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This article focuses on William L. Rowe’s concept of “friendly atheism”. For this purpose, it first examines what Rowe means by“friendly atheism,” and then discusses the argument he bases on the concept of “pointless evil” that grounds his understanding of atheism. According to Rowe, although the evils we witness do not constitute a conclusive argument against the existence of God, the lack of a purpose behind these evils makes the existence of God improbable. Starting from the fact that the problem of evil does not provide definitive evidence against the existence of God, Rowe argues that theists may have rational grounds for believing in God and that atheists should adopt a friendly attitude toward theists. While the concept of “friendly atheism,” based on this background, offers a positive contribution to the theist-atheist debate, it is also open to criticism. However, before addressing these criticisms, the article will examine “skeptical theism,” which challenges the “pointless evil” argument — the basis of Rowe’s atheism — from an epistemic perspective. The pointless evil argument suggests that the evils in the world serve no greater good. Skeptical theism, on the other hand, claims that due to the limitations of human cognitive capacity, we cannot know whether the evils in the world serve some greater good. In this article, which aims to discuss Rowe’s concept of “friendly atheism” and the philosophical foundations and arguments on which it is based, it is determined that the use of the concept of friendly atheism is problematic in two respects. If the atheist favours his or her arguments, the designation of friendly atheism does not offer a different and alternative viewpoint to traditional atheism. On the other hand, if it is meant that the arguments for theism and atheism are equally rational, then the claim that atheism is more rational collapses.