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ADAPTING TO CONFLICT: IRAN’S PROXY WARFARE STRATEGY IN SYRIA AND YEMEN (2011–2020)

Year 2025, Volume: 16 Issue: 31, 301 - 323, 27.06.2025

Melih Kazdal

https://doi.org/10.36543/kauiibfd.2025.012

Abstract

This research investigates how Iran employs proxy warfare in Syria and Yemen. Andrew Mumford’s quadrilateral framework is employed to analyze Iran’s use of proxy warfare in these cases, the focusing the provision of manpower, the provision military supplies, financial assistance, and non-military assistance. The study employed a method of multiple case analysis, enabling an examination of both the situations within and between cases. The objective of employing this approach was to identify the similarities, differences and underlying causes of these cases. The selection of these two cases for analysis was based on their distinctive environmental and socio-political factors, allowing for an evaluation of Iran’s proxy war strategy in the region. The time span of the study covers the decade following the beginning of the Arab Spring and ends with the assassination of Qassem Soleimani. This study demonstrates that Iran utilises a flexible proxy war strategy, modifying its approach in accordance with evolving war dynamics and conflict points.

Keywords

Proxy war Iran’s security civil war Syria Yemen

References

  • Akbar, A., & Isakhan, B. (2023). The Islamic State, Shia religious clerics and the mobilisation of Shia militias in Iraq and Syria. Contemporary Politics, 29(5), 535–552. doi: 10.1080/13569775.2023.2196875.
  • Al‐Aloosy, M. (2022). Hezbollah in Syria: An insurgent’s ideology, interest, and survival. Middle East Policy, 29(1), 125–138. doi: 10.1111/mepo.12608.
  • Alaraby, M., & Müller, A. (2020). Countering illicit arms transfers in the MENA region: The case of Yemen and Libya. Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.
  • Alfoneh, A. (2018, January 30). Tehran’s Shia foreign legions. Carneigeendowment. Retrieved May 24, 2024 from https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2018/01/tehrans-shia-foreign-legions?lang=en
  • Alfoneh, A. (2020, May 29). The Quds Force after Suleimani. The Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington. Retrieved May 24, 2024 from https://agsiw.org/the-quds-force-after-suleimani/
  • Al-Khalidi, S. (2013, July 31). Iran grants Syria $3.6 billion credit to buy oil products. Reuters. Retrieved May 25, 2024 from https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSBRE96U0XN/
  • Azizi, H. (2022). Integration of Iran-backed armed groups into the Iraqi and Syrian armed forces: Implications for stability in Iraq and Syria. Small Wars & Insurgencies, 33(3), 499–527. doi: 10.1080/09592318.2021.2025284.
  • Azizi, H., & Vazirian, A. H. (2023). The role of armed non-state actors in Iran’s Syria strategy: A Case Study of Fatemiyoun and Zainabiyoun Brigades. Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies, 25(3), 540–557. doi: 10.1080/19448953.2022.2143864.
  • Bayoumy, Y., & Ghobari, M. (2014, December 15). Iranian support seen crucial for Yemen’s Houthis. Reuters. Retrieved May 24, 2024 from https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSKBN0JT17A/
  • Byman, D. (2013). Outside support for insurgent movements. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 36(12), 981–1004. doi: 10.1080/1057610X.2013.842132.
  • Byman, D., Chalk, P., Hoffman, B., Rosenau, W., & Brannan, D. (2001). Trends in outside support for insurgent movements. Rand.
  • Carmi, O. (2017). Deconstructing and countering Iran’s threat network (Policy Notes No. PN42). The Washington Institute for Near East Policy.
  • Clarke, C., & Smyth, P. (2017). The implications of Iran’s Expanding Shia Foreign Fighter Network. CTC Sentinel, 10(10), 14–18.
  • Cohen, R. A., & Shamci, G. P. (2022). The “proxy wars” strategy in Iranian regional foreign policy. The Journal of the Middle East and Africa, 13(4), 385–405. doi: 10.1080/21520844.2022.2061789.
  • Conflict Armament Research. (2018). Mines and IEDs employed by Houthi forces on Yemen’s west coast. Conflict Armament Research.
  • Conflict Armament Research. (2020). Evolution of UAVs employed by Houthi forces in Yemen. Conflict Armament Research.
  • Counterextremism. (n.d.). Houthis. Counter Extremism Project. Retrieved May 25, 2024, from https://www.counterextremism.com/threat/houthis
  • Divsallar, A., & Azizi, H. (2023). Towards a non-Western model of security assistance: How Iran assists militaries. Mediterranean Politics, 1–23. doi: 10.1080/13629395.2023.2183661.
  • Fulton, W., Holliday, J., & Wyer, S. (2013). Iranian Strategy in Syria. Institute of Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project.
  • Ghobari, M. (2014, September 25). Yemen frees members of Iran Revolutionary Guards-sources. Reuters. Retrieved May 25, 2024 from https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSKCN0HK1K2/
  • Hashem, A. (2015, March 16). Iraq’s Shiite forces claim victory over IS. Al-Monitor. Retrieved 20 Arpil 2024 from https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2015/03/iraq-shiite-hezbollah-nujaba-victory-islamic-state.html
  • International Crisis Group. (2018). Iran’s priorities in a turbulent Middle East (Middle East Report No. 184). International Crisis Group.
  • Jamal, A. S. (2019). The Fatemiyoun army: Reintegration into Afghan society (Special Report No. 443). United States Institute of Peace. Retrieved May 19, 2024 from https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/2019-03/sr_443-the_fatemiyoun_army_reintegration_into_afghan_society-pdf_0.pdf
  • Juneau, T. (2021). How war in Yemen transformed the Iran-Houthi partnership. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 1–23. doi: 10.1080/1057610X.2021.1954353.
  • Kendall, E. (2017). Iran’s fingerprints in Yemen [Issue Brief]. Atlantic Council.
  • Knights, M. (2018). The Houthi war machine: From guerilla war to state capture. CTC Sentinel, 11(8), 15–23.
  • Leenders, R., & Giustozzi, A. (2022). Foreign sponsorship of pro-government militias fighting Syria’s insurgency: Whither proxy wars? Mediterranean Politics, 27(5), 614–643. doi: 10.1080/13629395.2020.1839235.
  • Levitt, M. (2021). Hezbollah’s regional activities in support of Iran’s proxy networks. The Middle East Institute.
  • Malakoutikhah, Z. (2020). Iran: Sponsoring or Combating Terrorism? Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 43(10), 913–939. doi: 10.1080/1057610X.2018.1506560.
  • Mansharof, Y. (2013, March 11). Iranian official: The loss of Syria will lead to the loss of Tehran itself; Syria ıs an Iranian province; Iran has formed a 60,000-strong Syrian basij; Israel is our only threat. MEMRI. Retrieved May 29, 2024 from https://www.memri.org/reports/iranian-official-loss-syria-will-lead-loss-tehran-itself-syria-iranian-province-iran-has
  • Mansharof, Y., & Kharrazi, E. (2015, April 20). Iran’s support for the Houthi rebellion in Yemen: “Without Iran There would be no war in Syria and Ansar Allah would have never emerged.” MEMRI. Retrieved May 15, 2024 from https://www.memri.org/reports/irans-support-houthi-rebellion-yemen-without-iran-there-would-be-no-war-syria-and-ansar
  • Maurer, T. (2016). ‘Proxies’ and cyberspace. Journal of Conflict and Security Law, 21(3), 383–403. doi: 10.1093/jcsl/krw015.
  • Muhsin, D. (2019, August 27). Houthi UAV strategy | Yemen | Houthi Drone attacks | Free to read. IISS. Retrieved May 22, 2024 from https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/online-analysis/2019/08/houthi-uav-strategy-in-yemen/
  • Mumford, A. (2013a). Proxy warfare and the future of conflict. The RUSI Journal, 158(2), 40–46. doi: 10.1080/03071847.2013.787733.
  • Mumford, A. (2013b). Proxy warfare: War and conflict in the modern world. Cambridge: Polity Press.
  • Mutschler, M., & Bales, M. (2023). Liquid or solid warfare? Autocratic states, non-state armed groups and the socio-spatial dimension of warfare in Yemen. Geopolitics, 1–29. doi: 10.1080/14650045.2023.2165915.
  • Nadimi, F. (2016, August 22). Iran’s Afghan and Pakistani proxies: In Syria and beyond? Washingtoninstitute. Retrieved May 2, 2024 from https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/irans-afghan-and-pakistani-proxies-syria-and-beyond
  • Orkaby, A. (2021). Yemen: What everyone needs to know®. New York: Oxford University Press.
  • Ostovar, A. (2018). Iran, its clients, and the future of the Middle East: The limits of religion. International Affairs, 94(6), 1237–1255. doi: 10.1093/ia/iiy185.
  • Patten, D. A. (2013). Taking advantage of insurgencies: Effective policies of state-sponsorship. Small Wars & Insurgencies, 24(5), 879–906. doi: 10.1080/09592318.2013.866424.
  • Qaidaari, A. (2016, March 24). Is Iran becoming a major regional arms producer? Al-Monitor. Retrieved May 11, 2024 from https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2016/03/iran-weapons-arms-experts-iraq-syria-lebanon.html
  • Radio Farda. (2020, May 20). Iran lawmaker says $30 billion spent on Syria must be returned. Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty. Retrieved May 18, 2024 from https://en.radiofarda.com/a/iran-lawmaker-says-30-billion-paid-to-syria-must-be-paid-back/30623998.html
  • Rauta, V. (2018). A structural-relational analysis of party dynamics in proxy wars. International Relations, 32(4), 449–467. doi: 10.1177/0047117818802436. Reuters. (2019, August 13). Iran’s Khamenei backs Yemen’s Houthi movement, calls for dialogue. Reuters. Retrieved May 14, 2024 from https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSKCN1V31WC/
  • Salehyan, I., Gleditsch, K. S., & Cunningham, D. E. (2011). Explaining external support for insurgent groups. International Organization, 65(4), 709–744. doi: 10.1017/S0020818311000233.
  • Salmoni, B. A., Loidolt, B., & Wells, M. (2010). Regime and periphery in Northern Yemen: The Huthi phenomenon. RAND.
  • Schwartz, K. L. (2022). “Citizen martyrs”: The Afghan Fatemiyoun Brigade in Iran. Afghanistan, 5(1), 93–121. doi: 10.3366/afg.2022.0085.
  • Seliktar, O., & Rezaei, F. (2020). Iran, revolution, and proxy wars. Cham: Springer International Publishing.
  • Shaam, N. (2015). Financin terror: The economic impact of Iran’s nuclear programme and its supoort to paramilitary groups. Naame Shaam.
  • Sinkaya, B. (2022). Houthi-Iran relations: Distant relatives turns brother in arms. Türkiye İran Araştırmaları Dergisi, 1(2), 76–93.
  • Sozer, B. (2016). Development of proxy relationships: A case study of the Lebanese Civil War. Small Wars & Insurgencies, 27(4), 636–658. doi: 10.1080/09592318.2016.1189495.
  • Spyer, J. (2016). Patterns of subversion: Iranian use of proxies in the Middle East. Middle East Review of International Affairs, 20(2), 29–36.
  • Tabatabai, A. M., Martini, J., & Wasser, B. (2021). The Iran threat network (ITN): Four models of Iran’s nonstate client partnerships [Research Report]. RAND Corporation. doi: 10.7249/RR4231.
  • The International Institute for Strategic Studies. (2020). Iran’s networks of influence in the Middle East. Taylor & Francis Group.
  • Topçu, M. (2021). Vekâlet savaşının İran dış politikasındaki rolü: Irak ve Yemen örnekleri. Unpublished Doctoral Thesis, İstanbul Medeniyet Üniversitesi, İstanbul.
  • United Nations. (2018). The Panel of Experts on Yemen (No. S/2018/594). United Nations Security Council.
  • Wastnidge, E. (2020). Iran’s Shia diplomacy: Religious identity and foreign policy in the Islamic Republic (Geopolitics of Religious Soft Power Policy Brief No. 3). Berkeley Center for Religion, Peace and World Affairs.
  • Williams, I., & Shaikh, S. (2020). The missile war in Yemen. Center for Strategic & International Studies.
  • Yılmaz, A. (2023). Meddahlar: İran’ın Suriye’deki propaganda ordusu (1. b). İstanbul: Ketebe Yayınevi.
  • Youssef, S. (2016). From an Ally of the Regime to an Occupying Force. Naame Shaam.
  • Zahid, F. (2016, May 27). The Zainabiyoun Brigade: A Pakistani Shiite militia amid the Syrian conflict. Jamestown. Retrieved May 16, 2024 from https://jamestown.org/program/the-zainabiyoun-brigade-a-pakistani-shiite-militia-amid-the-syrian-conflict/
  • Zorri, D. M., Sadri, H. A., & Ellis, D. C. (2020). Iranian proxy groups in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen: A principal-agent comparative analysis. Tampa: The JSOU Press.

ÇATIŞMAYA UYUM SAĞLAMA: İRAN’IN SURIYE VE YEMEN’DEKI VEKALET SAVAŞI STRATEJISI (2011-2020)

Year 2025, Volume: 16 Issue: 31, 301 - 323, 27.06.2025

Melih Kazdal

https://doi.org/10.36543/kauiibfd.2025.012

Abstract

Bu çalışma İran’ın, Suriye ve Yemen’de vekalet savaşını nasıl kullandığını incelemektedir. Çalışmada vekalet savaşı kavramsal çerçevesi kullanılmış ve sahadaki uygulaması Andrew Mumford’un ortaya koyduğu dörtlü çerçeve olan, insan gücü temini, askeri malzeme temini, finansal yardım ve askeri olmayan yardım üzerinden incelenmiştir. Çalışmada, hem vakalar içindeki hem de vakalar arasındaki durumların incelenmesine olanak tanıyan çoklu vaka analizi yöntemi kullanılmıştır. Bu yaklaşımı kullanarak vakaların benzerliklerini, farklılıklarını ve altında yatan nedenleri ortaya koymak amaçlanmıştır. Suriye ve Yemen’in vaka analizi için seçilmesi, İran’ın bölgedeki vekalet savaşı stratejisinin değerlendirilmesine olanak tanıyan farklı çevresel ve sosyo-politik faktörlere dayanmaktadır. Çalışmanın zaman aralığı Arap Baharı sürecinin başlangıcından sonraki on yılı kapsamakta ve Kasım Süleymani'nin öldürülmesi ile sona ermektedir. Bu çalışma, İran’ın, esnek bir vekalet savaşı stratejisi kullandığını, değişen savaş dinamikleri ve çatışma noktalarına göre yaklaşımını değiştirdiğini göstermektedir.

Keywords

Vekalet savaşı Iran’ın güvenlik stratejisi Suriye Yemen.

References

  • Akbar, A., & Isakhan, B. (2023). The Islamic State, Shia religious clerics and the mobilisation of Shia militias in Iraq and Syria. Contemporary Politics, 29(5), 535–552. doi: 10.1080/13569775.2023.2196875.
  • Al‐Aloosy, M. (2022). Hezbollah in Syria: An insurgent’s ideology, interest, and survival. Middle East Policy, 29(1), 125–138. doi: 10.1111/mepo.12608.
  • Alaraby, M., & Müller, A. (2020). Countering illicit arms transfers in the MENA region: The case of Yemen and Libya. Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.
  • Alfoneh, A. (2018, January 30). Tehran’s Shia foreign legions. Carneigeendowment. Retrieved May 24, 2024 from https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2018/01/tehrans-shia-foreign-legions?lang=en
  • Alfoneh, A. (2020, May 29). The Quds Force after Suleimani. The Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington. Retrieved May 24, 2024 from https://agsiw.org/the-quds-force-after-suleimani/
  • Al-Khalidi, S. (2013, July 31). Iran grants Syria $3.6 billion credit to buy oil products. Reuters. Retrieved May 25, 2024 from https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSBRE96U0XN/
  • Azizi, H. (2022). Integration of Iran-backed armed groups into the Iraqi and Syrian armed forces: Implications for stability in Iraq and Syria. Small Wars & Insurgencies, 33(3), 499–527. doi: 10.1080/09592318.2021.2025284.
  • Azizi, H., & Vazirian, A. H. (2023). The role of armed non-state actors in Iran’s Syria strategy: A Case Study of Fatemiyoun and Zainabiyoun Brigades. Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies, 25(3), 540–557. doi: 10.1080/19448953.2022.2143864.
  • Bayoumy, Y., & Ghobari, M. (2014, December 15). Iranian support seen crucial for Yemen’s Houthis. Reuters. Retrieved May 24, 2024 from https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSKBN0JT17A/
  • Byman, D. (2013). Outside support for insurgent movements. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 36(12), 981–1004. doi: 10.1080/1057610X.2013.842132.
  • Byman, D., Chalk, P., Hoffman, B., Rosenau, W., & Brannan, D. (2001). Trends in outside support for insurgent movements. Rand.
  • Carmi, O. (2017). Deconstructing and countering Iran’s threat network (Policy Notes No. PN42). The Washington Institute for Near East Policy.
  • Clarke, C., & Smyth, P. (2017). The implications of Iran’s Expanding Shia Foreign Fighter Network. CTC Sentinel, 10(10), 14–18.
  • Cohen, R. A., & Shamci, G. P. (2022). The “proxy wars” strategy in Iranian regional foreign policy. The Journal of the Middle East and Africa, 13(4), 385–405. doi: 10.1080/21520844.2022.2061789.
  • Conflict Armament Research. (2018). Mines and IEDs employed by Houthi forces on Yemen’s west coast. Conflict Armament Research.
  • Conflict Armament Research. (2020). Evolution of UAVs employed by Houthi forces in Yemen. Conflict Armament Research.
  • Counterextremism. (n.d.). Houthis. Counter Extremism Project. Retrieved May 25, 2024, from https://www.counterextremism.com/threat/houthis
  • Divsallar, A., & Azizi, H. (2023). Towards a non-Western model of security assistance: How Iran assists militaries. Mediterranean Politics, 1–23. doi: 10.1080/13629395.2023.2183661.
  • Fulton, W., Holliday, J., & Wyer, S. (2013). Iranian Strategy in Syria. Institute of Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project.
  • Ghobari, M. (2014, September 25). Yemen frees members of Iran Revolutionary Guards-sources. Reuters. Retrieved May 25, 2024 from https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSKCN0HK1K2/
  • Hashem, A. (2015, March 16). Iraq’s Shiite forces claim victory over IS. Al-Monitor. Retrieved 20 Arpil 2024 from https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2015/03/iraq-shiite-hezbollah-nujaba-victory-islamic-state.html
  • International Crisis Group. (2018). Iran’s priorities in a turbulent Middle East (Middle East Report No. 184). International Crisis Group.
  • Jamal, A. S. (2019). The Fatemiyoun army: Reintegration into Afghan society (Special Report No. 443). United States Institute of Peace. Retrieved May 19, 2024 from https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/2019-03/sr_443-the_fatemiyoun_army_reintegration_into_afghan_society-pdf_0.pdf
  • Juneau, T. (2021). How war in Yemen transformed the Iran-Houthi partnership. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 1–23. doi: 10.1080/1057610X.2021.1954353.
  • Kendall, E. (2017). Iran’s fingerprints in Yemen [Issue Brief]. Atlantic Council.
  • Knights, M. (2018). The Houthi war machine: From guerilla war to state capture. CTC Sentinel, 11(8), 15–23.
  • Leenders, R., & Giustozzi, A. (2022). Foreign sponsorship of pro-government militias fighting Syria’s insurgency: Whither proxy wars? Mediterranean Politics, 27(5), 614–643. doi: 10.1080/13629395.2020.1839235.
  • Levitt, M. (2021). Hezbollah’s regional activities in support of Iran’s proxy networks. The Middle East Institute.
  • Malakoutikhah, Z. (2020). Iran: Sponsoring or Combating Terrorism? Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 43(10), 913–939. doi: 10.1080/1057610X.2018.1506560.
  • Mansharof, Y. (2013, March 11). Iranian official: The loss of Syria will lead to the loss of Tehran itself; Syria ıs an Iranian province; Iran has formed a 60,000-strong Syrian basij; Israel is our only threat. MEMRI. Retrieved May 29, 2024 from https://www.memri.org/reports/iranian-official-loss-syria-will-lead-loss-tehran-itself-syria-iranian-province-iran-has
  • Mansharof, Y., & Kharrazi, E. (2015, April 20). Iran’s support for the Houthi rebellion in Yemen: “Without Iran There would be no war in Syria and Ansar Allah would have never emerged.” MEMRI. Retrieved May 15, 2024 from https://www.memri.org/reports/irans-support-houthi-rebellion-yemen-without-iran-there-would-be-no-war-syria-and-ansar
  • Maurer, T. (2016). ‘Proxies’ and cyberspace. Journal of Conflict and Security Law, 21(3), 383–403. doi: 10.1093/jcsl/krw015.
  • Muhsin, D. (2019, August 27). Houthi UAV strategy | Yemen | Houthi Drone attacks | Free to read. IISS. Retrieved May 22, 2024 from https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/online-analysis/2019/08/houthi-uav-strategy-in-yemen/
  • Mumford, A. (2013a). Proxy warfare and the future of conflict. The RUSI Journal, 158(2), 40–46. doi: 10.1080/03071847.2013.787733.
  • Mumford, A. (2013b). Proxy warfare: War and conflict in the modern world. Cambridge: Polity Press.
  • Mutschler, M., & Bales, M. (2023). Liquid or solid warfare? Autocratic states, non-state armed groups and the socio-spatial dimension of warfare in Yemen. Geopolitics, 1–29. doi: 10.1080/14650045.2023.2165915.
  • Nadimi, F. (2016, August 22). Iran’s Afghan and Pakistani proxies: In Syria and beyond? Washingtoninstitute. Retrieved May 2, 2024 from https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/irans-afghan-and-pakistani-proxies-syria-and-beyond
  • Orkaby, A. (2021). Yemen: What everyone needs to know®. New York: Oxford University Press.
  • Ostovar, A. (2018). Iran, its clients, and the future of the Middle East: The limits of religion. International Affairs, 94(6), 1237–1255. doi: 10.1093/ia/iiy185.
  • Patten, D. A. (2013). Taking advantage of insurgencies: Effective policies of state-sponsorship. Small Wars & Insurgencies, 24(5), 879–906. doi: 10.1080/09592318.2013.866424.
  • Qaidaari, A. (2016, March 24). Is Iran becoming a major regional arms producer? Al-Monitor. Retrieved May 11, 2024 from https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2016/03/iran-weapons-arms-experts-iraq-syria-lebanon.html
  • Radio Farda. (2020, May 20). Iran lawmaker says $30 billion spent on Syria must be returned. Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty. Retrieved May 18, 2024 from https://en.radiofarda.com/a/iran-lawmaker-says-30-billion-paid-to-syria-must-be-paid-back/30623998.html
  • Rauta, V. (2018). A structural-relational analysis of party dynamics in proxy wars. International Relations, 32(4), 449–467. doi: 10.1177/0047117818802436. Reuters. (2019, August 13). Iran’s Khamenei backs Yemen’s Houthi movement, calls for dialogue. Reuters. Retrieved May 14, 2024 from https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSKCN1V31WC/
  • Salehyan, I., Gleditsch, K. S., & Cunningham, D. E. (2011). Explaining external support for insurgent groups. International Organization, 65(4), 709–744. doi: 10.1017/S0020818311000233.
  • Salmoni, B. A., Loidolt, B., & Wells, M. (2010). Regime and periphery in Northern Yemen: The Huthi phenomenon. RAND.
  • Schwartz, K. L. (2022). “Citizen martyrs”: The Afghan Fatemiyoun Brigade in Iran. Afghanistan, 5(1), 93–121. doi: 10.3366/afg.2022.0085.
  • Seliktar, O., & Rezaei, F. (2020). Iran, revolution, and proxy wars. Cham: Springer International Publishing.
  • Shaam, N. (2015). Financin terror: The economic impact of Iran’s nuclear programme and its supoort to paramilitary groups. Naame Shaam.
  • Sinkaya, B. (2022). Houthi-Iran relations: Distant relatives turns brother in arms. Türkiye İran Araştırmaları Dergisi, 1(2), 76–93.
  • Sozer, B. (2016). Development of proxy relationships: A case study of the Lebanese Civil War. Small Wars & Insurgencies, 27(4), 636–658. doi: 10.1080/09592318.2016.1189495.
  • Spyer, J. (2016). Patterns of subversion: Iranian use of proxies in the Middle East. Middle East Review of International Affairs, 20(2), 29–36.
  • Tabatabai, A. M., Martini, J., & Wasser, B. (2021). The Iran threat network (ITN): Four models of Iran’s nonstate client partnerships [Research Report]. RAND Corporation. doi: 10.7249/RR4231.
  • The International Institute for Strategic Studies. (2020). Iran’s networks of influence in the Middle East. Taylor & Francis Group.
  • Topçu, M. (2021). Vekâlet savaşının İran dış politikasındaki rolü: Irak ve Yemen örnekleri. Unpublished Doctoral Thesis, İstanbul Medeniyet Üniversitesi, İstanbul.
  • United Nations. (2018). The Panel of Experts on Yemen (No. S/2018/594). United Nations Security Council.
  • Wastnidge, E. (2020). Iran’s Shia diplomacy: Religious identity and foreign policy in the Islamic Republic (Geopolitics of Religious Soft Power Policy Brief No. 3). Berkeley Center for Religion, Peace and World Affairs.
  • Williams, I., & Shaikh, S. (2020). The missile war in Yemen. Center for Strategic & International Studies.
  • Yılmaz, A. (2023). Meddahlar: İran’ın Suriye’deki propaganda ordusu (1. b). İstanbul: Ketebe Yayınevi.
  • Youssef, S. (2016). From an Ally of the Regime to an Occupying Force. Naame Shaam.
  • Zahid, F. (2016, May 27). The Zainabiyoun Brigade: A Pakistani Shiite militia amid the Syrian conflict. Jamestown. Retrieved May 16, 2024 from https://jamestown.org/program/the-zainabiyoun-brigade-a-pakistani-shiite-militia-amid-the-syrian-conflict/
  • Zorri, D. M., Sadri, H. A., & Ellis, D. C. (2020). Iranian proxy groups in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen: A principal-agent comparative analysis. Tampa: The JSOU Press.
There are 61 citations in total.

Details

Primary Language English
Subjects Regional Studies, Middle East Studies, International Security
Journal Section Articles
Authors

Melih Kazdal 0000-0002-4729-4064

Publication Date June 27, 2025
Submission Date December 16, 2024
Acceptance Date April 15, 2025
Published in Issue Year 2025 Volume: 16 Issue: 31

Cite

APA Kazdal, M. (2025). ADAPTING TO CONFLICT: IRAN’S PROXY WARFARE STRATEGY IN SYRIA AND YEMEN (2011–2020). Kafkas Üniversitesi İktisadi Ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi Dergisi, 16(31), 301-323. https://doi.org/10.36543/kauiibfd.2025.012
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KAUJEASF is the corporate journal of Kafkas University, Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences Journal Publishing.

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