FLSF Felsefe ve Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi

Abstract

Philosophical skepticism is related to the problem of the possibility of knowledge. Philosophers who have adopted philosophical skepticism argue that we do not know the propositions that we normally think we know; that we do not have a criterion to distinguish between knowledge and non-knowledge; and that we cannot adequately justify any proposition. Philosophical skepticism, which seeks to invalidate any claim to knowledge, historically dates to Ancient Greek philosophy. In ancient Greek philosophy, there are two skeptical schools. These are the Academics, who advocate a probabilistic approach to knowledge, and the Pyrrhonists, who also reject probabilism and suspend all claims to knowledge. The intellectual activities of both schools emerged in the Hellenistic period. Perhaps this is why ancient skepticism is said to be a product of the historical process that followed the conquest of Alexandria. Some researchers say that there were some Indian influences in the birth of ancient skepticism, based on the statements of Diogenes Laertius, who said that Pyrrho of Elis, the first skeptical philosopher, went to India and met with naked sages and put forward his skeptical claims after this visit. According to them, skepticism is not a direct product of ancient Greek philosophy. They argue that although there were some discussions about what knowledge is in early ancient Greek philosophy, there was no discussion about the possibility of knowledge. Is this claim true? Is it necessary to trace ancient Greek skepticism back to some possible Indian origins? Does the emergence of skepticism as a school in the Hellenistic period mean that there are no traces of philosophical inquiries regarding the possibility of knowledge, and therefore skeptical arguments, in early Greek philosophy? In this article, these claims will be criticized. The basic assumption of the article is this: If it is possible to show the historical background of the skeptical arguments regarding the possibility of knowledge formulated by the skeptical schools of the Hellenistic period in early Greek philosophy, there will be no need to attribute it either to some Indian sources or entirely to the Hellenistic period. That's why in the article, it will be shown with justification that, (i) ancient Greek philosophy was born with suspicion of mythical narrative, and this skeptical approach continued in the processes of philosophers examining each other's teachings, and in this respect, there was an autonomous methodological skepticism inherent in philosophy; (ii) important arguments developed by skeptical schools in the Hellenistic period are exemplified in the debates of early Greek philosophers; and (iii) a critique of proto-skeptical arguments was made in early Greek philosophy.