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İhtilafın Epistemolojisi ve Meta-Problemler

Year 2025, Issue: 36, 24 - 42, 15.06.2025
https://doi.org/10.35415/sirnakifd.1614806

Abstract

İhtilaf, ilk insanlardan beri gündemimizde olan bir tartışma alanı olmasına rağmen epistemolojik bir tartışma olarak ilgileri çekmesi oldukça yakın bir zamana tarihlenebilir. Çağdaş epistemolojide ‘denk ihtilafı’ ya da ‘denkler arası ihtilaf’ olarak ele alınan ve tüm ihtilaf durumlarından ziyade sadece denkler arasında cereyan eden hususlar özelinde nasıl bir tavır takınmanın –kararlılık ya da uzlaşım- doğru olduğuna yönelik bir çözüm sunma gayretiyle ortaya çıkan bu tartışma, epistemolojinin gündemine en son giren tartışmalardan biri olması nedeniyle ihtilaf durumunda benimsenecek tutumun ne olması gerektiğiyle sınırlı kalmayan birtakım meta tartışmaları da beraberinde getirir. Bu bağlamda, ihtilaf epistemolojisinde temel bir kavram olan ‘denk’ terimi netlik ve kesinlikten yoksundur; kriterleri belirlenebilir görünmemektedir. Denk kavramı, teorik olarak mantıklı olsa da pratikte savunulamaz görünmektedir; yalnızca kısıtlı veya planlanmış koşullar altında uygulanabilen bu kavramın pratik tartışmalara uygulanması mümkün görünmemektedir. Benzer meta-problemler kanıt söz konusu olduğunda da ortaya çıkmaktadır. Kararların, sahip olunan kanıtların güvenilirliğiyle orantılı olarak verildiği göz önünde bulundurulduğunda ve kanıtın doğasının bazı tartışmalarda öznel bir nitelik taşıdığı düşünüldüğünde, belirli ihtilafların kaçınılmaz hale geldiği görülecektir. Örneğin, önermesel olmayan bir tecrübeye dayanan bir inanan ile Tanrı inancını önermesel temellere dayandıran bir inanan arasındaki bir ihtilaf, epistemik denkliklerine rağmen farklı delil temellerinde ortaya çıkar. Dini bağlamda, epistemik kanıtlardan ziyade psikolojik kanıtlara yönelme eğilimi, kanıtları göreceli hale getirebilmektedir. Dolayısıyla, uzlaşma ve kararlılık arasında seçim yapabilmek için öncelikle bu meta-tartışmaların ele alınması gerekir. Her iki meselenin de kökleri o kadar derindir ki bazı senaryolar veya çözümler başlangıçta etkili gibi görünse de detaylı irdelendiğinde farklı soruların bu tartışmanın temelinde yer aldığı görülecektir. Örneğin, entelektüel erdemler, karşılaştırılabilir uzmanlık, kanıtlara erişim ve karşı tarafın argümanlarıyla etkileşim olarak kategorize edilebilecek epistemik denklik kriterlerini değerlendirmenin çeşitli yolları sunulmuştur. Denklik tartışmasına daha fazla kategori eklenebilir veya yukarıdaki kriterlerden birinin oldukça tartışmalı olduğu iddia edilebilir. Aynı durum kanıtlar için de geçerlidir. Örneğin dini tecrübe, dini hakikatin kanıtı olarak kabul edilebilir mi? Eğer öyleyse, iki farklı dinin kanıtı olarak kabul gören ancak birbirleriyle çelişen dini tecrübeler ne olacaktır? Farklı kişiler tarafından tecrübe edilen deneyimler farklı dinler için gerekçe teşkil edebilir. Daha da derine inersek, aynı dinin inananlarından kimileri dini tecrübeyi kanıt olarak kabul ederken, diğerleri bunu reddedecektir. Bu makale, denk ihtilafının iki temel meta-problemini ele alarak çeşitli tartışmalar üzerinden kararlılığın haklı olduğu sonucuna varmaktadır. Bunu yaparken, ilk olarak, denkliğin teorik sınırlamaları aşılmadıkça ve kanıtlar psikolojik önyargılardan arındırılmadıkça —ki her iki görev de oldukça zorludur— çelişen önermeler için kararlılık tutumunun haklı olduğu savunulacaktır. İkinci olarak, bu savunmanın, iddia edilenin aksine epistemik tevazu açısından bir sorun teşkil etmediği tartışılacaktır.

References

  • Aslantatar, Nesim. “Pragmatik Inertia ve Denk İhtilafının İmkanı”. İSLARA Uluslararası İslam Araştırmaları Kongresi (12 Şubat 2022): Bildiriler Kitabı. ed. Erdem Can Öztürk ve Mahmut Esad Erkaya. 637-644. Ankara: Ankara Hacı Bayram Veli Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2022.
  • Aslantatar, Nesim. “Evidence, Uncertainty, and Belief: A Critique of the Common Epistemic Grounds for Fideism and Agnosticism”. Dinbilimleri Akademik Araştırma Dergisi 22/2 (Eylül 2022), 813-842. https://doi.org/10.33415/daad.1107348.
  • Aslantatar, Nesim. Agnostisizm: Tanrı’nın Bilinemezliği Sorunu. Ankara: Elis Yayınları, 2023.
  • Bergmann, Michael. “Defeaters and Higher-Level Requirements”. The Philosophical Quarterly 55/220 (2005), 419-436.
  • Bergmann, Michael. “Rational Disagreement after Full Disclosure”. Episteme 6/3 (2009), 336–353.
  • Christensen, David. “Disagreement as Evidence: The Epistemology of Controversy”. Philosophy Compass 4 /5 (2009), 756–767.
  • Christensen, David. “Epistemology of Disagreement: The Good News”. The Philosophical Review 116 (2007), 187-217.
  • Christensen, David. “Higher-order Evidence”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81/1 (2010), 185-215.
  • Cruz, Helen De. Religious Disagreement. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019.
  • Elga, Adam. “Reflection and Disagreement”. Noûs 41/3 (2007), 478–502.
  • Elgin, Catherine. “Persistent Disagreement”. Disagreement, ed. Richard Feldman and Ted A. Warfield, 53–68. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.
  • Elgin, Catherine. “Reasonable Disagreement”. Voicing Dissent: The Ethics and Epistemology of Making Disagreement Public, ed. Casey Rebecca Johnson, 10–21. New York: Routledge, 2018.
  • Feldman, Richard. “Epistemological Puzzles about Disagreement”. Epistemology Futures, ed. Stephen Hetherington, 216–236. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.
  • Feldman, Richard. “Reasonable Religious Disagreements”. Philosophers without Gods: Meditations on Atheism and the Secular Life, ed. Louise M. Antony, 194-214. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.
  • Foley, Richard. Intellectual Trust in Oneself and Others. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.
  • Frieder, Bogner., Markus Seidel, Konstantin Schnieder, and Thomas Meyer. “Rational Peer Disagreement Upon Sufficient Evidence: Leaving the Track to Truth?” Peter van Inwagen, Materialism, Free Will and God, ed. Ludger Jansen and Paul Nager, 17–39. Dordrecht: Springer, 2018.
  • Gardiner, Georgi. “The Commutativity of Evidence: A Problem for Conciliatory Views of Peer Disagreement”. Episteme 11/1 (2014), 83-95.
  • Goldberg, Sanford. “Disagreement, Defeat, and Assertion”. The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays, ed. David Christensen and Jennifer Lackey, 167–189. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.
  • Gutting, Gary. Religious Belief and Religious Skepticism. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1982. Gündoğan, Saim. “Objections to Sam Harris’ Critic of Religion”. Ilahiyat Studies 14/2 (2023), 439-467. https://doi.org/10.12730/is.1257476
  • Hyde, Dominic, Diana Raffman. “Sorites Paradox”. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2018), ed. Edward N. Zalta, URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2018/entries/sorites-paradox/>.
  • Kelly, Thomas. “Peer Disagreement and Higher-Order Evidence”. Social Epistemology: Essential Readings, ed. Alvin I. Goldman, Dennis Whitcomb, 183-217. New York: Oxford University Press, 2011.
  • Kelly, Thomas. “The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement”. Oxford Studies in Epistemology, ed. John Hawthorne, Tamar Szabó Gendler, 167–196. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005.
  • King, Nathan L. “Disagreement: What’s the Problem? or A Good Peer is Hard to Find”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85/2 (2012), 249–272.
  • Kornblith, Hilary. “Belief in the Face of Controversy”. Disagreement, ed. Richard Feldman and Ted A. Warfield, 29–52. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.
  • Kraft, James. “Religious Disagreement, Externalism, and the Epistemology of Disagreement: Listening to Our Grandmothers”. Religious Studies 43/4 (2007), 417–432.
  • Kripke, Saul A. “On Two Paradoxes of Knowledge”. Saul Kripke, Philosophical Troubles: Collected Papers 1, 27-51. New York: Oxford University Press.
  • Kütükcü, Elif. İhtilafın Epistemolojisi ve Dini Çeşitlilik. Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi, Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, Doktora Tezi, 2022.
  • Lackey, Jennifer. “A Justificationist View of Disagreement’s Epistemic Significance”. Social Epistemology, ed. Adrian Haddock vd., 145-154. New York: Oxford University Press, 2010.
  • Lackey, Jennifer. “Disagreement and Belief Dependence: Why Numbers Matter”. The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays, ed. David Christensen and Jennifer Lackey, 243–268. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.
  • Lackey, Jennifer. “Taking Religious Disagreement Seriously”, Religious Faith and Intellectual Virtue, ed. Laura F. Callahan and Timothy O’Connor, 299-316. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014.
  • Lougheed, Kirk. The Epistemic Benefits of Disagreement. Cham: Springer, 2020.
  • Matheson, Janethon. “Conciliatory Views of Disagreement and Higher-order Evidence”. Episteme, 6/3 (2009), 269-279.
  • Matheson, Jonathan. “Deep Disagreements and Rational Resolution”. Topoi 40 (2018), 1025-1037.
  • Matheson, Jonathan. “Disagreement: Idealized and Everyday”, The Ethics of Belief: Individual and Social, ed. Jonathan Matheson, Rico Vitz, 315-330. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014.
  • Matheson, Jonathan. “The Case for Rational Uniqueness”. Logos and Episteme: An International Journal of Social Philosophy 6/3 (2011), 269–279.
  • Matheson, Jonathan. The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015.
  • Oppy, Graham. “Disagreement”. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 68, 1/3 (2010), 183-196.
  • Pasnau, Robert. “Resolute Conciliationism”. The Philosophical Quarterly 65/260 (2015), 442–463.
  • Rattan, Gurpreet. “Disagreement and the First-Person Perspective”. Analytic Philosophy 55/1 (2014), 31–53.
  • Schafer, Karl. “How Common is Peer Disagreement? On Self-Trust and Rational Symmetry”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91/1 (2015), 25–46.
  • Schwitzgebal, Eric. “The Unreliability of Naive Introspection”. The Philosophical Review 117/2 (2008), 245–273.
  • Sosa, E. “The Epistemology of Disagreement”. Social Epistemology, ed. Alan Haddock, Adrian Millar, and Duncan Pritchard, 278–297. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.
  • Tanış, Abdulkadir. “Denklerin İhtilafı, Dinî İnanç ve Şüphecilik”, Artuklu Akademi 11/1 (2024), 15-31. https://doi.org/10.34247/artukluakademi.1447155
  • Van Inwagen, Peter. “It is Wrong, Everywhere, Always, and for Anyone, to Believe Anything Upon Insufficient Evidence”. Faith, Freedom, and Rationality: Philosophy of Religion Today, ed. J. Jordan and D. Howard-Snyder, 137-154. London: Rowman & Littlefield. 1996.
  • Van Inwagen, Peter. “We’re Right. They're Wrong”. Disagreement, ed. Ted Warfield, Richard Feldman, 10-29. New York: Oxford University Press, 2010.
  • Van Leeuwen, Neil. “Religious Credence is not Factual Belief”. Cognition 133 (2014), 698-715.
  • Weatherson, Brian. “Disagreements, Philosophical and Otherwise”. The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays, ed. David Christensen and Jennifer Lackey, 54–75. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.
  • Zagzebski, Linda T. “Self-Trust and the Diversity of Religions”. Philosophic Exchange 36/1 (2006), 63- 77.

Epistemology of Peer Disagreement and Meta-Problems

Year 2025, Issue: 36, 24 - 42, 15.06.2025
https://doi.org/10.35415/sirnakifd.1614806

Abstract

Disagreement has been a part of human experience since the earliest times; however, it has only recently gained attention as an epistemological debate. In contemporary epistemology, this debate is referred to as “peer disagreement.” It specifically addresses the question of what attitude to adopt in cases of disagreement among peers, rather than in all disagreements generally. As one of the most recent topics to enter the epistemological agenda, it also introduces broader meta-discussions that extend beyond the question of the proper attitude in such cases. Thus, the problem of peer disagreement not only offers theoretical frameworks for managing disagreements but also initiates challenging meta-debates. Epistemic peers, engaged in philosophical, political, religious, or other forms of disagreement, typically either attempt conciliation by adjusting their positions or maintain steadfastness. This paper addresses two key meta-problems inherent in peer disagreement, exploring potential solutions and concluding that, given these unresolved issues, steadfastness is justified. The term ‘peer’, a foundational concept in the discourse on disagreement, lacks clarity and precision; its criteria remain undetermined. Peerhood, while theoretically cogent, appears practically untenable, applicable only under restricted or planned circumstances, thereby complicating its application to real-world debates. Similar issues arise with evidence: when decisions are evidence-based, disputes inevitably emerge. For instance, a dispute between a Christian grounded in religious experience and a Muslim basing belief in God on propositional foundations—or vice versa—occurs on distinct evidential grounds, despite their epistemic parity. In religious contexts, the inclination towards psychological rather than epistemic evidence renders evidence relative. Therefore, these issues must first be addressed to choose between conciliation and steadfastness. The root of both issues is so deep that, although certain scenarios or solutions may initially seem effective, they may raise different questions upon scrutiny. For instance, there are various ways to evaluate the criteria for epistemic parity, which can be categorized under intellectual virtues, comparable expertise, access to evidence, and engagement with counterarguments. One can add more categories to the discussion of peerhood or argue that one of the above criteria is highly disputable. The same applies to evidence. Can religious experience be accepted as evidence for religious truth? If so, what about conflicting religious experiences or outcomes? Different experiences may serve as justification for differing religions. Going deeper, some alleged peers will accept religious experience as evidence, whereas others will reject it. Ultimately, this paper aims to show that unless peerhood can transcend its theoretical constraints and evidence can be disentangled from psychological biases—both formidable tasks—steadfastness in religion proves justified in the face of contradictory propositions, content that steadfastness and epistemic humility are not in conflict and hands-on experience supports this end.

References

  • Aslantatar, Nesim. “Pragmatik Inertia ve Denk İhtilafının İmkanı”. İSLARA Uluslararası İslam Araştırmaları Kongresi (12 Şubat 2022): Bildiriler Kitabı. ed. Erdem Can Öztürk ve Mahmut Esad Erkaya. 637-644. Ankara: Ankara Hacı Bayram Veli Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2022.
  • Aslantatar, Nesim. “Evidence, Uncertainty, and Belief: A Critique of the Common Epistemic Grounds for Fideism and Agnosticism”. Dinbilimleri Akademik Araştırma Dergisi 22/2 (Eylül 2022), 813-842. https://doi.org/10.33415/daad.1107348.
  • Aslantatar, Nesim. Agnostisizm: Tanrı’nın Bilinemezliği Sorunu. Ankara: Elis Yayınları, 2023.
  • Bergmann, Michael. “Defeaters and Higher-Level Requirements”. The Philosophical Quarterly 55/220 (2005), 419-436.
  • Bergmann, Michael. “Rational Disagreement after Full Disclosure”. Episteme 6/3 (2009), 336–353.
  • Christensen, David. “Disagreement as Evidence: The Epistemology of Controversy”. Philosophy Compass 4 /5 (2009), 756–767.
  • Christensen, David. “Epistemology of Disagreement: The Good News”. The Philosophical Review 116 (2007), 187-217.
  • Christensen, David. “Higher-order Evidence”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81/1 (2010), 185-215.
  • Cruz, Helen De. Religious Disagreement. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019.
  • Elga, Adam. “Reflection and Disagreement”. Noûs 41/3 (2007), 478–502.
  • Elgin, Catherine. “Persistent Disagreement”. Disagreement, ed. Richard Feldman and Ted A. Warfield, 53–68. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.
  • Elgin, Catherine. “Reasonable Disagreement”. Voicing Dissent: The Ethics and Epistemology of Making Disagreement Public, ed. Casey Rebecca Johnson, 10–21. New York: Routledge, 2018.
  • Feldman, Richard. “Epistemological Puzzles about Disagreement”. Epistemology Futures, ed. Stephen Hetherington, 216–236. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.
  • Feldman, Richard. “Reasonable Religious Disagreements”. Philosophers without Gods: Meditations on Atheism and the Secular Life, ed. Louise M. Antony, 194-214. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.
  • Foley, Richard. Intellectual Trust in Oneself and Others. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.
  • Frieder, Bogner., Markus Seidel, Konstantin Schnieder, and Thomas Meyer. “Rational Peer Disagreement Upon Sufficient Evidence: Leaving the Track to Truth?” Peter van Inwagen, Materialism, Free Will and God, ed. Ludger Jansen and Paul Nager, 17–39. Dordrecht: Springer, 2018.
  • Gardiner, Georgi. “The Commutativity of Evidence: A Problem for Conciliatory Views of Peer Disagreement”. Episteme 11/1 (2014), 83-95.
  • Goldberg, Sanford. “Disagreement, Defeat, and Assertion”. The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays, ed. David Christensen and Jennifer Lackey, 167–189. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.
  • Gutting, Gary. Religious Belief and Religious Skepticism. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1982. Gündoğan, Saim. “Objections to Sam Harris’ Critic of Religion”. Ilahiyat Studies 14/2 (2023), 439-467. https://doi.org/10.12730/is.1257476
  • Hyde, Dominic, Diana Raffman. “Sorites Paradox”. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2018), ed. Edward N. Zalta, URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2018/entries/sorites-paradox/>.
  • Kelly, Thomas. “Peer Disagreement and Higher-Order Evidence”. Social Epistemology: Essential Readings, ed. Alvin I. Goldman, Dennis Whitcomb, 183-217. New York: Oxford University Press, 2011.
  • Kelly, Thomas. “The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement”. Oxford Studies in Epistemology, ed. John Hawthorne, Tamar Szabó Gendler, 167–196. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005.
  • King, Nathan L. “Disagreement: What’s the Problem? or A Good Peer is Hard to Find”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85/2 (2012), 249–272.
  • Kornblith, Hilary. “Belief in the Face of Controversy”. Disagreement, ed. Richard Feldman and Ted A. Warfield, 29–52. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.
  • Kraft, James. “Religious Disagreement, Externalism, and the Epistemology of Disagreement: Listening to Our Grandmothers”. Religious Studies 43/4 (2007), 417–432.
  • Kripke, Saul A. “On Two Paradoxes of Knowledge”. Saul Kripke, Philosophical Troubles: Collected Papers 1, 27-51. New York: Oxford University Press.
  • Kütükcü, Elif. İhtilafın Epistemolojisi ve Dini Çeşitlilik. Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi, Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, Doktora Tezi, 2022.
  • Lackey, Jennifer. “A Justificationist View of Disagreement’s Epistemic Significance”. Social Epistemology, ed. Adrian Haddock vd., 145-154. New York: Oxford University Press, 2010.
  • Lackey, Jennifer. “Disagreement and Belief Dependence: Why Numbers Matter”. The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays, ed. David Christensen and Jennifer Lackey, 243–268. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.
  • Lackey, Jennifer. “Taking Religious Disagreement Seriously”, Religious Faith and Intellectual Virtue, ed. Laura F. Callahan and Timothy O’Connor, 299-316. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014.
  • Lougheed, Kirk. The Epistemic Benefits of Disagreement. Cham: Springer, 2020.
  • Matheson, Janethon. “Conciliatory Views of Disagreement and Higher-order Evidence”. Episteme, 6/3 (2009), 269-279.
  • Matheson, Jonathan. “Deep Disagreements and Rational Resolution”. Topoi 40 (2018), 1025-1037.
  • Matheson, Jonathan. “Disagreement: Idealized and Everyday”, The Ethics of Belief: Individual and Social, ed. Jonathan Matheson, Rico Vitz, 315-330. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014.
  • Matheson, Jonathan. “The Case for Rational Uniqueness”. Logos and Episteme: An International Journal of Social Philosophy 6/3 (2011), 269–279.
  • Matheson, Jonathan. The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015.
  • Oppy, Graham. “Disagreement”. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 68, 1/3 (2010), 183-196.
  • Pasnau, Robert. “Resolute Conciliationism”. The Philosophical Quarterly 65/260 (2015), 442–463.
  • Rattan, Gurpreet. “Disagreement and the First-Person Perspective”. Analytic Philosophy 55/1 (2014), 31–53.
  • Schafer, Karl. “How Common is Peer Disagreement? On Self-Trust and Rational Symmetry”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91/1 (2015), 25–46.
  • Schwitzgebal, Eric. “The Unreliability of Naive Introspection”. The Philosophical Review 117/2 (2008), 245–273.
  • Sosa, E. “The Epistemology of Disagreement”. Social Epistemology, ed. Alan Haddock, Adrian Millar, and Duncan Pritchard, 278–297. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.
  • Tanış, Abdulkadir. “Denklerin İhtilafı, Dinî İnanç ve Şüphecilik”, Artuklu Akademi 11/1 (2024), 15-31. https://doi.org/10.34247/artukluakademi.1447155
  • Van Inwagen, Peter. “It is Wrong, Everywhere, Always, and for Anyone, to Believe Anything Upon Insufficient Evidence”. Faith, Freedom, and Rationality: Philosophy of Religion Today, ed. J. Jordan and D. Howard-Snyder, 137-154. London: Rowman & Littlefield. 1996.
  • Van Inwagen, Peter. “We’re Right. They're Wrong”. Disagreement, ed. Ted Warfield, Richard Feldman, 10-29. New York: Oxford University Press, 2010.
  • Van Leeuwen, Neil. “Religious Credence is not Factual Belief”. Cognition 133 (2014), 698-715.
  • Weatherson, Brian. “Disagreements, Philosophical and Otherwise”. The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays, ed. David Christensen and Jennifer Lackey, 54–75. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.
  • Zagzebski, Linda T. “Self-Trust and the Diversity of Religions”. Philosophic Exchange 36/1 (2006), 63- 77.

Epistemology of Peer Disagreement and Meta-Problems

Year 2025, Issue: 36, 24 - 42, 15.06.2025
https://doi.org/10.35415/sirnakifd.1614806

Abstract

Disagreement has been a part of human experience since the earliest times; however, it has only recently gained attention as an epistemological debate. In contemporary epistemology, this debate is referred to as “peer disagreement.” It specifically addresses the question of what attitude to adopt –steadfastness or conciliation- in cases of disagreement among peers, rather than in all disagreements generally. As one of the most recent topics to enter the epistemological agenda, it also introduces broader meta-discussions that extend beyond the question of the proper attitude in such cases. Thus, the problem of peer disagreement not only offers theoretical frameworks for managing disagreements but also initiates challenging meta-debates. In this context, peerhood, while theoretically cogent, appears practically untenable, applicable only under restricted or planned circumstances, thereby complicating its application to real-world debates. Similar issues arise with evidence: when decisions are evidence-based, disputes inevitably emerge. For instance, a dispute between a Christian grounded in religious experience and a Muslim basing belief in God on propositional foundations—or vice versa—occurs on distinct evidential grounds, despite their epistemic parity. In religious contexts, the inclination towards psychological rather than epistemic evidence renders evidence relative. Therefore, these issues must first be addressed to choose between conciliation and steadfastness. The root of both issues is so deep that, although certain scenarios or solutions may initially seem effective, they may raise different questions upon scrutiny. For instance, there are various ways to evaluate the criteria for epistemic parity, which can be categorized under intellectual virtues, comparable expertise, access to evidence, and engagement with counterarguments. One can add more categories to the discussion of peerhood or argue that one of the above criteria is highly disputable. The same applies to evidence. For example, can religious experience be accepted as evidence for religious truth? If so, what about conflicting religious experiences or outcomes? Different experiences may serve as justification for differing religions. Going deeper, some alleged peers will accept religious experience as evidence, whereas others will reject it. This paper addresses two key meta-problems inherent in peer disagreement, exploring potential solutions and concluding that, given these unresolved issues, steadfastness is justified. The term ‘peer’, a foundational concept in the discourse on disagreement, lacks clarity and precision; its criteria remain undetermined. Ultimately, this paper will show that unless peerhood can transcend its theoretical constraints and evidence can be disentangled from psychological biases—both formidable tasks—steadfastness in religion proves justified in the face of contradictory propositions, content that steadfastness and epistemic humility are not in conflict and hands-on experience supports this end.

References

  • Aslantatar, Nesim. “Pragmatik Inertia ve Denk İhtilafının İmkanı”. İSLARA Uluslararası İslam Araştırmaları Kongresi (12 Şubat 2022): Bildiriler Kitabı. ed. Erdem Can Öztürk ve Mahmut Esad Erkaya. 637-644. Ankara: Ankara Hacı Bayram Veli Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2022.
  • Aslantatar, Nesim. “Evidence, Uncertainty, and Belief: A Critique of the Common Epistemic Grounds for Fideism and Agnosticism”. Dinbilimleri Akademik Araştırma Dergisi 22/2 (Eylül 2022), 813-842. https://doi.org/10.33415/daad.1107348.
  • Aslantatar, Nesim. Agnostisizm: Tanrı’nın Bilinemezliği Sorunu. Ankara: Elis Yayınları, 2023.
  • Bergmann, Michael. “Defeaters and Higher-Level Requirements”. The Philosophical Quarterly 55/220 (2005), 419-436.
  • Bergmann, Michael. “Rational Disagreement after Full Disclosure”. Episteme 6/3 (2009), 336–353.
  • Christensen, David. “Disagreement as Evidence: The Epistemology of Controversy”. Philosophy Compass 4 /5 (2009), 756–767.
  • Christensen, David. “Epistemology of Disagreement: The Good News”. The Philosophical Review 116 (2007), 187-217.
  • Christensen, David. “Higher-order Evidence”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81/1 (2010), 185-215.
  • Cruz, Helen De. Religious Disagreement. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019.
  • Elga, Adam. “Reflection and Disagreement”. Noûs 41/3 (2007), 478–502.
  • Elgin, Catherine. “Persistent Disagreement”. Disagreement, ed. Richard Feldman and Ted A. Warfield, 53–68. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.
  • Elgin, Catherine. “Reasonable Disagreement”. Voicing Dissent: The Ethics and Epistemology of Making Disagreement Public, ed. Casey Rebecca Johnson, 10–21. New York: Routledge, 2018.
  • Feldman, Richard. “Epistemological Puzzles about Disagreement”. Epistemology Futures, ed. Stephen Hetherington, 216–236. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.
  • Feldman, Richard. “Reasonable Religious Disagreements”. Philosophers without Gods: Meditations on Atheism and the Secular Life, ed. Louise M. Antony, 194-214. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.
  • Foley, Richard. Intellectual Trust in Oneself and Others. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.
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Details

Primary Language Turkish
Subjects Philosophy of Religion
Journal Section RESEARCH ARTICLES
Authors

Nesim Aslantatar 0000-0002-7817-8576

Early Pub Date June 4, 2025
Publication Date June 15, 2025
Submission Date January 7, 2025
Acceptance Date February 9, 2025
Published in Issue Year 2025 Issue: 36

Cite

ISNAD Aslantatar, Nesim. “İhtilafın Epistemolojisi Ve Meta-Problemler”. Şırnak Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi 36 (June 2025), 24-42. https://doi.org/10.35415/sirnakifd.1614806.

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