The Munich Syndrome has been considered a constraint in the peace process decision-making of Israel. By raising questions such as what obstructs peacemaking in Israel, its costs, and whether it can force peace, the study employs the Munich analogy as a “historical lesson” method to examine why and how peace has turned into an anomaly in Israel. The Munich Agreement of 1938 by Britain and France, amid raging anti-Jewish violence in Europe, sought to appease Adolf Hitler by acquiescing to the German occupation of Czechoslovakia to prevent the world war outbreak, which, however, backfired and emerged as a metaphor for foreign policy decision-making weakness. This historical lesson has impacted Israeli society’s and its leaders’ attitudes towards peace, turning it into a Rubicon line. The study uses the 1970-1978 Arab- Israeli peace process as a case study to explain how the Munich Syndrome impedes peacemaking decisions and potential ways of overcoming it. It argues that a possible way to encourage Israel to make peace with its adversaries is with third parties providing significant concessions and guarantees.
The Munich Syndrome Rubicon Israel Arabs Peace Decision Guarantee
Birincil Dil | İngilizce |
---|---|
Konular | Bölgesel Çalışmalar |
Bölüm | Makaleler |
Yazarlar | |
Erken Görünüm Tarihi | 8 Kasım 2024 |
Yayımlanma Tarihi | 8 Aralık 2024 |
Gönderilme Tarihi | 30 Nisan 2024 |
Kabul Tarihi | 9 Ekim 2024 |
Yayımlandığı Sayı | Yıl 2024 Cilt: 11 Sayı: 2 |
TOÇD'nde yayınlanan makaleler Creative Commons Atıf-GayriTicari 4.0 Uluslararası Lisansı ile lisanslanmıştır.