices are learnt through revelations, while the religion can be learned using reason *(Inna sabīla al-sharʿa al-samʿ; Fa-amma al-dīn fa-inna sabīlahu al-ʿaql)*".[46] The decisive factor in this discussion is whether reason is sufficient on the issues of which it has definitive knowledge. Māturīdīyya, the religious understanding of the Ḥanafī theologians, takes into consideration the balance between reason and revelation and gives authority to reason in its own knowledge field. On the other hand, the Ḥanafī jurists are separated from the Māturīdī tradition in this respect, although they say that they are Māturīd .

3. Discussion on the Creation of Faith

Another issue that led to disagreement between the Bukhārī and Samarqandī Ḥanafīs is whether faith is created or not. Four trends emerged among the Ḥanafī jurists of Transoxiana:

a) Faith is created just as any other actions men.

b) Faith should not be called "created", because it can lead to the createdness of the Qurʾān.

c) Reaching to the grace of God and guidance, which are the actions of God and come to mind when faith is mentioned, are not created. Yet, confession and approval, which are man's actions, are created.

d) One should restrain himself from and not state any opinion on this matter.

The opinion that "Faith is created just as any other actions of men" were argued persistently by the Ḥanafīs of Samarqand, such as Abū Mutīʿ Makḥūl al-Nasafī (d. 318/930), al-Māturīdī, Abū Salama al-Samarqandī (d. second half of the 4th/10th century), Ibn Yaḥyā (d. second half of the 4th/10th century) and al-Ṣaffār

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[45] al-Ṣaffār al-Bukharī, *Talkhīṣ al-adilla*, 1: 36-37, 134-135.

[46] al-Ṣaffār al-Bukharī, *Talkhīṣ al-adilla*, 1: 132. See for Māturīdī's narrated view, al-Māturīdī, *Taʾwīlāt al-Qurʾān*, 4: 112.

al-Bukhārī. These scholars called the Ḥanafīs of Bukhārā, who believed that faith is not created, Ḥashwiyya and even accused them of ignorance.[47] Abū l-Yusr Muḥammad al-Bazdawī attributes the opinion that faith is created to all Samarqandī scholars without stating a name.[48]

The view that "it is not permissible (*jāʾiz*)to say that 'faith (*īmān*) is created'" is based on a report attributed to Abū ʿIṣma Nūḥ b. Abū Maryam Jaʿwana al-Jāmiʿ al-Marwazī (d. 173/789), who was appointed as the *qāḍī* of Marw while his mentor was still alive and was mentioned among ten students of Abū Ḥanīfa, who were eligible to be a *qāḍī*. This opinion was argued by Abū l-Ḥasan Muḥammad b. al-Ḥusayn b. Abd al-Karīm al-Bazdawī, who is the father of Abū l-Yusr Muḥammad al-Bazdawī who was active in Bukhārā in the 5th (12th) century, Abū Bakr Muḥammad al-Faḍl (d. 381/991), Abū Muḥammad Ismāʿīl b. al-Ḥusayn al-Zāhid (d. 402/1012), Abū Muḥammad b. Ḥāmid and Abū l-Yusr Muḥammad al-Bazdawī (d. 493/1100). These people did not accept the idea that faith is created because their concern that the same might be said by some about the Qurʾān. By being persistent in their views, these scholars agreed that one cannot perform *ṣalā* behind those [al-Māturīdī et al.] who argue that faith is created. In fact, they put pressure on these people and those who were hesitant. As told by Nūḥ b. Abū Maryam al-Marwāzī, the reason for the spread of this conception was that Abū Ḥanīfa was attributed by the opinion that "faith is not created" and that he stated that this opinion will lead to the view that the Qurʾān is also created. Abū l-Yusr Muḥammad al-Bazdawī states that his father Muḥammad al-Bazdawī conveyed the same report from Nūḥ b. Abū Maryam. He then states his opinion by saying, "We also adopt this opinion, as the view of Abū Ḥanīfa is what is told by Nūḥ b. Abū Maryam.[49]"

Another view is that there are two aspects of faith: God's grace and guidance as being His actions are not created, and man's confession (*taṣdīq*) and approval (*iqrār*) as being man's actions are created This view was argued by the Ḥanafī scholars of the first period such as Abū l-Ḥasan al-Rustufaghnī (d. 345/956) and Abū 'l-Layth al-Samarqandī, and Aḥmad b. Muḥammad al-Ghaznawī (d. 593/1197).[50]

Abū l-Muʿīn al-Nasafī (d. 508/1114) and Abū Ḥafṣ Najm al-Dīn ʿUmar al-Nasafī (d. 537/1141) preferred to abstain from stating their opinions on the issue. There are interesting points in this discussion:

a) Abū l-Yusr al-Bazdawī makes a general reference to the scholars as "the Imāms Bukhārā", including his father, who have the same opinion in this regard, and then mentions the names of those who have this opinion by using the expression of respect, *al-Shaykh al-Imām*. However, he does not specify the names of those who argue the other view, and he does not call them scholars or

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[47] Abū Mutīʿ Makḥūl al-Nasafī, *Kitāb al-Radd ʿalā Ahl al-Bidaʿ wa l-Ahwāʾ al-ḍālla al-muḍilla*, 90-91; Māturīdī, *Kitāb al-Tawḥīd*, 618-623; Ibn Yaḥyā, *Sharḥ Jumal uṣūl al-dīn*, 29b; al-Ṣaffār al-Bukharī, *Talkhīṣ al-adilla*, 2: 734. See for accusation of ignorance al-Bazdawī, *Uṣūl al-dīn*, 154-155.

[48] al-Bazdawī, *Uṣūl al-dīn*, 154-155.

[49] al-Bazdawī, *Uṣūl al-dīn*, 154-155.

[50] Abū l-Ḥasan al-Rustufaghnī, *al-Fawāʾid,* Süleymaniye MS Library, Yeni Cami, 000547, 292a-293a; Abū l-Layth Naṣr b. Muḥammad b. Aḥmad b. Ibrāhīm al-Samarqandī, *Bayān ʿaqīda al-uṣūl*, critical ed. A. W. Juynboll, In *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Landen Volkenkunde van Nederlandsch Indië*, Ser. IV, vol. 5 (1881): 274. This view is not included in the listed sixty one article in *al-Sawād al-aʿẓam*, but it is included in the commentary of the book "Faith is giving of Allah". al-Ḥakīm al-Samarqandī, *al-Sawād al-aʿẓam*, 15.

Imāms, but as scholars from Samarqand. His choice shows that he does not want to speak about the conception represented by al-Māturīdī.

b) Abū l-Yusr al-Bazdawī states that the scholars of Samarqand accuse those who argue that faith is not created of ignorance. Al-Māturīdī and al-Ṣaffār al-Bukharī are the ones who explicitly use the word "ignorance" for the jurists of Bukhārā in their works. In fact, al-Ṣaffār al-Bukharī also accuses those who adopted the view advocated by al-Bazdawī as being *ghabī* (dense).

c) Those who argue that faith is not created by referring to Abū Ḥanīfa agreed that one cannot perform the *ṣalā* (principal prayer of Islam, forms part of the *ʿibādāt*) behind those [al-Māturīdī et al.] who argue that faith is created, in fact, they put pressure on these people and those who were hesitant. This is one of the reasons that the conception of al-Māturīdī, who argues that faith is created, could not gain power in the region.

d) In the Western Qarakhānid period, al-Ṣaffār al-Bukharī embraced al-Māturīdī's view on the createdness of faith and advocated this opinion by using more explicit and clear expressions. However, Nasafī does not express an opinion on this subject and prefers to abstain. This situation might be linked to the fact that the Ḥanafī jurists who argued the opposite view were influential in the region and Nasafī was afraid of their reaction and repression. In fact, al-Ṣaffār al-Bukharī, who lived in exile for a long time, maintained Imām al-Māturīdī's view on the matter.

e) The source for the opinion that faith is not created by the scholars of Bukhārā is the opinion that is attributed to Abū Ḥanīfa as told by Abū ʿIṣma Nūḥ b. Abū Maryam Jaʿwana al-Jāmiʿ al-Marwazī, one of the students of Abū Ḥanīfa. al-Bazdawī states that this opinion is told from al-Marwazī by al-Bazdawī's father, Abū Ḥasan Muḥammad al-Bazdawī. It is understood that there were different "interpretations of Abū Ḥanīfa" between the Ḥanafī jurists both on this matter and the attitude of Abū Ḥanīfa towards Kalām, in the Western Qarakhānids period. The Transoxianan scholars of the 5th (12th) century, who are mentioned above, are important jurists whose names are frequently cited in the works of famous jurists such as Qāḍīkhān and al-Sarakhsī. The attitudes of the Ḥanafī jurists differ in terms of their understandings of Abū Ḥanīfa .

CONCLUSION

Māturīdīyya is a school that was formed as a result of the efforts of the Ḥanafī theologians, who thought that *ʿilm al-kalām* is significant and necessary. It can be said that the Ḥanafī jurists did not contribute sufficiently to the formation of this school. Instead, they tried to prevent it, as the results show that the Ḥanafī jurists in Transoxiana were divided into groups because they have different understandings of Abū Ḥanīfa. The Ḥanafī Theologians gave an independent role for reason as a source of knowledge in their field, whereas the Ḥanafī jurists, who are referred as the Imāms of Bukhārā, gave reason only the authority to understand and interpret the transmitted sources. The Ḥanafī theologians think that Abū Ḥanīfa did not approve the discussions with incompetent people, which will not yield any result but not *ʿilm al-kalām*. This group includes the Ḥanafī scholars, who possess the kalāmī attitude and are mentioned as "those who are truth-seekers among our people" in sources. The Ḥanafī theologians also accept that reason has the power to reach knowledge in his own knowledge field in terms of methodology. The leaders of this tradition are al-Māturīdī, Abū l-Ḥasan al-Rustufaghnī, Abū l-Ḥusayn Muḥammad b. Yaḥyā al-Bashāgharī, Abū Bakr al-ʿIyāḍī, Abū Salama al-Samarqandī and Ibn Yaḥyā. The Ḥanafī jurists, who were the majority in the region,

adopted literally the story that Abū Ḥanīfa forbade his son, Ḥammād b. Abū Ḥanīfa, to engage with *ʿilm al-kalām* and to discuss in this field, and they agreed that it is not permissible to engage with *ʿilm al-kalām* and explicitly stated this opinion in their works of fiqh. The jurists argued that faith is not created; that the definition of faith includes acknowledgement by language;it is more permissible not to derive other meanings from informative attributes; one cannot be responsibility to believe in a higher being only based upon reason without the message of the prophet; the people of fatra *(Ahl al-fatra)* cannot be held responsible. The Ḥanafī jurists did not write any theological work by adopting this attitude in their private lives, and avoided involving in theological discussions, even tried to prevent to teach *ʿilm al-kalām.*

The fact that the Ḥanafīs jurists began to consider Kalām blameworthy formed a basis for the exclusion of other disciplines, especially philosophical disciplines, as there was no justification for philosophical disciplines if Kalām was blameworthy and forbidden. Therefore, the influence of this change in the Ḥanafīs' religious understanding on the decline in the scientific fields after the Sāmānids period (third–fourth/ninth–tenth centuries) is also worth exploring, since some Ḥanafīs were driven away from the understanding of Abū Ḥanīfa valuing reason to the understanding of Abū Ḥanīfa forbidding Kalām. Historically speaking, it can be argued that religious understanding of the Ḥanafī jurists have been more influential than the religious understanding of the Ḥanafī theologians.

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SUMMARIES OF DOCTORAL DISSERTATIONS

The Morality, God and the Religion in Critical Philosophy of Kant

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ABSTRACT

The philosophy and the religion are the two different domains that are mainly addressed to find the most fundamental answers that we seek to lead our lives by attaching it a meaning that can satisfy us. For this reason, with regard to this important task that we attach to both of them, they seem to be aiming for the same direction in order to arrive at a common end regarding our life, which can be announced briefly as the truth. Because of this collective end, we see that these two domains get close to each other, support each other, or use one another according to the explanations that they adopt. Nevertheless in the matter of the claim of truth it is also probable that an inevitable conflict emerges between the two. The history of philosophy and the history of religions testify too many examples of this cooperation as well as those conflicts, to which critical philosophy is part as a well-known and often discussed example. Our thesis aims examining the position of Kant's critical philosophy, which bears a very strong claim of the truth and therefore, in its relation with the religion, it maintains a rather conflictual position. It is evident that the scope of religion

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its parts. This is the reason why we organized our work according to the most important parts of this structure on which it stands, in order to obtain the most appropriate illustration that we can attain.

The architectonical structure of the critical philosophy directs us almost in a constrained way to examine our subject by a tripartite classification in the present work. Because, according to this structure, Kant elaborates his conception of religion at each moment of his thought by taking in hand the various aspects of the subject (pure speculative, pure practical, empirical and historical etc.). These are the most important features of the critical philosophy with which we can arrive finding a satisfying exposition of our subject. For this reason we have divided our work in three chapters in which firstly we examine the critique of natural theology which includes Kant's objection that points to onto-theology, which marks the whole of the Western thought. Then we examine the moral philosophy of Kant, which is the unique domain to encompass and value the religion in terms of a final moral end of nature and all reasonable beings that are apt to achieve this end. And finally we try to deal with his position in relation to the historical religion, which constitutes the one of the main subjects of his last studies, in which he exercises after finishing to write his critical oeuvres, so they can be thought as their applications to the practical fields such as politics, history, anthropology and of course religion. After having determined the scope of our work in this way, we can say that our goal here is to reveal Kant's idea about religion in general and related concepts to it, in a way that encompasses the fundamental moments of his works. And on the other hand try to criticize his point of view by drawing attention to his claim to be the most adequate system for explaining the most fundamental subjects of man, by this we mean about the human condition in relation with the world and its author. In this way it seems plausible to think that Kant excludes all explanations alternatives along with the subjects that cannot be brought to the limits of transcendental idealisms, and evidently the irrational, which cannot be encompassed with human faculties of knowing.

It is probably not necessary to recall that Western philosophy is strictly linked to the tradition of monotheism as well as to the roots that we find in the antique philosophy. These two sources are often described as the antagonistic components of the philosophy, and it finds its clearest and by far the most common expression in the question of Tertullian "*Quid ergo Athenis et Hierosolymis?*". Yet in spite of Tertullian's objection, Western philosophy and monotheism engage in an inextricable way that Kant ends up calling this unity the "onto-theology" for the first time. Philosophy devotes an undeniable effort to make religion rational, while the latter provides for philosophy a valuable material, a set of concepts without which we cannot think the philosophy. Thus we have a great literature that is written to explain the world as the creation of a creator who is the most perfect and real being, the being as the supreme cause of what is. In the *Critique of Pure Reason* we observe that Kant brings a very severe criticism to the philosophy, which, in the course of its history, gives rise to the doctrinal theories concerning this explanation. Kant's criticism of reason, one of the higher faculties of knowledge that is responsible for critical errors that reason reaches as the conclusions of its ratiocinations, which compose these doctrinal theories, constitutes the starting point of his own conception of religion. Of course, this criticism occupies a very important part of our work because of its founding role in the critical philosophy. Nevertheless, it is argued that even if it signals a breaking point in the Western philosophy, Kant's criticism is not a categorical refutation of either natural theology or historical religion. In asserting the inevitability of the dialectic of speculative reason, Kant tries to show the impossibility of building the theology through the speculative use of reason, while he conserves the possibility

of this task within the practical use of reason that has supremacy over its speculative use. So in the first part of the thesis we examine Kantian criticism, without forgetting that it has for the purpose to designate another place for religion in its system, which will be legitimate according to Kant, but not to demolish all.

In the second chapter we examine the practical use of pure reason as the legitimate initiator of religion to the horizon of philosophy, designating it as the assurance of the moral law and the guardian of hope by which man thinks himself being free of all the necessities arising from nature, from the sensible world, and as a citizen of the intelligible world. The main purpose of this part is to prove the possibility and the necessity of the moral religion according to the critical philosophy and to make a presentation of the theoretical arguments, which Kant offered us. Here we focus our attention primarily on the two moral works of Kant, the *Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals* and the *Critique of Practical Reason*. We first try to show how Kant opens the door to a morality ensured by free causality, the possibility of which is recognized by speculative reason in a negative way. So in the second part we start our study by asking, "how can the practical reason have positive legislation that could have real effects on those that take place in empirical realm? ". Then we examine the two components of the highest good and the conditions for its realization. So the idea of immortality and God, the two postulates of practical reason are made subject to our inquiry as the key subjects of the moral religion. This part provides us with a very important information that can helps us to understand Kant's intention concerning religion, he reinforces religion's consoling function by trying to eliminate any element "irrational", it means in this case that does not conform to the criteria dictated by critical philosophy, in relation to all these two major parts, both the speculative and the practical. He also attaches to it another, a more fundamental task, which is to guarantee the realization of the aim of the moral law, thus to avoid the danger it confronts: to fall into absurdity because of heading towards an unattainable end.

The third part of our thesis is devoted to a subject less discussed and relatively unknown; we examine the position of Kant with respect to the historical or institutional religion. We believe that this part allows us to arrive at a clearer perspective on Kant's conception of religion. By the way of comparison the peculiarity of the moral religion is clarified, one comes to understand the importance that Kant attaches to religion because of its service rendered for the idea of humanity and its purpose. We explore in this chapter the fact that Kant's position is not hostile to historical religion but it is not conservative either. For him the only criterion to evaluate historical religion is the moral one and he applies this criterion without exception to every part of the historical religion without paying attention to its function in the religion under consideration.

By means of this last part, we believe that we arrive at a reliable conclusion on the Kant's thought concerning the concept of the religion. We argue that his conception engendered from the critical philosophy in a natural but not artificial or arbitrary way. In examining the architectonic structure of his thought, it is possible to say that it provides such a conception to the scope of its initial plan, without contradicting the internal order of its system. So we do not think that the reintroduction of the ideas of reason into its positive use is a compromise but on the contrary it serves to complete the aim of the critical philosophy. Nevertheless we think that Kant reinvents religion and attaches to it a single moral task that excludes all the other functions of religion. We find that such an exclusive treatment of the subject can lead to the unfavorable consequences regarding historical religions because of which they can lose their particular positions with regard to the morality, which we will try to examine in the conclusion.

Philosophy of Religion, Kant, Morality, God, Religion, Moral Religion, Historical Religions

Kant'ın Eleştirel Felsefesinde Ahlak, Tanrı ve Din

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ÖZET

Felsefe ve din, hayata dair en temel sorularımıza cevap bulmak ve böylece ona bizi tatmin edebilecek bir anlam yüklemek için başvurduğumuz iki farklı izah alanıdır. Bu sebeple, kendilerine yüklemiş olduğumuz bu önemli görevden ötürü her ikisi de hayatımıza dair aradığımız, kısaca hakikat diyerek ifade edilebilecek, ortak bir amaca yönelmiş gibi görünmektedirler. Söz konusu bu amaç ortaklığı sebebiyle her iki alanın birbirine yakınlaştığına, birbirlerini farklı yönlerden desteklediklerine, hatta kabul ettikleri yaklaşımlar elverdiği ölçüde birbirlerinden istifade ettiklerine tanıklık ederiz. Ancak iş hakikat iddia etmeye geldiği vakit bu iki alan arasında kaçınılması güç bir çekişmenin ortaya çıkması da muhtemeldir. Hal böyle olunca felsefe ve dinler tarihi alanları pek çok ortaklığa olduğu kadar çekişmeye de tanıklık eder ki bunlardan birisi de oldukça bilinen ve çokça tartışma konusu olan kritik felsefedir. Çalışmamız, çok güçlü bir hakikat iddiasında bulunan Kant'ın kritik felsefesinin, dinle büyük oranda çatışmacı bir ilişki içerisine girmek suretiyle benimsediği pozisyonu incelemeyi hedeflemektedir. Açıktır ki din sahası en uygun karşılığını Kant'ın ahlak düşüncesi içerisinde bulmaktadır, ancak belirtmek isteriz ki, tüm kritik felsefe, Kant'ın kullandığı terminolojiyle ifade edersek bir mimari olması itibariyle, bu konuyu ele almaktan geri kalmaz. Bu sebeple çalışmamızın içeriğini, Kant düşüncesine dair mümkün olduğunca uygun bir serimleme yapabilmek niyetiyle bu mimarinin üzerinde durduğu en önemli kısımları göz önünde bulundurarak oluşturduk.

Kritik felsefenin mimari yapısı bu çalışmanın konusunu neredeyse zorunlu bir biçimde üç kısımda ele almamızı gerektirdi. Çünkü Kant, bu yapı uyarınca, kendi din yaklaşımını, düşüncesinin her momentinde konunun farklı bir kısmına –saf spekülatif, saf pratik, ampirik ve tarihsel yönler vb.- eğilmek suretiyle ortaya koymaktadır. Bunlar bizim konumuza, yani dine dair mutmain olabileceğimiz bir teşrih yapabilmemiz bakımından kritik felsefe içerisindeki en önemli alanlara karşılık gelmektedirler. Bu yüzden çalışmamızı üç parçaya ayırdık. Bunların ilkinde Kant'ın, bütün bir batı düşüncesine damgasını vuran onto-teolojiyi hedef alan itirazını içerecek şekilde tabii teolojiye dair ortaya koymuş olduğu eleştiriyi ele alacağız. Sonrasında Kant'ın, dini ihata edebilmek ve ona, tabiatın ve akıl sahibi varlıkların nihai ahlaki amacı göz önünde bulundurulduğunda belli bir değer atfedebilmek bakımından yegane alan olarak gördüğü ahlak felsefesini inceleyeceğiz. En son bölümde ise Kant'ın *Kritik* serisinde yer alan üç temel kitabı bitirdikten sonra yöneldiği son çalışmalarının temel mevzularından biri olan tarihsel din konusundaki tutumunu ele almaya çalışacağız. Bahsi geçen geç dönem eserleri *Kritiklerin* siyaset, tarih, antropoloji ve pek tabii din gibi konulara tatbiki olarak düşünülebilirler. Bu sebeple son bölümdeki incelememiz kritik felsefenin amaçlarını ve başarılarını tahlil edebilmemiz açısından önem arz etmektedir. Çalışmamızın alanını bu şekilde belirledikten sonra bu tezle ulaşmak istediğimiz temel hedefin, Kant'ın düşüncesinin en temel momentlerini içerecek şekilde onun din ve bununla ilgili bir grup önemli kavrama dair fikirlerini tahlil etmek olduğunu söyleyebiliriz. Bununla beraber

insanoğlunun alemle ve onun yaratıcısıyla ilgili en temel problemlerine dair çözüm getiren en uygun sistem olmak iddiasına dikkat çekmek suretiyle Kant'ın bakış açısına bir eleştiri getirmeye çalışacağız. Bu şekilde Kant düşüncesinin, transandantal idealizmin kabul edebileceği sınırlara çekilemeyecek olan tüm alternatif izah şekillerini ve pek tabii bilme yetileri aracılığıyla ihata edilemeyecek olanı yani irrasyoneli dışladığını ifade edebiliriz.

Sanıyoruz ki batı felsefesinin köklerinin antik felsefeye dayandığı ölçüde monoteizm geleneğiyle de sıkı bağlantı içerisinde olduğunu hatırlatmaya gerek yoktur. Bu ikisi felsefenin sıklıkla birbirleriyle uzlaşamaz bileşenleri olarak anılırlar ki bu durum en açık ifadesini "*Quid ergo Athenis et Hierosolymis?*" sorusunda bulur. Yine de Tertulyanus'un itirazına rağmen batı felsefesi monoteizmle öyle girift bir ilişki içerisine girmiştir ki Kant felsefe tarihinde buna onto-teoloji diyerek işaret eden ilk isim olmuştur. Felsefe dini rasyonel kılabilmek için inkar edilemez bir çaba ortaya koymuş, din ise felsefenin bağrına çok önemli bir malzemeyi derç etmiştir ; felsefenin kendileri olmadan düşünülemeyeceği bir grup önemli kavramı. Böylelikle felsefe tarihi boyunca alemi en mükemmel ve en gerçek varlık olmak bakımından yaratan ve onun en yüce sebebi olan Tanrının eseri olarak izah eden geniş bir literatürle karşı karşıya kalırız. *Saf Aklın Eleştisi*'nde Kant'ın, tarihi boyunca bu tip doktrinal teorilerin ortaya çıkmasına zemin hazırlamış felsefeye acımasız bir eleştiri getirdiğini gözlemleriz. Kant'ın akıl eleştirisi, onun dine dair düşüncesinin başlangıç noktasını meydana getirir, ki akıl üst bilme yetilerimizden biridir ve Kant düşüncesinde, yapmış olduğu uslamlamaların neticesi olarak ulaştığı hatalı sonuçlardan yola çıkarak bahsi geçen doktrinal teorileri teşekkül ettirmekten sorumlu tutulur. Elbette ki bu eleştiri, eleştirel felsefedeki kurucu rolü sebebiyle onun eserinin en önemli kısımlarından biridir. Ancak onun batı felsefe geleneği içerisinde bir kırılma noktasını imlemiş olduğu düşünülse de Kant'ın eleştirisi ne tabii teolojinin ne de tarihsel dinin kategorik bir reddidir. Spekülatif aklın diyalektiğinin kaçınılmaz oluşunu iddia etmek suretiyle Kant, aklın spekülatif kullanımı aracılığıyla teoloji yapmanın imkansız olduğunu göstermeye çalışırken bu tip bir görevin aklın bu kullanımına üstünlüğü olan bir pratik kullanım için mümkün olduğunu savunur. Böylece biz tezimizin ilk bölümünde Kant'ın akıl ve tabii teoloji eleştirilerini, bunu sisteminde dine başka ve meşru bir zemin açmak için yaptığını, onu toptan ortadan kaldırma gibi bir gayesi olmadığını unutmadan ele aldık.

İkinci bölümde aklın pratik kullanımını, felsefenin ufkuna dini sokmanın meşru yolu olarak ele alıp, bu kullanımın ahlak yasasının teminatı ve insanın kendisi aracılığıyla kendini tabiattan kaynaklanan zorunluluklardan azade görebildiği ve kendisini bir akıl dünyasının vatandaşı olarak tasarladığı umudun hamisi olduğuna vurgu yapmaya çalışacağız. Bu bölümün temel amacı eleştirel felsefeye göre ahlak dininin imkanı ve zorunluluğunu göstermek ve bu minvalde Kant'ın bize sunduğu argümanları ele almak olacak. Burada Kant'ın ahlakı konu alan iki eserini temel alacağız, *Ahlak Metafiziğinin Temelleri* ve *Pratik Aklın Eleştirisi*. Öncelikle, Kant'ın bir önceki bölümde aklın spekülatif kullanımı için imkanını olumsuz olarak ortaya koyduğumuz özgür nedensellikle garanti altına alınan ahlaka ne şekilde kapı açtığını inceleyeceğiz. Bu sebeple ikinci bölümümüze "pratik akıl nasıl olur da etkileri ampirik alanda görülebilecek pozitif bir yasamaya sahip olabilir?" sorusunu sorarak başlayacağız. Sonrasında en yüce iyinin gerçekleşebilmesi için gerekli olan iki bileşenini ele alacağız. Bu bakımdan ruhun ölümsüzlüğü ve Tanrı ideleri, pratik aklın iki postülası, ahlaki dini anlamamız konusunda tezimize anahtar kavram olarak konu olacaklar. Bu kısım Kant'ın din konusundaki niyetini anlayabilmemiz için bize çok önemli bilgiler sunacak, göreceğimiz gibi bu iki kavram aracılığıyla Kant dindeki, eleştirel felsefece dayatılan kriterlere uymayan irrasyonel ne varsa eleyerek onun teselli edici

işlevini muhafaza edecek. Aynı zamanda o, dine ahlak yasasının gerçekleştirmeyi hedeflediği amacı garanti altına almak ve böylece onun karşı karşıya kaldığı tehlikeyi bertaraf etmek : onu ulaşılamaz bir hedefe yönelmek bakımından saçmaya düşmek tehlikesinden korumak gibi son derece önemli ve asli başka bir görev daha verecek.

Tezimizin üçüncü bölümü daha az tartışılan ve görece daha az bilinen bir konuya hasredilecek. Burada Kant'ın tarihsel-kurumsal dinler karşısındaki tutumunu ele almaya çalışacağız. Bu bölümün Kant'ın din kavramını anlamamız için bize daha açık seçik bir perspektif sunacağına inanıyoruz. Bu bölümde ahlak dinine atfedilen biriciklik diğer tarihsel dinlerle karşılaştırılacak ve bu yolla insanlık ideali ve onun amacı için gördüğü hizmet mukabilinde ahlak dininin değer kazandığını göreceğiz. Üçüncü bölümde Kant'ın tarihsel dinler karşısındaki tutumunun ne düşmanca olduğunu ne de onları gözetmek gibi bir amaç güttüğünü tespit edeceğiz. Onun için tarihsel dini değerlendirmenin yegane kriteri ahlaki dindir ve Kant bu kriteri tarihsel dinin her bir unsuruna, bu unsurun onda nasıl bir rol oynadığına dikkat etmeksizin, uygular.

Bu son bölümle birlikte, Kant'ın din kavramına dair düşüncesiyle ilgili güvenilir bir sonuca ulaştığımızı düşünüyoruz. Kant'ın kabul ettiği şekliyle bu kavramın eleştirel felsefenin tabii bir unsuru olduğunu ve eleştirel felsefe içerisine yeniden dahil edilen din kavramının bu düşünce içerisinde yapay ya da keyfi bir şekilde bulunmadığını savunuyoruz. Eleştirel felsefenin mimari yapısı göz önünde bulundurulduğunda bu kavramın Kant'ın temel planının bir parçası olduğunu ve sistemin iç dinamikleriyle çatışmadığını düşünüyoruz. Bu sebeple kanaatimizce pozitif kullanımlarıyla saf pratik aklın idelerinin yeniden Kant düşüncesine dahil edilmesi bir taviz değildir, aksine bunun eleştirel felsefenin amaçlarına ulaşmasında önemli bir yeri vardır. Ancak Kant'ın kabul ettiği şekliyle dini yeniden icat etmiş olduğunu ve ona dayattığı tek vazife olan ahlakın gereklerine hizmetin dinin diğer tüm işlevlerini ortadan kaldırdığını düşünüyoruz. Dinin bu şekilde dışlayıcı bir kullanımına gitmenin sonuç bölümünde ele alacağımız gibi ciddi sakıncalara yol açabileceğini düşünüyoruz.

ANAHTAR KELİMELER

Din Felsefesi, Kant, Ahlak, Tanrı, Din, Ahlak Dini, Tarihsel Dinler

La Moralité, Dieu et la Religion dans la Philosophie Critique de Kant

RESUME

La philosophie et la religion sont les deux domaines qu'on s'adresse principalement pour trouver les réponses les plus fondamentales pour conduire notre vie en vue de lui attacher une signification qui peut nous satisfaire. C'est pour cela concernant cette tâche importante qu'on les attache, toutes les deux semblent viser la même direction pour arriver à une fin commune, ce qu'on peut annoncer brièvement en tant que la

vérité. En raison de cette fin collective nous voyons que ces deux domaines s'approchent, se soutient mutuellement ou se servent l'une à l'autre selon les explications qu'elles adoptent. Néanmoins en cas de la revendication de la vérité il est aussi probable qu'un conflit inévitable s'émerge. L'histoire de la philosophie et la religion témoigne maintes d'exemples de ces coopérations aussi que ces conflits dont la philosophie critique fait partie en tant qu'un exemple bien connu et souvent discuté. Notre thèse a pour le but d'examiner la position de la philosophie critique de Kant qui porte une très forte revendication de la vérité et donc face à la religion elle garde une position conflictuelle. Il est évident que la portée de la religion trouve son équivalant le plus adéquat dans la pensée morale de Kant, cependant on constate que toute la critique, si on utilise le terme kantien, en ayant une structure architectonique, retient ce sujet tout au long de ses parties composantes. C'est pour cela nous avons organisé notre travail selon les parties les plus importants de cette structure sur lesquelles elle se lève, en vue d'obtenir l'illustration la plus adéquate qu'on peut en arriver.

La structure architectonique de la philosophie critique nous dirige presque d'une façon contrainte à examiner le sujet par une répartition tripartite. Parce que selon cette structure Kant élabore sa conception de la religion à chaque moment de sa pensée en prenant en main les différents aspects du sujet (purement spéculatif, purement pratique, empirique et historique etc.). Ces sont les traits les plus importants de la philosophie critique avec lesquels on peut arriver à un exposé satisfaisant. Pour cette raison nous avons divisé notre travaille à trois parties dans lesquelles nous examinons la critique de la théologie naturelle qui comporte les points d'objection de Kant face à l'onto-théologie qui couvre la pensée occidentale tout entière, la philosophie morale en tant que le domaine unique d'englober et de valoriser la religion sous le rapport d'une fin finale morale de la nature et de tout être raisonnable, qui sont aptes à réaliser cette fin. Enfin nous avons essayé d'examiner sa positon face à la religion historique qui constitue l'un des sujets principaux de ses études dernières qu'il exerce après avoir terminé de rédiger les *Critiques*, c'est pour cela on peut les considérer en tant que leurs applications aux domaines pratiques comme la politique, l'histoire, l'anthropologie et bien évidemment la religion. Après avoir déterminé la portée de notre travail de cette manière, nous pouvons dire que notre objectif est ici de révéler l'idée de Kant en ce qui concerne la religion et les concepts relatifs d'une manière qui englobe les moments fondamentaux de ses œuvres. Et dans l'autre côté, de critiquer son point de vue en attirant l'attention à sa revendication d'avoir révéler le système le plus adéquate pour expliquer les sujets les plus fondamentaux de l'homme, voire sa condition propre face au monde et son auteur. De cette manière il est plausible de penser que Kant exclue toutes les explications alternatives en même temps que les éléments qui ne peuvent pas être apportés aux limites de l'idéalisme transcendantal, et évidemment l'irrationnel, ce qui ne peut pas être englobé avec les facultés humaines de connaissance.

Il n'est pas nécessaire probablement de rappeler que la philosophie occidentale est strictement liée à la tradition du monothéisme aussi bien qu'elle trouve ses racines dans l'antiquité. Ces deux sources sont souvent décrites comme les composants antagonistes de la philosophie qui trouve son expression la plus claire dans la question de Tertullien « *Quid ergo Athenis et Hierosolymis ?* ». Pourtant en dépit de l'objection de Tertullien la philosophie occidentale et le monothéisme s'engage d'une façon inextricable qu'on finit par Kant nommer la première l'onto-théologie. La philosophie consacre un effort indéniable pour rendre la religion rationnelle, tandis que la deuxième en fournit un matériel précieux, qui sont les concepts sans lesquels on ne peut pas penser la philosophie. Ainsi nous avons une grande littérature qui est rédigée pour expliquer le monde en tant que la création d'un créateur qui est l'être le plus parfait et le plus réel, l'être en tant que la

cause suprême de ce qui est. Dans la *Critique de la raison pure* nous voyons que Kant apporte une critique très sévère à la philosophie qui, au cours de son histoire, engendre les théories doctrinales concernant cette explication. Cette critique de Kant qui vise la raison, l'une des facultés supérieures de connaissance qui est responsable selon lui des erreurs graves que la raison accède comme les conclusions de ses raisonnements dont ces théories doctrinales se composent, est le point de départ de sa conception propre face à la religion. Bien évidemment cette critique constitue une partie très importante de notre travaille, en raison de son rôle fondateur dans la philosophie critique. Néanmoins on défend que même si elle signale un point de rupture dans la philosophie occidentale, la critique de Kant ne soit pas une réfutation catégorique ni de la théologie naturelle, ni de la religion historique. En affirmant l'inévitabilité de la dialectique de la raison spéculative Kant essaie de montrer l'impossibilité de faire la théologie par l'usage spéculative de la raison, tandis qu'il garde la possibilité de cette tâche au sein de l'usage pratique qui a de la suprématie par rapport à l'usage spéculatif. Donc dans la première partie de la thèse nous examinons la critique kantienne sans oubliant qu'elle a pour le but désigner une autre place pour la religion dans son système qui sera légitime selon Kant, mais pas un « brise-tout ».

Dans la deuxième partie nous examinons l'usage pratique de la raison pure en tant que l'initiateur légitime de la religion à l'horizon de la philosophie, en lui désignant comme l'assurance de la loi morale et le gardien de l'espoir par lequel l'homme se pense débarrassé de tout les nécessités issues de la nature, du monde sensible, et s'installe au monde intelligible. Le but principal de cette partie est de montrer la possibilité et la nécessité de la religion morale selon la philosophie critique et faire un exposé des arguments théoriques que Kant nous offrit. Ici nous attachons l'attention principalement à deux œuvres morales les *Fondements de la métaphysique des mœurs* et la *Critique de la raison pratique.* Nous essayons de montrer premièrement comment Kant ouvre la porte à une moralité assurée par la causalité libre, dont la possibilité est reconnue par la raison spéculative d'une façon négative. Donc dans la deuxième partie nous commençons à notre étude en demandant « à quel titre la raison pratique peut avoir une législation positive qui pourrait avoir des effets à l'échelle empirique ? ». Deuxièmement nous examinons les deux composants du souverain bien et les conditions pour sa réalisation. Donc l'idée de l'immortalité et Dieu, les deux postulats de la raison pratique sont mis en question en tant que les clefs de la religion morale. Cette partie nous fournit une matériel très notable pour comprendre l'intention kantienne concernant la religion, il renforce sa fonction de consolateur en essayant d'éliminer tout élément « irrationnel » cela veut dire dans ce cas-là qui ne conforme pas aux critères dictés par la philosophie critique, par rapport à toutes ces deux parties majeures, à la fois la spéculative et la pratique. Il aussi lui attache une autre tâche plus fondamentale, qui est de garantir la réalisation de l'objet de la loi morale, le souverain bien, donc d'éviter le danger que la loi morale confronte : tomber dans l'absurdité à cause se diriger vers une fin irréalisable.

La troisième partie de notre thèse est consacrée à un sujet moins discuté et relativement peu connu, nous examinons la position de Kant face à la religion historique ou bien institutionnelle. Nous pensons que cette partie nous permet de parvenir à une perspective plus claire sur la conception de Kant concernant la religion. Par la voie de comparaison la particularité de la religion morale se précise, on arrive à comprendre l'importance que Kant attache à la religion à cause de son service rendu pour l'idée de l'humanité et la finalité de celle-ci. Nous explorons le fait que la position de Kant n'est pas hostile à l'égard de la religion histo-

rique mais qu'elle n'est pas conservatrice non plus. Pour lui le seul critère de lui évaluer est la religion morale et il applique ce critère sans exception à chaque partie de la religion historique sans prêter attention à son rôle dans celle-ci.

Par cette dernière partie, nous croyons qu'on arrive à une conclusion fiable sur la pensée kantienne concernant le concept de la religion. Nous défendons que sa conception a engendrée de la philosophie critique d'une façon naturelle mais pas artificielle ou arbitraire. En examinant la structure architectonique de sa pensée, il est possible de dire que celle-ci fournit une telle conception à porté de son plan initial sans contredisant l'ordre interne de son système. Donc nous ne pensons pas que la réintroduction des idées de la raison dans son usage positif est un compromis mais tout au contraire cela sert à l'achèvement de la visée de la philosophie critique. Néanmoins nous pensons que Kant réinvente la religion et lui attache une seule tâche morale qui exclue tous les autres fonctionnements de celle-ci. Nous trouvons qu'un tel traitement exclusif du sujet peut nous mener aux conséquences défavorables pour les religions historiques pour qu'elles puissent garder leurs positions particulières face à la moralité, dont on va essayer d'examiner dans la conclusion.

LES MOTS CLES

Philosophie de la Religion, Kant, Moralité, Dieu, Religion, La Religion Morale, Les Religions Historiques